SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES

Chapters 1-34

Francisco Sylvestri Ferrara, O.P.

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of

Summa Contra Gentiles

With the Commentary of

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Dedicated to Mary, The Star of The Sea

Chapter I

What the Office of the Wise Man is

"My mouth shall meditate truth, and my lips shall detest the wicked." — Proverbs 8:7

The common usage that the Philosopher judges should be followed in the naming of things has established that those are called wise who direct things rightly and govern them well. Thus, among the other qualities that men attribute to the wise man, the Philosopher posits that it belongs to the wise man to impose order. Now, in all things ordered to an end, the rule of governance and order must be taken from the end itself: for then is each thing best disposed when it is fittingly ordered to its own end, since the end is the good of each thing. Thus we see in the arts that one governs another and stands, as it were, as its master — that one, namely, to which the end of the other belongs. The art of medicine, for instance, governs and directs the art of the apothecary, because health, with which medicine is concerned, is the end of all the compounds prepared by the apothecary's art. The same applies to the art of navigation with respect to shipbuilding, and to the military art with respect to horsemanship and every instrument of war. These arts, which rule over others, are called architectonic arts — that is, the principal arts — and their practitioners, who are called architects, claim for themselves the name of the wise. But because these practitioners deal with the ends of certain particular things and do not attain the universal end of all things, they are called wise in this or that domain, in the manner of the saying in 1 Corinthians 3: 'As a wise architect, I have laid a foundation.' The name of the wise man, without qualification, is reserved for him alone whose consideration bears upon the end of the universe, which is likewise the first principle of the universe. Hence, according to the Philosopher, it belongs to the wise man to contemplate the highest causes.")]), ("Now the ultimate end of each thing is that which is intended by its first author or mover. The first author and mover of the universe, however, is the intellect, as will be shown below. Therefore, the ultimate end of the universe must be the good of the intellect. And that good is truth. It is necessary, therefore, that truth be the ultimate end of the whole universe, and that wisdom principally strive toward the contemplation of truth. For this reason, divine Wisdom, clothed in flesh, testifies that she came into the world for the manifestation of truth, saying in John 18: 'For this I was born, and for this I have come into the world,

that I should bear witness to the truth.' The Philosopher likewise defines First Philosophy as the science of truth — not of any truth, but of that truth which is the origin of all truth, namely, the truth that pertains to the first principle of being for all things. The truth of such a principle is the principle of all truth, for the disposition of things in truth is as their disposition in being. Moreover, it belongs to the same discipline to pursue one of two contraries and to refute the other: just as medicine, which produces health, also drives out sickness. Hence, just as it belongs to the wise man to meditate upon the truth concerning the first principle and to set it forth for others, so also it belongs to him to refute the falsehood that is contrary to it. Fittingly, therefore, from the mouth of Wisdom, the twofold office of the wise man is presented in the words set before us: first, to speak forth the divine truth, which is truth in the most proper sense, after meditating upon it — and this is touched upon when it says, 'My mouth shall meditate truth'; and second, to refute the error that stands against the truth — and this is touched upon when it says, 'and my lips shall detest the wicked,' by which phrase the falsehood that stands against divine truth is signified. This falsehood is contrary to religion, which is also called piety; thus the falsehood that opposes it takes to itself the name of impiety."

[Ferrara's Commentary]

Intending to publish a treatise against the Gentiles, Saint Thomas prefaces it with a prologue divided into nine chapters. In this prologue he does three principal things: first, he makes known his intention; second, he shows the manner of manifesting the truth he intends, in Chapter III; third, he sets forth the order of procedure in this work, in Chapter IX. Concerning the first, he does two things: first, he sets forth what the office of the wise man is; second, from what has been established, he draws out what his intention is in this book, in Chapter II.

I. With regard to the first, he lays down five conclusions. The first of these is: It belongs to the wise man to consider the end. This is proved as follows. Those are called wise who rightly order things and govern them well. But in all things ordered to an end, the rule of governance and order must necessarily be taken from the end. Therefore it belongs to the wise man to consider the end. The major premise is proved in two ways. First, from the common usage that the Philosopher judges should be followed in the naming of things, in Topics II, c. 1: for it has become established that such persons are called wise. Second, from the authority of Aristotle in Metaphysics I, who holds that it belongs to the wise man to impose order. The minor premise is proved in two ways. First: then is each thing best disposed when it is fittingly ordered to its end, since the end of each thing is its good. Supply: but each thing is best disposed when it is fittingly ordered to its good, which is its ultimate perfection. Therefore, etc. Second: in the arts we see that one governs another and stands as its master — the one to which the end of the other belongs. This is evident in the medical art, which governs the art of the apothecary: for health, with which medicine is concerned, is the end of all compounds. It is also evident in the art of navigation with respect to shipbuilding, and in the military art with respect to horsemanship and every instrument of war. All these are called architectonic, that is, the principal arts, and their practitioners, who are called architects, claim for themselves the name of the wise. Concerning the first proof of the major, it should be noted that the wise man, properly speaking, is one who considers the most difficult and highest causes with certainty, as is evident from Aristotle in Metaphysics I and Ethics VI. It is in this sense that philosophers use the name of the wise man. But because, from this account, other qualities of the wise man follow — qualities of which Aristotle makes mention in Metaphysics I, among which is that of rightly ordering and governing well — the common people, observing this quality in the wise man, transferred the name of wise to anyone who rightly orders things, whom we may also call prudent, according to that saying of Proverbs X: 'Wisdom is prudence to a man.' It is for this reason that Saint Thomas says that common usage has established that such persons are called wise — as if to say: this is not the complete philosophical understanding of the wise man, but rather that of the common people and the crowd.

II. The second conclusion is: It belongs absolutely to the wise man to consider the end of the universe. This is proved in two ways. First: the said practitioners, treating of the ends of certain particular things and not attaining the universal end, are not called wise without qualification, but wise in this or that domain — in the manner of 1 Corinthians 3: 'As a wise architect, I have laid a foundation.' Therefore the name of the wise man without qualification is reserved for him alone whose consideration bears upon the end of the universe. Second: it belongs to the wise man without qualification, according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics I and Ethics VI, to contemplate the highest causes. But the end of the universe is the highest cause, which is also the first principle

of the universe. Therefore, etc. Concerning this proposition — that the end of the universe is also the first principle of the universe — it should be noted that by this statement Saint Thomas intends to convey that the first agent and the ultimate end are not two distinct things, but one. For since other agents act for some end distinct from themselves, the first agent, as will be shown below, acts not for anything outside itself, but for itself alone. Hence the first agent and the ultimate end are really the same. From this it may be understood how the words of the Philosopher in Metaphysics II are to be interpreted, where he says that the principles of eternal things must be most true. For these words are not to be taken as if he wished to say that there are many really distinct principles of eternal things; rather, because there are many principles of eternal things that are distinct only by reason — namely, the first efficient cause and the ultimate end, which the Philosopher, following Saint Thomas's interpretation here, calls the highest causes.

III. The third conclusion is: It belongs to wisdom without qualification to dwell principally upon the contemplation of truth. This is proved as follows. The contemplation of the end of the universe belongs to wisdom without qualification, by the preceding conclusion. But the end of the universe is truth. Therefore, etc. The minor is proved. The end of the universe must be the good of the intellect. But that good is truth. Therefore, etc. — The major is proved: the end of each thing is what is intended by its first author and mover. But the first author and mover of the universe is the intellect, as will be shown below, namely in Book II. Therefore the ultimate end of the universe must be the good of the intellect. This is confirmed first by the sign that divine Wisdom came into the world for the manifestation of truth, as it testifies when it says in John 18: 'For this I was born, that I should bear witness to the truth.' It is confirmed second by the authority of Aristotle, who says in Metaphysics II that First Philosophy is the science of truth. Concerning the inference of the principal argument, note that the argument presupposes that the first agent of any thing primarily intends its own good, and secondarily the good of its effect. Therefore, since Saint Thomas had to infer: 'Therefore the ultimate end of the universe is what the intellect intends,' he inferred instead: 'Therefore it is the good of the intellect' — so as to indicate that what is primarily intended by such an agent and what is its good are the same thing. Concerning the proposition assumed in the first argument — that the intellect is the first author and mover of the universe — it should be noted that this may be explained in two ways. First, that the intellect is author and mover as the power by which God produced the universe, just as we say that a craftsman produces his works through the intellect, and thus the intellect of the craftsman is the primary cause of those works. In this sense it is certainly true that the divine intellect is the author and mover of the universe: for since God is an agent by will, and the will is moved to act by some apprehension, the primary principle of action on God's part must be his intellect. Saint Thomas makes use of this argument below, in Book II, Chapter 24, to show that God produces his effects through his wisdom. — Second, it may be

explained that the intellect is the first author and mover of the universe not only as the principle by which, but also as the underlying agent itself. For this, it should be noted that, although God is an intellectual substance just as other intelligences and man are, there is nevertheless a difference between him and other intellectual beings: for created intellectual beings are not intellect itself, but intellect in them is an accident added to their substance, and therefore they are not properly called intellects, but only intellectual substances or beings that have intellect. God, on the other hand, not only has intellect, but is his own intellect, just as all other things that are in God are the divine substance itself. And therefore, just as it can be said that God acts, so it can be said that the divine intellect acts and is the author of the universe as the underlying agent. — Although both senses are true, the second seems more directly intended by the manner of the text.

III. Concerning the proposition assumed in the same argument — that the ultimate end of the universe is truth — it should be considered that an agent sometimes acts for the sake of an end either to produce it or to acquire it for itself, as is evident in one who heals or in something that moves locally; but sometimes it acts for the sake of an end that already pre-exists, in order to multiply it, communicate it, or make it manifest — as a natural agent acts to communicate its own form. Truth, therefore, is not said here to be the end of the universe and the good of the divine intellect in the sense that God, by producing the universe, acquires truth or the perfection of the intellect or brings them into being; but because, in the production of the universe, he intends to manifest and communicate his truth. For since the truth of the divine intellect, which is the end of the universe, is nothing other than the conception of the divine intellect — which things are naturally disposed to imitate and equal — when things are brought into being, divine truth is communicated to them, inasmuch as they receive forms that are similar to and conformed with the conception of the divine intellect.

IV. The fourth conclusion is: It belongs to wisdom to consider the first truth. This is proved by the authority of Aristotle, cited above, who says that First Philosophy is the science of that truth which is the origin of all truth — namely, the truth that pertains to the first principle of being for all things. For the truth of such a principle is the principle of all truth, since the disposition of things in truth is as their disposition in being.

Note, from the teaching of Saint Thomas in De Veritate, q. 21, a. 1, that since the true perfects another according to the nature of a species, the true insofar as it is on the side of the thing and is convertible with being, includes being in its notion and adds that relation of the perfecting. Therefore the Philosopher rightly says that the disposition of things in truth is as their disposition in being: because the true is founded in being, and the notion of the true accompanies the notion of

being.

The third and fourth conclusions are together confirmed by the authority of Proverbs 8, where it says: 'My mouth shall meditate truth' — for divine truth is called truth in the most proper and distinctive sense.

V. Concerning what has been said in the third and fourth conclusions, two difficulties arise. The first is this: Although the will is simply prior to the intellect in the order of nature, nevertheless the will is prior to the intellect in the order of moving, according to the teaching of Saint Thomas, Part I, q. 82, a. 4. But to produce things is a kind of moving, or quasi-moving. Therefore, in the production of things, the divine will holds the primary place, and not the intellect. It is therefore incorrectly said that the first author and mover of the universe is the intellect. The second difficulty is this: The ultimate end of all created things is placed below, in Book III, as the divine goodness. Therefore, truth is not the ultimate end of the universe, as is said here. 2. In responding to these difficulties, one should begin with the second, since from its solution the solution to the first will be more evident. It must be known first that, just as inferior agents have a twofold end, as is said in Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 123, a. 7 — namely a proximate end and a remote end, where the proximate end is to introduce a likeness of their form into another, and the remote end is whatever good follows from this if it is intended — so too the divine intellect has a twofold end. Its proximate end is to introduce its form into creatures; its remote end is the good that is ultimately intended in creatures thereby. And since the form of the divine intellect by which it acts is the conception to the likeness of which things are produced — and that conception is the very truth of the intellect — therefore creatures, by reason of their imitating the divine conception, have the truth of the divine intellect as the proximate end of their agent; but because in communicating his truth to a creature God also intends that the creature become a partaker of divine goodness, therefore divine goodness is also its ultimate end. It must be known second that the ultimate end of an effect may be said to be ultimate in two ways. In one way, because it is the end ultimately intended by its efficient causes according to the order of execution. In another way, because it is the proper end of the last and highest of its causes in the order of resolution. And in this way, if the last cause itself intends several ends, any one of them can be called ultimate in relation to the ends of lower causes — namely, insofar as the ends of other causes are ordered to the end of the higher cause, while the end of the highest cause, whatever it may be, is not ordered to the end of any higher cause, since there is no cause higher than it.

3. To the difficulty, therefore, it is said that truth is called the ultimate end of the universe only in this second manner — namely, because it is the proper end of its highest cause — and not in the

first manner, as something ultimately intended. Hence Saint Thomas did not say that the ultimate end of each thing is what is ultimately intended by its first author, but absolutely and without distinction what is intended by its first author; so as to indicate that every proper end of the highest cause has the character of an ultimate end in comparison with the ends of other causes, even if it is that cause's proximate end. Divine goodness, on the other hand, is called the ultimate end of the universe not only in the second sense, but also in the first — namely, in that it is ultimately intended by the highest cause: for the divine intellect introduces the likeness of its truth into the universe precisely in order to attain divine goodness. — It should also be noted that, although truth is the ultimate end of the universe in the second sense, as intended by its highest cause, it likewise belongs to truth to be the proximate end of the universe, inasmuch as the universe has no other efficient cause apart from the highest — since the divine intellect itself is both its first and its proximate cause. Hence truth is called the ultimate end of the universe insofar as the intellect is its first and highest cause; but insofar as the same intellect is also its proximate cause, truth may likewise be called its proximate end. A second response to this difficulty is also possible: that by positing truth as the ultimate end of the universe, divine goodness is not excluded but rather included. For divine goodness, as is said in Sentences II, d. 1, q. 2, a. 2, ad 3, is the end of creatures according to the order and manner in which it is willed by God. But since the manner in which divine goodness is willed is according to the manner of the divine intellect's conception, it follows that divine goodness, conceived under such a manner of communication, is the ultimate end of the universe. But goodness thus conceived has the character of truth. Therefore, when it is said that truth is the end of the universe, goodness is not excluded; and when it is said that goodness is the end, truth is not excluded — rather, they mutually include one another. Hence in this matter there is no contradiction in the teaching of Saint Thomas.

4. From these considerations the first difficulty is easily answered. For it is said that by the statement that the intellect is the first author of the universe, the divine will is not excluded but included: since the divine knowledge is not the cause of things except when joined with the will, as will be shown below. Nevertheless, because the form that the divine effect proximately imitates is in the intellect, the divine intellect is said to be the first author of the universe — which is why Sacred Scripture also sets Wisdom down as the creator of things. An example of this may be seen in works of art: for although the craftsman works through the will, he is nonetheless said absolutely to act through the intellect, for the reason stated. There is also another reason for this. For although the intellect moves the will and the will moves the intellect, yet, since there cannot be an infinite regress, there is a resting point in the intellect, and the intellect is itself the absolutely first mover in relation to the will: for the intellect can apprehend something without being moved by the will, but the will cannot will anything unless moved by the intellect. Hence it is false that the will holds the

first place in moving absolutely, since it does not tend toward the unknown. This is evident from the teaching of Saint Thomas in many places, especially in Part I, q. 82, a. 4, and from the teaching of Aristotle in Ethics VI. The first author of the universe, therefore, as containing its form in himself, is the intellect; but the will is joined to it as applying this cause to action."

VI. The fifth conclusion is: It belongs to wisdom to refute the falsehood that is contrary to truth concerning the first principle. This is proved first as follows. It belongs to the same discipline to pursue one of two contraries and to refute the other, as is evident from the example of medicine, which produces health and drives out sickness. But it belongs to the wise man to meditate principally upon the truth concerning the first principle and to set it forth for others. Therefore it also belongs to him to refute the contrary falsehood. Second, it is proved from the authority of the aforesaid text of Proverbs, which says: 'And my lips shall detest the wicked.' For the falsehood that stands against divine truth is called impiety, because it is contrary to religion, which is called piety. Concerning the statement that by 'the wicked' is signified the falsehood contrary to divine truth, inasmuch as it is contrary to religion — which is called piety — it should be noted first, from the teaching of Saint Thomas in Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 101, a. 1, that the name of piety, taken in its proper sense, designates a virtue that shows honor and devotion to parents and to one's homeland. But because God is called our Father by a certain excellence, piety is therefore extended and transferred also to divine worship, as is said in that same article 3; which is why, as he says in the third book of the Sentences, d. 9, q. 1, a. 1, the same virtue is called in Greek eusebia or theosebia, and in Latin piety, latria, and religion. Religion is therefore called piety not in the first and proper meaning of this name, but by a certain transference of the name. It should be noted second that, since it belongs to latria to show reverence to Sacred Scripture and to other divine things, as Saint Thomas holds in the third book of the Sentences, d. 34, a. 2, and since religion is the same virtue as latria, as has been said, Saint Thomas rightly states that the falsehood contrary to divine truth is opposed to religion. For it pertains to irreverence toward God to attack divine truth and to teach the opposing falsehood — which manifestly opposes religion, which shows worship and reverence to God.

Chapter II

What the Authors Intention Is In This Work

Among all the pursuits of men, the pursuit of wisdom is the most perfect, the most sublime, the most profitable, and the most delightful. It is the most perfect because, insofar as a man devotes himself to the pursuit of wisdom, he already has some share in true blessedness; hence the Wise Man says: 'Blessed is the man who shall continue in wisdom,' Ecclesiasticus 14. It is the most sublime because it is through wisdom that a man draws especially near to the likeness of God, who 'made all things in wisdom.' And because likeness is the cause of love, the pursuit of wisdom joins one especially to God in friendship; which is why it is said in Wisdom 7 that wisdom is an 'infinite treasure to men, and those who use it become partakers of the friendship of God.' It is the most profitable because through wisdom one arrives at the kingdom of immortality: 'for the desire of wisdom leads to the everlasting kingdom,' Wisdom 6. It is the most delightful because 'her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness, but joy and gladness,' Wisdom 8. Therefore, taking our confidence from the divine goodness to pursue the office of the wise man, though it surpasses our own powers, our proposed intention is to set forth, to the best of our ability, the truth that the Catholic faith professes, while eliminating contrary errors. For to use the words of Hilary: I am conscious that I owe it to God as the chief duty of my life that my every word and sense may speak of him. Against the particular errors of individuals, however, it is difficult to proceed, for two reasons. First, because the sacrilegious statements of individual erring parties are not so well known to us that we might draw arguments from what they say in order to destroy their errors. This is the method the ancient teachers employed in the refutation of the errors of the Gentiles, whose positions they were able to know because they themselves had been Gentiles, or had at least lived among Gentiles and been instructed in their teachings. — Second, because certain of them — such as the Muhammadans and pagans — do not agree with us in accepting the authority of any Scripture by which they might be refuted, as we are able to dispute against the Jews through the Old Testament and against heretics through the New. But these groups accept neither. We must therefore have recourse to natural reason, to which all are compelled to give assent — though in divine matters it is deficient. At the same time, while investigating some particular truth, we shall show what errors are excluded by it, and how

the demonstrative truth accords with the faith of the Christian religion.

[Ferrara's Commentary]

Having laid down what was said in the first chapter concerning the wise man, Saint Thomas sets forth his own plan, saying that his intention is to set forth the truth of the Christian faith while eliminating contrary errors. The reason for this plan is that, trusting in divine goodness, he intends to assume the office of the wise man — though it surpasses his own powers — whose task it is to teach truth and exclude falsehood, as was made clear above. He assigns two reasons why he assumes the office of the wise man. The first is that among all the pursuits of men, the pursuit of wisdom is the most perfect, the most sublime, the most profitable, and the most delightful. It is the most perfect because through it a man already has some share of true blessedness, according to Ecclesiasticus 14: 'Blessed is the man who shall continue in wisdom.' — It is the most sublime because a man thereby draws especially near to the divine likeness, since God 'made all things in wisdom,' and consequently is joined to God through friendship, since likeness is the cause of love; hence Wisdom 7 says that wisdom is an infinite treasure through which those who use it become partakers of the friendship of God. — It is the most profitable because through wisdom one arrives at the kingdom of immortality, according to Wisdom 6: 'The desire of wisdom leads to the everlasting kingdom,' etc. — It is the most delightful because, according to Wisdom 8: 'Her conversation has no bitterness,' etc.

II. In elucidating these points, it should be noted first that since blessedness consists in the contemplation of the divine truth and the divine essence as it is in itself, when someone devotes himself to the pursuit of wisdom he participates in some likeness of that supreme blessedness. Hence it is well said here that he already has some share of true blessedness. It should be noted second, from the teaching of Saint Thomas in Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 19, a. 7, that although wisdom as understood by philosophers is only cognitive of the highest causes and consists purely in speculation, among theologians it is not only cognitive but also directive of human life — which is directed not only by human reasoning but also by divine rules and precepts, as is the case with Augustine in De Trinitate XII. Therefore, one who devotes himself to the pursuit of such wisdom is likened to God in two ways: first, with respect to the knowledge that God has of himself; second, with respect to action. For just as God knows himself and 'made all things in wisdom,' so also the wise man both knows God and is directed in his actions not only by human but also by divine rules. It is therefore rightly said here that through the pursuit of wisdom a man draws especially near to the divine likeness. It should be noted third that there may be two reasons for what Saint Thomas says — that through wisdom one arrives at the kingdom of immortality. The first is that, as he said, wisdom causes friendship with God, through which we are led to eternal blessedness. The second is that the wise man is directed through wisdom in right actions, by which he is prepared for

immortal life. For although those devoted to human wisdom very often fall away from virtue, those who devote themselves to divine wisdom — of which we are speaking — are, insofar as they are such, disposed toward immortality, because they are directed in good works through wisdom derived from divine rules. It should be noted fourth that two reasons may be given for the statement that the pursuit of wisdom is more delightful than other human pursuits. The first is that, as Aristotle says in De Animalibus XI, one who loves is more delighted by a small understanding of the beloved than by a great understanding of anything else. The second is that, as the same text states, the little that we can understand of separate substances delights more than whatever we might know of other things. Therefore, knowledge of God is far more pleasant and delightful than knowledge of any other things whatsoever — especially when that knowledge draws one into love of God.

III. The second reason why he assumes the office of the wise man is that, following the judgment of Hilary, he considers it his own office to speak of God in every word and thought. He then excuses himself for not proceeding against individual errors. He says he does this partly because not all errors are known, so that arguments might be drawn from what is said to destroy those errors; — and partly because some of them, such as the Muhammadans and pagans, do not accept the authority of Scripture. One must therefore have recourse to natural reason, to which all are compelled to give assent — though it is deficient in divine matters. Here it should be observed that, since our natural light is utterly surpassed by divine things, it cannot by its own power rise to see into divine things clearly. Therefore there are some errors concerning divine things that we cannot eliminate by effective argument. Hence, when even the propagators of such errors do not accept divine Scripture, it is better to pass them by than to attack them with ineffective argument. Saint Thomas adds lastly that, while investigating some particular truth, he will at the same time show what errors are excluded by it, and how the demonstrative truth accords with the Christian religion."

Chapter III

In What Mode Making Divine Truth Manifest is Possible

Since not every mode of manifesting truth is the same — and it is the mark of a disciplined man to seek no more certainty in each matter than the nature of the thing allows, as the Philosopher has excellently stated and as Boethius introduces — it is necessary first to show what mode is possible for manifesting the truth we propose to set forth. Now, in those things that we confess of God, there is a twofold truth. For some things that are true of God exceed the entire capacity of human reason — such as that God is three and one. But other things there are to which natural reason can also attain — such as that God exists, that God is one, and others of this kind, which the philosophers also proved demonstratively of God, guided by the light of natural reason. That there are some intelligible truths about God that altogether surpass the capacity of human reason is most evidently apparent. For since the principle of the entire knowledge that reason grasps about any given thing is the intellect's grasp of that thing's substance — because, according to the teaching of the Philosopher, the principle of demonstration is the definition of the thing — it follows that the mode in which the substance of a thing is understood must determine the mode of what is known about that thing. Hence, if the human intellect comprehends the substance of some thing — for example, a stone or a triangle — no intelligible truth about that thing will exceed the capacity of human reason. But this is not what happens with us in regard to God. For the human intellect, by its natural power, cannot attain to the comprehension of his substance, since the knowledge of our intellect, in accordance with the mode of the present life, begins from the senses; and therefore those things that do not fall under the senses cannot be grasped by the human intellect, except insofar as knowledge of them is gathered from sensible things. Sensible things, however, cannot lead our intellect to see what the divine substance is, since they are effects that do not equal the power of their cause. Nevertheless, our intellect is led by sensible things to a knowledge of God — to know that he exists and other such things that must be attributed to the first principle. There are therefore some intelligible truths about God that are accessible to human reason, and others that altogether exceed the power of human reason. The same point is readily seen from the hierarchy of intellects. Of two intellects, one of which perceives a thing with greater subtlety than the other, the one whose intellect is more elevated understands many things that the other is

altogether unable to grasp — as is evident in a simple, uneducated person, who in no way can grasp the subtle speculations of philosophy. But the intellect of an angel surpasses the human intellect far more than the intellect of the greatest philosopher surpasses that of the most ignorant fool — for this latter distance falls within the limits of the human species, which the angelic intellect surpasses. The angel knows God from a more noble effect: for the angel's own substance, through which it is led to knowledge of God by natural knowledge, is more excellent than sensible things — and even than the soul itself — through which the human intellect ascends to knowledge of God. And the divine intellect exceeds the angelic far more than the angelic exceeds the human. For the divine intellect, in its comprehension, equals its own substance, and therefore perfectly understands what it is and knows all that is intelligible about it: whereas an angel by natural knowledge does not know what God is, because even the angel's own substance, through which it is led to knowledge of God, is an effect that does not equal the power of its cause. Hence not all that God understands about himself can the angel grasp by natural knowledge; nor is human reason sufficient to grasp all that the angel understands by its natural power. Therefore, just as it would be the height of folly for an ignorant man to assert that what the philosopher proposes is false because he cannot grasp it, so too — and far more so — it is the height of great foolishness for a man to suspect that what is divinely revealed through the ministry of angels is false because it cannot be investigated by reason. The same truth is manifestly evident from the deficiency that we daily experience in knowing things. For we are ignorant of very many properties of sensible things, and for many of the properties that we apprehend by the senses we cannot perfectly find the reason. Far less, then, is human reason capable of investigating all the intelligible truths of that most excellent substance. This accords also with the saying of the Philosopher, who asserts in Metaphysics II that our intellect is related to the primary beings — which are the most manifest in nature — as the eye of a bat is to the sun. Sacred Scripture also bears witness to this truth. For it is said in Job 11: 'Perhaps you shall comprehend the footsteps of God, and will find out the Almighty to perfection?' And in Job 36: 'Behold, God is great, exceeding our knowledge.' And in 1 Corinthians 13: 'We know in part.' It should not, therefore, be immediately rejected as false whenever something about God cannot be investigated by reason — as the Manichaeans and many of the unbelievers have thought."

[Ferrara's Commentary]

Having made known his plan for this work, Saint Thomas consequently shows what mode is possible for manifesting divine truth. Concerning this he does two things: first, he enumerates what is to be made manifest; second, he settles the question of their manifestation in the following chapter. With regard to the first, presupposing from the judgment of Aristotle and Boethius that it is the mark of a disciplined man to seek in each matter only as much certainty as the nature of the thing admits, he lays down this conclusion: Among the things we confess of God, some can be known by the natural light of reason, while others altogether exceed the capacity of human reason. He leaves the first part known as given, since philosophers, using natural reason alone, proved many things about God demonstratively — such as that God exists and that God is one. — The second part he first proves by three arguments, showing that there are intelligible truths about God that altogether exceed human capacity; he then confirms it by authorities.

I. The first argument is this. That of which all knowable truths can be known by the natural light of the intellect is one whose substance can be comprehended by that intellect. But the substance of God cannot be comprehended by our intellect. Therefore our intellect cannot by its natural light know all that is knowable about God. The major is proved. The principle of the entire knowledge of a thing is the intellect's grasp of its substance, for according to the Philosopher, the principle of demonstration is the definition of the thing. Therefore the mode of knowledge of a thing's substance determines the mode of what is known about it. Hence if the substance of some thing — say, a stone or a triangle — is comprehended by the human intellect, no intelligible truth about that thing will exceed the capacity of human reason. Supply: therefore, conversely, if no intelligible truth about it exceeds the natural light, and indeed all things about it can be known naturally, its substance will be able to be comprehended. The minor is proved. Only those things that do not fall under the senses can be grasped by the human intellect if knowledge of them can be gathered from the senses — since our intellect, in the mode of the present life, receives its knowledge from the senses. But the senses cannot lead our intellect to see what the divine substance is, since sensible things are effects that do not equal divine power. Therefore, etc. — He adds, however, that although sensible things do not lead to knowledge of what God's substance is, they do make us know that he exists and other such things that must be attributed to the first principle."

2. In clarifying the major, it should be noted that Saint Thomas's intention is to speak of knowable things that belong to a subject of themselves — for it is to such things that science extends, and not to accidental predicates. These properties, as they are called, are contained virtually in the substance of the thing as an effect in its cause, in which they have a distinction outside the intellect: for they

are produced, according to the teaching of Saint Thomas, from the substance through a kind of natural emanation. Where they are not so distinguished — as is the case with the passions of being, which are not really distinguished from being — the notion of the subject virtually contains the notions of its passions, and each is the cause and reason of the other in purely intelligible being only. Since, therefore, the passions are contained in the subject as in their cause — whether with respect to real being or to intelligible being — all the passions of a thing cannot be known about it unless the thing's quiddity is fully known, nor can the quiddity of a thing be perfectly known unless all the properties that naturally flow from it are known: just as all the effects of a cause in the cause cannot be known except through comprehensive knowledge of the cause, nor can the cause, as such, be comprehended except through inspection of all the effects into which it can extend.

3. With regard to the minor, it should be noted first that Saint Thomas did not simply say that the substance of God cannot be known from sensible things, but added the qualification: so as to see in them what it is — because knowing sensible things does make us know God's substance, since everything that is in God is his substance; but it cannot bring us to know him quidditatively according to what he is in himself, which would be properly to know God's substance. It should be noted second that there is a difference between calling something the adequate object of a power and calling it an effect adequate to its cause. An object is called adequate to a power according to a certain community of extension: because, namely, whatever has the character of that object can be attained by such a power, and conversely whatever can be attained by the power is contained under that object. But since it is of the nature of an effect, precisely as effect, to depend on its cause, an effect is said to equal its cause — as Saint Thomas seems to intend in Book III, Chapter 49 of this work — when in that effect the entire power of the cause is expressed. I take this to be the case when an effect is produced by the power of the cause that has as much perfection as the cause. But when in an effect the entire power of the cause is not expressed — because the effect does not have as much perfection as its cause, which can be discerned when the cause is capable of producing an effect more noble than that one — such an effect is inadequate to its cause. Since therefore there is no effect of divine power that God could not produce more noble, and no effect that has as much perfection as God, no effect is adequate to him. It should be noted third that, since power follows upon the essence of a thing and is proportioned to it, when an effect equals the power of its cause, the essence also seems to equal the essence: just as a man who is begotten, in his essence, equals the man who begets. For this reason, from quidditative knowledge of an effect, the cause can be known quidditatively. But where the effect does not equal the power of its cause — as is the case with divine effects — it cannot equal the cause's essence either. And consequently the cause cannot be perfectly known from inspection of the effect alone: but only those things about the cause can be known through such an effect that must be found in the cause in order for such an effect to be

produced by such a cause — such as: that in order for something to be produced from something as from a primary cause, that cause must exist, must be intellectual, and must be immaterial. Therefore from knowledge of effects, though inadequate, of the first cause, we can know that it exists, that it is intellectual and immaterial, and the like.

II. But concerning this argument a difficulty arises, because Saint Thomas seems to commit the fallacy of figure of speech in the proof of the major. For he argues as follows: According to the mode in which the substance of a thing is known, so is the mode of what is known of it. Therefore, the substance of a thing whose intellect comprehends can have all intelligible truths about it known. But here there is a passage from mode to multitude of known things — from quality to quantity. In which a fallacy of figure of speech is manifestly committed. The reply is that just as one essence is the single cause of all its passions, so all its passions agree in one notion — namely, that of being its natural properties — and the mode of knowledge of a natural passion is proportioned to the mode of knowledge of its substance. For a thing whose essence is fully known, its natural passion must of necessity be fully known. But from a thing's natural passion being fully known and comprehended, it follows that there is no natural passion of it that is not known. The fallacy is therefore not committed: for the passage is not immediately from mode to quantity, but from the mode of the essence to the mode of the predicate — which mode of the known is accompanied by the numerical quantity. Saint Thomas, for brevity's sake, touched on the quantity explicitly, so as at once to indicate the mode that immediately follows from the antecedent and the accompanying quantity. The explicit argumentation would therefore be as follows: According to the mode of knowledge of the substance of a thing is the mode of knowledge of the natural passion known about it. Therefore, the thing whose essence is comprehended and fully known has its natural passion comprehended and fully known — either in act, namely, or in power. But a thing's natural passion is fully known when there is none of it that is not known. Therefore, etc.

III. The second argument is drawn from the hierarchy of intellectual beings. The argument proceeds as follows: The higher and more elevated an intellect is, the more it can understand things that a lower intellect cannot grasp. But the divine intellect exceeds the human to the highest degree. Therefore there are some things God knows in himself that the human intellect is altogether unable to grasp. The major proposition can be seen in human beings. For the intellect of a simple and uneducated person is altogether incapable of grasping the subtle reasonings of philosophy that a philosopher and a man of great intelligence can grasp. The minor is also evident. For the angelic intellect surpasses the human intellect far more than the intellect of the greatest philosopher surpasses that of the most ignorant fool — since the distance between the intellect of one man and that of another is contained within the limits of the human species, whereas the angelic intellect is

superior in species. This can be easily discerned because the angel knows God from a more noble and more abstract effect: for through the very substance of the angel — which is more noble than sensible things and even than the human soul through which the human intellect ascends to God — the angel knows God by natural knowledge, as will be shown below. And the divine intellect exceeds the angelic far more than the angelic exceeds the human. This is evident because the divine intellect equals the divine substance, and therefore perfectly understands itself; whereas the angelic intellect does not know what God is, since the angel's own substance, through which it knows God, is an effect that does not equal the power of its cause — and therefore not all that God knows of himself can the angel know by natural knowledge. Therefore the divine intellect exceeds the human to the highest degree.

2. In clarifying the major, together with its proof, it should be known first that there are two ways in which something may be incapable of being known by a power, as Saint Thomas indicates: either because it does not fall under the object of the power — as sound cannot be grasped by sight — or because, although it falls under the object, it is disproportionate to the power — as a very bright light cannot be seen by the eye of a bat. That certain philosophical subtleties are grasped by the intellect of one man but cannot be grasped by that of another is therefore not because they fall under the common object of the one and not of the other, but because they are proportionate to the intellect of the one and disproportionate to that of the other — since the intellect of the one can penetrate natural quiddities while the intellect of the other, by its dullness, cannot.

It should be known second, from the teaching of Saint Thomas in Summa Theologiae I, q. 85, a. 7, and Sentences II, d. 32, q. 2, a. 3, that just as all human bodies are of one species, and yet this specific unity admits a range of various individual degrees — since one man is well-constituted and graced with a fine and handsome appearance while another is deformed and ill-constituted — so too, alongside the specific unity of souls, there is a diversity of individual degrees among them, so that just as one body is individually more perfect in substance and of more noble constitution, so one soul is individually more noble than another, and accordingly one man is of more outstanding intelligence than another. For individual forms are created commensurate in substance to bodies, so that through commensuration to this body this soul is individually distinguished from that one. Hence just as one body is more nobly constituted than another, so must one soul be more noble than another. — Nevertheless, one man is not thereby more a man than another, though he may be a more perfect man: for we do not use the word 'more' except in forms that admit variation between greater and lesser — which does not occur in the intellective soul, since each retains unchangeably the perfection in substance that it received from the beginning. One man can therefore be more excellent in understanding than another because he has a more noble and

excellent soul; although this may also arise from a better disposition of the sensitive powers, since the intellect depends on them for its operation.

IV. The third argument is from the greater. It seems more likely that we know all that is knowable about sensible things than that we know all that can be known about God — since sensible things are closer to us and more proportionate to us. But of sensible things we are ignorant of many properties, or cannot perfectly find the reason for them. Therefore, far less can we know by nature all that is knowable about God.

V. This is confirmed by the authority of the Philosopher in Metaphysics II, and by numerous texts of Sacred Scripture. For Aristotle says that our intellect is related to the most manifest things in nature as the eye of a bat to the sun. From Job 11: 'Perhaps you shall comprehend the footsteps of God,' etc.; and from Job 36: 'Behold, God is great,' etc.; and 1 Corinthians 13: 'We know in part,' etc. Concerning the authority of the Philosopher, it should be noted that it does not imply complete ignorance of divine things, but a kind of obscure knowledge and difficulty of cognition. For just as a bat cannot fix its gaze on the very splendor of the sun, so neither can our intellect naturally understand the divine essence as it is in itself by comprehending its quiddity. Hence the error of the Manichaeans is refuted, and of many unbelievers, who thought that what is divinely revealed through the ministry of angels and cannot be investigated by human reason should be immediately rejected as false — with whom it goes no differently than with an uneducated man who would say that what is stated by philosophers is false because he cannot grasp it.

VI. Concerning this part of the conclusion that Saint Thomas has proved, Scotus agrees in part in his first question of the Prologue to the Sentences and disagrees in part. He agrees with Saint Thomas that there are many truths about God that no one can discover naturally, because knowledge of them cannot be caused by the agent intellect and phantasms. But he disagrees in this, that he holds such knowledge to be supernatural when comparing the possible intellect to the agent; but when comparing it to the actual knowledge itself as such, he holds it to be natural to the possible intellect, since the possible intellect is naturally perfected by any knowledge whatsoever and naturally inclines toward any knowledge whatsoever. Saint Thomas holds the opposite of this — taking natural power properly and not as extending to the obediential power — in Sentences III, d. 26, q. 1, a. 2, and De Veritate, q. 18, a. 2, where, following the interpretation of the Commentator in Metaphysics IX, he holds that a natural passive power does not extend save to those things to which its natural active power extends. From which he concludes in De Veritate that the possible intellect is naturally in potency only to those forms that are made intelligible through the agent intellect. The position of Saint Thomas is confirmed by the procedure and

argument of Aristotle in De Anima III, where he proves the necessity of the agent intellect. For by this argument he proves that there must be posited in the soul an agent intellect, because in a nature in which there is a passive power there must be posited an active power. Now it is clear that Aristotle is speaking of the proximate and proportionate active power: otherwise his argument would not prove the proposition. Therefore, if some passive power is naturally inclined toward some act, it must be able to receive it from some natural and proportionate agent. But if it be objected — as Scotus objects in Sentences IV, d. 49, q. 11, ad 2 — that in the body there is a receptive potency for the intellective soul, and yet it cannot be produced by any natural agent: — the reply, following the mind of Saint Thomas in De Potentia, q. 3, a. 9, ad 5 and 6, is that it is not necessary that every natural agent produce the essence of the form, but it suffices that it be a disposing cause of the matter and a cause of the union of the form with the matter. For if the form is not subsistent, the natural cause is the cause of the form itself; but if the form is subsistent, as the rational soul is, the natural cause is the cause of the disposition of the matter and of the union of the form to the matter, but not of the form itself. Hence this inference is denied: 'No created or natural agent can produce the intellective soul; therefore no natural agent can reduce matter to act with respect to the intellective soul' — for it is said that the opposite of the consequent is consistent with the antecedent: a natural agent can reduce matter to act of a form by causing the dispositions toward the form and the union of the form to the matter, without being the cause of the form.

Chapter IV

That the Truth of Divine Things Attainable by Natural Reason is Fittingly Proposed to Men as Some Thing to be Believed

There being, therefore, a twofold truth of intelligible divine things — one to which the inquiry of reason can attain, and another that altogether exceeds the capacity of human reason — it is fitting that both be divinely proposed to man as something to be believed. This must first be shown of that truth which the inquiry of reason is capable of reaching, lest perhaps it seem to someone that, since it can be had by reason, it was superfluous to have it handed down as something to be believed through supernatural inspiration. Now if this kind of truth were left to reason alone to inquire into, three inconveniences would follow. The first is that very few men would possess knowledge of God. For many are impeded from the fruit of diligent inquiry — which is the discovery of truth — by three causes. Some are impeded by a deficient bodily constitution, from which many are naturally indisposed to learning; so that no effort could lead them to attain the highest degree of human knowledge, which consists in knowing God. — Others are impeded by the necessities of domestic life. For there must be among men some who devote themselves to the management of temporal affairs, who could not spend so much time in the leisure of contemplative inquiry as to reach the summit of human inquiry — namely, the knowledge of God. — Yet others are impeded by laziness. For in order to know the things about God that reason can investigate, much prior knowledge is required, since virtually the whole of philosophy is ordered toward the knowledge of God; which is why metaphysics, which is concerned with divine things, remains the last part of philosophy to be learned. Thus one can only arrive at the investigation of the aforesaid truth after great labor of study — a labor that few are willing to undertake out of love of knowledge, even though God has implanted a natural desire for it in the minds of men. The second inconvenience is that those who did arrive at the discovery of the aforesaid truth would barely do so after a long stretch of time. Both because of the profundity of this truth — for the human intellect is not found capable of grasping it through the path of reason except after long exercise — and also because of the many things that are required as prior knowledge, as has been said — and also because at the time of youth, when the soul is tossed about by the various movements of the passions, it is not suited to knowledge of so lofty a truth; it is by settling and sitting at rest that one

becomes wise and knowing, as is said in Physics VII. The human race would therefore remain, if the knowledge of God were available only through the path of reason, in the densest ignorance: since the knowledge of God, which makes men most perfect and good, would come only to a few, and to these only after a great length of time. The third inconvenience is that falsehood is very often mingled in the investigation of human reason, because of the weakness of our intellect in judging, and the mixture of phantasms. And so many would remain in doubt even about those things that are most truly demonstrated, not knowing the force of the demonstration; and this especially when they see that various men who are called wise teach different things. Also, among the many true things that are demonstrated, something false is sometimes mingled — not demonstrated, but asserted by some probable or sophistical reasoning that is sometimes taken for demonstration. It was therefore necessary that through the way of faith firm certainty and pure truth about divine things be presented to men. Divine clemency has therefore provided salutarily that those things too that reason can investigate, it commanded to be held by faith — so that all might easily be able to share in the knowledge of God, and without doubt or error. Hence it is said in Ephesians 4: 'Walk not as other Gentiles walk in the vanity of their mind, having the understanding darkened.' And in Isaiah 54: 'I will make all your children taught by the Lord.'

[Ferrara's Commentary]

"Having shown that there is a twofold truth about God, Saint Thomas now declares the manner of manifesting each truth. Concerning this he does two things: first, he settles the question of the manner of such manifestation absolutely; second, comparatively, in Chapter VII. — Concerning the first he does two things: first, he settles the question of the manner of manifestation with respect to the teacher's side; second, with respect to the learner's side, in Chapter VI. — Concerning the first he does two things: first, he treats the manner of things that can be known of God by nature; second, the manner of things that exceed natural reason.

I. With regard to the first — lest perhaps it seem to someone, as he says, that since such truth can be had by reason, it was superfluous to have it handed down as something to be believed through supernatural inspiration — he lays down this conclusion: The truth of divine things attainable by rational inquiry is fittingly proposed to man by God as something to be believed. This is proved from the inconveniences that would follow if it were not done so. The first is that very few men

would possess knowledge of God. For many are deterred from the inquiry of truth by three causes: either because of bodily constitution, from which many are naturally indisposed to science and cannot attain the highest degree of human knowledge, which consists in knowing God; or because of the necessity of domestic life, on account of which many cannot devote themselves to the leisure of contemplative inquiry; or because of laziness, from which most people flee the labor of acquiring learning — for in order to have the knowledge of God that can be had naturally, much prior knowledge is required, since virtually all of philosophy is ordered toward it, which is why metaphysics remains the last to be learned; so that, although God has implanted in the minds of men a natural desire for knowing, yet many are those who refuse to undergo the labor of learning.

II. It should be noted first here, from the teaching of Saint Thomas in Sentences III, d. 25, q. 2, a. 2, that the quantity of knowledge can be considered in two ways: with respect to objects, and with respect to the efficacy of the act regarding the object. When therefore Saint Thomas says that the highest degree of human knowledge is the knowledge of God, this is to be understood with respect to the object, and not with respect to the efficacy of the act. It should be noted second, as Saint Thomas holds in his commentary on Boethius's De Trinitate, q. 5, a. 1, ad 9, that metaphysics is naturally prior to the other sciences — namely, in terms of perfection — but with respect to us it is posterior to the other sciences. Hence Avicenna, in the first book of his Metaphysics, says that the order of this science is to be learned after the other sciences — which Saint Thomas also says here. But although this is so of the science itself, insofar as properties of being and of separate substances are investigated in it by demonstration, nevertheless certain metaphysical terms must of necessity be known according to their concepts before the terms of the other sciences — with respect to us — since the terms of the other sciences are resolved into them. Hence, although those terms are called metaphysical insofar as the properties of what they signify are inquired into in metaphysics, with respect to their concepts they are common to all the sciences. — If it be asked: Why then does Metaphysics V settle their meanings? — It is said that this is because, if a treatise on all of them is to be given at once, it pertains more to the metaphysician than to another practitioner, since he also inquires into their properties. This does not prevent them from being the common terms of all the sciences. It should be noted third that Saint Thomas did not say absolutely that the whole of philosophy is ordered toward metaphysics, but added the qualifier 'virtually': because, as he says in De Trinitate, q. 5, a. 1, ad 9, there are some sciences that are not absolutely necessary for metaphysics, but only for its better state, such as music, moral philosophy, and the like. It should be noted fourth that natural desire, as is held in Summa Theologiae I, q. 60, a. 1, can be taken in two ways: in one way, as distinguished from the appetite that follows from knowledge; in another way, as distinguished from free appetite. In the first way, it names only the order of nature toward something, and imports nothing other than the form of a thing with its natural inclination toward

something — just as the appetite of a heavy thing toward a place below is nothing other than the form of heaviness with its inclination to a place below — and it stands as a first act. In this way every power naturally desires what is fitting for it, as is said in Summa Theologiae I, q. 78, a. 1, ad 3. In the second way, it names an elicited act following from knowledge, yet so determined to one of the opposites that it cannot be turned to the other — just as all men naturally desire blessedness by an elicited act of the will following upon the apprehension of blessedness. — The desire for knowledge, therefore, which Saint Thomas and Aristotle in Metaphysics I say is natural, although it can be taken in the first way — since the intellect by its nature has an inclination and order toward knowledge as toward what is fitting for it — yet because this is not proper to the intellect alone but to every power, as we said, in that it tends toward what is fitting for it; and since Saint Thomas and the Philosopher seem to want to posit something particular about the appetite for knowledge not found in the appetite for operations of other powers: it should therefore be said that this desire is a certain natural act of the will by which the will tends toward knowledge presented to it in such a way that it cannot be turned to the opposite. This seems also to be what Saint Thomas intends in Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 10, a. 1 and II-II, q. 166, a. 2, where he holds the virtue of studiousness to be the moderator of this natural desire.

III. The second inconvenience is that men would barely arrive at that knowledge even after a long stretch of time: both because of the profundity of the knowledge, to which the intellect of man is not found suited except after long exercise; and because of the many things required as prior knowledge; and because of the movements of the passions abundant in youth, which cause the soul to be unfit for knowledge of so great a truth. It should be noted first that, since abstract things cannot be known by us except from sensible things, in order that our intellect — for which sensible things are connatural — might be elevated to the point of eliciting from the forms of sensible things a knowledge of such substances, it is necessary first that it be exercised in the operations of the intellect — abstracting universals from particulars and common things from proper ones — so that from such exercise in abstraction it may become more capable of knowledge of immaterial things: for the intellect cannot reach its noblest operations unless, by practice and exercise in less noble operations, it becomes more vigorous and ready for investigating what is hidden. Therefore, far less will it be able to be raised to that substance which is supremely immaterial and most remote from the senses, unless it has been strengthened after long exercise. Hence Saint Thomas says that our intellect cannot grasp that depth of knowledge except after long exercise. For a certain readiness for the investigation of difficult things is produced in the intellect through study and exercise, which would not be present without such exercise. Similarly, the interior sensitive powers, which the intellect uses, are rendered more capable through such exercise for inquiring into the truth of subtle things in their own order. It should be noted second that, since intellectual knowledge comes

about through abstraction from sensible things, but the intensity of the passions draws the attention of the soul away from intelligibles toward sensible things: the act of contemplation is impeded to the greatest degree by the violence of the passions. Hence the moral virtues, especially chastity — as Saint Thomas says in Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 15, a. 3 — dispose a man most of all to the perfection of intellectual operation. Therefore, where a multitude of passions surges — as is generally the case with the young — there the soul is not suited to subtle speculations; but by settling and sitting at rest from the tumult of the passions, as the Philosopher says, one becomes wise.

IV. The third inconvenience is that knowledge of God would be had with doubt and an admixture of error. For the weakness of reason, along with the mixture of phantasms, causes even those things that have been most truly demonstrated to remain doubtful for many people, who do not know the force of the demonstration — and especially when they see those who are called wise teaching different things. It also causes many falsehoods to be mixed in among the many true things that are demonstrated — falsehoods asserted by some sophistical or merely probable reasoning that is taken for demonstration. It was therefore necessary that what we are to hold of God be determined through faith. The conclusion therefore is that divine clemency provided salutarily that those things too that reason can investigate, it commanded to be held by faith — so that all might share in the knowledge of God easily, and consequently quickly, and without doubt or error. It should be noted first that this weakness of the intellect does not signify some disease or something above nature befalling our intellect, but its own natural order in the genus of intelligibles. For since it holds the lowest place in that genus and is something most imperfect — like prime matter in the genus of material things — it therefore by its very nature has the property of being feeble in grasping truth and easily capable of being deceived. It should be noted second that, although phantasms serve our intellect in understanding, yet the mixture of phantasms itself impedes the knowledge of truth about immaterial things for many people. For since phantasms are likenesses only of material and determinate things — things bound to the here and now — some people, understanding through such phantasms, cannot understand that there is anything in the nature of things that is not material and determined to some particular place; which is why they fall into many errors concerning immaterial things. The mixture of phantasms in our intellectual understanding, therefore, although necessary for us in understanding, is nevertheless, since it is a weak and disproportionate instrument with respect to immaterial things, very often a cause of error in investigating the truth about such immaterial things. The conclusion is confirmed first by the authority of the Apostle in Ephesians 4: 'Walk not as other Gentiles walk,' etc. It is confirmed second by the authority of Isaiah 54: 'I will make all your children taught by the Lord,' etc.

V. But concerning what was said in the first inconvenience, two difficulties arise. The first concerns the statement that metaphysics is the last to be learned. Against this the following argument is raised. First: metaphysics proves the principles of the other sciences, as Saint Thomas says in De Trinitate, q. 5, a. 1, ad 9. Therefore metaphysics ought to precede the other sciences. — The inference is evident: for all science depends on knowledge of principles.

Second: metaphysics confers principles on all the sciences, as is the mind of Saint Thomas in many places, especially De Trinitate, q. 6, a. 1. Therefore, etc. — The inference is proved: because those things that pertain to metaphysics cannot be known except through metaphysics. If therefore the other sciences use principles that are proper to metaphysics, it follows that metaphysics must be included in all the sciences as their prior, and consequently must be learned first.

Third: we must always proceed from what is more known to us, as the Philosopher shows in Posterior Analytics I. But the principles proper to metaphysics are more known to us than all that is taught in the sciences. Therefore our knowledge ought to begin from these. Therefore metaphysics is to be learned first.

VI. The second difficulty concerns the statement that very many people are deterred from the investigation of truth by labor and hardship. For the following argument is raised against it: The inclination of nature is no less than that of a habit. But a habit produces ease and delight in its operations, as is said in Ethics II. So also does nature. If therefore men are naturally inclined toward science and knowledge, the acquisition of science will be easy and delightful. Therefore no one is deterred from it by laziness or labor.

VII. For the elucidation of the first difficulty, it should be considered first that the primary and universal principles of all the sciences can be considered in two ways: in one way, with respect to their truth absolutely; in another way, with respect to the judgment of them and their defense against those who attack them. In the first way they pertain to a single habit called understanding, which Aristotle in Ethics VI distinguishes from science and wisdom. In the second way they pertain to the metaphysician, as Saint Thomas says in Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 66, a. 5, ad 4: for the metaphysician disputes against those who deny such common principles, because they are constituted from common terms, which are the object of the metaphysician's consideration.

It should be considered second that, although they pertain to the understanding that is the habit of principles — with respect to their truth considered absolutely — and to metaphysics with respect to their examination and defense, they are nevertheless also common to all the sciences, insofar as

their terms extend to the terms of the other sciences, and insofar as science depends on the understanding that is the habit of these principles, as is the mind of Saint Thomas in Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 57, a. 2, ad 2. Hence it may be said that these principles, as absolutely true, all sciences receive from the understanding that is their habit; but as already examined and defended against attackers, they receive them from metaphysics. This is why Saint Thomas in Metaphysics XI, Lesson 1, says that one science — meaning metaphysics — considers these principles, to which the consideration of common terms belongs, and from which the other sciences receive such principles. It should be considered third, as may be gathered from the teaching of Saint Thomas in his commentary on Boethius's De Trinitate, q. 6, a. 1, that we may speak of the sciences in two ways: in one way, with respect to the ordered acquisition of all of them; in another way, as they are already acquired and found.

VIII. It is therefore said first that with respect to their acquisition through the invention of human reason, metaphysics is the last: because all the other speculative sciences are ordered toward it, and their discovery is required before the discovery of what is metaphysical. And according to this consideration, nothing belonging to metaphysics, precisely as metaphysical, needs to be understood beforehand: but knowledge of first principles — insofar as they are known through the habit called understanding — does precede the discovery of any science whatsoever, since no science has perfectly the character of science except insofar as it depends on that habit. It is said second that if we speak of the sciences as already found, then there is nothing inconsistent in the other sciences using metaphysical principles as already examined and defended by metaphysics. It is said third that it is not necessary because of this to learn metaphysics before the other sciences: both because the metaphysical habit bears primarily and principally on being and the passions of being, and also on separate substances — not on such principles, since they are not conclusions demonstrated in metaphysics; — and both because the other sciences receive those principles mutually from metaphysics, and therefore it is not necessary that that habit be possessed beforehand, but it suffices that it be found and acquired at some point, even after the other sciences. Hence the other sciences believe these principles to be metaphysics — namely, that they have been examined and defended by it — although they see them as dependents of the understanding that is the habit of these principles.

IX. To the first objection it is replied that metaphysics is not said to prove the principles of the other sciences in the sense that they are demonstratively known through the metaphysical habit — as a subalternating science is said to prove the principles of the subalternated science — but because through those common principles, according to some consideration pertaining to metaphysics, the principles of the other sciences are made manifest, inasmuch as all sciences depend on the habit of

these principles called understanding; and inasmuch as they are resolved into these principles — naturally known but derived by the metaphysician according to some consideration, as being principles proper not to one science but common to all, though principally considered by the metaphysician. To the second objection it is replied that metaphysics does not confer its principles on others when the order of discovery and acquisition is considered, as has been said; but it confers them when all the sciences are understood as already found, insofar as all sciences now receive from metaphysics these principles as confirmed and defended by it, though in themselves naturally known. Hence it does not follow that metaphysics is to be learned before the other sciences. To the third objection it is replied first that first principles, according to their absolute truth, are more known to us than anything in the sciences. But as for their examination and defense against attackers, they are known subsequently. — It is replied second that, since they pertain to the understanding that is their habit according to their truth, and to metaphysics according to their examination and defense, it does not follow that metaphysics precedes the other sciences — but only the understanding that is their habit, implanted in us by the natural light of the agent intellect.

X. To the second difficulty it is replied first that not every inclination of nature is like the inclination of a habit. For, as Saint Thomas holds in De Veritate, q. 24, a. 10, ad 1, there is a natural inclination toward something in two ways: in one way, when a thing has in itself a sufficient principle from which what is inclined toward follows of necessity; in another way, when a thing does not have in itself a sufficient principle from which what is inclined toward necessarily follows — in which way it is natural for a woman to conceive a child, and for free will to tend toward the good. The first kind of natural inclination produces ease and delight in operation in those that have knowledge, and is likened to the inclination of a habit. With the second, on the other hand, difficulty and labor are consistent in acquiring that toward which there is a natural inclination, and on account of the labor one may be deterred from its acquisition. And so it is with the desire for knowledge. It is replied second that, although a habit of itself produces ease in operation, nevertheless from some impediment coming from outside — as is said in Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 65, a. 3, ad 2 — one who has the habit experiences difficulty in operating, and consequently does not feel delight. Similarly, therefore, a man can be deterred from the acquisition of science, even though he has a natural inclination toward it, by the labor of learning and other causes, as Saint Thomas says in Metaphysics I. For, as he also says in Metaphysics V, in the chapter on the Necessary, the momentum of natural inclination can be impeded in the pursuit of something already begun, and prevented from commencing its motion. But against this: natural desire is never altogether in vain, because nature does nothing in vain, as is said in De Caelo II. Therefore, granted that a man is at a time impeded from the acquisition of science, yet at some point the desire will be fulfilled and

the impediments will cease. The reply is that, although natural desire following the whole of nature cannot be altogether frustrated — since it must be completed in some individual — yet it is not inconsistent for it to be frustrated in some individuals: especially when such desire is an elicited act of the will; and most especially if there is not in the thing a complete principle from which that toward which there is a natural inclination necessarily follows — just as it is not inconsistent for a woman to remain permanently without offspring, although she is naturally inclined to it. It may also be said that this natural desire will be fulfilled in the soul separated from the body: just as Porphyry said that the soul will then be blessed, even if it does not attain blessedness while joined to the body.

Chapter V

That Those Things Which Cannot Be Investigated by Reason are Fittingly Proposed to Men as Something to Be Held By Faith

Now it may perhaps seem to some that those things which reason cannot investigate ought not to be proposed to men as something to be believed, since divine wisdom provides for each thing according to the measure of its nature. It must therefore be shown that it is necessary for things that exceed reason to be divinely proposed to men as something to be believed. For no one desires and strives after something unless it be foreknown to him. Since, therefore, human frailty is ordered by divine providence to a higher good than can be experienced in the present life — as will be investigated below — it was fitting that the mind be summoned to something higher than our reason can attain in the present, so that it might thus learn to desire something and to strive toward something that wholly surpasses the state of the present life. And this pertains especially to the Christian religion, which singularly promises spiritual and eternal goods; and therefore many things that surpass human understanding are proposed in it. The Old Law, which promised temporal things, proposed few things that exceeded the inquiry of human reason. — According to this same method, the philosophers also took care to lead men from the delights of sensible things to uprightness, by showing that there are other goods superior to these sensible goods, in the taste of which those who devote themselves to the active or contemplative virtues take far more exquisite delight. It is also necessary that things of this sort be proposed to men as something to be believed, for a truer knowledge of God. For then only do we truly know God when we believe him to be above all that it is possible for man to think of God — because the divine substance exceeds the natural knowledge of man, as was shown above. By the fact, therefore, that certain things about God are proposed to man that exceed reason, there is confirmed in man the opinion that God is something above what he can think. Another advantage also follows from this, namely the repression of presumption — which is the mother of error. For some presume so much on their own intelligence that they think they can measure with their intellect the whole nature of things — deeming everything true that seems so to them, and false whatever does not seem so. In order, therefore, that the human mind, freed from such presumption, may arrive at a modest inquiry into truth, it was necessary that certain things wholly exceeding its intellect be

proposed to man by God. Another advantage is also evident from what the Philosopher says in Ethics X. For when Simonides advised man to pass over divine knowledge and to apply his mind to human affairs — saying that it befits man to know what is human, and what is mortal befits the mortal — the Philosopher says in opposition to him that man ought to draw himself toward immortal and divine things as much as he can. Hence in De Animalibus XI he says that, although we can perceive but little of the higher substances, yet that little is more beloved and desired than any knowledge we have of lower substances. He also says in De Caelo and De Mundo that when questions about heavenly bodies can be answered with even a small and probable solution, it happens that the listener experiences great joy from it. From all this it is evident that even the most imperfect knowledge of the most noble things confers the greatest perfection on the soul. And therefore, although one cannot grasp these things, yet much perfection is acquired if one holds them at least somehow by faith. And therefore it is said in Ecclesiasticus 3: 'Many things above the understanding of man have been shown to you.' And in 1 Corinthians 2: 'The things that are of God no one knows except the Spirit of God; but to us God has revealed them by his Spirit.'

[Ferrara's Commentary]

"With regard to the second, this conclusion is laid down: It is necessary that things exceeding human reason be divinely proposed to man as something to be believed. But before it is proved, a counter-argument is introduced that some might raise. For divine wisdom provides for each thing according to the measure of its nature. Therefore it does not seem necessary for man to be given something above the capacity of nature. He then proves the conclusion by four arguments. But it should be noted concerning the conclusion that since the necessary in relation to an end is said in two ways according to Aristotle in Metaphysics V — namely, absolutely, and in relation to what is well-being — both modes of necessity are meant in the conclusion. The first argument therefore proves absolute necessity; the others prove necessity in relation to well-being.

I. The first argument is this: Men are ordered by divine providence to a higher good than human frailty can experience in the present life. Therefore it was fitting that we be summoned to something higher than our reason can attain in the present life. — The antecedent will be proved below, in Book III. — The inference is proved: because no one desires and strives after something unless it be foreknown to him. Since therefore man must tend with desire and striving toward what

he is ordered to by divine providence, it is necessary that he foreknow it. This argument is confirmed first from a comparison of the Old and New Law. For since in the Christian religion spiritual and eternal goods are promised, many things exceeding human understanding are proposed in it; whereas in the Old Law, since temporal things were promised, few things were proposed that exceed human reason. It is confirmed second from the laws of the philosophers. For wishing to lead men from the delights of sensible things to uprightness, the philosophers showed that there are other goods superior to these sensible ones, in the taste of which those who devote themselves to the active or contemplative virtues take far more exquisite delight.

2. Concerning this argument, it should be noted that desire is sometimes taken for an act of the sensitive or rational appetite tending toward something not possessed; sometimes for an appetite and inclination of any sort toward something, even if it follows upon a natural form. What is said, therefore, that no one is moved by desire except toward what is foreknown, must be understood of desire as an elicited act of appetite, and not of inclination following upon a natural form: because, even if such desire also follows some knowledge — since every work of nature is the work of intelligence, as is said in Physics II — it does not however follow upon knowledge of the one naturally desiring. But it seems that this argument of Saint Thomas does not conclude: for the opposite of the consequent seems consistent with the antecedent. For something can be naturally known by us and yet we cannot attain it by our own power — just as someone may naturally know the nature of empire, and yet cannot become emperor by his own powers. The reply is that the force of the argument does not rest on this — that supernatural knowledge is necessary for us because we are ordered to an end that we cannot attain by our own power — but because we are ordered to an end that we can neither attain nor know by natural power, according to that of Isaiah 64: 'Eye has not seen, O God, besides you, what things you have prepared for those who wait for you.' And in this way the opposite of the consequent is not consistent with the antecedent. For it is not consistent that the intellect not be elevated to what is above its nature, and yet that man be ordered to what cannot be known naturally. For if they were consistent, then something would be moved by desire and striving toward the unknown: for it would know the end neither naturally nor supernaturally.

3. Concerning the first confirmation, it should be noted first, as is held in Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 107, a. 1, that the Old and New Law are not so distinguished as if they were ordered toward different ends — the Old toward temporal goods, the New toward spiritual goods — but because, having the same end, namely that men be subject to God, the New orders men more proximately toward this end, and the Old more remotely, and they are related to each other as imperfect and perfect. For the Old Law, being given to those who were imperfect and had not yet received grace,

led men to the observance of divine precepts through fear of punishments and the promise of temporal goods; but the New, which is given to those who are perfect and have already received grace and faith through Baptism, leads men to virtue from the very good of virtue, and especially from charity. That the Christian religion is said to promise spiritual things while the Old Law promised temporal things is not to be understood as if men of the Old Law had temporal goods as their end while men of the New Law had spiritual goods — but because temporal things led those who were imperfect to the love of God and to spiritual things, whereas we, having the perfection of grace, are moved from the very consideration of spiritual things in themselves to virtue and especially to charity. It should be noted second that, although there is one faith for modern believers and the ancients, as Saint Thomas holds in De Veritate, q. 14, a. 12, nevertheless men are required in the age of grace to believe explicitly more things than in the age of the written Law, as the same article 11 states. What is said here, therefore — that many things exceeding human understanding are proposed to us, while few were proposed to the men of the Old Law — is to be understood explicitly: because the ancients believed implicitly all that we believe, as Saint Thomas holds in the cited place.

4. Concerning the second confirmation, it should be noted first, as is held in Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 179 and 181, that some virtues belong to the contemplative life — such as those perfecting the speculative intellect, like wisdom — since the contemplative life has the contemplation of truth as its end. Others belong to the active life, such as the moral virtues, which are ordered toward action: for the end of the active life is exterior action. It should be noted second that, although sensible delights are for us more intense than spiritual ones — because sensible things are more known to us, and these delights come with bodily change, and they are desired as remedies against bodily troubles — yet spiritual delights are greater in themselves, as is said in Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 31, a. 5, and Sentences IV, d. 49, q. 3, a. 5, because spiritual perfection is more noble than bodily perfection, and better for rational nature, and for other reasons that Saint Thomas gives in those places. Hence he says here that those who devote themselves to the active or contemplative virtues take delight from the taste of spiritual realities — for the delights experienced by those devoted to the contemplative life, which rests in the contemplation of truth, or even of the active life, which is devoted to the exercise of the moral virtues, are far better simply speaking and according to their nature than any bodily and sensible pleasures.

II. The second argument is this: We have a truer knowledge of God from the fact that we hold this kind of truth through faith. Therefore this is useful for us. — The antecedent is proved: for we truly have knowledge of God when we believe him to be above all that we can think about him — since the divine nature exceeds the natural capacity of man. But by the fact that certain divine

things exceeding human reason are proposed to man, there is confirmed in us the opinion that God is something above all that we can think. Therefore, etc. It should be noted that, since we cannot see the divine essence as it is in itself, nor do we know God quidditatively, whatever predicates we attribute to him fall far short of the divine perfection — since God is something more excellent. Hence one who would opine that there is in God only the perfection that can be naturally investigated about him would be deceived, wishing to equal the divine nature to a created intellect. But if he estimates God to be more excellent than all that we can know of him by natural investigation, he has a truer knowledge — as one whose knowledge approaches God's nature more closely. Now to knowing this we are helped by the revelation of certain divine things that no one has ever been able to investigate by his own intelligence.

III. The third argument: Human presumption — which is the mother of error — is thereby repressed. Therefore, etc. — The antecedent is proved: because there are some who presume so much on their own intelligence that they consider only what seems true to them about God to be true, and what does not seem so to them to be false. But this rashness is repressed when certain things from infallible truth are proposed that exceed their intellect.

The fourth argument: Much human perfection is acquired by any sort of knowledge and faith of such things. Therefore, etc. — The antecedent is proved from the authority of Aristotle in Ethics X, who says in opposition to Simonides that man ought to draw himself toward immortal and divine things as much as he can; and from De Animalibus XI, that the little that is perceived of higher substances is more beloved and desired than all the knowledge we have of lower substances; and from De Caelo, that when questions about heavenly bodies can be answered with a small and probable solution, it happens that the listener experiences great joy. From these it is gathered that even the most imperfect knowledge of the most noble things confers the greatest perfection on the soul.

IV. It should be noted that the counter-argument made at the beginning of the chapter is not solved by Saint Thomas, but left solved by what has been said. For the inference is denied: because since the nature of man has been ordered by divine providence to a supernatural end, divine providence has provided supernatural knowledge for him — just as it provided natural principles for attaining his natural end.

V. Scotus, in the first question of the Prologue to the Sentences, agrees with us in two things: first, that it is necessary for us to have some knowledge supernaturally transmitted; second, that the end to which human nature is ordered — namely God seen through his essence — is not naturally

knowable by us in our present state. He disagrees, however, in that he holds that end to be natural, though to be acquired supernaturally. Saint Thomas, on the other hand, in the first argument of this chapter and elsewhere, holds that the ultimate end of man, which is God, is both supernatural and to be acquired supernaturally. Scotus proves his assertion first from the authority of Augustine in De Praedestinatione Sanctorum I, c. 5, where he says: 'And so to be able to have faith, just as to be able to have charity, belongs to the nature of man; but to have faith, just as to have charity, is a grace of the faithful.' Therefore, to be able to have faith and charity is naturally proper to man. Therefore, also to be able to have the end toward which faith and charity dispose.

Second: Man naturally desires this end that you call supernatural. Therefore he is naturally ordered toward it. And consequently it is a natural end.

2. But against this position of Scotus, insofar as he disagrees with Saint Thomas, the following argument is raised. If God were the natural end — that is, the end toward which nature inclines — but to be acquired supernaturally, it would follow that nature inclines its subject toward something to which it is impossible for it to lead. But this seems false in all natures. And it also conflicts with reason: for in that case the natural appetite would be in vain in nature, since it could in no way be fulfilled by nature. Therefore, etc.

3. But a difficulty arises here. For Saint Thomas seems to agree with Scotus in his commentary on Boethius's De Trinitate, at the last question, last article, last reply. For there he says that although man is naturally inclined toward the ultimate end, he cannot attain it naturally, but only through grace.

The reply is that Scotus takes natural inclination and natural end differently from Saint Thomas. For Scotus takes natural inclination as a purely natural inclination following upon nature and excluding knowledge — which is not an elicited act, as is evident from his own words in Sentences IV, d. 49, q. 10. He also speaks of the ultimate end materially — that is, of that in which the character of ultimate end is found. Saint Thomas, on the other hand, by natural inclination means not the inclination of nature as opposed to the inclination that follows knowledge, but an elicited act of the will that is natural and determined with respect to the specification of the act, though not with respect to its exercise. He also speaks of the ultimate end in general and under the common character of ultimate end and blessedness, as will be made clear below. And the sense of his words is that if the ultimate end and blessedness in general are proposed to the will, the will can elicit or not elicit an act regarding that object — but if it does elicit an act regarding it, that act will be a pursuit, and the will cannot flee from such an object; although a man cannot arrive at that

good by his own power. Now it is not inconsistent for a man to be inclined toward something by a natural act of the will in the said manner, and yet to be unable to attain it by his own power: because, although natural power does not suffice for it, yet it is proposed to the will under the character of the desirable from every point of view and lacking no good, from which the will has the property of not being able to reject it. But it is indeed inconsistent that something be naturally desired by that appetite which is the inclination of nature alone, and yet that man cannot arrive at it by any natural power: because nature of itself has no inclination except within the limits of nature.

4. The arguments of Scotus are not compelling. For what Augustine says — that to be able to have faith belongs to the nature of man — is not said because in man there is a natural power for faith and charity and for the supernatural end: but because in the nature and substance of man there is an obediential power for these things, and a logical power, which is non-repugnance. For it is not repugnant to the nature of man to have faith and charity, as it is to the nature of a stone. On the contrary, there has been given to man's nature a capacity for those things by which man can arrive at the supernatural end — as may be gathered from what is said in De Veritate, q. 14, a. 10, ad 1. Hence the sense of Augustine is that in the nature of man there is a capacity and aptitude for faith and charity, which is not found in other material natures.

To the second objection, the antecedent is denied if man is taken simply with respect to his natural endowments. For man, considered in his nature, does not naturally desire the vision of the divine essence as the supreme good and ultimate end toward which the intellectual nature is ordered by divine providence — for this is how we are speaking of the vision of the divine essence here. But if man is taken as informed by divine revelation and faith that his ultimate end and supreme good is the clear and perfect vision of the divine essence, then he does naturally desire it, just as he naturally desires the supreme good in general. But in that case the inference is denied — namely, 'Therefore it is natural' in the manner in which we speak here of what is natural: that is, of the end that is proportionate to nature, whose natural capacity exists, and to which one can arrive by the powers of nature. For it is in this sense that something is called natural among philosophers, unless we wish to misuse words.

Chapter VI

That to Assent to Those Things That Belong to Faith is Not Levity, Though They Are Raised Above Reason

"Now those who give faith to this truth — to which human reason provides no experimental confirmation — do not believe lightly, as though following uneducated fables, as is said in 2 Peter 1. For these secrets of divine Wisdom — which divine Wisdom itself, which knows all things most fully, has deigned to reveal to men — have demonstrated its presence, and the truth of its doctrine and inspiration, by fitting arguments. In order to confirm those things that exceed natural knowledge, it has manifestly displayed works that surpass the entire capacity of nature — namely, in the miraculous healing of the sick, in the raising of the dead, in the marvelous alteration of heavenly bodies; and, what is more marvelous, in the inspiration of human minds, so that simple and uneducated people, filled with the gift of the Holy Spirit, should in an instant attain the highest wisdom and eloquence. Beholding these things, through the efficacy of the aforesaid proof — not by the violence of arms, not by the promise of pleasures, and, what is most marvelous of all, amid the tyranny of persecutors — a countless multitude not only of simple folk but of the most learned men flocked to the Christian faith, in which things exceeding every human intellect are proclaimed, the pleasures of the flesh are restrained, and all are taught to hold in contempt everything in the world. For the souls of mortals to give assent to all this is both the greatest of miracles and a manifest work of divine inspiration — so that, with visible things despised, only invisible things be desired. Now that this was done not suddenly or by chance but by divine disposition is clear from this: that God foretold through many oracles of the prophets that this would come to pass, and their books are held in reverence among us as bearing testimony to our faith. This mode of confirmation is touched upon in Hebrews 2: 'Which salvation, having begun to be declared by the Lord, was confirmed to us by them that heard, God also bearing them witness by signs and wonders and various distributions of the Holy Spirit.' Now this most marvelous conversion of the world to the Christian faith is the most certain indication of past signs — so that there is no need for them to be repeated further, since they appear evidently in their effect. For it would be more miraculous than all signs if the world had been led — without miraculous signs — by simple and ignoble men to believe things so arduous, to do things so difficult, and to hope for things so lofty. Yet God does not cease even in our times to work miracles through his

saints for the confirmation of the faith. But those who have introduced the sects of error have proceeded by the contrary way: as is evident in Muhammad, who lured peoples with promises of carnal pleasures, toward the desire of which carnal concupiscence drives them. He also gave precepts conformable to those promises, giving free rein to pleasure — precepts that carnal men are easily disposed to obey. He brought no documents of truth except those that could easily be known by any moderately wise man through natural intelligence; or rather, he mingled the truths he taught with many fables and most false doctrines. Nor did he use signs wrought supernaturally — by which alone a fitting witness to divine inspiration is provided, since a visible work that cannot be other than divine shows that the teacher of truth has been invisibly inspired — but said that he was sent with the power of arms, which are signs that are not lacking to robbers and tyrants either. Not even any wise men, exercised in divine and human affairs, believed in him from the beginning: but brutish men dwelling in the deserts, altogether ignorant of all divine doctrine, through the multitude of whom he compelled others by the violence of arms into his law. Nor did any oracles of the preceding prophets bear him testimony. On the contrary, he corrupted virtually all the documents of the Old and New Testament by a fabulous narrative — as is evident to anyone who examines his law. Hence by cunning counsel he did not leave the books of the Old and New Testament to his followers to be read, lest through them he be convicted of falsehood. And so it is clear that those who give faith to his words believe lightly.

[Ferrara's Commentary]

Having settled the question of the mode of knowing divine truth with respect to the teacher's side, Saint Thomas now settles it with respect to the learner's side. And he lays down this conclusion: Those who give faith to the truth to which human reason provides no experimental confirmation do not believe lightly. First this is proved simply; second, comparatively with respect to the law of Muhammad.

I. The first argument is this: To believe divine Wisdom that reveals is not levity but prudence. But what we are speaking of, divine Wisdom has revealed. Therefore it is not levity to believe these things. — The major is manifest: because divine Wisdom can neither err nor deceive us. — The minor is proved as follows. A revelation and manifestation of certain things, confirmed by visible works that surpass the capacity of nature, comes from none other than one who is above created

nature. But the things of faith have been thus confirmed — namely, by what surpasses every capacity of nature. Therefore, etc. The minor is proved by going through the miracles. First, for the confirmation of faith there were marvelous healings of the sick, raisings of the dead, marvelous changes of heavenly bodies, and many other things in the corporeal order, of which knowledge has been transmitted to us both in the Old and in the New Testament. — Second, there was an inspiration of human minds beyond nature, when simple and uneducated people, filled with the gift of the Holy Spirit, attained in an instant the highest wisdom and eloquence. — Third, there was a marvelous and supernatural conversion of the world. For not by the power of arms nor by the promise of pleasures, but from the sight of divine works — even amid the tyranny of persecutors — a countless multitude not only of simple folk but even of the most learned men flocked to the Christian faith, in which things exceeding the human intellect are proclaimed, the pleasures of the flesh are restrained, and all are taught to hold everything in the world in contempt. This is the greatest of miracles and the work of divine inspiration — that the minds of mortals should assent to these things. And if anyone should say that this happened suddenly and by chance: Saint Thomas insists from the fact that God foretold through the oracles of many prophets beforehand that this would come to pass — which is a sign of divine disposition, not of chance. The Apostle touched on this mode of confirming faith in Hebrews 2, saying: 'Which salvation, having begun to be declared by the Lord, was confirmed to us by them that heard, God also bearing them witness by signs and wonders and various distributions of the Holy Spirit.' From this the following corollary is drawn: that it is not necessary for past signs to be further repeated — although God does not cease even now to work miracles through his saints. — This is proved: because this most marvelous conversion of the world to the Christian faith is the effect of past signs, and so those signs appear in their effect. — But if it be said that the conversion of the world did not come from preceding signs: this will be more marvelous than all signs and miracles, if the world was led without miracles by simple and ignoble men to believe things so arduous, to hope for things so lofty, to do things so difficult. And on this account miracles will no longer be necessary."

II. Second, he proves by comparison with the law of Muhammad. For there is nothing surprising if many have adhered to that law: because it promised pleasures and gave precepts conformable to them, giving free rein to the very things toward which the mind of man is inclined. — Likewise, Muhammad did not confirm his words with miracles, but said he was sent with the power of arms — which is what tyrants do. — Furthermore, not wise and learned men believed in him from the beginning, but brutish men dwelling in the deserts, altogether ignorant of all knowledge. — Finally, no oracles of the prophets preceded, which would bear testimony to that law as instituted by God. — From which it follows that it is levity and folly to believe it; whereas to adhere to our faith is the height of wisdom.

III. Concerning the proof of the conclusion a difficulty arises. For no works, however marvelous, seem necessarily and sufficiently to prove that our Law is from God. For there are no works so great that someone cannot by quibbling twist them — either asserting that they were done by demons, or that they appeared so through tricks but were not truly done in reality, or that they were produced by some natural cause. For the magicians of Pharaoh performed virtually all the works that Moses performed. Similarly, among the Gentiles many marvelous things happened resembling the miracles of our faith. And among the Muhammadans also various miracles are said to occur.

IV. For the elucidation of this difficulty — in which many Christians waver — it must first be considered that those alone are truly miracles — as is declared below in Book III — that can be done only by God alone, either with respect to the substance of what is done, or with respect to that in which they are done, or with respect to the manner of doing specially beyond the common mode of governing the universe. Therefore, when we wish to investigate whether something is truly a miracle, we must examine whether there is anything in it that cannot be done by any creature by its own power. If such a thing is found — and it is done in truth and not only in appearance — we shall assert with certainty that it is a true miracle. Yet we must take care not to attribute more power to creatures, and especially to immaterial substances, than belongs to them, nor to subtract more from their power than is proper: lest we either think that things that can be done only by God can be done by some created power; or believe that things that a created power can produce can be done only by divine power. For from either error, errors about true miracles can arise.

It must also be considered that, although in those things that are done corporeally it is difficult to have indubitable certainty — since demons, through the local transmutation of air or of some other body, or even through the alteration of the senses, can make many things appear that are not in reality — yet even in such things, from all the circumstances weighed together, it will be possible to discern what is true. For example, in the raising of a dead person: although a demon could enter a corpse and perform in it certain works similar to the works of life, or even so alter men's senses that one appears to have revived who has not — yet if we see all the works of life being performed in that body in the same manner as before, such that it appears so to all indifferently and for a long time, we shall say that the dead person has truly revived and not only in appearance. And similarly in other cases. It should further be noted that, although in some cases there may be illusion by the operation of a demon, there are nevertheless certain miracles in which illusion has no place — such as the alteration of the intellect and will, which are not perceived by the bodily senses. For illusions are directed at corporeal things that are perceived by some sense.

V. It is said therefore first that there are some truly and simply miraculous works that admit no slander — by which the truth of the teacher is best and most efficaciously confirmed. For there are some things that, if granted to have been done in truth — such as the sun standing still at the time of Joshua, or the sun suffering a defect of light in the passion of Christ when the moon was at opposition — cannot be denied to have been done by God alone. Similarly with the raising of the dead and the like. And of such things some cannot be denied to have been done in truth — such as the permanence of the sun and many signs performed by Christ. It is said second that the sudden illumination of the Apostolic mind brought about by the mission of the Holy Spirit admits of no slander. For not only in appearance but in truth all who heard the Apostles speaking in tongues and disputing recognized that this had been done. Nor could it have been done by demons: because this conflicts with their perverse will, by which they wish to draw men toward evil, not to lead them toward good. But if someone should say that an illumination of this kind could have been brought about by angels: even granting this, we shall say that just as other miracles are performed by God through angelic ministers, so also are the illuminations of men. And this will indeed be a certain confirmation of the truth preached by uneducated men: because good angels do not deceive but instruct men in divine things. — In a similar manner, the conversion of men — both of the uneducated and of the wise — to the faith of Christ, and the rejection of pleasures toward which there is a natural inclination of men, can be referred to God alone as its author, who alone can change human wills. It is said third that unusual signs and true miracles are worked by divine power, as is argued when the one who works miracles for the confirmation of his teaching preaches good morals and lives according to them, strives to lead men back to God rather than seeking his own advantage, makes no use of superstitions, and works wonders about useful things rather than vain ones. For then one can be certain that he is moved by a divine and not by a deceptive spirit. It is on this basis that Saint Thomas in Sentences II, d. 7, q. 3, a. 1, ad 2, distinguishes true signs from false ones. Therefore, although the magicians of Pharaoh, or unbelievers, or even Muhammad performed certain things that appeared to be miracles, they were nevertheless not true miracles — namely, things that would surpass the entire capacity of nature — as will be shown below. Finally it should be noted that the working of miracles does not so confirm the Christian faith as to make one see in a particular way that the things of faith are true — for this conflicts with the character of faith. Rather, they move the will so that one who sees them wills to believe. For from them, it is judged fitting to believe one who preaches the faith, because they show in general that what is preached is true and accords with divine wisdom, as being confirmed by miracles."

Chapter VII

That The Truth of Reason is Not Contrary to The Truth of The Christian Faith

Although the aforesaid truth of the Christian faith surpasses the capacity of human reason, nevertheless those things that are naturally implanted in reason cannot be contrary to this truth. For those things that are naturally implanted in reason are most true — so much so that it is impossible to think of them as false. Nor is it lawful to believe that what is held by faith — confirmed as it is so evidently by divine means — is false. Since, therefore, only the false is contrary to the true, as is manifestly apparent from an inspection of their definitions, it is impossible for the aforesaid truth of faith to be contrary to those principles that reason knows naturally. Furthermore: whatever is introduced into the mind of a disciple by a teacher is contained in the knowledge of the teacher — unless the teacher teaches fictitiously, which it would be impious to say of God. Now knowledge of naturally known principles is divinely implanted in us, since God himself is the author of our nature. Therefore God also contains these principles in his divine wisdom. Whatever, therefore, is contrary to these principles is contrary to divine wisdom. Therefore it cannot be from God. Those things, therefore, that are held by faith through divine revelation cannot be contrary to natural knowledge. Moreover: when the intellect is bound by contrary reasonings, it cannot proceed to the knowledge of truth. If, therefore, contrary kinds of knowledge were infused into us by God, our intellect would thereby be impeded from the knowledge of truth. This cannot be from God. Furthermore: those things that are natural cannot be changed as long as nature remains. But contrary opinions cannot be in the same person at the same time. Therefore no opinion or faith contrary to natural knowledge is infused into man by God. And therefore the Apostle says in Romans 10: 'The word is near you, in your heart and in your mouth — this is the word of faith that we preach.' But because it surpasses reason, it is regarded by some as though it were contrary. Which cannot be. The authority of Augustine also agrees with this, who says in De Genesi ad litteram II thus: 'What truth shall reveal cannot in any way be contrary to the sacred books of either the Old or the New Testament.' From which it is clearly gathered that whatever arguments are brought against the documents of faith do not proceed rightly from the first principles of nature implanted in us and known of themselves. Hence neither do they have the force of

demonstration, but are either probable or sophistical reasonings. And so there remains room for solving them.

[Ferrara's Commentary]

"Having settled the question of the mode of knowing divine truth absolutely, Saint Thomas now settles it comparatively with respect to human reason. Concerning this he does two things: first, he compares believed truth with naturally known truth; second, he compares the first truth with natural reason itself, in the following chapter.

I. First, then, he compares truth with truth. And he lays down this conclusion: The truth of faith is not contrary to the truth naturally implanted in us. Concerning this it should be noted that the first indemonstrable principles naturally known to us virtually contain the knowledge of all other things that can be known by natural investigation — and such things are true insofar as they accord with those principles. Therefore, from the fact that the truth of faith is shown not to be contrary to knowledge of the first principles, it is established that it is contrary to no other truth naturally known. This conclusion is proved in multiple ways.

First: what is contrary to the true must be false — since the true is not contrary to the true, but only the false, as is evident from their characters. But the first principles cannot be false, nor can they be thought to be false. Nor is it lawful to believe that what is held by faith — confirmed so evidently by divine means — is false. Therefore, etc. In clarifying the major, it should be noted that just as the character of the true consists in the adequation of intellect and thing through its understanding — namely, when it apprehends the thing as it is — so the character of the false consists in inadequation: hence it is said in Metaphysics IV that the false is constituted from something being said or appearing to be what it is not, or not to be what it is. A true cognition will therefore be one by which something is known to be as it is; and a false one, by which something is known to be as it is not. And since apprehending being and non-being are contraries, as is said in De Interpretatione II, true and false cognition are contraries. It is rightly said, therefore, that the false is contrary to the true — not the true — as is evident from their characters: because adequate cognition of a thing is not contrary to adequate cognition of the thing; but inadequate cognition — by which something is judged not to be that which it is, in which the character of the false consists — is contrary to adequate cognition of the thing, by which the thing is judged to be as it is, in which the character of the true consists. It should also be noted, for the clarification of the minor, that Saint Thomas speaks in different ways about first principles and about the things of faith, so as

to show that we have different relations to knowing them. For principles must be most true and must appear most true, so much so that not even their falsehood can be thought — as the Philosopher says of this first principle: 'It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be in the same subject at the same time,' in Metaphysics IV. For although someone could verbally say this is false, he cannot mentally think it: since then contraries would be in the same thing at the same time, as the Philosopher deduces. But the things of faith, although they are in themselves most true, do not have their truth apparent to us from the proper characters of their terms, but are judged in general to be true only because they have been divinely revealed — as is confirmed by miracles, as we said in the preceding chapter. In order, therefore, to hint at this different mode of our relation to knowing these things, Saint Thomas said of principles that it is established that they are most true; but of what is held by faith, he said that it is not lawful to believe it to be false.

2. From this argument of Saint Thomas the reasoning of Robert Holcot is excluded — who argues in Sentences I that the things of faith are contrary to natural reason, because natural reason dictates the opposite to be true. For from what has been said it is evident that this assumption is false. From what has been said it is also evident that what he assumes in another argument is false — namely, that the articles of faith are contrary to reason not only of uneducated people but even of the learned: for example, that a woman should conceive without the seed of a man. For it is said that they are not contrary to the reason of the truly wise. For if some truly wise men say that it is impossible for a virgin to conceive, they say this having considered the order of secondary causes — not, however, having considered the order of divine power. And if some have said this is impossible even for God, they were neither truly wise nor truly philosophers. Hence Saint Thomas, in his commentary on Boethius's De Trinitate, q. 2, a. 3, says that if anything is found in the statements of philosophers contrary to faith, this is not philosophy but rather an abuse of philosophy arising from a defect of reason.

II. Second: what is contrary to divine wisdom cannot be from God. But what is contrary to first principles is contrary to divine wisdom. Therefore it cannot be from God. Therefore what is held through divine revelation cannot be contrary to natural knowledge.

The minor is proved. What is introduced into the mind of a disciple by a teacher is contained in the knowledge of the teacher, unless he teaches fictitiously. But knowledge of naturally known principles is divinely implanted in us, since God is the author of our nature. Therefore God's wisdom contains these principles. Therefore what is contrary to them is contrary to divine wisdom.

Concerning this argument it should be noted that the containment whereby the teacher's knowledge is said to contain the disciple's knowledge is not the virtual containment of an active principle — since, as Saint Thomas says in Summa Theologiae I, q. 117, a. 1, ad 2, knowledge is not an active quality, but operates only as a directing principle in action. But the teacher's knowledge is said to contain the disciple's knowledge insofar as it extends to the same knowable things and to the same truths as the disciple's knowledge: for the same truth is known by both disciple and teacher, since the teacher moves the disciple to know the same things that he himself knows. Hence that containment could be called perfective and similitudinary — in the way that a square contains a triangle, and one white thing contains another white thing.

2. But a difficulty arises concerning the last inference. For this does not seem to follow: 'Divine wisdom contains the principles; therefore what is contrary to the principles is contrary to divine wisdom.' For this is not valid: 'Divine power contains white because it can produce white; therefore what is contrary to white is contrary to divine power.' It will be said that, just as divine power can be the cause of contraries because it contains both virtually, so divine wisdom will be able to be the cause of opposing kinds of knowledge, as virtually and super-eminently containing both. Nor does it follow that if one is contrary to another, it is also contrary to divine wisdom. For the elucidation of this difficulty, it should be considered that the containment of which we speak here is not, as we have already said, the containment of an active principle, but of a certain likeness and agreement, according to which two kinds of knowledge agree in the same truth known. And since one cognition is not contrary to another except because they are directed at opposed propositions — just as cognition by which someone judges man to be capable of laughter is contrary to cognition by which someone judges man not to be capable of laughter — therefore if one cognition is contrary to another, it will also be contrary to any that is similar to it, as agreeing with it in the object known. For what is contrary to this human cognition — 'Man is capable of laughter' — is contrary to every other cognition, whether angelic or human, by which man is known to be capable of laughter. The following inference is therefore valid: 'Divine wisdom contains knowledge of the principles; therefore a cognition contrary to knowledge of the principles is also contrary to divine wisdom' — because by this containment nothing else is meant than an agreement in the truth known by divine wisdom and by knowledge of the principles.

To the objection it is replied that the cases are not parallel: because there the argument proceeds from a virtual containment alone of the active principle, according to which the same thing can eminently contain contraries; but here we speak of also the proper containment of knowledge, which is perfective and similitudinary — a containment of a certain unity and agreement in the same object — according to which one kind of knowledge cannot contain opposing kinds of

knowledge; even though divine wisdom is also the cause of our natural knowledge. — But what is said — that the same science is of opposites — is understood, with respect to simple terms, as meaning that consideration of both opposites pertains to the same science, just as the same science deals with the healthy and the sick; and with respect to complex terms, that by the same science one part of a contradiction is known to be true and the other false.

III. Third: if this contrariety existed, our intellect would be impeded from the knowledge of truth. But this cannot be from God. Therefore, etc. — The inference is proved: contrary reasonings impede the intellect from the knowledge of truth. Therefore, if contrary kinds of knowledge were infused into us by God, our intellect would be impeded from the knowledge of truth. For the proof of the inference, it should be considered that the contrariety of arguments is taken from the opposition of the conclusions at which they terminate — since argument is a kind of movement of reason, and contrary movements terminate at contrary terms. For contrary arguments to exist and for contrary cognitions to be caused by them are therefore the same thing. And for the intellect to be impeded and confused by contrary arguments is the same as for it to be impeded by contrary cognitions caused by each. Now divine wisdom is proportioned to demonstration insofar as it causes knowledge in us. Hence, just as contrary arguments impede the intellect by causing contrary cognitions, so, if divine wisdom causes contrary cognitions in us, it itself would impede the intellect from the knowledge of truth. Which cannot be from God by action — unless perhaps on account of mystery or utility — but can be by non-action, that is, by not infusing the light by which something is understood: just as the evil of fault is not from God except by his not infusing grace.

IV. Fourth: either these kinds of knowledge will be simultaneously in the intellect, or when one comes the other departs. Not the first: because contraries cannot be in the same thing simultaneously. Not the second: because natural cognition always remains — for those things that are natural cannot be changed as long as nature remains. Therefore they are not contrary. — This is confirmed by the authority of the Apostle and of Augustine.

2. But a difficulty arises. For it is natural to water to be cold: and yet coldness is removed from it, with the water remaining, when it is heated. Therefore it is false that those things that are natural cannot be changed as long as nature remains.

This is confirmed: because Saint Thomas himself says in Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 57, a. 2, ad 1, that those things that are natural are always present in immobile things, but not in mobile things, of which man's nature is one. Therefore, although some cognition is natural to man, it can nevertheless be separated from man while he remains.

3. In responding to both difficulties together, it is said first that 'natural' — as Saint Thomas holds in Sentences IV, d. 26, q. 1, a. 1 — is said in two ways: namely, what is caused of necessity by the principles of nature; or that toward which nature inclines. The proposition, therefore — that things that are natural cannot be changed as long as nature remains — is to be understood of what is natural in the first sense: and it is true both of mobile and of immobile things. But of what is natural in the second sense it is true only of immobile things, not of mobile ones: because in accordance with a change of nature, such natural things too can be changed and impeded, while the substance remains in its essential perfection. Hence Saint Thomas does not contradict himself: for here he speaks of what is natural in the first sense; but in the cited passage he speaks of what is natural in the second sense.

It is said second that it is natural for water to have coldness — but within a certain range: namely, because from the essential principles of water a certain degree of coldness follows within that range, and water cannot fail to have some degree of that coldness. On the contrary, if coldness were reduced to a degree below the entire range — say, below the range between two and six — the nature of water would cease. Although, therefore, water left to itself and unimpeded is brought by nature to the highest degree of that range of coldness, it can nevertheless be impeded by a contrary through violence from having that highest degree of coldness: yet it can never have all degree of coldness entirely removed by any heating agent whatsoever, while its nature remains. Hence we may say that some degree of coldness is absolutely natural to water as caused from the principles of nature, and this cannot be removed from water; while other degrees of coldness are natural to water as degrees to which the nature of water, with impediments removed, brings it — and these can be removed from water by violence and for a time.

Chapter VIII

In What Relation Human Reason Stands to Faith

It also seems that consideration should be given to this: that sensible things — from which human reason takes the starting point of its knowledge — retain in themselves some vestige of an imitation of God, yet so imperfect a vestige that it proves altogether insufficient to declare the very substance of God. For effects bear in their own fashion a likeness to their causes — since an agent produces what is like itself — yet the effect does not always attain to a perfect likeness of the agent. Human reason, therefore, in relation to knowledge of the truth of faith — which can be most evident only to those who see the divine substance — stands in such a relation that it can gather some likenesses of it, but these do not suffice for the aforesaid truth to be comprehended as though demonstrated or understood of itself. Yet it is useful for the human mind to exercise itself in such reasonings, however weak, provided the presumption of comprehending or demonstrating is absent: for to be able to perceive even something about the most sublime things, even with a small and weak consideration, is most delightful, as appears from what has been said. With this view the authority of Hilary agrees, who speaks thus in his book De Trinitate concerning this kind of truth: 'Begin believing these things; advance, persevere: even if I know you will not arrive, I shall rejoice nonetheless that you will have made progress. For whoever piously pursues the infinite — even if he never arrives — will always profit by advancing. But do not plunge yourself into that mystery, nor immerse yourself in the secret of interminable generation, presuming to comprehend the sum of intelligence: but understand that these things are incomprehensible.'

[Ferrara's Commentary]

First, Saint Thomas compares the first truth to natural reason itself. Concerning this he does two things: first, he shows what human reason can do regarding the things of faith; second, what is useful.

I. First, therefore, he says that in order to know the truth of faith — which can be most evident only to those who see the divine substance — human reason can gather likenesses, but not demonstrations. — This is proved: sensible things, from which human reason takes the starting

point of its knowledge, retain some vestige of divine imitation in themselves, but not perfect enough to declare the substance of God. Therefore, in order to know what we believe of God — which is most evident only to those who see the divine substance — reason can indeed have likenesses, but not demonstrations. The antecedent in its first part is evident, because sensible things are effects of God; but an effect bears some likeness to its cause. — The second part is also manifest from what was said above: because they are weak and inadequate effects. — The inference is similarly evident, because an effect according to its condition leads to knowledge of its cause.

II. It should be noted for the clarification of the conclusion that, although faith has certainty in itself, yet that certainty is accompanied by non-evidence: because the things of faith are neither apparent to be true from the characters of their terms, nor are they manifestly known from their resolution into the first principles naturally known — since they are above human reason — but we believe them to be true only because they have been revealed by God, who is infallible truth. This is why Saint Thomas says that they can be most evident only to those who see the divine essence. For those who see the divine substance see that what we believe of the divinity is necessary, because from the characters of the terms they know that the predicate necessarily inheres in the subject — which relation we cannot now see. As for the point that human reason can have likenesses, this is to be understood, I think, after the revelation of faith has been made, and not before: since the human mind cannot of itself be elevated to the things of faith. Hence Saint Thomas says in Summa Theologiae I, q. 32, a. 1, ad 2, that a reason can be adduced for the manifestation of the Trinity that is congruent with the Trinity already posited, but not by which the Trinity of Persons is sufficiently proved. It should also be noted that Saint Thomas posits a twofold mode of evidence in these words: which yet do not suffice for the aforesaid truth to be comprehended as though demonstrated or understood of itself. For something becomes evident to the intellect in two ways: either by necessary deduction from principles known of themselves — and this is seen through demonstration; or from the characters of terms — and this is said to be known of itself to the intellect. Each, however, takes its origin from sensible things: because universal propositions, from which demonstration is constituted, are known only through experience, as is said in Metaphysics I; and likewise the characters of terms are deduced from sensible things, as the Philosopher teaches in Posterior Analytics II.

III. Second, he shows that, however weak such reasonings may be, it is yet useful for the human mind to exercise itself in these matters — provided the presumption of demonstrating or comprehending is absent. — This is proved by the authority of Aristotle cited above: because it is most delightful to be able to perceive even something about the most sublime things with even a

small and weak reason. — It is also proved by the authority of Hilary in De Trinitate who says: 'Begin believing these things; advance.'

Chapter IX

On The Order and Mode Proceeding In This Work

From what has been premised, then, it evidently appears that the intention of the wise man ought to be directed toward the twofold truth of divine things, and toward the destruction of contrary errors — to one of these truths the inquiry of reason can attain, while the other altogether exceeds the industry of reason. I speak of a twofold truth of divine things not on the part of God himself, who is one and simple truth, but on the part of our knowledge, which relates in different ways to knowing divine things. For the manifestation of the first truth, then, one must proceed through demonstrative arguments by which the adversary can be convinced. But since such arguments cannot be had for the second truth, the intention should not be to convince the adversary by arguments; but rather to solve his arguments — those, namely, that he brings against the truth — since natural reason cannot be contrary to the truth of faith, as has been shown. The singular mode of convincing the adversary against this kind of truth is from the authority of Scripture divinely confirmed by miracles: for what is above human reason, we believe only because God reveals it. Nevertheless, some likenesses of truth are to be adduced for the manifestation of such truth — for the exercise and consolation of the faithful, not for the convincing of adversaries — since the very insufficiency of the arguments would confirm them more in their error, as they would judge that we assent to the truth of faith for such weak reasons. Proceeding in the proposed manner, therefore, we intend first to strive toward the manifestation of that truth which faith professes and reason investigates, adducing demonstrative and probable arguments — some of which we have collected from the books of philosophers and of the saints, by which the truth may be confirmed and the adversary convinced. Then, that the process may go from what is more manifest to what is less manifest, we shall proceed to the manifestation of that truth which exceeds reason — solving the arguments of the adversaries, and declaring the truth of faith by probable arguments and authorities, as much as God shall grant. As we intend to follow the way of reason in pursuing those things about God that human reason can investigate, the first consideration to arise is that of those things that belong to God considered in himself; the second is the consideration of the procession of creatures from him; the third is the consideration of the ordering of creatures to him as their end. Among the things to be considered about God in himself, the

consideration by which it is demonstrated that God exists must be premised as the necessary foundation of the entire work. With this not established, all consideration of divine things is necessarily removed.

[Ferrara's Commentary]

Last of all, Saint Thomas, bringing his prologue to a close, declares his intention from what has been premised — with respect to the manner of proceeding. He first notes that, since there is a twofold truth of divine things, this duality of truth is not to be taken on the part of God himself but on the part of our knowledge. For the understanding of this, it should be considered that, since truth is in the intellect that is adequate to the thing through its understanding — namely, when it apprehends the thing as it is — two things are included in this: one that is real, namely the act of understanding; another that is of reason, especially in God, namely the relation of adequation to the thing understood. If we speak of truth with respect to the very act of understanding, there is in God one simple truth — indeed, he is himself most simple truth, since he understands the being of all things by one most simple understanding. But if we speak of truth with respect to the relation of reason, there is no inconsistency in there being many truths in God, according to the many things that he has understood and to which he is adequate. Yet because he understands those many things in one — namely, in his own essence — he is said absolutely to be one simple truth. Our intellect, however, knows diverse complex things by diverse understandings. Therefore, in relation to a multitude of things understood, there are in it many truths — not only with respect to the relation, but also with respect to the foundation and act of understanding. When, therefore, we say that there is a twofold truth of divine things transmitted to us, it is not to be understood as if God had a twofold knowledge of himself and had transmitted it to us; but because concerning those things that God — knowing them in himself by one knowledge — has revealed to us, we have a twofold knowledge and a twofold truth.

Second, it may be explained thus. For truth can be taken in two ways: either as it is in the thing known, or as it is in the intellect. Saint Thomas speaks here of truth as it is in the thing known, not as it is in the intellect. Now propositions about the same thing can be multiplied in two ways: either because in the thing itself there are diverse things from which diverse propositions are constituted — as about the man who is musical and white, one understands that he is musical and that he is white; or because the thing itself is most simple and utterly without diversity, yet because the intellect cannot comprehend it, it forms of it diverse imperfect and inadequate concepts from which it constitutes diverse true propositions. The sense of Saint Thomas therefore is that this

twofold truth — or diversity of true propositions — is not to be taken on the part of God himself, as if in him there were diverse things from which the diversity of propositions were taken (on the contrary, he is himself one and simple truth on the part of the thing, because all predicates attributed to the divine essence are identical with one another and also with the subject); but it is on the part of our intellect, which understands God diversely and through diverse concepts — knowing some things about him naturally and other things through revelation.

II. Having premised this, Saint Thomas adds that for the manifestation of naturally known truth one must proceed both through demonstrative and through probable arguments — collected from the books of both philosophers and saints. — From which it appears that not all arguments placed in this book by the holy Doctor are to be defended as demonstrative: since he himself says that he wants to adduce some that are probable. For the manifestation of supernaturally known truth, on the other hand, the intention should not be that the adversary be convinced by arguments; but that the arguments of adversaries be solved, and the truth shown from the authority of Scripture confirmed by miracles. Nevertheless it will not be useless to adduce likenesses of truth for the exercise and consolation of the faithful — not to convince adversaries.

Chapter X

On The Opinion of Those Who Say That God's Existence Cannot Be Demonstrated Since It is Self-Evident

This consideration — by which one strives to demonstrate that God exists — will perhaps seem superfluous to some, who assert that God's existence is self-evident, such that its contrary cannot be conceived, and that therefore God's existence cannot be demonstrated. This indeed seems to follow from the following considerations. For those things are said to be self-evident that are known immediately upon knowledge of the terms — just as, when one knows what a whole is and what a part is, one immediately knows that every whole is greater than its part. Now this is what we mean when we say 'God exists.' For by the name 'God' we understand something than which nothing greater can be thought. This is formed in the intellect of one who hears and understands the name 'God,' so that at least in the intellect, God must now exist. Nor can he exist in the intellect alone: for what exists in both intellect and reality is greater than what exists in the intellect alone; but the very character of the name demonstrates that nothing is greater than God. Therefore it remains that God's existence is self-evident — as though manifest from the very signification of the name. Furthermore: it is conceivable that there is something that cannot be conceived not to exist. This is evidently greater than what can be conceived not to exist. Therefore, if God could be conceived not to exist, something greater than God could be conceived — which is contrary to the character of the name. It remains, therefore, that God's existence is self-evident. Moreover: those propositions must be most evident in which the same is predicated of itself — as 'Man is man' — or in which the predicates are included in the definitions of the subjects — as 'Man is an animal.' Now in God, above all else, it is found — as will be shown below — that his existence is his essence: as if what is answered to the question 'What is it?' were the same as what is answered to the question 'Is it?' Thus when it is said 'God exists,' the predicate is either identical with the subject or at least included in the definition of the subject. And so God's existence will be self-evident. Furthermore: what is naturally known is known of itself — for it is not arrived at by studious inquiry. But God's existence is naturally known — since man's desire naturally tends toward God as toward his ultimate end, as will be evident below. Therefore it is self-evident that God exists. Furthermore: what by which all other things are known must be self-evident. But God is such. For just as the

light of the sun is the principle of all visible perception, so the divine light is the principle of all intelligible knowledge — since it is that in which the intelligible light is found primarily and to the greatest degree. It must therefore be self-evident that God exists. From these and similar considerations, some are of the opinion that God exists in such a self-evident way that its contrary cannot mentally be conceived.

[Ferrara's Commentary]

Having completed the prologue, Saint Thomas turns to the manifestation of divine things, which he intends to treat in this work. Now this book is divided into two principal parts, according to the two things that are known of God: for first he treats of those things that can be investigated by human reason; and second, of those that have been revealed and exceed human intellect — and this in Book IV. With respect to the first, he does three things, as he himself shows in the preceding chapter. For in Book I he settles the question of those things that belong to God in himself; in Book II, the procession of creatures from him; in Book III, the ordering of creatures to him as their end. Concerning the first, he does three things. For since in order to consider what belongs to God in himself it is necessary to know, as a necessary foundation, that he exists, he first premises that consideration by which it is demonstrated that God exists. Second, he treats of the divine simplicity — through which we can in some way know what God is — in Chapter 14. Third, he shows what God is like, in Chapter 28. Concerning the first of these, since for two reasons various people consider the inquiry into whether God exists to be vain, he does two things: first, he removes the stated reasons; second, he demonstrates his intention, in Chapter 13. — Concerning the first he does two things: first, he inquires about the first reason; second, about the second, in Chapter 12. — Concerning the first he does two things: first, he sets forth the arguments of the adversaries; second, he solves them, in the following chapter.

II. With regard to the first, then: there were some, Saint Thomas says, who thought the aforesaid inquiry to be superfluous on the grounds that God's existence is self-evident, such that its contrary cannot be conceived. They therefore said that no demonstration is needed in this matter. And this seems to have been the opinion of Anselm, as Saint Thomas reports in De Veritate, q. 10, a. 12. They confirm this by several arguments. The first of these is: God's existence is known immediately upon knowledge of the terms. Therefore it is self-evident. — The antecedent is proved: because by the name 'God' we understand that than which nothing greater can be thought of. But this cannot exist in the intellect alone: for what exists in the intellect and in reality is greater than what exists in the intellect alone. The second is that if God could be conceived not to exist, then something

greater than God could be conceived — namely, that which cannot be conceived not to exist. The third is that in God, being and essence are the same. But those propositions must be most evident in which the same predicate is predicated of itself. The fourth is that God's existence is naturally known — since man's desire naturally tends toward him. But what is naturally known is known of itself. The fifth is that God is that by which all other things are known — since the divine light is the principle of all intelligible knowledge.

Chapter XI

The Refutation of The Aforesaid Opinion and The Solution Of Its Arguments.

The aforesaid opinion proceeds partly from the custom by which people from the beginning have been accustomed to hear the name of God and to invoke it. But custom — and especially that which is from childhood — acquires the force of nature: from which it happens that those things with which the mind is imbued from childhood are held so firmly as if they were naturally and self-evidently known. Partly it also proceeds from a failure to distinguish between what is self-evident simply speaking and what is self-evident to us. For simply speaking, God's existence is self-evident — since his very existence is his being. But since we are unable to conceive in our minds what God himself is, his existence remains unknown to us. Just as it is self-evident simply speaking that every whole is greater than its part — yet to one who could not conceive in his mind the notion of a whole, it would necessarily be unknown. And so it happens that our intellect stands in relation to the things that are most evident in themselves as the eye of a night-bird to the sun, as is said in Metaphysics II. Nor does it follow that, upon knowledge of the signification of this name 'God,' God's existence is known — as the first argument intended. First, because it is not known to all — even those who concede that God exists — that God is that than which nothing greater can be thought; for many ancients said that the world itself is God. Nor is anything of this sort given to be understood from the interpretations of this name 'God' that Damascus gives. — Then, because even granting that by the name 'God' everyone understands something than which nothing greater can be thought, it will not be necessary that there be in the nature of things something than which nothing greater can be thought. For it is necessary to posit a thing and the signification of a name in the same way. But from the fact that it is mentally conceived what is expressed by this name 'God,' it does not follow that God exists except in the intellect. Hence neither will that than which nothing greater can be thought need to exist except in the intellect. And from this it does not follow that there is something in the nature of things than which nothing greater can be thought. And so nothing inconvenient befalls those who hold that God does not exist: for it is not inconvenient that, given anything whatsoever — either in reality or in the intellect — something greater can be conceived, unless one concedes that there is in the nature of things

something than which nothing greater can be thought. Nor does it follow — as the second argument supposed — that if God can be conceived not to exist, then something greater than God can be conceived. For that he can be conceived not to exist is not from imperfection of his being or from its uncertainty — since his being is of itself most manifest — but from the weakness of our intellect, which cannot behold him through himself but is led by reasoning through his effects to knowledge of his existence. From this the third argument is also resolved. For just as it is self-evident to us that every whole is greater than its part, so to those who see the divine essence it is most self-evident that God exists — from the fact that his essence is his being. But since we cannot see his essence, we arrive at knowledge of his existence not through himself but through his effects. The solution of the fourth argument is also evident. For a man knows God naturally in the same manner as he naturally desires him. But a man desires him naturally insofar as he naturally desires blessedness — which is a certain likeness of divine goodness. Thus God himself considered in himself does not need to be naturally known to man, but only his likeness. Hence it is necessary that a man arrive by reasoning at knowledge of God through likenesses of him found in effects. The solution to the fifth is also easily evident. For God is indeed that by which all things are known — not in the sense that other things cannot be known without him being known first, as happens with principles known of themselves — but because through his influence all knowledge in us is caused.

[Ferrara's Commentary]

Saint Thomas solves the premised arguments with great learning. Concerning this he does two things: first, he shows whence the deception of this opinion arises; second, he responds to the arguments.

I. With regard to the first, he says that two things could have led men into this opinion. The first is custom. For since from the beginning men have been accustomed to hear and invoke the name of God, and since custom — especially that which is from the beginning — acquires the force of nature, God's existence is therefore held firmly, as if it were naturally and self-evidently known. For those things with which the mind is imbued from childhood are held so firmly as if they were naturally and self-evidently known.

The other is that they failed to distinguish between what is simply self-evident and what is self-evident to us. For God's existence is simply self-evident — since God is his own being. But it is not self-evident to us: for we cannot conceive in our minds what God himself is. Just as it is simply self-evident that every whole is greater than its part — but to one who could not conceive in his mind the notion of a whole, it would not be self-evident; rather, it would be unknown. And it is for this reason that our intellect stands in relation to the things that are most evident as the eye of a night-bird to the sun — because we cannot conceive of them as they are.

II. For the clarification of this distinction, it should be noted that a proposition is said to be self-evident because it needs no prior and better-known proposition for its manifestation, nor can it be demonstrated through another. Hence Saint Thomas says in Summa Theologiae I, q. 17, a. 3, ad 2 — and it is the mind of Aristotle in Posterior Analytics I and of Boethius in De Hebdomadibus — that self-evident principles are those that are known immediately upon knowledge of their terms. But since a thing has being in two ways — namely, in itself outside the intellect, and according to how it is conceived and understood by our intellect — we can therefore speak of a thing in two ways: in one way, according to what belongs to it according to its nature; in another way, according to what belongs to it according to how it is conceived and understood by us. Now it is not inconsistent that something belong to a thing in one way according to its nature, while not belonging to it in the manner in which it is conceived by us — and vice versa. It can therefore happen that the nature of a subject and a predicate is such that one is identical with the other, or one has an immediate order to the other; and therefore, if each of them were known according to what it is in itself, it would immediately appear that the predicate inheres in the subject. But since the nature of subject and predicate is not comprehended as it is in itself, but is conceived weakly and imperfectly, therefore from that knowledge of subject and predicate it does not immediately appear that the predicate inheres in the subject — but something more known and prior to us is needed for its evidence. Such a thing is then said to be simply and by nature self-evident, because it is in the nature of subject and predicate that, if they were known as they are, the predicate would immediately appear to inhere in the subject, and no more known thing would be needed to have knowledge of it; but it is not self-evident to us, because their nature is not perfectly known, and from those concepts we form of subject and predicate, the connection of predicate with subject does not immediately appear. Which is why such a thing is not known upon knowledge of the terms as we conceive of them. But if some complex is such that from the nature of subject and predicate as they are in themselves known, the necessary connection of both appears, and their natures are known by us through proper and perfect concepts: such a thing will be both simply self-evident by nature — insofar as their natures have the property that, when perfectly inspected, the predicate is seen to belong to the subject; and self-evident to us — insofar as its evidence appears

from the concepts of the terms formed about them by our intellect, and not from any previously known proposition. Since, therefore, if the divine essence were seen as it is in itself, existence would immediately appear to belong to it — since existence is one and the same with it — it is rightly said that God's existence is self-evident simply and by nature. But since to God, as conceived by us, it is not established that existence belongs to him necessarily except from his effects — since we cannot conceive God as he is in himself — therefore that is not self-evident to us.

III. But a difficulty arises in the teaching of Saint Thomas concerning what propositions are those that are known immediately upon knowledge of their terms — which are called self-evident to the intellect: for we are speaking of these, and not of those that are evident to the senses, such as 'snow is white.' To some Thomists it seems that only those are such in which the predicate is of the definition of the subject: and they think this true of Saint Thomas from certain of his words. — To others it seems that not only those in which the predicate is included in the notion of the subject, but also many others, are self-evident: as is evident from those that Saint Thomas himself cites as self-evident — such as: 'Every whole is greater than its part,' and 'If from equals you take away equals, the remainders are equal,' and 'Incorporeal things are not in a place,' and the like. And they say in particular that also self-evident simply is the proposition in which the first passion is predicated of a subject. But we may say that being of the definition and notion of the subject can be taken in two ways: in one way, formally — as entering into the essence of the subject, as 'animal' is of the notion of 'man'; in another way, virtually and consecutively — as included virtually in the quiddity of the thing and immediately following upon the essence of the thing, as if we were to say that it is of the notion of fire to be hot, because heat so follows upon the essence of fire that fire cannot exist without being immediately hot. If 'being of the notion of the subject' is taken in the first way, then it is not required that that alone be a self-evident proposition in which the predicate is of the notion of the subject. Nor is this what Saint Thomas means. For although with him every proposition in which the predicate is of the notion of the subject is self-evident in itself, yet not conversely is every self-evident proposition such that the predicate is of the notion of the subject. For even he himself, in Posterior Analytics I, Lesson 36, expounding text 38, places among indemonstrable principles the proposition in which it is signified that a passion inheres in its proper and immediate subject — and similarly, the one in which a passion is denied of such a subject. And this also seems to be the mind of the Philosopher in the same place. But if 'being of the notion of the subject' is taken in the first or the second way under a disjunction, then it is true with Saint Thomas that every proposition that is simply and in itself self-evident is such that the predicate is included in the notion of the subject. For just as no middle falls between a subject and its definition — which is why the proposition in which the definition is predicated of the defined is immediate and indemonstrable — so between a subject and its first passion, with respect to the thing, no middle falls, and the subject of itself — not through anything else — has the property that such a passion belongs to it. And on this account the proposition in which such a passion is predicated of the subject is indemonstrable and self-evident; and immediately, upon knowledge of the nature and definition of the thing, it appears that such a passion inheres in it — just as immediately, upon thorough consideration of the nature and definition of a whole, it appears that a whole is greater than any of its parts; and, upon knowledge of the nature of fire, heat is immediately seen to inhere in it.

2. But the words of Saint Thomas in De Veritate, q. 10, a. 12, create a difficulty here. For there he proves that the existence of no creature can be said to be self-evident and in itself, because being is not perfectly included in the notion of any creature — since the being of any creature is other than its quiddity. From which the following argument is raised: No less is a first passion other than the quiddity, according to his teaching, than being. Therefore, if the existence of a creature is not self-evident in itself because it is other than its quiddity, for the same reason that proposition will not be self-evident in itself in which a passion is predicated of a subject.

I would say, for what now occurs to me, that being is other than quiddity in one way, and a passion other than its subject in another way. For being is altogether other than quiddity, and is in no way included in the notion of a creature — neither as existing identically with the quiddity essentially, nor as necessarily immediately concomitant with the quiddity: since any creature whatsoever has being entirely from without, and consequently the subject does not of itself have the property that being belongs to it, but through another. But the first passion, although it does not enter into the essence of the thing, yet necessarily immediately follows from the essence and is produced from it through a kind of natural emanation. Hence it is of the notion of the subject in the second sense. Therefore it is self-evident that such a passion inheres in the subject — but not that the being of a creature inheres.

IV. But against two things said in this determination — namely, that a proposition is self-evident in which the predicate is of the notion of the subject in the explained manner, and that it is different for a proposition to be simply self-evident and for a proposition to be self-evident to us — Scotus argues. For Scotus holds, in Sentences I, d. 2, q. 2, that a self-evident proposition is one that has evident truth contained in its terms, from those terms that are something of it, as they are of it; and that if a proposition in which the defined term is placed as such — importing a confused concept — is evident of itself, then it is self-evident; but if it is not evident from the terms taken in that way, even though it may be evident from the definitive concept, such a proposition is not self-evident.

Against the first thing stated by us, from Scotus's statements, the argument is raised as follows: and it is supposed, from Posterior Analytics I, that the definition is the middle of demonstration. Then thus: In a demonstration, the premise is a self-evident principle, but the conclusion is not self-evident but demonstrated. But in the premise the definition of the term is placed, while in the conclusion the defined is placed. Therefore, granting that the predicate is of the definition of the subject in the manner explained above, the proposition will not be self-evident — but the one in which the predicate is attributed to the definition of the subject will be. — This is confirmed: for if

such were self-evident, in a demonstration — in which a proposition is demonstrated through the definition of the subject — there would be, beyond impossibility (since an indemonstrable would be demonstrated), a begging of the question, because the same would be demonstrated by the same, and something equally known by something equally known.

Second: a self-evident proposition is one that has evident truth from its proper terms. But the distinct concept of the quiddity, as imported through the definition, and the confused concept of the quiddity, as imported through the name, are different terms. Therefore the proposition is not self-evident when the quiddity is taken confusedly — as it is signified through the name — which is not known except when the definition of the name is known.

Third: then any proposition that the metaphysician could know to be self-evident from the definitions of the extremes would be self-evident in the particular sciences. But this is not the case: because the geometer uses as self-evident propositions only those that have evident truth from terms known confusedly. Therefore, etc.

2. Against the second thing, he argues that a proposition is said to be self-evident because, by the nature of the terms, it is by nature apt to have evident truth contained in the terms — even if no intellect conceives the terms: because, by the nature of the terms, it is self-evident to any intellect if the terms are conceived. Therefore a proposition that is self-evident simply and in itself does not differ from a proposition that is self-evident to us. It may also be argued against this second point from the statements of Aureolius. An intellect conceiving a self-evident proposition either directs its gaze upon the concepts from which the knowledge of the proposition arises, or upon other concepts. If upon the same concepts, then the proposition will be self-evident to it. If upon others, then it will no longer be the same proposition: since words alone do not make a proposition, but rather concepts. And so it is wrongly said that the same proposition is simply self-evident but not self-evident to us.

V. For the solution of these objections it should be known that, when we say a proposition is self-evident that is known from its proper terms and not through another proposition, we mean by 'known from its proper terms' one that is known to be true from the definitions of the terms. But the definition of a term can be taken in two ways. In one way, for the definition on the side of the thing according to what it is in itself: and it is that through which the quiddity and essence signified by the name is defined and explained perfectly and according to what it is in itself. In another way, for the definition on the side of the thing according to what it is in our intellect: and it is that which our intellect forms of the thing as known by it, as known by it — discerning it from

any other thing, even if it sometimes imperfectly represents the nature and essence of the thing, as happens in the definitions our intellect forms of God and which are signified by the name 'God.' A proposition is therefore said to be simply self-evident when the predicate is of the notion of the subject on the side of the thing as it is in itself, and which is by nature apt, if its terms are known with respect to such definition, to be evident of itself to the intellect. But a proposition is also said to be self-evident to us when that concept on the side of the thing as it is in itself is also formed by our intellect, and the thing is perfectly known by our intellect as it is in itself. It should also be noted that the concept and definition on the side of the thing as it is in itself can be considered in two ways: in one way, materially — with respect to the thing signified and represented absolutely and in itself; in another way, formally — with respect to the thing as it stands under such a definition. In the first way, the definition and the defined are the same: for the definition signifies the same thing as the name of the defined. In the second way, they are distinguished: because the definition represents the thing distinctly, and the name confusedly — as is held in Physics I, Book 5. From this it follows that between the defined and the first passion there is no mediating definition, if both the definition and the defined are taken materially: for between the essence of a thing and its immediate passion there is no real middle. But if they are taken formally, between the subject and the predicate the definition of the subject is a middle: for the first is the thing as confusedly conceived; the second is the thing as distinctly conceived; and the third is the passion that follows. It follows second that the first and immediate passion cannot be demonstrated through the definition of the subject — as through a middle — if the definition is taken materially: since the definition taken materially is not a middle between the defined and the passion, but is the same as the defined. And it is in this sense that the words of Saint Thomas are to be understood when he places among indemonstrable principles the proposition in which a passion is predicated of its proper and immediate subject. But if the definition is taken formally, then such a passion can be demonstrated through it as a prior cause of knowledge; and as a cause in some way of being — in the way that the prior notion of a thing is the reason why the second belongs to it.

VI. To the first argument of Scotus against the first thing stated by us, the reply is that the conclusion of such a demonstration is demonstrated and not self-evident, if all things are taken formally — and 'what something is' functions as a middle, as we showed. But if all things are taken materially, then the conclusion is indemonstrable; and 'what something is' is not a middle. Therefore the same proposition is not self-evident in the respect in which it is demonstrated — when all things are taken formally — and is self-evident and indemonstrable when all things are taken materially. — To the confirmation it is replied that, if all things are taken formally, there is no begging of the question: because the same thing distinctly conceived is formally distinguished from itself confusedly conceived. But if all things are taken materially, then there is a begging of the

question, and there are then only two terms — because the middle and the subject of the conclusion are materially the same.

To the second objection, the reply is that the definition and the defined are not different terms if they are taken materially. Hence Saint Thomas in De Veritate and in other places proves through this that being is placed in the definition of God — with respect to what is on God's part — because the predicate is the same as the subject, since essence and being are one in God.

To the third, the inference is denied. Because it is consistent that in metaphysics the proper concepts on the side of the thing be known — from which the proposition is rendered self-evident in itself — and yet not be known in the particular sciences. — Similarly, it is false that the geometer uses only those propositions as self-evident that have evident truth from terms confusedly known.

VII. To the argument against the second thing stated, the inference is denied. For from the fact that a proposition is said to be self-evident because, by the nature of the terms, it is naturally apt to have evident truth — and by nature, if the terms are conceived, is self-evident to any intellect — it does not follow that it is known to us. Rather it follows that, because there is some such proposition whose concepts on the side of the thing we do not have, it is therefore self-evident in itself by nature but not to us. And Boethius in De Hebdomadibus says that some things that are self-evident to the wise — who understand the characters of the terms — are not self-evident to the common people; such as that incorporeal things are not in a place. To Aureolius we say that, when we say the same proposition is simply self-evident in itself but not self-evident to us, if we refer to those who in no way understand the signification of the terms — as when a Greek speaks to a Latin — then the same proposition is taken both materially and formally: for it is known in itself, but the terms are not understood by them. But if it refers to those who understand the terms in some manner, the same proposition is said materially — with respect to the voice and the thing ultimately signified — but not formally with respect to the concept imported. When therefore the intellect conceives and in some way understands a proposition that is simply self-evident in itself but not so to it, it forms other concepts from the concepts by which it is self-evident in itself. And therefore the proposition is formally other from that which is simply self-evident in itself: but materially it is the same, both on the part of the thing signified and on the part of the voice.

VIII. Having premised these points, Saint Thomas responds in two ways to the first argument made in the preceding chapter. First: it is not known to all — even those who concede that God exists — that God is that than which nothing greater can be thought. Nor is this given to be understood from the interpretations of Damascus. Second: even granting this, it is not necessary

that there be in the nature of things something than which nothing greater can be thought. For it is necessary to posit a thing and the signification of a name in the same way. Nor does it follow except that God exists in the intellect.

But for the refutation of this, it is said that it is not inconvenient that something greater than anything given — whether in reality or in the intellect — can be thought, except for one who concedes that there is in the nature of things something than which nothing greater can be thought.

2. Concerning the second response — in which it is granted that by the name 'God' is signified that than which nothing greater can be thought, but yet it is denied that such a thing must exist in the nature of things — note, concerning the proposition: 'It is necessary to posit a thing and the signification of a name in the same way,' that there is a twofold signification of a name: formal and objective. The formal signification is the concept that the intellect forms in itself. The objective signification is what on the part of the thing corresponds to the concept of the intellect. Now the formal signification is said to be posited in reality when in reality there corresponds to it some objective signification, which is the thing signified by the name. This proposition is therefore to be understood of the formal signification. For since, as was said, definition and defined are materially on the part of the thing the same — if the thing signified by the name is posited in reality, it is necessary that the signification of the name also be posited in reality, that is, that something existing in reality correspond to the signification of the name: since the same thing is signified on the part of reality by the name and by the definition of the name — though by the name it is signified confusedly, while by the definitive signification of the name it is signified distinctly. For it is equally necessary to posit man and rational animal: for if man is in the nature of things, rational animal will be in the nature of things; but if man were only in the intellect, rational animal would be in the intellect too. But from the fact that what is expressed by the name 'God' is mentally conceived, it does not follow that God exists except in the intellect — just as from the fact that what is expressed by the name 'vacuum' is conceived, it does not follow that the vacuum exists except in the intellect. Hence it is not necessary on account of such a conception that that than which nothing greater can be thought exist except in the intellect.

But when the following objection is raised: 'What is in both intellect and reality is greater than what is in the intellect alone. But nothing is greater than God — as is established from the character of the name. Therefore from the very character of the name it is established that God exists also in the nature of things and not in the intellect alone' — the reply is that the minor proposition is not true except on the supposition that God exists in the nature of things, or that there is something in

the nature of things than which nothing greater can be thought. For one who would deny that God exists, or that there is anything in the nature of things than which nothing greater can be thought, would say that something greater than God can exist — namely, whatever is in the nature of things. And when this is proved from the character of the name, the reply is that, although by the name 'God' is signified that than which nothing greater can be thought, that thing is nevertheless not in the nature of things.

But it should be noted — since Saint Thomas says that it is not inconvenient that something greater than anything given in reality or in the intellect can be thought, except for one who concedes that there is in the nature of things something than which nothing greater can be thought — that if the signified of this name 'God' is not conceded to be in the nature of things, it is nothing entitatively and really, though it is something in conceived being: just as the signified of the name 'vacuum' is. Hence it is not inconvenient that something greater than it can be thought — because whatever real being having existence in nature is thought of, that will be more worthy and greater: since being is more noble than non-being. Hence that real being — say, a man — is more nobly thinkable than God, supposing the signified of this name 'God' to be nothing in nature but only in thought. — But this is to be understood simply and with respect to being in nature, not with respect to conceived being. For even if God were not in nature, the signified of this name 'God' is greater than the signified of this name 'man,' if each is taken in conceived being only — though the signified of the name 'man' is simply and in nature greater, as being is more noble than non-being, as we said.

IX. To the second argument, Saint Thomas denies this inference: 'God can be conceived not to exist; therefore something greater than God can be conceived.' For this inference would be valid if God's being able to be conceived not to exist proceeded from imperfection or uncertainty of his being — since then he would be an imperfect being; but not if it proceeds from the weakness of our intellect, which cannot behold him. It should also be noted that the ratio of these two propositions is not the same: 'It can be conceived that there is something that cannot be conceived not to exist,' and 'Something can be in the nature of things that cannot be conceived not to exist.' The first, which the argument assumes, is true: for in conceived being there is no inconsistency in something's existence that cannot be conceived not to exist. But the second is false: because nothing can exist in the nature of things that cannot be conceived not to exist, since even God's non-existence can fall within human thought — according to the Psalm: 'The fool has said in his heart: there is no God.' It should further be noted that this consequent — 'Something greater than God can be conceived' — is false if we suppose God to exist and by the name 'God' to be signified that than which nothing greater can be thought. And because the argument seems to proceed on

that supposition, Saint Thomas therefore denies the inference — and not the falsity of the consequent, as he seems to deny in responding to the first argument, in which it is not supposed — indeed, it is denied from the response of those who hold God not to exist — that there is in the nature of things something than which nothing greater can be thought. Hence there is no contradiction when in response to the first he concedes that something greater than God can be thought, while here he seems to admit that this is false: for there he replied without admitting that there is in nature something than which nothing greater can be thought; but here he replies on the supposition by the arguer that something of the sort is in nature.

X. To the third he replies that it is certainly known by those who see the divine essence that God exists in itself — but it is not self-evident to us, who arrive at knowledge of him from his effects. For the elucidation of this, it should be known first that, although a proposition in which the same is predicated of itself is simply self-evident in itself — since the predicate is not only of the notion of the subject but is even entirely identical with the subject — yet it may not be self-evident to us: either because we do not know the signification of the terms, as happens to a Latin with respect to the proposition 'Man is man' in Greek; or because we do not evidently know the predicate to be identical with the subject — and so it is with 'God exists.' For since we do not see the divine essence as it is in itself, we cannot therefore comprehend of itself his existence, so as to see from the terms as we conceive them that being is not distinguished from his essence; but we arrive at that knowledge from his effects. But to the blessed it is most evident, since they behold the very divine essence.

2. To the fourth, he says that a man naturally desires God insofar as he naturally desires blessedness — which is a certain likeness of divine goodness. Hence it is not necessary that God himself, considered in himself, be naturally known to man, but only his likeness.

For the elucidation of this, it should be understood that man is said here to naturally desire blessedness — which is a certain likeness of God — and thus to know God in his likeness, not because he desires blessedness according to this particular character that it is the vision of the divine essence (for neither is it naturally known nor naturally desired in that way, speaking absolutely) but because he naturally desires blessedness in general — for everyone wishes to be blessed. But in whatever blessedness is placed, that is a certain likeness of divine goodness.

To the fifth, he says that all things are indeed known by God — not as the first thing known, but because through his influence all knowledge in us is caused."

Chapter XII

On The Opinion of Those Who Say That God's Existence Cannot Be Demonstrated But Is Held By Faith Alone

Now there is another opinion contrary to the position stated above, through which also the effort of those intending to prove that God exists would be rendered useless. For they say that God's existence cannot be found by reason, but is received by the way of faith and revelation alone. Some were moved to say this by the weakness of the arguments that certain people adduced for proving that God exists. However, this error could take for itself a certain false support from the statements of certain philosophers, who show that in God essence and existence are the same — that is, that what is answered to the question 'What is it?' is the same as what is answered to the question 'Is it?' Now by the path of reason one cannot arrive at knowing what God is. Hence it seems that neither can it be demonstrated by reason whether God exists. Furthermore: if the starting point for demonstrating 'whether something is' must, according to the art of the Philosopher, be taken from 'what the name signifies,' and the signification conveyed by a name is a definition, according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics IV — no way will remain for demonstrating that God exists, if knowledge of the divine essence or quiddity is removed. Furthermore: if the principles of demonstration take the origin of their knowledge from sense, as is shown in the Posterior Analytics, those things that altogether exceed sense and sensible things seem to be indemonstrable. But God's existence is of this kind. It is therefore indemonstrable. The falsity of this opinion is shown to us: first, from the art of demonstration, which teaches how to conclude causes from effects; second, from the order of the sciences themselves — for if there is no knowable substance above sensible substance, there will be no science above Natural Science, as is said in Metaphysics IV; third, from the pursuit of the philosophers, who strove to demonstrate that God exists; and fourth, from the apostolic truth asserting, in Romans 1: 'The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.' Nor should it trouble anyone that in God essence and existence are the same, as the first argument proposed. For this is understood of the existence by which God subsists in himself — which existence is unknown to us in its character, just as his essence is. But it is not understood of the existence that signifies the composition of the intellect. For in this latter sense, God's existence falls under

demonstration, since our mind is led by demonstrative arguments to form such a proposition about God by which it expresses that God exists. Moreover, in the arguments by which God's existence is demonstrated, it is not necessary to take the divine essence or quiddity as the middle term, as the second argument proposed — for in place of the quiddity, an effect is taken as the middle term, as happens in demonstrations of the fact; and from such an effect the meaning of the name 'God' is derived. For all divine names are imposed either by removing the effects of God from him, or by some relation of God to his effects.From this it is also clear that, although God surpasses all sensible things and sense itself, his effects — from which the demonstration for proving that God exists is drawn — are sensible. And so the origin of our knowledge is in sense even regarding those things that transcend sense.

[Ferrara's Commentary]

Having excluded the first reason for which some thought the inquiry into whether God exists to be in vain, Saint Thomas now excludes the second — which seems opposed to the first. For there were some, as Rabbi Moses reports, who said that God's existence is neither self-evident nor demonstrable, but is held only by faith. They were moved to this position by the weakness of the arguments that certain people adduced for proving that God exists. There are three such arguments. The first: in God, existence is the same as essence. But by the path of reason one cannot arrive at knowledge of what God is. Therefore neither at knowledge of whether he is. The second: the starting point for demonstrating whether something is, is the definition of the name. But a definition of God cannot be had. Therefore, etc. The third: those things that exceed sense and sensible things are indemonstrable, because the principles of demonstration take their origin from sense. But God's existence is of this kind. Therefore, etc.

II. But Saint Thomas refutes this opinion in four ways. First, from the art of demonstration, by which we are taught to conclude causes from effects. For from the fact that we see some effect to exist in things, we can by demonstration conclude — as Aristotle argues — that a first cause must exist, which we call God. Second, from the order of the sciences. For if there is no knowable substance above sensible substance, there will be no science above natural science. But it is established that divine science exists above natural science. Therefore there must be some knowable substance above sensible substance. But this second argument seems to be deficient for two reasons. First: even granting that there were a knowable substance above sensible substances, it does not

follow that its existence could be demonstrated. For its existence could be supposed, and other predicates about it could be known by demonstration. Second: in order for there to be some science above natural science, it suffices that there be some immaterial substance about which science is possible — it is not required that God exist, and that God's existence be known by demonstration.

To the first of these it is replied that, when the existence of the subject of a naturally discovered science is supposed, that existence must either be known through sense, or be self-evident from the terms, or be demonstrated in that science or in another. Since God — about whom metaphysics treats — is not known through sense, nor from the terms, as the aforesaid opinion holds, his existence must of necessity be demonstrated. The metaphysician cannot therefore demonstrate anything about God by supposing that he exists, unless it has been demonstrated either by himself or by another.

To the second, a twofold reply is possible. First: if there were no knowable substance other than those immaterial ones that the philosophers investigated by natural reason as the movers of the heavenly bodies, there would be no divine science — because the consideration of those would pertain to natural science, to which it belongs to consider self-movers and their parts. Second: Saint Thomas intends that in order to preserve the order of the sciences, one must posit a knowable substance above sensible substances — that is, the genus of separate substances under which God is also contained, using the name 'genus' in a broad sense. When this is demonstrated to exist, God's existence is also demonstrated, at least under the common character of immaterial substance.

Third, the aforesaid opinion is refuted from the pursuit of the philosophers, who strove to demonstrate that God exists. Fourth, from the authority of the Apostle in Romans 1, who says: 'The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.'

III. To the first counter-argument, Saint Thomas replies that existence can be taken in two ways: in one way, as signifying the actual existence by which a thing exists; in another way, as signifying the composition of the intellect. If it is taken in the first way, then it is true that God is his own existence — but what this is like is unknown to us, just as his essence is. But if it is taken in the second way, then God's existence falls under demonstration. — But supply: existence is not taken in the second way when it is said 'In God, essence and existence are the same.' For the elucidation of this reply, it should be noted that, since in every proposition the word 'is' signifies the composition of the proposition — in that it is a kind of copula and conjunction of predicate with subject — sometimes in a proposition, besides the composition of the proposition, it also signifies actual existence, as when it is said 'Socrates exists'; but sometimes it signifies only the truth of the

proposition, or the composition that the intellect forms about the thing — that is, that the intellect, in forming such a composition, is adequate to the thing and therefore is true. For example, when we say 'man is an animal,' what is signified is that the intellect which understands 'animal' of 'man' apprehends things as they are in reality. Similarly, when we say 'blindness is' — since blindness is not a being in the nature of things but only a negation — what is signified is that the intellect which apprehends something as lacking the visual power is adequate to the reality. The word 'is' does not signify actual existence, even in a proposition of the second adjacent, unless it is attributed to a real being; it signifies only the composition of the proposition. It should also be known that we stand differently when we know that God exists and when we know that Socrates exists. For since in Socrates existence is really distinguished from essence, it is nothing other than the actuality by which Socrates exists. Therefore Socrates's existence is completely known when it is known that Socrates thereby exists in the nature of things — which must indeed be known when it is known that Socrates exists, since Socrates is a true real being. — But divine existence does not differ really from the divine essence, but only by reason, on the part of our intellect, when we apprehend the divine essence under the character of the actuality of being proportionally to created existence. Therefore, divine existence is not perfectly and completely apprehended when it is known to be the actuality of being by which God exists in the nature of things — but only when it is known to be the divine essence, which is existence itself. Saint Thomas rightly says, therefore, that by the demonstration by which we know that God exists, we do not know the existence by which God subsists in himself — that is, with a perfect, complete, quidditative knowledge, just as we do not know the divine essence as it is in itself — but we know the existence that signifies the composition of the intellect. That is, we know that existence belongs to God as the actuality of being, but since we know only the composition that the intellect makes — that the intellect is adequate to the reality, and that the intellect composing in this way is true, and that the reality is as the intellect understands it — this presupposes knowledge of divine existence as an actuality of being and grounds the truth of the proposition, but does not attain the quiddity of that existence as it is in itself. By this, the objection of Scotus is removed — who says in Sentences I, d. 3, q. 1, that it is not necessary to distinguish concerning 'whether it is' as a question about the truth of a proposition and as a question about God's existence: because, he says, if there can be a question about the truth of a proposition in which existence is asked as a predicate of a subject, then in order to conceive the truth of that question the terms must be preconceived. — The reply is that certainly in such a question God's existence is preconceived — but not through a perfect and quidditative concept, but only as the actuality of being.

IV. To the second argument, Saint Thomas replies by denying that in the arguments by which God's existence is demonstrated it is necessary to assume the divine essence and quiddity — that is,

the definition itself, of which it is said in Metaphysics IV that the signification conveyed by a name is a definition. But in place of the quiddity, an effect is taken — from which the meaning of the name 'God' is derived — as happens in demonstrations of the fact. For the understanding of this reply, note that the starting point taken for demonstrating 'whether something is' concerning some thing is the definition of the name, not the quidditative definition — which is called the definition of the thing — as Saint Thomas says in Summa Theologiae I, q. 2, a. 2, and as is held in Posterior Analytics II: for the question 'what is the thing?' follows the question 'whether it is?,' as is clear from Posterior Analytics II. Now such a definition of the name 'God' is taken from divine effects. Hence the demonstrations by which God's existence is shown are, on the part of the reality, from the posterior — but on our part they are from the prior, because the effects of God are better known to us than God himself. For this reason Saint Thomas says that for the middle term in proving that God exists, it is not necessary to use the quiddity of God, but only his effect. This is to say that it is not necessary to use as the middle term the 'what is the thing?' of God, but the 'what the name means,' derived from the effect.

V. To the third argument, Saint Thomas replies that certainly the origin of this knowledge is in sense — because the effects of God, from which the demonstration for proving his existence is drawn, are sensible, even though God surpasses all sensible things and sense itself. It should be noted that from this reply Saint Thomas gives us to understand that the knowledge of something can be said to originate from sense in two ways. In one way, because the thing itself must first be known in itself through sense before anything about it can be known through the intellect. In this sense the proposition is false — for we know many things about God and the intelligences, and yet neither God nor the intelligences fall under sense in themselves. In another way, because either the thing itself falls under sense, or the intellect is led to knowledge of it through something that falls under sense. In this sense the proposition is true, as experience also teaches — for we experience that we have no knowledge of immaterial substances except insofar as we arrive at knowledge of them from sensible things.

CHAPTER XIII

Arguments for Proving God Exists

Having shown, therefore, that it is not in vain to strive to demonstrate that God exists, let us proceed to set forth the arguments by which both the philosophers and the Catholic teachers have proved that God exists. We shall first set forth the arguments by which Aristotle proceeds to prove that God exists. He intends to prove this from the standpoint of motion, by two ways. The first way is as follows. Everything that is moved is moved by another. Now it is evident to the senses that something is moved — for instance, the sun. Therefore it is moved by something else that moves it. Either that mover is itself moved or it is not. If it is not moved, then we have what we proposed, namely that we must posit some immovable mover — and this we call God. If, on the other hand, that mover is itself moved, then it is moved by yet another mover. Now either there is an infinite regress here, or we arrive at some immovable mover. But there cannot be an infinite regress. Therefore we must posit some first immovable mover. In this proof there are two propositions to be demonstrated: namely, that everything that is moved is moved by another; and that in movers and moved things there is no infinite regress. The Philosopher proves the first of these in three ways. First, as follows. If something moves itself, it must have within itself the principle of its own motion — otherwise it would manifestly be moved by another. It must also be primarily moved — that is, it must be moved by reason of itself, and not by reason of one of its parts, as an animal is moved by the motion of its foot; for in that case the whole would not be moved by itself, but a part of it, and one part by another. It must also be divisible and have parts — since everything that is moved is divisible, as is proved in Physics VI.

With these presuppositions the argument proceeds as follows. What is posited as moving itself is primarily moved. Therefore, if one part of it comes to rest, the whole comes to rest. For if, while one part is at rest, another part of it were still moving, then the whole itself would not be primarily moved, but that part of it which moves while the other is at rest. But nothing that is at rest because something else is at rest moves itself — for if the rest of one thing follows upon the rest of another, the motion of the one must follow upon the motion of the other; and so the thing does not move itself. Therefore what was posited as

moving itself does not move itself. We must therefore conclude that everything that is moved is moved by another. Nor does it meet this argument if someone were to say that the part of a self-mover cannot come to rest, and also that a part can neither rest nor move except accidentally — as Avicenna objects. For the force of the argument consists in this: that if something moves itself primarily and through itself, its being moved must not depend on anything else. But the being moved of something divisible depends on its parts, just as its being does; and so it cannot move itself primarily and through itself. It is not required for the truth of the drawn conclusion that one should suppose the part of a self-mover to be at rest as something absolutely true — but it suffices that the following conditional be true: 'If a part were to rest, the whole would rest.' And this conditional can be true even if the antecedent is impossible — just as it is true that 'If a man is a donkey, he is irrational.' Now it is impossible that something that is divisible should have its being moved not depend on the being moved of its parts. Therefore it is also impossible that something should move itself primarily and through itself.

Second, the same is proved by induction, going through all the things that are moved — whether accidentally, or by violence, or by nature, or as self-movers such as animals, or as things moved by nature such as heavy and light bodies. Everything that is moved, therefore, is moved by another.

Third, the argument is as follows. Nothing is simultaneously in act and in potency with respect to the same thing. But everything that is moved, insofar as it is moved, is in potency — since motion is the act of what exists in potency insofar as it is in potency. But everything that moves, insofar as it moves, is in act — since nothing acts except insofar as it is in act. Therefore nothing is both mover and moved with respect to the same motion. And so nothing moves itself. Saint Thomas adds that there is no difference between Plato, who held that there is a first thing that moves itself, and Aristotle, who held that there is a first that is altogether immovable. For Aristotle took motion in the proper sense, as the act of something existing in potency insofar as it is in potency — which mode belongs only to things that are divisible and corporeal, as is proved in Physics VI. But Plato took motion more broadly, for any operation whatsoever, so that understanding and forming an opinion are a kind of motion — a manner of speaking that Aristotle himself also touches upon in De Anima III. According to this, Plato said that the first self-mover moves in that it

understands itself and wills or loves itself. This in some respect does not conflict with the arguments of Aristotle — for it makes no difference whether we arrive at some first thing that moves itself, according to Plato, or at a first that is altogether immovable, according to Aristotle.

The second proposition — namely, that in movers and moved things there is no infinite regress — is proved by three arguments. The first is as follows. If in movers and moved things there is an infinite regress, then all such infinitely many things must be bodies — since everything moved is divisible and a body, as is proved in Physics VI. Now every body that moves a moved thing is itself simultaneously moved while it moves. Therefore all these infinitely many things are simultaneously moved while one of them is moving. But one of them, being finite, is moved in a finite time. Therefore all those infinitely many things are moved in a finite time. But this is impossible. Therefore it is impossible to proceed in movers and moved things to infinity. That it is impossible for infinitely many things to be moved in a finite time is proved as follows. The mover and the moved must be simultaneous — as Aristotle proves by going through the individual species of motion. But bodies can only be simultaneous by continuity or contiguity. Since therefore all the aforesaid movers and moved things are bodies, as has been proved, they must be as one mobile thing through continuity or contiguity. And so one infinite thing would be moved in a finite time — which is impossible, as is proved in Physics VI. The second argument to prove the same is as follows. In ordered movers and moved things — namely, those in which one is moved in order from another — it must necessarily be found that if the first mover is removed or ceases from its motion, none of the others will move or be moved, because the first is the cause of moving for all the others. But if there were movers and moved things ordered to infinity, there would be no first mover, and all would be as intermediate movers. Therefore none of the others would be able to be moved. And so nothing would be moved in the world.

The third proof amounts to the same, but in reverse order, beginning from the higher. It is as follows. What moves as an instrument cannot move unless there is something that moves as a principal mover. But if one proceeds to infinity in movers and moved things, all will be as instrumental movers — since they are posited as moved movers — while nothing will be as a principal mover. Therefore nothing will be moved. And so the proof of both

propositions that were supposed in the first demonstrative way — by which Aristotle proves that there is a first immovable mover — is clear. The second way is as follows. If every mover is moved, this proposition is either true of itself or accidentally. If accidentally, then it is not necessary — for what is true accidentally is not necessary. It is therefore contingent that no mover is moved. But if a mover is not moved, it does not move, as the opponent says. Therefore it is contingent that nothing is moved — for if nothing moves, nothing is moved. But Aristotle holds this to be impossible, namely that there should at some point be no motion at all. Therefore the first proposition was not contingent; since from a contingently false proposition no impossibility follows. And so the proposition 'Every mover is moved by another' was not accidentally true.

Furthermore: if two things are conjoined accidentally in some subject, and one of them is found without the other, it is probable that the other can be found without it — just as if 'white' and 'musical' are found in Socrates, and in Plato 'musical' is found without 'white,' it is probable that in some other subject 'white' could be found without 'musical.' If, therefore, mover and moved are conjoined accidentally in some subject, and moved is found in some subject without its moving, it is probable that mover can be found without being moved. — Nor can the objection be raised against this of two things one of which depends on the other — for these are not conjoined accidentally but essentially. But if the aforesaid proposition is true of itself, a similar impossibility or inconvenience follows. For either the mover must be moved by the same species of motion as that by which it moves, or by a different species. If by the same species, then that which alters must itself be altered, and that which heals must itself be healed according to the same science. But this is impossible — for the teacher must have the science, while the learner must not; and so the same thing would be both had and not had by the same subject, which is impossible. If, on the other hand, it is moved by a different species of motion — so that, for instance, what moves locally is altered, and what alters is increased, and so on through the rest — then, since there are finite genera and species of motion, it will follow that there is no infinite regress. And so there will be some first mover that is not moved by another. — Unless perhaps someone says that a reflexion occurs in this way: that when all genera and species of motion have been completed, one must return to the first — so that what moves locally is altered, and what alters is increased, and what increases again moves locally. But from this the same conclusion follows as before: namely, that what moves by any one species of motion is

moved by the same species — though not immediately but mediately. It therefore remains that one must posit some first thing that is not moved by any external force. Now since, once we have established that there is a first mover not moved by any external force, it does not follow that it is altogether immovable, Aristotle proceeds further, saying that this can be the case in two ways. In one way, so that that first thing is altogether immovable — in which case we have what we proposed: that there is some first immovable mover. In another way, so that that first thing is moved by itself. And this second way seems probable: for what is through itself is always prior to what is through another; and therefore, in things moved, it is reasonable that the first moved thing moves itself, rather than being moved by another. But granting this, the same conclusion follows again. For it cannot be said that the whole moves the whole — since then the aforesaid inconveniences would follow, namely that someone simultaneously teaches and is taught, and similarly in other motions; and also that something would simultaneously be in potency and in act, since the mover as such is in act, while the moved is in potency. It therefore remains that one part of it is mover only, and the other is moved. And so the same conclusion is again reached: that there is some immovable mover. Nor can it be said that both parts are moved — one by the other; nor that one part moves itself and also moves the other; nor that the whole moves the part; nor that the part moves the whole — since the aforesaid inconveniences would follow: namely, that something simultaneously moves and is moved by the same species of motion; that it is simultaneously in potency and in act; and furthermore that the whole is not primarily moving itself but through a part. It therefore remains that one part of a self-mover must be immovable and move the other part. But since in self-movers found among us — namely in animals — the moving part, namely the soul, though immovable in itself, is nevertheless moved accidentally, Aristotle goes on to show that the moving part of the first self-mover is moved neither essentially nor accidentally. For self-movers found among us — namely, animals — since they are corruptible, have their moving part moved accidentally. But corruptible self-movers must be reduced to some first self-mover that is sempiternal. Therefore there must be some mover of a self-moving thing that is moved neither essentially nor accidentally. That there must, according to his position, be some sempiternal self-mover is evident. For if motion is sempiternal, as he supposes, then the generation of self-movers that are generable and corruptible must be perpetual. But the cause of this perpetuity cannot be any one of those self-movers, because it does not always exist. Nor can it be all of them at once — both because they would be infinite in number, and because they do not

exist simultaneously. It therefore remains that there must be some perpetual self-mover which causes the perpetuity of generation in these inferior self-movers. And so its mover is moved neither essentially nor accidentally.

Furthermore: in self-movers we see that some begin to move anew on account of some motion that does not move the animal by itself — such as when food is digested or the air is changed — by which motion the motor that is the self-mover is moved accidentally. From this it can be gathered that no self-mover moves always if its motor is moved essentially or accidentally. But the first self-mover moves always — otherwise there could not be sempiternal motion, since every other motion is caused by the motion of the first self-mover. It therefore remains that the first self-mover is moved by a motor that is moved neither essentially nor accidentally. Nor does it tell against this argument that the motors of the lower spheres produce sempiternal motion while being said to be moved accidentally. For they are said to be moved accidentally not by reason of themselves, but by reason of their mobile bodies, which follow the motion of the higher sphere. But since God is not a part of any self-mover, Aristotle goes on, in his Metaphysics, to investigate from this motor — which is a part of a self-mover — another motor that is altogether separate, which is God. For since everything that moves itself is moved by appetite, the motor that is a part of the self-mover must move on account of the appetite of some object of appetite. That object of appetite is superior to it in moving — for what desires is a mover that is in some sense moved, while the object of appetite is a mover that is altogether unmoved. There must therefore be a first mover that is altogether separate and immovable, which is God. Now the aforesaid processes seem to be invalidated by two things. The first is that they proceed from the supposition of the eternity of motion, which Catholics suppose to be false. And to this it must be said that the most efficacious way to prove that God exists is from the supposition of the newness of the world — on which supposition, God's existence appears less manifest than it does on the supposition of the eternity of motion. For if the world and motion began anew, it is plain that one must posit some cause that newly produced the world and motion — since everything that begins anew must take its origin from some innovating cause, since nothing brings itself from potency to act, or from non-being to being.

The second is that in the aforesaid demonstrations there is supposed that the first moved

thing — namely, the heavenly body — is moved by itself. From which it follows that the heavenly body is animated — something that many do not concede. And to this it must be said that if the first mover is not posited as moved by itself, then it must be moved immediately by something altogether immovable. And therefore Aristotle introduces this conclusion under a disjunction: namely, that one must either arrive straightaway at a first immovable mover that is separate, or at a self-mover from which one again arrives at a first immovable separate mover. The Philosopher also proceeds by another way in Metaphysics II, to show that it is impossible to proceed to infinity in efficient causes, but that one must arrive at one first cause — and this we call God. This way is as follows. In all ordered efficient causes, the first is the cause of the intermediate, and the intermediate is the cause of the last — whether the intermediates are one or many. But when a cause is removed, what it causes is removed. Therefore, if the first is removed, the intermediate cannot be a cause. But if one were to proceed in efficient causes to infinity, none of the causes would be first. Therefore all the others would be removed — those that are intermediate. But this is manifestly false. Therefore one must posit a first efficient cause — which is God. Another argument can also be gathered from the words of Aristotle. For in Metaphysics II he shows that what is supremely true is also supremely a being. And in Metaphysics IV he shows that there is something supremely true — from the fact that we see that of two false things one is more false than the other, and therefore one must be more true than the other; and this is by approximation to what is simply and supremely true. From this it can further be concluded that there is something that is supremely a being. And this we call God. An argument from the governance of things is also adduced from The Damascene and is also hinted at by the Commentator in Physics II. It is as follows. It is impossible for contrary and discordant things to come together into one order always or for the most part unless they be directed by some governance, through which it is given to each and every thing to tend toward a certain end. But in the world we see things of diverse natures coming together into one order — not rarely and by chance, but always or for the most part. There must therefore be some being whose providence governs the world. And this we call God.

[Ferrara's Commentary]

Having removed those things for which some thought the inquiry into whether God exists to be in vain, Saint Thomas adduces the arguments of both philosophers and theologians by which it is

proved that God exists. Concerning this he does two principal things: first, he adduces the arguments drawn from Physics VIII; second, the arguments drawn from the Metaphysics and from Damascus. With regard to the first, he does two things: first, he adduces the arguments themselves; second, he shows what force they have.

I. With regard to the first, the argument proceeds first as follows. Everything that is moved is moved by another. Either, then, that mover is itself moved or not. If the second, we have the proposition — since we call an immovable mover God. If the first, then it is moved by another mover. But there is no infinite regress. Therefore it is necessary to posit some first immovable mover.

2. The first assumption is proved. First: what moves itself is primarily moved. Therefore at the rest of one of its parts, the whole comes to rest — for if, while one part is at rest, another part of it were still moving, then the whole would not be primarily moved. But if the rest of one thing follows upon the rest of another, its motion must follow upon the motion of that other. Therefore such a thing is not moved by itself. Therefore what was posited as moving itself does not move itself. — Nor does it meet this argument to say that the part of a self-mover cannot be at rest, and that a part can neither rest nor move except accidentally, as Avicenna objects. For the force of the argument consists in this: that if something moves itself primarily, its being moved does not depend on anything. But the being moved of a divisible thing depends on its parts, just as its being does. The conditional 'If a part were to rest, the whole would rest' must be true — and this conditional can be true even if its antecedent is impossible. Second, the same is proved by induction — going through all things that are moved either essentially, or accidentally, or by violence, or by nature. Third: because everything that is moved, insofar as it is moved, is in potency; and everything that moves, insofar as it moves, is in act. But the same thing is not simultaneously in act and in potency with respect to the same thing. Saint Thomas also adds that there is no difference between Plato, who holds that one must arrive at a first that moves itself, and Aristotle, who holds that one must arrive at a first that is altogether immovable. For Aristotle took motion as the act of something existing in potency insofar as it is in potency; Plato, on the other hand, took motion for any operation whatsoever, so that understanding is a kind of motion. 3. That there is no infinite regress in movers and moved things — the second thing assumed in the principal argument — is proved in three ways: first, because since all such infinitely many things must be bodies, and since a body that moves a moved thing is itself simultaneously moved while it moves, all must be moved while one of them is moving. And since one of them is moved in a finite time because it is finite, all those must be moved in a finite time — which is impossible, since as one mobile through continuity or contiguity, one infinite thing would be moved in a finite time. Second, because there will be no first mover, and all will be as intermediate movers. And so nothing will be moved — because if the first

mover is removed or ceases from its motion, none of the others will move or be moved. Third, because all will be as instrumental movers, with nothing as a principal mover — and so again nothing will be moved.

II. Concerning the first argument by which it is proved that everything that is moved is moved by another — where it is supposed that if something moves itself it must be primarily moved — note that Saint Thomas here speaks according to the mind of Aristotle: concerning what moves itself primarily, not what does not move itself primarily. For if something moves itself primarily, the whole must move according to itself, and the whole according to itself must be moved — so that it is both primarily moving and primarily moved. For if only a part were to move and not the whole, the part would be primarily moving — that is, not through anything else — while the whole would be said to move not primarily but through another, namely through the part. Similarly, if only a part were to be moved essentially, that part would be primarily moved, while the whole would be said not to be moved primarily but through the part.

III. Concerning the proposition 'What is at rest because something else is at rest does not move itself,' a difficulty arises. For someone could say that this is true of what is at rest because the mover is at rest — but not of what is at rest because the part is at rest. For the part is the matter of the whole, not what moves the whole. Therefore the fact that the whole rests at the rest of the part does not argue that it is moved by another — but only that the motion of the whole cannot be without the motions of the parts, just as nothing can exist without its matter. And this is not inconvenient. For the elucidation of this, it should first be premised — following the Commentator in Physics VII, comment 2 — that the proposition is to be understood of what rests essentially at the rest of another, not of what rests accidentally. For if we suppose a stone to descend by itself, it could nonetheless come to rest upward at the rest of a millstone encountered by it and violently held in place — but this would be accidentally. — As to the difficulty: it is said that something is argued not to move itself primarily not only if it rests at the rest of the mover, but also if it rests at the rest of the part. For as Albert says in Physics VII, if something is supposed to move itself primarily, then when one part of it rests, the other part could be moved by the motion of the whole — otherwise to move and to be moved would not belong to the whole primarily. Therefore if when a part rests the whole rests, this argues that the whole is moved by another.

IV. But what Saint Thomas further assumes — that the being moved of a divisible thing depends on its parts just as its being does — presents a difficulty. For it seems to be the contrary that is true. For being and motion belong primarily and essentially not to the parts but to the whole — since parts exist only through the being of the whole, nor are they moved except by the motion of the

whole, if what moves locally is continuous. Therefore being and motion of the whole do not depend on being and motion of the parts, but rather being and motion of the parts depend on being and motion of the whole. The reply is that, although parts formally exist through the being of the whole, and similarly are formally moved by one motion that is the motion of the whole continuous as motion is divided by the division of the mobile, they are nevertheless the cause of the whole in the order of material cause, and the motions of the parts are the matter of the motion of the whole. And thus parts, as such, are prior to the whole. Hence the being and motion of the whole depend on the parts in the way of generation and in the order of material cause — while the parts depend on the whole in the order of formal cause.

2. But then a greater difficulty arises. If for this reason nothing moves itself primarily — because its being moved depends in the order of material cause on the being moved of its parts — it follows that nothing can be primarily moved by another either, since in every moved thing it is true that the being moved of the whole depends materially on the being moved of its parts. It is said first that, although something may be moved primarily with priority of time and priority of information — because a whole is simultaneously moved and informed with motion according to all its parts — yet it is true that nothing is moved primarily, even by another, with priority of causality in every mode, such that its being moved does not depend in any order of causality on the being moved of another. For just as the whole depends materially on its parts such that when the parts are removed the whole is removed, so the motion of the whole depends on the motions of its parts such that when the motions of the parts are removed the motion of the whole is removed. It is said second that if something were to move itself primarily such that the whole, precisely as itself, were to move, and the whole, precisely as itself, were to be moved, then the whole would need to be moved primarily by itself with priority of causality — such that the motion of the whole does not depend in any order of causality on anything else, and such that the removal of motion from a part would not remove it from the whole. For as is clear from Posterior Analytics I, what belongs to something primarily does not belong to it through another — indeed it belongs to others through it; nor is it removed from it because it is removed from another, as we showed in Physics VII against Scotus, where we treated this matter more at length. And since it is impossible for the being moved of anything not to depend on the being moved of its parts, it is therefore also impossible that anything should move itself primarily.

V. Further, in the second argument — by which it is proved that nothing moves itself, by induction — note that what is moved accidentally can indeed in some way move itself, namely when it moves something else and is moved by its motion, as when the soul is moved by the motion of the body moved by it, or a sailor by the motion of the ship. But it cannot move itself primarily. For if

something is moved by the motion of another, it is manifestly not being moved primarily and as such.

VI. Concerning the third argument to the same effect, a difficulty is raised from Scotus, in Sentences I, d. 3, q. 7, in his replies to arguments for the second opinion. He says that although nothing can simultaneously be in formal act and in formal potency with respect to the same thing — for instance, formally hot and potentially hot — yet something can be simultaneously in virtual act and in formal potency. And so he holds that something can move itself primarily while it is in virtual act, because it has the power to move; and while it is in formal potency, because it does not formally have the form it acquires through motion but can have it. He explains this at more length in Sentences II, d. 11, q. 10, ad 2. He also adds that the proposition 'Nothing acts upon itself' is not true except of a univocal agent. — And this can be confirmed by the fact that Aristotle in Physics VIII, text 40, where he proves the proposition by the adduced argument, deduces that the same thing would be hot and not hot, and similarly each of the others — whatever they are — of which the mover must have a univocal instance. In these words he manifestly seems to wish that it is only in univocal cases that he intends it to be true that nothing moves itself primarily, and not in equivocal cases.

VII. But against this response the following argument is raised. First, that the first thing stated is not according to the mind of Aristotle, as follows. Aristotle wishes to have from the proved proposition — that the same thing does not move itself primarily — the conclusion that a self-mover is divided into two parts, one of which is mover and the other is moved. Hence at the end of text 40 he concludes: 'This, therefore, moves, and that is moved, of the self-mover.' But if the assumed proposition — that the same thing cannot simultaneously be in act and in potency — were understood only of formal act and formal potency, and not of virtual act and formal potency, this intended conclusion would not be proved. For it would be said that a self-mover locally is not in formal act but in virtual act and formal potency; and so it would not be necessary for it to be divided into two parts — since being in virtual act and in formal potency can belong simultaneously to the same thing; and consequently the same thing can move itself primarily. Therefore, etc. Furthermore: something is said to be according to its nature in virtual act of some form because it has the power to produce that form. But what has the power to produce some form in itself cannot lack that form. Therefore something cannot be simultaneously in virtual act and in formal potency with respect to that form. — The minor is proved: because, given a naturally sufficient cause, its effect is posited in reality.

2. That the second thing stated is not true is proved as follows. First, that it is not according to the

mind of Aristotle. For when the Philosopher deduces from the fact that there is no infinite regress that one must arrive at one first self-mover, and that one of its parts must be mover and the other moved — because nothing moves itself primarily — he either posits the heaven as moving as a univocal agent or as an equivocal agent. Not as a univocal agent: both because Aristotle posits what is mover as immovable, and consequently the heaven, insofar as it moves itself, does not move itself by motion — which would make it a univocal mover; and also because a self-mover locally does not cause motion in itself through a local motion existing in itself, as if local motion were the form by which it acts. Therefore it moves itself as an equivocal mover. Therefore the proposition assumed is not true only in univocal agents, but also in equivocal ones, and according to Aristotle, a self-mover must be divided into a moving part and a moved part.

Second: an equivocal agent is one to which it does not belong to have in itself the form of its effect, but something more eminent in which that form is contained. But if something existing in virtual act were simultaneously in formal potency with respect to the same thing, it would at some point have formally in itself that form of which it is the cause — namely, when it has been reduced from potency to act. Therefore such a thing would not be an equivocal agent.

Third: the reason why it is repugnant for something to be simultaneously in formal act and in formal potency is that the character of act and the character of passive potency are opposed — since the character of the one consists in perfection, and the character of the other in imperfection and privation. But virtual act is no less perfect than formal act — indeed it is more excellent in mode. Therefore, if it is repugnant for something to be simultaneously in formal act and in formal potency — namely in those things that are said univocally — it will be far more repugnant for something to be simultaneously in virtual act and in formal potency, in equivocal cases. As for the authority of Aristotle: setting aside the Commentator's exposition there, it is said that Aristotle makes mention of univocal cases because in these it is manifest to us that the same thing cannot be in act and in potency — leaving it as obvious that if in those cases it cannot be so, much less can it be in equivocal cases, where the act is of a more eminent mode.

VIII. But a difficulty remains here from the words of Saint Thomas in Summa Theologiae I, q. 77, a. 6. For there he says that a subject, insofar as it is in potency, is receptive of its proper accident, while insofar as it is in act, it is productive of it. From this he concludes that it is not inconvenient for the powers of the soul to flow from the essence of the soul as from a principle, while some of them are in the soul alone as their subject. From these words the following argument is raised: the soul is in virtual act with respect to its powers, and in formal potency with respect to the same powers — since it is productive of them insofar as it is in act, and receptive of them insofar as it is in

potency. Therefore, etc.

The reply is that from the words of Saint Thomas it is not gathered that the soul is in virtual act and in formal potency — but only that it has something of actuality and something of potentiality, by one of which it produces and by the other of which it is the subject of the powers. For to be in formal potency is to not have a form and to be able to have it; and to be in virtual act and in formal potency is to be able to produce and receive through an intermediate action and transmutation a form that is not yet had. But this is not found in the soul with respect to its powers — for the soul is never without its powers, especially those that are in the soul alone, such as the intellective powers; rather, the soul always has them conjoined, since they are not produced through an intermediate action, but through natural sequence. Now there is nothing inconvenient about the same thing causing something in itself through natural resultance, and being the principle of that thing insofar as it has something of actuality, while being the subject of it insofar as it is not pure act but has something of potentiality — just as the soul in relation to its being has the character of potency. But it is indeed impossible for something to cause in itself some form through an intermediate action and transmutation, since this supposes the thing to be simultaneously in act and in remote potency from act. It should also be noted, when we say that the same thing cannot be mover and moved, agent and patient, with respect to the same thing, that we do not mean identity of supposit — for the same supposit can be agent and patient. We are speaking of identity of formal principle of acting and being acted upon: for we say that one and the same thing cannot be the principle of acting and the principle of being acted upon with respect to the same thing.

IX. Concerning the first argument by which it is proved that there is no infinite regress in movers and moved things, a difficulty is raised. For it seems to be inefficacious. For it does not follow that if one continuous thing is made from infinitely many mobile things, that one motion that is infinite in number would be infinite in time in a finite time — speaking of infinite motion in the sense that the whole infinite body traverses some space, which is the sense in which Physics VI proves that an infinite mobile cannot be moved in a finite time. For it would be said that if there are infinitely many separate and distinct movers and moved things, they would all be moved in the same finite time — but not by traversing the same finite magnitude, but each a different one. For the one that moves last traverses its magnitude in that time, and the one nearest the mover traverses an equal magnitude in the same time, if the mover applied to the mobile drives it by straight motion and is of the same size as it, applied to its extremity — as if a rod one cubit long were to push a rod of the same size. Similarly, if we were to imagine a continuum made from those infinitely many things, it would not follow that the whole traverses one magnitude in a finite time: but that its finite parts would traverse diverse finite magnitudes — infinite in number but finite in quantity — in a finite

time, so that each finite part of it would traverse some finite space. This, though impossible, is proved by Aristotle in Physics III and De Caelo I to be impossible for the infinite to be moved; yet it does not seem to be intended by Aristotle here, since Physics VI had a different sense when it proved that the infinite cannot be moved in a finite time.

I would say — subject always to a better judgment — that this argument of Aristotle applies only to circular motion, by which one circular body contained within another is moved circularly, so that all are moved by the same diurnal motion, as happens with the heavenly spheres. For Aristotle considered the order of the universe in which the elements are contained by the lunar sphere, the heavenly bodies contain one another, and all are moved daily from east to west returning to the east — so that lower and higher bodies are moved by such motion in equal time. And in these things, as having an essential order in moving, he proved there is no infinite regress. It rightly follows that if from infinitely many bodies so moved one continuous body were formed, the infinite would be moved in a finite time traversing some space. For since all the spheres now traverse the space from east to west returning to the east in the natural day — even though one is greater than another and a higher sphere traverses a greater space — if there were an eleventh sphere, it would traverse its space in the same time; and similarly if there were a twelfth, a thirteenth, and so on to infinity. On the supposition that all things are movers because they are moved, all must be simultaneously moved. Therefore those infinitely many bodies would traverse some space in a finite time by their revolution. Therefore, if we imagine from those infinitely many bodies one infinite body to be formed, that body would traverse some space in a finite time — which has been disproved in Physics VI.

X. Concerning the second argument to the same effect, a difficulty arises. For those positing an infinite regress in movers and moved things would deny the assumption — namely, that if the first mover is removed or ceases from its motion, none of the others would be moved. For where there is no first, a posterior cause does not depend on the first in causing, nor does the completeness of its causality have dependence on the first. For although an infinite upward and downward ascent with temporal succession is incompatible with completeness, yet an infinite upward and downward descent of causality is not incompatible with completeness. Now such is the infinity of the infinite movers and mobile things — since all are supposed to move and be moved simultaneously. The reply is that the argument of Aristotle is efficacious if it is well considered. For the foundation of the argument is that in essentially ordered movers and moved things there must be some first. And this is clear to one who considers it carefully. For if there are many movers and moved things in which there is no first unmoved thing, the whole multitude of movers will stand as one moved mover. But this is impossible — for then something would be moved and moved by nothing. For

that multitude would not be primarily moved by itself, since nothing moves itself primarily. Nor because one unmoved part would move the other parts — since no unmoved mover is posited there. Nor because one moved part moves another — since the aggregate of them has the character of a moved thing, and thus needs something else by which it is moved. If it be said that the whole multitude of movers and moved things need not stand as one mover moved by some external cause — but their condition is preserved because one is moved by another, and that one by another, and so to infinity, just as in an infinite multitude of numbers each number is exceeding and exceeded, and yet the whole multitude need not be exceeded by something — the reply is that every mover must be in act, and similarly every thing moved locally. Therefore the whole multitude of movers and moved things can be taken as one — especially because none of them has the property of moving except insofar as it is moved; and if it has the character of a moved thing, it must be moved by something. But the infinite multitude of numbers is not posited as in act, but in potency. Therefore the whole multitude need not be exceeded by something. Since therefore in essentially ordered things there must be some first, and in the infinite there is no first, it follows that there cannot be infinitely many essentially ordered things. — See on these matters Capreolus, Sentences I, d. 3, q. 1.

XI. The second principal argument is as follows. If every mover is moved, this proposition is either true of itself or accidentally. If accidentally, then it is not necessary. Therefore it is contingent that no mover is moved. Therefore it is contingent that nothing is moved — since if a mover is not moved, it does not move, as the opponent says. But Aristotle holds this to be impossible. Therefore, etc. Furthermore: if mover and moved are conjoined accidentally in some subject, it is probable that the mover is found without being moved, because the moved is found without moving. For if two things are conjoined accidentally in something, and one of them is found without the other, it is probable that the other can be found without it. — Nor does the objection hold concerning two things one of which depends on the other but not vice versa — as substance and accident. For these are conjoined essentially, not accidentally. If, on the other hand, the proposition is true of itself, then either the mover is moved by the same species of motion as that by which it moves, or by a different species. If the same species, then what alters must itself be altered, and what teaches must itself be taught according to the same science — which is impossible. If a different species, then since there are finite genera and species of motion, there will be no infinite regress — and so there will be a first mover not moved by another. Unless perhaps it be said that a reflexion occurs by returning to the first — but from this it would follow that the mover by some species of motion is moved by the same species, not immediately but mediately.

2. Concerning the proposition — 'If two things are accidentally conjoined in something, and one

of them is found without the other, it is probable that the other can be found without it' — it should be known, following the Commentator in Physics VIII, comment 37, that this is to be understood in those things of which each exists essentially — that is, neither of which is necessary for the being of the other. For if one needs the other for its being, what needs the other cannot be separated from it. Just as, although some form is found without matter, matter cannot be found without a form; and although some substance exists without an accident, an accident cannot exist without a substance — since both matter needs form for its being, and accident needs substance. Therefore it is only in those things that are altogether accidentally conjoined — neither of which needs the other for its being — that it can happen that one is found separately if the other is found without it. It should also be noted that the possibility of which we here speak is logical, not natural. For some species may perhaps not be naturally separable from inseparable accidents — as the swan from whiteness — yet there is no repugnance to a swan's not being white. Hence what the Commentator says — that in such cases it is necessary that the other be without the other — is to be understood in terms of logical possibility: the sense being 'It is necessary that the other be separate, that is, be able to exist without repugnance.' For Albert and Saint Thomas say it is probable, not necessary. And this is also what the text of Saint Thomas has. For this reason the Commentator himself, in Metaphysics XII, comment 35, stating the same proposition, says that every composite from two of which one can exist independently will possibly have the other also existing independently — unless the composition is of substance and accident.

3. What Saint Thomas also says — that substance and accident are not conjoined accidentally but essentially (although in some corrupt copies the opposite reading is found) — is to be understood in terms of their common characters, not of this or that substance and this or that accident according to their proper characters. For a wall and whiteness, if considered particularly, are conjoined accidentally. But if the wall is considered as substance, and whiteness as accident, they are conjoined essentially and not altogether accidentally — because substance is included in the character of accident, and philosophers hold that an accident without a subject cannot exist in the nature of things.

XII. As to the second thing to be shown — since these arguments do not lead to the very existence of God but only to the conclusion that there is some first mover not moved by another — Saint Thomas shows that from this Aristotle further hunts out that God exists. He argues as follows: We arrive at a first mover not moved by any external force. Either that thing is altogether immovable — and we have the proposition; or it moves itself — which is probable, since what is through itself is prior to what is through another. But if it moves itself, it cannot be said that the whole is moved by the whole — since the aforesaid inconveniences would follow. Therefore one part of it is mover

only, and the other is moved. And so again we have the conclusion that there is some immovable mover. Nor can it be said that both parts are moved — one by the other; or one moves itself and the other; or the whole moves the part; or the part moves the whole — since the same inconveniences would follow. Therefore, etc.

2. If it be said that the moving part of the first self-mover is moved accidentally, as in animals — the following argument is raised in reply. First: in animals, since they are corruptible, the moving part is moved accidentally. But corruptible self-movers must be reduced to some sempiternal self-mover — since, since motion is sempiternal according to Aristotle, the generation of corruptible self-movers must be sempiternal. But none of them can be the cause of this perpetuity, since each does not always exist; nor can all of them together be the cause, since they are infinite and do not exist simultaneously. It is therefore necessary that there be some sempiternal self-mover. No self-mover moves always whose motor is moved essentially or accidentally. But the first self-mover moves always — otherwise motion could not be sempiternal. — Nor does it matter that the motors of the lower spheres are moved accidentally — since this is only by reason of their mobile bodies following the motion of the higher sphere.

3. Saint Thomas also adds that, since God is not a part of any self-mover, from this Aristotle further investigates another motor altogether separate — which is God — on the grounds that a self-mover is moved on account of the appetite of some object of appetite, which is superior to it in moving.

XIII. If it be objected, first, that the aforesaid processes proceed from the supposition of the eternity of motion, which is false — the reply is that the most efficacious way to prove that God exists is from the supposition of the newness of the world; not so from the supposition of eternity. For if the world began anew, it is plain that one must posit some cause that newly produced it. But from the supposition of the eternity of the world this seems less manifest.

2. If it be objected, second, that the heaven seems to be supposed to be animate since it is posited as moved by itself — something that many do not concede — the reply is that if the first mover is not posited as moved by itself, then it must be moved immediately by something altogether immovable. For this reason Aristotle introduced one of these two alternatives under a disjunction.

XIV. Note concerning the proposition 'Animals, since they are corruptible, have their moving part moved accidentally' that the phrase 'since they are corruptible' is not taken as the cause of the moving part being moved accidentally in them, but to express the condition of animals in the order of self-movers. For self-movers are in two classes — some are corruptible, others incorruptible. In

corruptible ones, the moving part is moved accidentally, because when the body is moved from place to place, everything in the body is also moved. But in incorruptible ones, which are moved by sempiternal motion, the moving part is not moved. Animals found among us therefore belong to the class of self-movers that are corruptible. Hence the moving part in them is moved accidentally. But though corruptibility is not the cause of this, yet both seem to proceed from the same cause — as the Commentator seems to wish in Physics VIII, comment 52 — namely, both being corruptible and having the moving part moved accidentally. The reason is that the moving part is constituted in its being through union with the moved part, and is variably connected to it; from which it follows that when one is posited, the other must necessarily also be posited — for when one is posited, its cause must be posited; and once that is posited, the other effect must also necessarily be posited.

XV. Concerning the proposition that no self-mover moves always whose motor is moved essentially or accidentally — it should be noted that there is a twofold accidentality of motion of the moving part in animals: one from outside, according as an animal is stimulated by something to move itself — for when the body is altered and excited to motion, the soul is accidentally excited and moved; the other from within, from the moving part itself, when by moving the body it moves itself accidentally. Now because what is accidental can be removed, motion in animals can therefore cease when the moving part ceases. And consequently the whole will not move always.

XVI. As to the motors of the spheres — how they are said to be moved accidentally not by reason of themselves but by reason of the bodies moved by them — note that since to be moved accidentally is to be moved by the motion of another, this can happen in two ways: either because the motor itself is transferred from place to place — though this happens to it by the motion of another — and this is called being moved accidentally by reason of itself; or because the motor itself does not change place by the motion of another, but something to which it is joined does. The motors of the lower spheres are therefore not moved accidentally in the first way; but in the second way — namely, because the spheres moved by them are moved by the motion of the higher sphere, not by their own motor, but accidentally.

2. As to how they are not moved accidentally by reason of themselves — it should be considered, as Saint Thomas says in Summa Theologiae I, q. 51, a. 3, ad 3, and Sentences I, d. 37, q. 4, a. 1, ad 4, and Sentences II, d. 8, a. 4, ad the question, that nothing is moved accidentally when what it is in is moved, unless it is definitively in it — so that it is not in another; but it is indeed moved accidentally when what it is definitively in is moved: just as the soul is not moved when the hand is moved, but it is when the whole body is moved. It should also be noted, as Saint Thomas hints in the Prima Pars and in the Sentences, that what the motor is definitively in either changes its place in

its entirety, or always remains in the same place really, although its parts change place — as happens in circular motion. If therefore something indivisible is united to a body as its motor, but throughout the whole — as the soul to the body — and that body is transferred from place to place, then that motor must also be accidentally transferred, since it too changes the place belonging to it by reason of the body. But if it is not transferred from place to place, that indivisible motor is not moved even accidentally — since it is united to the body throughout the whole, but the whole does not change place. But if it were affixed to some determinate part of that body, then it would be moved accidentally — since that part would be transferred from place to place.

Therefore, according to various opinions about the motors of heavenly bodies, motion can be attributed to them accidentally in different ways. If we suppose the motor is present to the sphere as a potter is present to the wheel — always contacting by its power each successive part of the mobile that arises in the east — it is clear that the motor need not rotate with the motion of the sphere, any more than the potter with the motion of the wheel. If, on the other hand, we suppose it to be united to some determinate part of the sphere, it will have to rotate just as the part to which it is affixed rotates. But if we suppose it to be united to the sphere throughout the whole — as the intellective soul to a human body — it is not moved even accidentally, as Saint Thomas holds in the places already cited, since the whole does not really change its place, but only relatively. Whether it is in fact united to the sphere in being will be shown below.

XVII. It should further be known, concerning what Saint Thomas says about Aristotle's investigating in the Metaphysics — from the motor that is a part of the self-mover — another motor altogether separate from matter, that Aristotle posited two orders of immaterial substances: as Saint Thomas himself seems to wish in Metaphysics XI, expounding text 48, and states more explicitly in his Questions on Spiritual Creatures, article 6 in the body and ad 10, and also in his Treatise on Angels. For there are some that are the movers of the heavenly spheres, which are also called souls of the heavens; and others that are the proximate ends of those motions. But all these orders are contained under God as under the first separate substance. Thus Aristotle, having investigated the mover of the heaven that is its soul and a part of the self-mover, investigates from that motor another motor that is not a part of a self-mover, but is separate from all matter — because the part of the self-mover moves on account of the appetite of something superior in moving, so as to be likened to it and to express in effect what is contained by power in the first motor.

XVIII. It should also be noted that in the reply to the first objection which Saint Thomas introduces, some texts are corrupt. For where it says that 'the most efficacious way to prove that

God exists is from the supposition of the eternity of the world, on which supposition it seems manifest that God exists' — it should be read as the correct manuscripts have it: 'It must be said that the most efficacious way to prove that God exists is from the supposition of the newness of the world; not so from the supposition of the eternity of the world, on which supposition it seems less manifest,' etc. In these words it is given to understand that an efficacious argument to prove that God exists is indeed drawn from the eternity of the world, but the argument drawn from the newness of the world is more efficacious and more manifest.

Concerning the reply to the second objection, it should be noted that the sense of the reply is that it does not harm Aristotle's argument that many do not concede the heaven to be animate. For if they deny that the first mover that is not moved externally moves itself or is animate, they must concede that it is altogether immovable — and so concede that God exists. Therefore Aristotle introduced one of these alternatives under a disjunction: namely, that a mover that is not moved from without must either move itself or be altogether immovable. For whether one concedes the one or the other, it necessarily follows that one must arrive at something altogether immovable — which is God.

XIX. But two difficulties arise here. The first: the attributes that Aristotle assigns in Metaphysics XII to the separate motor — such as being of infinite power, being immaterial, etc. — he also assigns in Physics VIII to the first motor that he investigates there through motion. Therefore the motor investigated in the Metaphysics is not different from the one investigated in the Physics. This is confirmed by the words of Saint Thomas and of Aristotle in Metaphysics XII, who say that of that very substance treated in Metaphysics XII — which moves as a desired and loved end — it has been shown in Physics VIII that it has no magnitude. And Saint Thomas takes up the same argument again.

2. The second difficulty: it does not seem necessary that, if the motor of the heaven is desiring and understanding, it must move on account of the appetite of another end distinct from itself. For it can move for itself as for an end — just as God acts for himself. And so it will not be necessary to posit another motor higher than the soul of the heaven.

XX. To the first difficulty it must be said that the ancient philosophers against whom Aristotle was disputing in the Physics considered only the motion of bodies. Therefore everything they called 'being moved' was understood as being moved by some motion of the kind by which bodies are moved. Hence if something is demonstrated to be altogether immovable by such motion — so that it is moved neither essentially nor accidentally — it must according to them be God. For by the name 'God' we understand the first mover that is altogether immovable. When, therefore, in

Physics VIII Aristotle demonstrated that we must arrive at something that is moved by the motion of bodies neither essentially nor accidentally — even though the motor investigated there is a part of a self-mover and is not the first motor in the absolute sense — he nevertheless spoke of it there as though it were the first motor in the absolute sense, and attributed to it the attributes of the first motor in the absolute sense — as the opinion of the ancient philosophers required. But since besides the motion of bodies there is another motion that also belongs to immaterial things — according as they are moved by an intelligible and desirable object — therefore, for something to be absolutely immovable, it must also not be moved by this spiritual motion. For this reason, in Metaphysics XII, having proved in the Physics that there is some mover immovable by the motion of bodies, Aristotle investigates another motor — one from which the immovable motor that is a part of the self-mover is moved as by something desirable and intelligible — yet which is itself altogether immovable, as not moved by appetite from others, while it itself is moved by no desirable and intelligible object.

To the difficulty, then, it is said that the motor investigated in Physics VIII is indeed different from the one investigated in Metaphysics XII. But the reason why Aristotle attributes to it some attributes of the first motor in the absolute sense is that he used it there as the first motor in the absolute sense — alluding to the opinion of the ancient philosophers, as we said. The same reply applies to the confirmation. For they say that he proved the same substance for the same reason: because Aristotle used it for the same purpose there, adapting the truth of the philosophers to their opinion.

2. For the elucidation of the second difficulty, it should be noted that in Aristotle's view the first intelligence — which is God — differs from the other intelligences in that the first has the character of the first and principal cause, while the others have the character of secondary cause and instrument. For one must arrive at one first in movers that is the cause of the others, as is proved in Metaphysics II. Now an instrument operates in order to express in effect what is contained virtually in the principal agent. The intelligences other than the first cannot therefore act for themselves as for their ultimate end — since they have the character of instrument and secondary agent. Nor does it suffice for each to act for its own proximate and proportionate end — since the action of all must be reduced to one common end, beyond their particular ends; just as there is one first and universal principle of all motion. To the difficulty, therefore, the reply is that a second intelligence cannot act for itself as for the ultimate end — though the first can — for the reasons stated.

XXI. With regard to the second principal matter, Saint Thomas adduces arguments from the Metaphysics. The first is as follows: In efficient causes there is no infinite regress. Therefore one

must arrive at one first — which we call God. The antecedent is proved: if there is an infinite regress, none of the causes will be first. Therefore all the others — those that are intermediate — will be removed. This is false. Therefore, etc. — The inference is proved: because in ordered efficient causes the first is the cause of the intermediate, and the intermediate of the last. When a cause is removed, what it causes is removed.

XXII. The second argument: There is something supremely true. Therefore there is also something supremely a being. And this we call God. The inference is clear from Metaphysics II, text 4, where it is held that what is supremely true is supremely a being. — The antecedent is shown in Metaphysics IV, text 18, from the fact that we see that of two false things one is more false than the other. Therefore one must also be more true than the other — and this by approximation to what is supremely and simply true.

2. For the elucidation of this argument, it should be considered — as is held by Saint Thomas in Summa Theologiae I, q. 49, a. 3, ad 3, and Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 22, a. 2, ad 1 — that more and less are found differently in things that pertain to perfection and in those that import defect. For in those that express perfection, more and less — or intensity and remission — are attended to by comparison and greater or lesser approach to some summit. Thus what approaches most nearly to the supremely bright is called more bright, and what approaches less is called less bright. In privation and defect, on the other hand, more and less are attended to by recession from the summit and the perfect — since privation is a kind of removal. Since, therefore, Saint Thomas had introduced from Metaphysics IV that one of two false things is more false than the other, he did not conclude that this happens by approach to something supremely false — since the false consists in privation — but he ingeniously subjoined that therefore one is more true than the other, and consequently there must be something most true, by approach to which something is called more or less true, and by recession from which something is more false than another.

3. It should also be noted that, since there are many attributes that belong to God alone, sometimes several of his attributes are simultaneously taken by some as his character, sometimes one alone and sometimes another. Since to be the cause of all beings belongs to God alone, as does being the supreme and most perfect of beings, Aristotle in Metaphysics II — since among philosophers the first cause of all was understood by the name 'God' — concludes that there must be one first cause of all, from the fact that there must be something that is supremely a being, and consequently that God must exist. Saint Thomas, seeing that being supremely a being also belongs to God alone, once that has been proved does not proceed further — since by that conclusion alone it is established that God exists. — Or alternatively, for the sake of brevity, having deduced that there must be

something that is supremely a being, he passes over, as known from metaphysics, the conclusion that Aristotle drew — namely, that there must be something that is the cause of all things; since what is supremely such is the cause of all the others.

XXIII. But concerning what has been said, two difficulties arise. First: it does not seem true that one thing is more true than another. For truth is a kind of adequation, and consequently a kind of equality. But equality does not admit of more and less. — Nor is this inference valid: 'One of two false things is called more than the other, therefore also one of two true things.' For falsity consists in inadequation and recession from equality — and one can be at a distance from the mean in multiple ways.

Second: it does not seem true to Aureolus that the proposition of Aristotle assumed as the foundation of the argument — though Saint Thomas passes it over in silence — is true. That proposition is: 'What is supremely such is the cause of the others.' For whiteness is the most perfect thing in the genus of colors — yet it is not the productive cause of the other colors, as is self-evident.

XXIV. To the first difficulty it is said that truth, insofar as it is in the thing, is founded on the being of the thing. Hence what is material in it is the being of the thing, while what is formal is the adequation to the intellect. We can therefore speak of the truth of a thing in two ways. Either with respect to what is material only — that is, with respect to being. And in this sense, there is no inconvenience in one thing being more true than another, just as one is a more perfect being than another. For which reason the most perfect of beings are called most true. — Or with respect to what is formal, or with respect to what is material as it stands under the formal. And in this sense, one is not more true than another. For each thing is by nature adapted to equate the intellect to itself in its own way; and each thing is equated to the divine intellect according to its entity; nor can one be more equated than another — just as a stick of twenty cubits is not more equated to a stick of twenty cubits than a stick of one cubit is to a stick of one cubit. — The objection, therefore, proceeds in the second sense. But the words of Saint Thomas have the first sense.

To the second difficulty it is said that Aristotle's meaning is not that the first and most noble species of some genus is the productive cause of the other species of that genus — otherwise man, which is the most noble species of animals, would produce the other animal species. Rather, his meaning is that where something participates most perfectly in some character — so that by that character it is called supremely such — it is the effective cause of all the others insofar as they also participate in that character. And this is understood of substances: whether the character by which they are called

supremely such is substantial or accidental to them. For what is supremely hot is the cause of all other hot things insofar as they are hot. Even if some things are heated by the light of the sun or by something else that is not formally hot, they are nevertheless heated by it insofar as it virtually contains fire — which is the hottest of all bodies. — Whiteness, on the other hand, is neither a substance, nor is it called supremely color — though it is the most perfect species of color. Similarly, man is not called supremely an animal, since the character of animal is participated equally by all, even though man is the most perfect of animals.

XXV. The last argument, drawn from John Damascene and from Averroes, Physics II, comment 75, is as follows. In the world we see things of diverse natures coming together into one order — always or for the most part. Therefore there is something by whose providence the world is governed. Therefore, etc. The first inference is proved: because such things cannot always or very often come together into order unless they be directed by some governance, through which it is given to each and every one of them to tend toward a certain end. But Aureolus says in response to this that it is inefficacious. For it would be said, he argues, that these diverse things come together into one order and are ordered to one end from their own proper forms and natures — and moreover that the order of the universe need not be from chance: rather, it is through itself, since it has its origin from the quiddities of things. But since Saint Thomas refutes this response below in Book III, the matter should be deferred until then.

Chapter XIV

That In Knowing God, The Way of Remotion Must Be Used

Having shown, therefore, that there is some first being which we call God, we must now investigate his attributes. In the consideration of the divine substance, the way of remotion must be used principally. For the divine substance, by its immensity, surpasses every form that our intellect attains, and so we cannot apprehend it by knowing what it is. But we have some knowledge of it by knowing what it is not. And the more things we are able to remove from it through our intellect, the more closely do we approach knowledge of it. For the more fully we see the differences of a thing from other things, the more perfectly do we know it — for each thing has in itself its own proper being, distinct from all other things. And so even in things whose definitions we know, we first place them in a genus by which we know in general what they are, and then add the differences by which they are distinguished from other things — and so a complete knowledge of the substance of the thing is achieved. But since in the consideration of the divine substance we cannot take 'what it is' as a genus, nor can we take its distinction from other things through affirmative differences, we must take it through negative differences. Now just as in affirmative differences one contracts another and approaches more nearly to a complete designation of the thing insofar as it makes it differ from more things, so too one negative difference is contracted by another, which makes it differ from more things. For instance, if we say that God is not an accident, by this he is distinguished from all accidents; then if we add that he is not a body, we shall distinguish him also from some substances; and so in order, through such negations, he shall be distinguished from all that is other than himself. And then there will be a proper consideration of his substance when he is known as distinct from all things — though it will not be a perfect knowledge, since we shall not know what he is in himself. To proceed, therefore, in the knowledge of God by the way of remotion, let us take as our starting point what has already been made clear from the foregoing — namely, that God is altogether immovable. This the authority of Sacred Scripture also confirms. For it is said in Malachi 3: 'I am God, and I change not'; and in James 1: 'With whom there is no change'; and in Numbers 23: 'God is not a man that he should change.'

[Ferrara's Commentary]

Once it has been shown that some first being exists, which we say is God, Saint Thomas begins to investigate his simplicity and what he is, in the manner possible for us. But since it is foolish to seek simultaneously the science and the mode of knowing — as is said in Metaphysics II — he declares in this chapter how we ought to investigate the divine substance, and in the following chapters he inquires into his attributes.

I. The conclusion of this chapter therefore is: In the consideration of the divine substance, one must proceed principally by the way of remotion. For the understanding of this conclusion, it should be noted that since above we inquired into the being of God and demonstrated that the proposition we form about God when we say 'God exists' is true, the consideration of his quiddity and substance remained — for the question 'what is the thing?' follows the question 'whether it is?'. But since the quiddity and substance of God are not known in the same way as the quiddities of other things — especially natural ones — since those can be perfectly known but God's essence cannot, after the knowledge of 'whether he is' the question of 'what God is' is indeed asked — but not 'what he is,' rather 'what he is not.' The sense of the conclusion, therefore, is that in knowing the divine substance and what God is, the principal mode of knowledge is to proceed by knowing what he is not, and not what he is. — He adds 'principally' to show that the divine substance can indeed be known in some way by other modes — namely by the way of causality and of eminence, about which he himself treats following Dionysius, in his commentary on Boethius's De Trinitate, q. 1, art. 2, and in Sentences I, d. 35, a. 1. But this way is more fitting and easier for us.

II. He proves the conclusion by presupposing, as he gives us to understand, that our intellect knows natures and substances through intelligible species of things. He then argues as follows: we approach knowledge of what we cannot know the 'what it is' of, the more things we can remove from it through the intellect. But we cannot know the 'what it is' of God. Therefore, etc.

He proves the major: the more fully we see the differences of a thing from other things, the more perfectly do we know it — since each thing has in itself its proper being distinct from all others. And the more perfectly something is known, the more fully its being — that is, its essence, to which being belongs — is comprehended. This is also evident from the mode of defining. For when we seek the definition of a thing, we first place it in some genus, then add the differences by which it is distinguished from others. But when we cannot know the 'what it is' affirmatively, we see its

differences from other things through negations and removals. Therefore, etc. He proves the principal minor. Our intellect can know quidditatively only those things whose quiddities are represented through intelligible forms it possesses. But the forms of our intellect cannot represent the divine substance and quiddity — since the divine substance surpasses in its immensity every form of our intellect, as will be declared in the following. Therefore, etc. He then adds the mode of proceeding in such negative differences, saying that just as in affirmative differences one contracts another and approaches more nearly to a complete designation and definition of the thing insofar as it makes the thing differ from more things, so too in negative ones. Hence there will be a proper consideration of God when through such negations he is known as distinct from all things — though even in this way a perfect knowledge of him is not attained.

III. For the elucidation of the argument, it should be known that although negation does not intrinsically pertain to the essence of a thing, and through negations known of something the substance of the thing as it is in itself is not known — yet this mode of knowing does approach a proper knowledge of the nature, because negation restricts the nature of the thing known. For if I say of something that it is a substance, and this is divided into corporeal and incorporeal: on knowing that it is not an incorporeal substance, the thing known is restricted to corporeal substance. And since this is divided into sensible and insensible, on knowing that it is not insensible, it is restricted to sensible nature. And so on successively. Hence the holy Doctor rightly says that one negative difference is contracted by another — because the more things are denied of a thing, the more restricted the thing remains.

IV. But against the conclusion and the argument, objections can be raised from the statements of Scotus in Metaphysics II. First: a negation cannot be known except through an affirmation. For as is said in Metaphysics IV, text 16, an affirmative expression is better known than its opposite negation. Therefore if we cannot know what God is, neither can we know what he is not.

Second, from the Philosopher in De Interpretatione II: 'Good is not evil' — because this affirmative is true: 'Good is good.' Therefore if we know what God is not, we know beforehand what he is. The way of remotion, therefore, should not be used. This is confirmed: because Saint Thomas says in De Potentia, q. 7, a. 5, that since every negative is proved by an affirmative, if the human intellect knew nothing affirmatively about God, we could deny nothing of God.

V. For the solution of these objections, it should be considered that, although not every negation in the absolute sense is founded on a real affirmation — since, as is said in the Categories, 'not sitting' is said of what is and of what is not — yet a negation that is said of some real being is always

founded on something existing in the thing that does not admit together with itself what is negated. For this reason a man is not a donkey, because such is his nature that it does not admit the nature of a donkey. And an Ethiopian is not white because he has blackness, which does not admit whiteness together with itself. Since, therefore, the negation said of God is said of something existing, it must be founded on something existing in God. Though this is so, it is not necessary that one who knows the negation of God should know determinately and distinctly in God the affirmation on which it is founded. For some negation about God can be known while the affirmation that is its foundation is unknown. For someone can know that God is not a donkey, and yet will not thereby know distinctly in God that nature which does not admit the nature of a donkey — just as someone can know that a cloth is not white, while not distinctly knowing what color of the cloth it is that does not admit whiteness. Even if our intellect were to know all the affirmations on which the negations said of God are founded, the 'what it is' of God would still not thereby be known — since the divine essence is of infinite perfection, which cannot be sufficiently explicated by those known affirmations. And even if by those affirmations the 'what it is' of God were known, the way of remotion would still be useful to use. For in order to attain essentially and comprehensively those things that are most excellent and can be known by us only through inadequate effects, we cannot ascend with as much ease and security as we can if we first remove from them the imperfection of the effects — since the effects fall far short of their perfection — and are thus raised to some knowledge of them.

VI. To the first objection, then, it is said that the antecedent is false — concerning the affirmation on which the negation is founded. — To the proof it is said that an affirmation is indeed in itself, insofar as it is an affirmation, better known than a negation as such — but not as regards us. To the confirmation it is said that Saint Thomas's meaning is not that we must know the affirmation on which the negation said of God is founded before knowing the negation itself. Rather, since a negative is proved by an affirmative in itself, it is necessary that the being about which the negation is formed as about some being be known with respect to some affirmative predicate — otherwise we would not know that such a negation is said of a being. And so if we are to deny something of God as of a being, it is necessary that we know something affirmatively of him. Nevertheless, it remains consistent with this that one who knows something of God negatively need not previously know the affirmation on which that negation is founded. For it suffices that something be known affirmatively of God in order that we know there is in him some foundation of negation — for this would not be known unless we knew him to be some being in nature, and consequently unless we knew some affirmative predicate of him. But where the essence of a thing as it is in itself cannot be comprehended — as will be shown below of the divine substance — a negation can for us be better known, and the affirmation can be known through the negation. To the second objection, the

inference is denied. For even though negation is founded in an affirmation, it is not necessary to know the affirmation first in every case; rather, sometimes on the contrary the affirmation is known through the negation — as was said in reply to the first.

Chapter XV

That God is Eternal

From what has been shown it further appears that God is eternal. For everything that begins or ceases to be undergoes this through motion or change. But God has been shown to be altogether immutable. Therefore he is eternal, lacking both beginning and end. Furthermore: only those things are measured by time that are moved — for time is the number of motion, as is clear from Physics IV. But God is altogether without motion, as has now been proved. Therefore he is not measured by time. There is therefore no before and after in him. Therefore he does not have being after non-being, nor can he have non-being after being, nor can any succession be found in his being — for these things cannot be understood without time. He is therefore lacking beginning and end, possessing all his being at once. And in this consists the character of eternity. Furthermore: if at some point God did not exist and then did exist, he would have been brought from non-being into being by something else. Not by himself — for what does not exist cannot act. But if by another, then that other is prior to him. But God has been shown to be the first cause. Therefore his being did not begin. Hence neither will it cease — for what has always existed has the power to always exist. Therefore he is eternal. Moreover: we see in the world certain things that are capable of both being and not being — namely, generable and corruptible things. But everything that is capable of being has a cause, since, as it is equally disposed toward both being and not being, if being is to be assigned to it, this must be from some cause. But in causes there is no infinite regress, as was proved above by Aristotle's argument. Therefore one must posit something that is necessary being. Now everything that is necessary either has the cause of its necessity from another, or does not — and it is necessary through itself. But there is no infinite regress in necessary things that have the cause of their necessity from another. Therefore one must posit some first necessary being that is necessary through itself. And this is God, as has been shown — since he is the first cause. Therefore God is eternal, since every self-necessary being is eternal. Aristotle also shows from the sempiternality of time the sempiternality of motion, and from this again shows the sempiternality of the moving substance. But the first moving substance is God. Therefore he is sempiternal. — Even if the sempiternality of time and motion is denied, the argument for the sempiternality of substance remains. For if motion began, it must have

begun through some mover. If that mover also began, it began through some agent. And so either one goes on to infinity, or one arrives at something that did not begin. To this truth divine authority also bears witness. Hence the Psalm says: 'But you, O Lord, endure forever.' And again: 'But you are always the selfsame, and your years shall not fail.'

[Ferrara's Commentary]

Having shown the mode of arriving at knowledge of God, Saint Thomas now, following the mode taught, proceeds to the declaration of divine things. In this he does three things: first, he removes from God the imperfection of temporal things; second, the imperfection of passive potency, in the following chapter; third, the imperfection of composition, in Chapter XVIII.

I. With regard to the first, he lays down this conclusion: God is eternal. This is proved first. What begins or ceases to be undergoes this through motion or change. God is altogether immutable. Therefore he does not begin or cease to be. Note here that motion or change can be taken in two ways. In one way, for the transition that occurs between being and non-being presupposing some subject — which is called physical change. In another way, for every succession between being and non-being, whether it presupposes a subject or not — in which way even what is newly created or totally annihilated can be said to be changed, since the former receives being after non-being, and the latter receives non-being after being. The change in the major premise is therefore to be taken in the second way — for in this sense too God is altogether immutable, both accidentally and substantially. But not in the first way — for the universe began to exist, and yet did not begin through motion or change in the proper sense, but through creation.

II. Second: God possesses all his being at once, has no being after non-being and no non-being after being. Therefore he is eternal. — The inference is proved: because eternity consists in these things. — The antecedent is proved: God is not measured by time — since only those things are measured by time that are moved, since time is the number of motion. Therefore there is no before and after in him. Therefore neither being after non-being, nor non-being after being, nor any succession in his being. The inference is proved: because these things cannot be understood without time. Note first that all before and after, and all succession in duration, pertain to the character of time — since all other durations lack succession. Hence 'being measured by time' and 'having before and after in duration' are convertible. Saint Thomas therefore rightly concludes: 'He is not measured by time; therefore there is no before and after in him in duration.' Note second that in this place Saint Thomas touches on the character of eternity as given by Boethius in De Consolatione V, where he

says that eternity is the complete, simultaneous, and perfect possession of unlimited life. In explaining this, Saint Thomas in Summa Theologiae I, q. 10, a. 1, says two things. The first is that since in every motion there is succession and before and after, while in what lacks motion and is always in the same state there is no before and after — just as the character of time consists in the numbering of before and after in motion, so the character of eternity consists in the apprehension of the uniformity of what is altogether outside motion. And this is signified when it is said that eternity is altogether simultaneous. — The second is that those things are said to be measured by time that have a beginning and an end in time, as is held in Physics IV. But what is altogether immutable can have neither succession nor beginning nor end. And this is signified when it is said that what is measured by eternity is without end.

III. But in this elucidation — leaving other matters aside — there is a difficulty about how the character of eternity is to be understood as consisting in the apprehension of the uniformity of what is altogether immutable. Some interpret this as meaning that by 'apprehension' Saint Thomas understands an objective conception, and that 'consisting in the apprehension of uniformity' is the same as 'consisting in the character of uniformity.' But since it does not seem that Saint Thomas superfluously added 'in the apprehension' — for if he had meant what they say, he could have said more briefly and clearly that the character of eternity consists in the character of uniformity — I therefore think, subject always to a better judgment, that it can be explained in two other ways.

2. For the first of these, it is presupposed that the character that the intellect forms about some thing is the concept by means of which it understands and apprehends the thing. The character of eternity is therefore said to consist in the apprehension of the uniformity of the altogether immovable thing, because the intellect forms the concept and character of eternity when it apprehends the uniformity of the altogether immovable thing. From this it follows that the first exposition seems to intend that the character of eternity is the being of the uniformity of the altogether immovable thing.

3. For the second mode, it should be noted that since Saint Thomas wishes to make the character of eternity known from the character of time — and just as he says the character of time consists in numbering, so he says the character of eternity consists in apprehension — the character of eternity's consisting in apprehension must be explained proportionally to the mode in which the character of time is said to consist in numbering. Here it should be known that since time is in some way continuous and in some way discrete — since it is the number of continuous things, namely of the before and after in motion — we can speak of time in two ways: with respect to its continuity, and with respect to its discreteness and separation of parts. The first belongs to it really,

according to the being it has outside the intellect — for it is truly continuous, as is the motion it measures and in which it is. The second belongs to it according as it is apprehended by the soul separating and distinguishing it into parts — such as days, months, years, and the like — and similarly separating the first motion into parts corresponding to the parts of time. For this separation is not in the thing, since both the parts of time and the parts of motion are continuous outside the intellect; it is only in the apprehension of the intellect. And it is analogous to saying that the number ten by which ten cubits of cloth are intrinsically numbered, outside the intellect is a continuous quantity — since it is nothing other than the quantity of the cloth itself, which is continuous — but in the intellect it is a number with respect to the separation into ten units of which such a number of ten is composed. The character of time is therefore said to consist in the numbering of the before and after in motion — because its completion, which is what is formal in time, namely the very discreteness and separation of the parts of time included in the character of number, belongs to time through the operation of the soul numbering, that is, distinguishing and separating it into several parts and several units. Hence, with the operation of the soul removed, there is indeed in the thing the entity that is time — but it does not completely have the character of time, because it does not have actual division and separation, and consequently is not actually a number. This seems to be the intention of the Commentator in Physics IV, comment 131, where he says that time will not be in act unless the soul is, though it will be in potency even if the soul is not. It also seems to be the opinion of Saint Thomas in Sentences I, d. 19 — for there in q. 2, a. 1, and q. 5, a. 1, he says that what is formal in time is completed in the operation of the soul numbering; and he compares time to the universal, and says the universal is a nature under the intention of universality. He also holds the same in Physics IV, expounding that text of Aristotle in which he says that time, without the soul existing, is somehow.

4. Proportionally, therefore, in eternity we can consider two things: the very unity of the divine being that is altogether immutable; and its being measured insofar as the divine being measures. The first belongs to it according to what it is in the thing — for the divine being is really one outside the intellect. The second, on the other hand, belongs to it through the operation of the soul distinguishing the unity of the divine being from the being itself, and apprehending it as a kind of measure and duration. Since, therefore, the character of eternity expresses a unity measuring the altogether immutable being, and 'to measure' belongs to it only through the operation of the soul distinguishing it from the being and apprehending it under the character of measure — the character of eternity is not completed except through the operation of the soul. Hence without the soul's consideration, there is indeed in the thing the entity that is eternity — but it does not completely have the character of eternity, because it is not a measure according to the being it has outside the soul, but only according as it is in the apprehension of the soul. The character of

eternity is therefore said to consist completively in the apprehension of the uniformity of what is altogether immutable, because the completion of its character — namely, being a measure — is only according to the soul's apprehension. Just as the character of time is also said to consist completively in the numbering of the before and after in motion, because the very discreteness and distinction of parts — which completes the character of time — is only according to the apprehension of the soul numbering and separating both time and motion into parts. — This seems to be the mind of Saint Thomas in Summa Theologiae I, q. 10, a. 2, ad 3, where he says that God is not called eternal as though he were in some way measured, but the character of measure is taken there only according to our apprehension.

5. It should also be noted that, since Saint Thomas seems to imply that succession is found in the being of a thing measured by time — when he concludes that no succession is found in the divine being because it is not measured by time — if we speak of the substantial being of a temporal thing, this can be understood in two ways. In one way, that it is not all at once, but is acquired part after part. In this sense it is not true that it has succession in itself — nor does Saint Thomas mean this. In another way, that although it is all at once and indivisible, it is nevertheless subject to change when some change occurs with respect to its conservation or cessation — and for this reason it has succession and divisibility accidentally, because that change is not all at once. In this sense it is true that it has succession. And this is the sense Saint Thomas intends, as can be gathered from Sentences I, d. 19, q. 2, a. 1, ad 4, and Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 31, a. 2, in the body, and De Potentia, q. 5, a. 1, ad 2 and a. 4, ad 1, and from the treatise On Time.

IV. Third: If God did not always exist, he was brought from non-being to being by another. Therefore God is not the first cause. This is false. Therefore the first also. — The first inference is proved: because nothing brings itself from non-being to being, since what does not exist cannot act. — The second inference is also clear: because what brings something into being must be prior to it, at least in priority of nature. Then further: he did not begin to be, but always existed. Therefore neither will he cease to be. — The inference is clear: because what has always existed has the power to always exist. — Therefore he is eternal. Concerning this inference — 'He did not begin to be; therefore he will not cease to be' — a difficulty arises: because, on the supposition of the eternity of the world (which is possible according to Saint Thomas), the intelligences did not begin to be; and yet, according to theologians, they could cease to be through annihilation from without. Therefore, etc. — Nor does the proof adduced seem to be valid. For it can be said that, although what has always existed has the power to always exist, yet that power can be removed through annihilation. The reply is that something's not beginning to be can happen from two causes: in one way, because it essentially belongs to it to be from eternity, and not to be produced by anything; in another way,

because it is produced from eternity by some external agent. From not beginning to be in the first way, it follows that it will not cease to be either intrinsically or extrinsically — for its being is such and has the power essentially to always be. And it is in this sense that Saint Thomas makes the inference. — From not beginning to be in the second way, on the other hand, it does not follow that it cannot cease to be, at least extrinsically. Nor is it necessary that everything of this kind that did not begin should have the power to always be — for a man or a donkey could have been produced from eternity, and yet would not have the power to always exist.

V. Fourth: There must be posited in things something that is necessary being. Either that has the cause of its necessity, or it does not. If it does, then that other has a cause, and so on to infinity — or one must posit a first necessary being. But an infinite regress is impossible. Therefore there must be something that is self-necessary. And this we call God. Therefore God is eternal — because every self-necessary being is eternal. The antecedent is proved: everything that is possibly being has a cause, since, as it is equally disposed toward being and non-being, the fact that it is determined to being can only be from some cause. But there is no infinite regress in causes. Therefore one must arrive at something that is not possibly being. Therefore there must be some being that is self-necessary.

2. For the elucidation of the proposition 'Every self-necessary being is eternal,' it should be considered that something can be called self-necessary in two ways — just as something can be called necessary through another. For something is called necessary through another either because it has some extrinsic cause producing its necessity, or because it has necessity from another form. On the opposite side, something is called self-necessary either because it has no extrinsic cause of its necessity, or because it is necessary from its own form and not through another form. What is said here, therefore, is to be understood of the self-necessary in the first mode, as is clear from the process of the argument — not in the second mode. For the self-necessary in this sense has no cause of its being. For since the necessity of being is a condition concomitant with being, if it had its being from another, it would also have its necessity from another — and so would not be self-necessary as we are now speaking of the self-necessary. But everything that has no cause of its being is subsisting being itself — for if its being were distinguished from its essence, it would not belong to it of itself, since no thing is the effective cause of its own being; and so it would need to receive its being from another. From this it follows that such a thing is eternal — since subsisting being itself includes every perfection of being and cannot fail.

3. It should further be known concerning the proposition 'A possible being is equally disposed toward being and non-being' that 'possible' here is taken simply and absolutely. For since the

essence of a possible thing is really distinguished from actual existence, and considered alone has no being of itself — speaking absolutely, it is no more inclined toward being than toward non-being, just as it is no more inclined toward being produced by an agent than toward not being produced, but this comes from the disposition of the agent. — But if we were to speak of the possible as already having a matter disposed through an agent for the introduction of the form, then the possible would not be equally disposed toward being and non-being, but would be more inclined toward being than toward non-being. But a difficulty arises. For according to the teaching of Saint Thomas, the nature of a possible thing has non-being from itself — for if left to itself, it is non-being, while it has being from another. Therefore the possible is not equally disposed toward being and non-being — for each thing is more inclined toward what belongs to it of itself than toward what belongs to it from another. The reply is that the nature of a possible thing having non-being of itself can be understood in two ways. In one way, affirmatively — that is, that by its own nature it determines non-being for itself, as fire by its nature determines heat for itself. In another way, negatively — that is, that by its own nature it does not determine being for itself, just as we say that the universal is everywhere because it does not determine any particular place for itself. If taken in the first way, then it is true that each thing is more inclined toward what belongs to it of itself than toward what belongs to it from another alone. But then it is false that the nature of a possible thing has non-being from itself, according to the mind of Saint Thomas. — If taken in the second way, then it is true that the nature of a possible thing has non-being from itself. And this is how Saint Thomas understands it. But then the inference is denied. And as for its proof, the assumption is denied. For since a possible thing, as such, does not have being of itself, yet has no repugnance to receiving being, it is equally disposed toward being and non-being — that is, it can as well have non-being as being, and vice versa. Aureolus considers this argument inefficacious among philosophers — thinking they would not concede that there is something necessary that has a productive cause. But there will be a special inquiry into this below.

VI. Fifth: the argument of Aristotle from Physics VIII. Time is eternal. Therefore motion is eternal. Therefore the mover is eternal. But the first moving substance is God. Therefore, etc. But if the antecedent is denied, the same conclusion follows from its opposite. For if motion and time began, then they began through some mover. But there is no infinite regress. Therefore one arrives at something that did not begin. And consequently, something eternal. Finally, the authority of Sacred Scripture favors this truth. For it is said in Psalm 101: 'But you, O Lord, endure forever.' And also: 'But you are always the selfsame, and your years shall not fail.'

VII. For the elucidation of what is said here, it should be considered that, although duration seems to have a kind of extension, succession, and before and after — and also to really measure the things

that fall under duration, since these features are more familiar to us in duration as found in time — yet some durations are found that have no extension or succession but consist in an indivisible, such as eternity and the aevum, just as those that endure under them are indivisible. Moreover, eternity does not really measure the divine being — as if it were something really distinct from God, better known and more manifest than he is — but is only a measure according to our mode of understanding, as was shown above.

Chapter XVI

That in God, There is No Passive Potency

Since God is eternal, he must not be in potency. For everything in whose substance potency is mixed, can fail to be according to what it has of potency — since what can be can also not be. But God, according to himself, cannot fail to be, since he is sempiternal. Therefore in God there is no potency for being. Furthermore: although something that is at some time in potency and at some time in act is prior in time to the act in potency, yet simply speaking act is prior to potency — for potency does not bring itself to act, but must be brought to act by something that is in act. Therefore everything that is in any way in potency has something prior to it. But God is the first being and the first cause, as is clear from what has been said above. Therefore he has no potency mixed in him. Furthermore: what is self-necessary is in no way possibly being — for what is self-necessary has no cause, while everything that is possibly being has a cause, as was shown above. But God is self-necessary being. Therefore he is in no way possibly being. Therefore no potency is found in his substance. Furthermore: each thing acts according as it is in act. Therefore what is not total act does not act with all of itself, but with some part of itself. But what does not act with all of itself is not the first agent — for it acts by participation, not through its essence. Therefore the first agent, which is God, has no potency mixed in it, but is pure act. Furthermore: just as each thing is by nature apt to act insofar as it is in act, so it is by nature apt to be acted upon insofar as it is in potency — for motion is the act of what exists in potency. But God is altogether impassible and immutable, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore he has nothing of potency — that is, of passive potency. Furthermore: we see something in the world that goes from potency to act. But it does not bring itself from potency to act — for what is in potency does not yet exist, and therefore cannot act. Therefore there must be something that is entirely in act and in no way in potency. And this we call God.

[Ferrara's Commentary]

Having removed from God the imperfection of temporal things, Saint Thomas now removes the imperfection of passive potency. Concerning this he does two things: first, he removes passive

potency; second, he deduces a corollary.

I. With regard to the first, this conclusion is laid down: God is not in passive potency. For the understanding of this, it should be known that, although God has no passive potency whatsoever and is receptive of nothing alien to himself, the inquiry here is only about the potency for substantial being that is separable from act in itself. For it is established that Saint Thomas speaks here of that passive potency that is removed by sempiternality — since he deduces its removal from God from his sempiternality. And this is potency separable from act. For the potency that is inseparable from act in itself — namely, one whose capacity is completed by one act — is not repugnant to sempiternality, as is evident in the heavenly bodies. But if it were said that all passive potency is repugnant to sempiternality — since the sempiternal must properly be alien from all change both intrinsically and extrinsically, and wherever there is any passive potency the thing is changeable, at least extrinsically — this cannot be according to the mind of Saint Thomas: since it is established that he proved in the preceding chapter that God is eternal in this sense only, that he has no beginning or end of duration, in which sense philosophers also held time, motion, and the heavenly bodies to be eternal — not in the sense that every change is absolutely excluded. The sense of the conclusion, therefore, is that in God there is no potency for substantial being that is separable from the act he has. And it is the same as if it were said that God is not composed of matter and form in the way corruptible things — which are not eternal — have composition. And in this sense it is proved. Nevertheless, although this sense is what he principally intends, he also inserts some arguments by which it is proved not only that he is not in potency, but also that in him there is nothing that has the character of potency — since if that is the case, it is patently clear that he cannot be in potency.

II. The first argument is therefore as follows: God, according to himself, cannot fail to be. Therefore there is no potency for being in him. — The antecedent is clear: because he is eternal. — The inference is proved: because in whatever substance potency is mixed, it can fail to be according to what it has of potency — since what can be can also not be. Note for the understanding of this argument that the assumption for proving the inference is not understood of being able to fail to be through extrinsic potency — though it is true in that sense too — since being in potency is also not taken according to extrinsic potency. Rather, it is taken of being able to fail to be intrinsically — namely, that it has in itself a source of failing at some point, as happens in corruptible things. This is clear from the proof of the antecedent. For God's not being able to fail to be is proved because he is sempiternal. But to the sempiternal — such as the heaven — there belongs the inability to fail to be intrinsically, even though it could fail to be extrinsically. Hence he also said that God cannot fail to be 'according to himself' — that is, through some intrinsic principle. It is also clear from the

assumption for the proof of the inference. And the proposition is true if taken in the sense of the conclusion — but in another sense it would be false. For potency being mixed in the substance of something can be understood in two ways. In one way, because it has in itself several parts, one of which is related to another as potency to act and as recipient to form — though it cannot be separated from act on its own side. In another way, because it has in itself a potential part separable from act in itself, in that it is receptive of another act. For that in which potency is mixed in the first way need not be capable of failing to be intrinsically, as is evident in the heavenly bodies — according to those who hold them to be composed of matter and form: for there is potency in them, and yet they are incorruptible. But for that in which potency is mixed in the second way — which is the sense in which the conclusion is understood — it can at some point fail to be. For if that potency can be separated from act, what has such potency can fail to be — just as, because the matter of Socrates can receive another form and thus lack the form it has, Socrates can fail to be. Saint Thomas adds 'according to what it has of potency' — partly because if something consists of potency and act, the inability to be does not belong to it by reason of the act it has, but by reason of the potency, which is receptive of another form; and partly because if it has potency for substantial being, it can fail to be substantially; but if it has potency for some accidental being, it can fail to be accidentally — such as white or black and the like; and universally speaking, it can fail to be that toward which it is in potency.

III. Second: God has nothing prior to him. Therefore he is not in potency. — The antecedent is clear: because he is the first being and the first cause. — The inference is proved: because act is simply prior to potency — although in one and the same thing potency is prior in time to act — since what is in potency is not brought to act except by some being in act. Therefore if God were in potency, there would be some being in act prior to him. Therefore, etc. For the elucidation of this argument, it should be noted that 'act being simply prior to potency' can be understood in two ways: in one way, priority of nature and causality; in another way, priority of duration. And although both are true, as is clear from Aristotle in Metaphysics IX and from the teaching of Saint Thomas there and in Lesson 7, and in De Potentia, q. 7, a. 1, yet they are true in different ways. For if we speak of priority of nature and causality, this is true absolutely — both of what is produced successively and of what is produced in an instant. But if we speak of priority of duration, this is not universally true, but requires two qualifications. The first is that what is in potency should be reduced to act through successive change. The second is that the potency should be proximate potency — which can be reduced to act through a single change — and not remote potency. This is clear from Aristotle in Metaphysics IX, text 12, and from Saint Thomas in Lesson 6, who explains how something is said to be in potency for an act. Due to the absence of the first qualification, it is not necessary that what is capable of illuminating precede in duration what is capable of being

illuminated — since illumination is not a successive but an instantaneous change. Due to the absence of the second qualification, it is not necessary that a being in act precede prime matter in duration — since, though it is in potency, it is not proximate potency but remote potency.

2. The proposition being understood in this way, its truth is plainly evident. For since matter is successively brought by the action of something existing in act to such a disposition as to be proximate matter that can be reduced to act by a single action, it is clear that a being in act precedes not only in duration the thing produced, but also its proximate potency — since between it and such potency there is an interval of time during which the matter was brought by the action of the agent to that disposition according to which it is proximate matter. The truth of this exposition is also clear from the argument by which the stated proposition is proved — namely, that what is in potency is not reduced to act except by a being in act. For if this were understood of remote potency or of bare matter, then this inference would be invalid: 'What is in potency is not brought to act except by some being in act; therefore act is prior in time to potency.' But it would rightly follow: 'Therefore act precedes the act successively produced from it.' — But if it is understood in the explained manner, the inference is valid. For if what is in potency before any action of the agent is reduced to act successively by something existing in act, it follows that the act precedes the proximate potency of what is brought to act — since the matter is successively disposed by the agent with that disposition which is the proximate and immediate disposition to the form. Although the proposition is true both of priority of duration and of priority of nature, Saint Thomas here takes it as true of priority of nature and causality. For in this sense act is prior to what is sometimes in potency and sometimes in act — and since nothing is prior to God in causality, since he is the first cause, it follows that he is not sometimes in potency and sometimes in act.

IV. Third: God is self-necessary being. Therefore he is not possibly being. Therefore no potency is found in his substance. — The first inference is proved: every possibly being has a cause, as was shown in this chapter. But what is self-necessary has no cause — otherwise it would not be self-necessary. Therefore, etc. Note that, although if 'possible' is taken as opposed to 'impossible,' self-necessary being is also possibly being — yet if 'possible' is taken as the same as 'contingent' — namely, what can be and not be, which is opposed in this way to the necessary — then nothing that is self-necessary is possible. Just as one of two opposites is not the other.

V. Fourth: The first agent is pure act. But God is the first agent. Therefore pure act. — The major is proved: because the opposite of the predicate implies the opposite of the subject. For it follows: 'It is not pure act; therefore it does not act with all of itself but with some part' — since each thing acts insofar as it is in act. 'Therefore it acts by participation, not through its essence. Therefore it is not

the first agent.' For the elucidation of this argument, it should be considered that everything that is received in some potency receives from such reception a certain limitation — just as whiteness received in a subject is limited to some degree of whiteness, while if it were abstracted from a subject it would have every perfection possible to it — for act is impaired by having received being. It follows from this that an act received in potency is participated — since it does not have every perfection that can belong to it according to the character of its species. It rightly follows, therefore, that if something does not act with all of itself, it does not act through its essence — in the sense that its essence, which names the whole, is what acts primarily — but by participation of something — that is, through its actual part that is participated by being received in another potential part. And this is indeed repugnant to the character of the first agent. For the first absolutely must also act primarily, and consequently not through anything in any way — just as what is moved primarily must not be moved through a part, as is said in Physics VII.

VI. Fifth: God is altogether impassible and immutable. Therefore he has no passive potency. — The inference is proved: because each thing is by nature apt to be acted upon from what it is in potency — since motion is the act of what exists in potency.

Sixth: Something in the world goes from potency to act. And it does not bring itself from potency to act — since what is in potency does not yet exist, and consequently cannot act. Therefore one must arrive at something that is entirely in act and in no way in potency. And this we call God. — The inference is proved: because there is no infinite regress in these things. Against this argument it could be objected that from the fact that there is no infinite regress in things that go from potency to act, it does not seem to follow that one must arrive at pure act — which is God — but only at something that is not brought from potency to act. For if we suppose the heaven to have been produced from eternity, it would not have been reduced from passive potency to act, yet it has potency. But this objection is removed if the intended conclusion is considered. For Saint Thomas does not intend in this chapter to prove that God is pure act having nothing in himself that has the character of potency — but that in God there is no potency separable from act, through which he would be said to be in passive potency for something else, as air is in potency to become fire, and universally all corruptible things are in potency to become something else from them.

CHAPTER XVII

That in God, There is No Matter

For matter, as to what it is, is in potency. Furthermore: matter is not a principle of acting — hence agent and matter do not coincide, according to the Philosopher. But it belongs to God to be the first efficient cause of things, as was said above. Therefore he is not matter. Moreover: it would follow that natural things exist by chance for those who reduced all things to matter as to the first cause — against whom the argument proceeds in Physics II. If, therefore, God — who is the first cause — were the material cause of things, it would follow that all things exist by chance. Furthermore: matter does not become the cause of something in act except by being altered and changed. If, therefore, God is immovable, as has been proved, in no way can he be the cause of things after the manner of matter. This truth the Catholic faith confesses — asserting that God did not create all things from his own substance, but from nothing.

[Ferrara's Commentary]

From the preceding chapter Saint Thomas deduces this conclusion: God is not matter. Concerning this he does two things: first, he proves the conclusion; second, he excludes a certain error from what has been determined.

I. The first argument for the conclusion is as follows: In God there is no potency for substantial being. Therefore God is not matter. — The inference is proved: because prime matter is what it is in potency. Note that matter is in potency differently from how what comes from matter is in potency. For matter is not in potency in the sense that it can be produced and subsist in act as fire can — since it is ingenerable and incorruptible, as is said in Physics I. Rather, matter is essentially potency — for it is potency itself and is the subject receptive of act. This the mode of speaking of Saint Thomas hints at, when he says 'matter, as to what it is, is in potency' — that is, according to its whole essence it is the receptive potency of act; so that the essentiality of potency is signified by the phrase 'as to what it is,' and the ordering to act by the phrase 'is in potency.' — What comes into being, on the other hand, before it exists, is in potency because it can be in act through the action of an agent, and there is some potency in the matter from which it can be drawn.

The second argument: God is the first efficient cause. Therefore he is not matter. — The inference holds: because agent and matter do not coincide, according to the Philosopher in Physics II and Metaphysics V.

The third argument: If God were matter, all things would exist by chance.

The fourth argument: God is immovable. Therefore he is not matter. — The inference is clear: because matter does not become the cause of something in act except by being altered and changed. It should be noted that for matter to be a part of something is one thing, and for matter to become the cause of something in act is another. For matter to be a part of something is for it to constitute the essence of the composite thing partially. This can happen without the alteration and change of matter — as we see in the heavenly bodies. But for matter to become the cause in act of something is for matter, previously existing as a cause only in potency, subsequently to actually cause that thing in its genus. But this cannot be without alteration and change, by which it is stripped of its present form and puts on another — for matter that is under the form of air cannot become the actual cause of the form of fire except through an alteration by which it is stripped of the form. Since, therefore, we posit God as the first cause, and something as newly caused by him — if he were matter, he would need through some change to become the actual cause of what he was previously only the potential cause of.

II. With regard to the second, Saint Thomas refutes the foolish position of David of Dinant, who thought God to be prime matter — deceived by this argument: if God and matter were not the same, they would differ by some differences, and so they would not be simple — for what differs from another by a difference has composition made in it by that difference. But Saint Thomas replies that he was ignorant of the distinction between 'differing' and 'being diverse.' For 'different' is said in relation to something — since everything that differs is different by something — as is clear from Metaphysics X, text 12; while 'diverse' is said absolutely, from the fact that something is not the same. Now difference is to be sought between things that agree in something — for there must be something assigned according to which they differ, just as two species agree in a genus and therefore must be distinguished by differences. But between things that agree in nothing, one must not ask what makes them differ — they are diverse in themselves. For even opposite differences are distinguished from one another in this way — they do not participate in a genus as part of their essence, and therefore one must not ask by what they differ: for they are diverse in themselves. In this way too God and prime matter are distinguished — one being pure act, the other being pure potency, having no agreement in anything.

III. For the clarification of what is said here, it is necessary to recall what is had from Metaphysics V and X — that 'diverse' is opposed to identity and universally does not import identity. Hence in whatever way things are not the same, they can be called diverse. But 'different' — if we wish to use the word properly — is said of what agrees with another in something but is distinguished from it by certain differences of that common thing, just as man, who agrees with the horse in the genus of animal, differs from it by 'rational.' Hence every different thing is diverse, because it is in some way not the same — but not every diverse thing is different, because even things that agree in nothing can be called diverse, though not different. But sometimes we use one word indistinctly for the other — so that things that are in any way diverse we say are different because they are not the same, not because they are distinguished under some common thing by some differences.

It should also be considered, concerning what he says that differences do not participate in a genus as part of their essence, that genus can be considered in two ways: materially and formally. If considered materially — with respect to its entity alone — it is not a part either of a species or of a difference, but expresses the total entity of both species and difference. But if considered formally — according as it corresponds as a foundation to a concept common to all its species — it expresses a part of the essence of a species, but not of a difference, if we take the essence of the thing formally — that is, according as the nature responds to the defining concept of the intellect. For in the essential definition of a species, the genus is included as a part of the definition and is therefore called a part of the essence of the species. But the genus is not placed in the definition of a difference as a part of it, nor is the genus formally predicated of it, as is said in Metaphysics III — otherwise in definitions there would be tautology. The genus therefore does not express a part of the essence of a difference, though it is materially the same as it. And for this reason differences are called primarily diverse, since they agree in no common objective concept.

IV. But three difficulties arise. The first: for something is not said to be relative because it is such by something — but because it is related to another as to a correlative. For 'white' is not a relative term, though white is white by whiteness. Therefore, even if something that is different differs by something, it does not therefore become a relative term. The opposite of this seems to be what Saint Thomas holds here, when he says that 'different' is said in relation to something.

The second: it does not seem that 'diverse' is distinguished from 'different' in the way posited here. For just as what is different is different by some difference, so what is diverse is diverse by some diversity. And so, by the same reasoning as the one is said 'in relation to something,' so is the other.

The third: matter and God agree in being. Therefore they are different — since, as the Philosopher

says in Metaphysics V, text 15, those things are different that are diverse and yet the same in some respect, whether in number or in species or in genus or in proportion. And Saint Thomas gives an example 'in proportion' of quantity and quality in being. Therefore it is false what Saint Thomas says — that they have no agreement and are not different.

V. For the elucidation of these difficulties, it should be considered that in what is said relatively, besides the term to which it is related, there must necessarily be something by which it is related to the term — something in some way distinct from it. For in what is similar, there must be a relation by which it is likened to another, and some quality that is the foundation of likeness — since what is similar is similar by some likeness and according to some quality. But what is said negatively does not need anything by which it is negatively said, but can be negated from another by itself. If, therefore, 'different' is a relative term, there must be in it something by which it differs from the term. But 'diverse,' because it is absolute — importing no relation to another of itself — does not need anything by which it is diverse, but can be denied by its whole self. For this reason, wishing to assign the mode in which they are distinguished, Saint Thomas introduced from the authority of Aristotle that one is relative and the other absolute — from which it follows that in one there is something by which it is said such, while in the other there is not. 'Relative' or 'in relation to something' is therefore said in two ways: to one thing as to a term alone and correlative, and to another as to the reason for referring. For 'father' is said in relation to 'son' as to the term, and in relation to paternity as to the reason for referring — for a father is formally a father by paternity, and fundamentally by the power or act of generating. 'Different' therefore is relative, because it is said in relation to what it differs by as to the reason for referring, not as to the term. 'Diverse,' on the other hand, is not said in relation to anything as to the reason for referring.

VI. To the first difficulty it can first be replied that, although something is not relative because it is such by something in any manner whatsoever, yet something is said 'in relation to something' because it is such by something as by the reason for referring. And this does not apply to 'white.' For although 'white' is white by whiteness, the name 'white' does not import whiteness as the reason for referring to another. A second reply is possible: 'relative' and 'in relation to something' can be taken in two ways, just as 'absolute' can. For something is called absolute either because it is freed from a term — such as 'quantity,' which as such is not said in relation to another as term — or because it is freed from a subject, a form, or any other mode of dependence on another, such as substance, which is absolute from a subject, and accident, which is absolute from a form by which it is such — for an accident is not an accident by some form added to it, but by itself. Similarly, 'in relation to something' is said either as to a term alone, or as to a subject or form or in any other mode than as to a term alone. When, therefore, 'different' is said to be in relation to something or

relative — as is said in Sentences I, d. 8, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3 — 'in relation to something' is not taken as to a term, which is properly 'in relation to something,' but as to a form, which can in a broad sense be called 'in relation to something.' For 'different' imports some form by which it is different. But 'diverse' does not import a form by which it is diverse — it can be diverse by itself. Therefore it is called absolute from a form. — In this broad sense, 'white' is conceded to be said 'in relation to something' as to a form, since every white thing is white by whiteness — though it is not 'in relation to something' as to an extrinsic term.

This distinction can be drawn from Saint Thomas in Metaphysics V, in the chapter on 'in relation to something,' where he says that sight can rightly be called 'of the seer' — not insofar as sight is such, because in that sense it is called visible, but insofar as it is an accident or power of the seer. For a relation looks to something outside, not to its subject except insofar as it is an accident. Just as sight has a relation both to the visible and to the seer — though insofar as it is properly relative it is said in relation to the visible, and insofar as it is an accident or power in relation to the subject, so that in that broad sense it can also be called relative because it imports a relation to another — namely to the subject — so too 'different' imports a relation to what it differs from as to an extrinsic term, and in this sense is properly relative; it also imports a relation to the difference as to the form by which it is different, and in this broad sense can be called 'in relation to something' — insofar as everything that imports a relation to another in any way can be called 'in relation to something.' This response seems to be more according to the mind of the holy Doctor. For in Summa Theologiae I, q. 3, a. 8, ad 3, he says: 'Hence according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics X, "diverse" is said absolutely, but everything "different" differs by something.' From this he gives us to understand that he takes 'absolute' as the same as 'not importing a form distinct from itself by which it is such,' and similarly 'in relation to something' as 'importing a form by which it is such, in some way distinct from it.' Also in Sentences I, d. 8, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3, explaining from the Philosopher's mind how 'diverse' is absolute and 'different' is relative, he assigns as the reason that everything different differs by something, but not every diverse thing is diverse by something.

VII. To the second difficulty: 'diverse' and 'diversity' are said negatively, like 'not the same' and 'non-identity.' Hence 'diverse' is not diverse by some diversity as by a form, but as by a negation of a form. It should also be noted that, although 'diverse' seems to be said relatively — for something is diverse from something — yet the preposition 'from' does not import a term of relation but of negation: it imports that to which something is not identical; just as when it is said 'Socrates not existing is distinguished from Plato not existing,' no ordering of one to the other is imported, but the negation of one from the other. Hence 'diverse' is not relative but absolute.

VIII. To the third difficulty: 'different' — taken properly — is said between those that are distinguished in genus or species, as is said in Metaphysics X, text 12. Hence it does not suffice for 'different' in the proper sense that some things agree in one analogical and proportional common thing — but it is required that each of them be in some genus or species. Hence the Philosopher says there in Metaphysics X that it is necessary that what things differ in should be something the same in them — in those that do not differ in this way — and this is a genus or species. As for what Saint Thomas and Aristotle say — that also things that are one by proportion are different — this is to be understood on the supposition that each of them is in a genus. And as for the example of quantity and quality that are united in being: these are not taken as the highest genera, but as species of genera — namely as a line and whiteness. For these differ in genus, agreeing in nothing except being as said of them proportionally. The reply to the argument is therefore that, although God and matter agree in being as said of them proportionally, they nevertheless do not agree as things of different genera or different species — as Saint Thomas understands, who refers to Aristotle in Metaphysics X. — The same must be said of opposite differences. For although they agree in being, they are nevertheless not in any genus or species formally predicated of them. Therefore they are distinguished in themselves and not by other differences.

Chapter XVIII

That in God, There is No Composition

From the foregoing it can be concluded that in God there is no composition. For in every composite there must be act and potency. For several things cannot become simply one unless one of them is act and another is potency. Those things that are in act are not united except as it were by being bound together or gathered, which things are not simply one. And in these things, the parts gathered together are themselves as potency with respect to the union — for they are united in act after having been in potency as capable of being united. But in God there is no potency. Therefore there is no composition in him. Furthermore: every composite is posterior to its components. Therefore the first being — which is God — is composed of nothing. Moreover: every composite is potentially dissoluble insofar as the character of composition is concerned — though in some cases there is something else that resists dissolution. But what is dissoluble is in potency for non-being. This does not befit God — since he is self-necessary being. Therefore there is no composition in him. Furthermore: every composition needs something to do the composing. For if there is composition, it is from several parts; but things that are in themselves several do not come together into one unless united by some composer. If, therefore, God were composed, he would have a composer — for he cannot compose himself, since nothing is the cause of itself; otherwise it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. But the composer is the efficient cause of the composite. Therefore God would have an efficient cause. And so he would not be the first cause — which has been established above. Furthermore: in every genus, a thing is nobler the simpler it is — as in the genus of hot things, fire, which has no admixture of cold. Therefore what is in the highest degree of nobility among all beings must be in the highest degree of simplicity. But what is in the highest degree of nobility among all beings is what we call God, since he is the first cause — for the cause is nobler than the effect. Therefore no composition can befall him. Moreover: in every composite the good is not of this or that part, but of the whole — and I say good according to that goodness that is the proper good and perfection of the whole: for parts are imperfect with respect to the whole, just as the parts of a man are not a man, and the parts of the number six do not have the perfection of six, and similarly the parts of a line do not attain the perfection of measure found in the whole line. If, therefore, God is composed, his

proper perfection and goodness is found in the whole, not in any of his parts. And so what is proper to him as good will not be in him purely. Therefore he is not the first and highest good. Furthermore: before all multiplicity one must find unity. But in every composite there is multiplicity. Therefore what is before all things — namely, God — must lack all composition.

[Ferrara's Commentary]

Having excluded passive potentiality from God, Saint Thomas consequently excludes composition also. Concerning this he does two things: first, he excludes composition universally; second, he descends to particular compositions, in Chapter XX. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he excludes all composition from God; second, he deduces a corollary, in the following chapter.

I. With regard to the first: he proves that there is no composition in God. He argues first as follows: In God there is no potency. Therefore no composition. — The inference is proved: because where there is composition, there is act and potency. For from several things one cannot simply be made unless one is act and the other potency — otherwise there would be only a union by binding and gathering, if both were act. And even so the parts would be as potency with respect to the union. The foundation of this argument will be declared below in Book II, where the discussion of the plurality of forms will occur.

II. Second: God is the first being. Therefore he is not composite. — The inference is proved: because the composite is posterior to its components. Note that the composite is compared to its component parts in some way as act to potency. Therefore in the order of formal cause, the whole is by nature prior to its parts; but in the order of material cause, the parts are prior to the whole. Hence Saint Thomas says in Sentences III, d. 2, q. 2, a. 1, that parts are prior to the whole originally, but the whole is prior to the parts completively. This is to say that by the way of generation and of matter — by which one proceeds from potency to act — the parts are prior to the whole; but in the order of nature and form — from which a thing's complement comes — the whole is prior to the parts.

III. Third: If he were composite, he could fail to be. But this does not befit God. — The inference is proved: because every composite, as such, is dissoluble — though in some things there is something that resists dissolution. But this argument seems to destroy itself. For it will be said that, although

God's being composite would entail that he could fail to be, yet his failing to be is repugnant to him from elsewhere — and he is necessary being. For the elucidation of this, it should be known that every composite includes several really distinct things from which it is composed. Now things that are really distinct, as they are really distinct, admit of no inconvenience in being able to be separated from one another — though sometimes from their particular characters it is repugnant for them to be separated, because one has a necessary dependence on the other. It is therefore rightly said that every composite is dissoluble from the character of composition — since composition includes the plurality of parts, which, as they are several and distinct, admit of one being separable from another, whether both remaining or only one or neither; and consequently the whole can be dissolved and cease to be. But in God nothing of this sort can be found from which he might fail to be — since he is self-necessary in the primary sense, from which it follows that in no way can he fail to be, whether intrinsically or extrinsically.

IV. Fourth: He would have an efficient cause. And so he would not be the first cause. — The inference is proved: because every composition needs a composer — for several things do not come together into one unless united by something. But the composite does not compose itself — since nothing is its own cause. Therefore there must be something else doing the composing. But such a thing is the efficient cause of the composite. Therefore, etc.

V. Fifth: God is the most noble of beings. Therefore he is not composite. — The antecedent is clear: because he is the first cause. — The inference is proved: in every genus a thing is nobler the simpler it is — as fire, which has no admixture of cold, is most noble in the genus of hot things. Therefore what is in the highest degree of nobility among all beings is in the highest degree of simplicity. And consequently is not composite. Note concerning the proposition 'In every genus the nobler a thing is, the simpler it is' that this is true in those things that are placed per se and directly in the genus — not universally of all things. For prime matter is not nobler than man, though it is simpler; nor is man simpler than matter because he is more perfect. For matter is not in a genus as something completed in a species. But among species themselves, the one that is nobler is also simpler. Note also, when it is said 'fire which has no admixture of cold,' that this can have two senses. The first: the phrase 'which has no admixture of cold' limits the term 'fire' — so the sense is: 'Since some fire has an admixture of cold and some does not, the fire that has none is most perfect.' And then it is probable that this supposition is true of fire in its own sphere — that it has no degree of coldness, but has the highest degree of heat, at least in its highest part. — The second sense can be that it declares the nature of fire — as if it belongs to the nature of fire not to have any degree of coldness. And then it is to be understood of fire in its proper matter, left to its own nature, and not in alien matter. For if we were to speak of it insofar as it is altered by something cold — say by water, which

converts it into water — it would not appear why coldness could not be mingled with its heat. Indeed, this seems necessary since fire cannot be converted into water unless it is first disposed with the dispositions of water.

VI. But a difficulty arises concerning this proposition — 'In every genus the nobler something is, the simpler it is.' For it does not seem true either in genera or in species. In genera: because the higher a genus is, the simpler it is — since it includes fewer things in its character. Yet it is not more perfect: rather it is less perfect, because it is more potential, as it is contractible by more differences — as is evident to one considering the order of the predicament of substance. Also in species: because a stone is simpler than a man — since it is constituted by the single difference of 'body,' while man is constituted by many other differences, such as 'living' and 'animal.' And yet man is far nobler than a stone. — Similarly, elements are simpler than animate mixtures. And yet animate things are more excellent than elements. This is confirmed by the words of Saint Thomas in Summa Theologiae I, q. 3, a. 7, ad 2. For there he concedes that among us composites are better than simple things.

VII. To these objections it could briefly be said that Saint Thomas speaks of simplicity as opposed to mixture with the opposite — as is clear from the words of the text. For what is less mixed with its contrary is more perfect in its nature — just as whiteness is more perfect the less it is mixed with blackness, and heat is more perfect the less admixture of coldness it has. And in this sense 'simpler' is the same as 'purer.' Since, therefore, God is most perfect in the genus of beings, he must be most pure — having nothing of non-being and of potentiality. And consequently he has no composition.

VIII. Nevertheless, in order to consider more deeply the order of simplicity and composition in things, it should be known first that there is a twofold simplicity: corporeal simplicity and formal — or actual — simplicity. That is said to be altogether simple with corporeal simplicity which is a body not composed of another body. And something is simpler to the extent that it is composed of fewer other bodies — as elements are simpler than mixtures. — But that is said to be altogether simple with formal and actual simplicity which is altogether form and act. And something is simpler to the extent that it is more formal and actual and has less of potentiality.

It should be known second — for greater evidence of this formal simplicity and the composition opposed to it — that since the foundation of composition is act and potency, since from many things one is simply made only if one of them is act and the other potency; and since composition depends above all on potency, since pure potency cannot exist on its own — the more potentiality and diversity of potency from act is preserved under one being, the more the character of

composition is preserved. For composition imports the positing of several things — act and potency — for the being of one. Therefore where potentiality and distinction are more preserved with unity of being, composition is more preserved. — Now distinction of potency and act and potentiality are preserved in a composite to a greater degree the less potency is actuated by the form and the less the form predominates over matter — for then from them one is made less, since one is drawn less to the degree of the other. It therefore follows that where the form predominates over matter less, that thing is more potential and more composite. — From this it further follows that where the form is more perfect and more predominant over matter, from that form and matter something less composite and more one and simpler comes to be — since a form, the more it predominates, the more perfectly it actualizes matter and leaves less in potency. This is clearly evident if we go through the grades of forms informing matter of the same kind. For the forms of the elements, since they are wholly immersed in matter, actualize it very little, leaving it in potency to the act of a mixture, a living thing, an animal, and a rational being. But the form of the mixture actualizes matter more — since it gives it corporeal being and the being of a mixture — and leaves it less in potency, since not toward the being of a mixture as the preceding; but the form of a living thing actualizes even more, since it gives it its proper being and that of the preceding forms, and leaves less in potency; and so on successively — the more perfect the form, the less it leaves matter in potency, and consequently the composite is more one and has less of potentiality in its essence. For this reason Saint Thomas says in Book II of this work, Chapter 68, that from an intellectual substance and corporeal matter there comes one that is no less — indeed perhaps more — one than from the form of fire and its matter: since the more the form overcomes matter, the more one is made from it and the matter. But it should also be noted that, although the more perfect and noble something is, the less it has of potentiality and real diversity, yet it has more of virtual plurality — containing more perfections in a united and simple way that in others are distinct. The proposition of Saint Thomas — 'The nobler something is, the simpler it is' — is therefore to be understood of this formal simplicity, not of corporeal simplicity. For the more actual something is and the less it has of potentiality, the nobler it is. And so what is in the highest degree of nobility is also in the highest degree of simplicity, excluding from itself all diversity of potency and act.

IX. To the difficulty, therefore, it is said first that Saint Thomas here does not make a comparison between the higher and the lower, but between those that exist per se and in act. It is said second that also the genus — with respect to the nature of the genus itself, taken formally in the mode of a nature and abstract form from species — is nobler and more perfect than its species, as containing every perfection of animality in itself unitedly and without distinction. Just as abstract whiteness abstracted from every recipient contains — as such — every degree of whiteness. For then the genus is taken as abstract form, not as unlimited matter. But if the genus is taken in the mode of a

universal — as a potential whole containing its species in potency — then it is less perfect than its species and more composite with material composition, insofar as all its species are contained materially and potentially in it. — It is said second that a stone is not simpler than man, nor an element simpler than a mixture, in terms of formal simplicity. Rather they are less simple — since they have more of potentiality, as in them the form is wholly immersed in matter and leaves matter more in potency. — When it is proved that in their formal character they include fewer differences: the inference does not hold. For from the fact that they include fewer things in their character, it is argued that they contain fewer perfections virtually — not that they are more actual and more formal. Similarly, a plurality of differences in someone's character argues a plurality of perfections contained virtually and unitedly in that thing, not greater potentiality. To the confirmation: it is said that in the Prima Pars, where it is cited, Saint Thomas is not speaking of formal simplicity and potential composition opposed to it — which is his intention here — but of corporeal composition. For among us, bodies composed of other bodies are better than simple ones, because they have more of act and perfection, being constituted by a more noble form.

X. Sixth: He would not be the first and highest good. — The inference is proved: in every composite the good that is the proper perfection of the whole is not of this or that part. The reason is clear: since parts are imperfect with respect to the whole. And this is also clear from example — for the parts of a man are not a man, and the parts of the number six do not have the perfection of six, and the parts of a line do not have the perfection of measure that the line has. If, therefore, God were composite, what is proper to him as good would not be in him purely — since there would be in him something to which it would not belong. And so he would not be the first and highest good. It should be noted here that the first and highest good must be the very essence of goodness — since if it were not goodness itself, it would have goodness received in something, and consequently limited and participated, and so would not be the first and highest good. Now an abstract form admits nothing extraneous together with itself — as is established from Boethius in De Hebdomadibus: just as humanity expresses only those things by which man is man, and if it were separated from all individuals — as signified by the abstract name — it would have nothing else with it, otherwise it would not be only that by which man is man. Therefore goodness abstracted from all recipients has nothing that is not goodness itself. And if there is something that besides its own goodness and perfection has something to which its goodness does not belong, it is not goodness itself, but a thing participating in goodness — and therefore is not the first and highest good. If therefore we posit in God something to which the divine perfection proper to him does not belong, God will not be the first and highest good.

Seventh: Unity precedes all multiplicity. Therefore what precedes all things must necessarily lack multiplicity — and consequently composition.

Chapter XIX

That in God, There is Nothing Violent nor Contrary to Nature

From this the Philosopher concludes that in God there can be nothing violent or contrary to nature. For everything in which something violent or contrary to nature is found has something added to it — since what belongs to the substance of a thing cannot be violent or contrary to nature. But nothing simple has something added to it in itself — for from this composition would result. Since, therefore, God is simple, as has been shown, nothing in him can be violent or contrary to nature. Furthermore: the necessity of coercion is necessity from another. But in God there is no necessity from another — for he is self-necessary being, and is the cause of necessity for others. Therefore there is nothing compelled in him. Moreover: wherever there is something violent, there can be something besides what belongs to a thing of itself — since the violent is contrary to what is according to nature. But in God it is not possible for anything to be besides what belongs to him according to himself — since he is self-necessary being, as has been shown. Therefore there cannot be anything violent in him. Furthermore: everything in which there is something violent or unnatural is by nature apt to be moved by another — for the violent is that whose principle is outside, with the one subjected to violence contributing nothing. But God is altogether immovable, as has been shown. Therefore there cannot be in him anything violent or unnatural.

[Ferrara's Commentary]

From the preceding conclusion it is corollarily deduced that in God nothing can be violent and nothing contrary to nature. For the elucidation of this, it should be considered that 'violent' is said of what is done from an extrinsic principle, with no inclination in what is acted upon toward it — indeed with an inclination toward the opposite. But 'contrary to nature' is when in the nature there is neither inclination toward it nor repugnance to it. The sense of the conclusion, therefore, is that in God nothing can be that is repugnant to his nature, nor anything that is not according to the inclination of his nature. This is proved first: God can have nothing added to his substance, as is clear from the foregoing. Therefore nothing in him can be violent or contrary to nature. — The inference is proved: because nothing violent or contrary to nature belongs to the substance of a

thing, as is clear from the characters of the terms. Second: In God there is no necessity from another — on the contrary, he himself is the cause of necessity for others. Therefore, etc. — The inference is proved: because the necessity of coercion is from another.

Third: Nothing can be in God besides what belongs to him according to himself. Therefore nothing violent can be in him. — The inference is proved: because the violent is contrary to what is according to nature. — The antecedent is clear: because God is self-necessary being. Note that in what is self-necessary being of itself, nothing can be that does not necessarily belong to it — since the necessity in it is from its substance. Therefore nothing can belong to it that does not belong to it according to itself — otherwise there would be in it something of potentiality. — But this argument is different from the first. For in the first the argument was from the fact that nothing is added to his substance; in this one, from the fact that nothing can be in him besides what belongs to him according to himself — whether substantial or not.

Fourth: God cannot be moved by another. Therefore there is nothing violent in him. — The inference is clear from the definition of the violent. Note that to this definition should be supplied that in what is acted upon there is an inclination toward the opposite. For it is not sufficient for the character of the violent that what is acted upon has no inclination toward what is done in it — for that alone is contrary to nature; but an inclination toward the opposite is required, since the violent is against nature.

Chapter XX

That God is Not A Body

From the foregoing it is likewise shown that God is not a body For every body, being continuous, is composite and has parts. But God is not composite, as has been shown. Therefore, he is not a body. Furthermore, everything quantitative is in some way in potentiality: for a continuum is potentially divisible to infinity, and number is potentially augmentable without limit. But every body is quantitative. Therefore, every body is in potentiality. But God is not in potentiality but is pure act, as has been shown. Therefore, God is not a body. Moreover, if God were a body, he would have to be a natural body; for a mathematical body does not exist of itself, as the Philosopher proves, since dimensions are accidents. But he is not a natural body, since he is immovable, as has been shown, and every natural body is movable. Therefore, God is not a body. Besides, every body is finite, as is proved of both circular and rectilinear body in the first book of On the Heavens. But any finite body can be transcended by our intellect and imagination. If therefore God were a body, our intellect and imagination could conceive something greater than God. And thus God would not be greater than our intellect—which is absurd. Therefore, he is not a body.

Moreover, intellectual cognition is more certain than sense cognition. Now there is found in the nature of things something that is the object of sense. Therefore, there is also something that is the object of intellect. But the order of powers corresponds to the order of objects, as does their distinction. Therefore, above all sensible things there is something intelligible that exists in the nature of things. But every body that exists in reality is sensible. Therefore, above all bodies there is something more noble. If therefore God were a body, he would not be the first and greatest being. Furthermore, any living thing is more noble than any non-living body. And the life of any living body is more noble than the body itself, since it is through life that it has its nobility above other bodies. Therefore, that than which nothing is more noble is not a body. But this is God. Therefore, he is not a body.

Again, there are found arguments of the philosophers tending to prove the same point from

the eternity of motion, proceeding as follows. In every everlasting motion it is necessary that the first mover be moved neither essentially nor accidentally, as is evident from what was said above. But the body of the heavens is moved circularly with everlasting motion. Therefore, its first mover is moved neither essentially nor accidentally. But no body moves locally unless it is itself moved, because the mover and the moved must be simultaneous, and thus a body that moves must itself be moved in order to be simultaneous with the body moved. Nor does any power in a body move unless it is moved accidentally; for when the body is moved, the power of the body is moved accidentally. Therefore, the first mover of the heavens is neither a body nor a power in a body. But that to which the motion of the heavens is ultimately reduced as to its first immovable mover is God. Therefore, God is neither a body nor a power in a body. Moreover, no infinite power is a power residing in a magnitude. But the power of the first mover is infinite. Therefore, it does not reside in any magnitude. And thus God, who is the first mover, is neither a body nor a power in a body.

The first premise is proved as follows. If the power of some magnitude were infinite, it would be either the power of a finite magnitude or of an infinite one. There is no infinite magnitude, as is proved in the third book of the Physics and in the first book of On the Heavens. But in a finite magnitude it is impossible for there to be infinite power. And thus in no magnitude can there be infinite power. That infinite power cannot reside in a finite magnitude is proved as follows. The same effect which a lesser power produces in a greater time, a greater power produces in a lesser time, whatever that effect may be—whether it involves alteration, local motion, or any other kind of motion. But an infinite power is greater than every finite power. Therefore, it must bring about its effect in less time, moving more swiftly, than any finite power whatsoever. Nor can the time involved be less than some given time. It follows, therefore, that this will take place in an indivisible instant of time. And thus the acts of moving and being moved, and the motion itself, will occur in an instant—the contrary of which has been demonstrated in the sixth book of the Physics. That infinite power in a finite magnitude cannot move in time is proved again as follows. Let the infinite power be A. Take a part of it, which is AB. This part will then move in a greater time. There will, however, have to be some proportion of this time to the time in which the whole power moves, since both times are finite. Let these two times be in a tenfold ratio to each other—for it makes no difference to this argument whether one posits this or another ratio. Now if something is added to the aforesaid finite power, the time must

diminish proportionally to the addition made to the power, since a greater power moves in less time. If, therefore, the tenfold is added, that power will move in a time that is one tenth of the time in which the first part of the infinite power, namely AB, was moving. And yet this power, which is ten times AB, is a finite power, since it has a determinate ratio to a finite power. It follows, therefore, that a finite and an infinite power move in equal time—which is impossible. Therefore, infinite power cannot reside in any finite magnitude. That the power of the first mover is infinite is proved as follows. No finite power can move for infinite time. But the power of the first mover does move for infinite time, since the first motion is everlasting. Therefore, the power of the first mover is infinite. The first premise is proved as follows. If some finite power of a given body moves for infinite time, a part of that body, having a part of the power, will move in less time; for the greater a thing's power, the longer it will be able to continue a motion—and thus the aforesaid part will move for finite time, while a greater part will be able to move for a greater time. And so, continually, as something is added to the power of the mover, something will be added to the time in the same proportion. But an addition made a sufficient number of times will arrive at the quantity of the whole, or even exceed it. Therefore, the addition on the side of time will likewise arrive at the quantity of the time in which the whole moves. The time in which the whole was moving was said to be infinite. Therefore, a finite time will measure an infinite time—which is impossible. Now against this procedure of Aristotle many objections are raised. One of these is that it is possible to posit that the body which causes the first motion is not divisible, as is clear in the case of the celestial body. But the foregoing proof proceeds from the division of that body. The answer to this is that a conditional proposition can be true even though its antecedent is impossible. And if anything destroys the truth of such a conditional, it is itself impossible—just as it would be impossible if someone were to destroy the truth of the conditional: 'If a man flies, he has wings.' The foregoing proof is to be understood in this manner: because this conditional is true—'If the celestial body is divided, a part of it will have less power than the whole'—and the truth of this conditional would be destroyed if one were to posit the first mover as a body on account of the impossibilities that would follow—hence it is clear that this is impossible. And similarly one can reply if the objection is raised about the augmentation of finite powers.

A second objection is that even if the body is divided, some power can exist in a given body that is not divided when the body is divided—as, for example, the rational soul is not

divided when the body is divided. The answer to this is that the foregoing argument does not prove that God is not united to a body as the rational soul is to a human body; this is a matter belonging to a different line of reasoning. What it does prove is that he is not a power in a body in the way that a material power is—namely, one that is divided with the division of the body. And thus it is also said of the human intellect that it is neither a body nor a power in a body. But how God is not united to a body as a soul is a matter for a different argument.

A third objection is that if every body has finite power, as is shown in the foregoing argument, and if a finite power cannot make something endure for infinite time, it will follow that no body can endure for infinite time, and thus the celestial body will of necessity be corruptible.

To this some respond that the celestial body can indeed fail according to its own power, but acquires the perpetuity of its duration from another of infinite power. And Plato in the Timaeus seems to support this response, introducing God as speaking of celestial bodies in this manner: 'By your nature you are dissoluble; but by my will you are indissoluble, because my will is stronger than the bond that holds you together.' But the Commentator, in the eleventh book of the Metaphysics, refutes this response, arguing that it is impossible for what is of itself capable of not existing to acquire from another the perpetuity of existing—for it would follow that the corruptible would be changed into the incorruptible, which he regards as impossible. And so he himself responds as follows: that in the celestial body all power that exists is finite; yet it is not necessary that it have every power—for in the celestial body there is, according to Aristotle in the eighth book of the Metaphysics, a power with respect to where, but not with respect to being. And thus it is not necessary that there be in it a power for non-existence. It must be known, however, that this response of the Commentator is not adequate. For even granting that in the celestial body there is no quasi-passive power with respect to being—which is the power of matter—there is nevertheless in it a quasi-active power, which is the power of existing, since Aristotle explicitly says in the first book of On the Heavens that the heavens have the power to be always. It must therefore be said more adequately that, since power is spoken of in relation to act, we must judge concerning power according to the mode of the act. Now motion has quantity and extension in its very nature; hence its infinite duration requires that the

moving power be infinite. But being does not have any extension of quantity, especially in a thing whose being is invariable, such as the heavens. And therefore it is not necessary that the power of existing be infinite in a finite body, even though it endures infinitely; for it makes no difference, through that power, whether something endures in one instant or for infinite time, since that invariable being is not touched by time except accidentally.

A fourth objection is that it does not seem necessary that what moves for infinite time should have infinite power, in the case of those movers that are not altered by their moving. For such motion uses up nothing of their power; hence they can move for no less time after they have been moving for some time than before—just as the power of the sun is finite and yet, because its active power is not diminished by its acting, it can according to its nature act on these lower things for infinite time.

The answer to this is that a body does not move unless it is itself moved, as has been proved. And therefore if it should happen that a body is not moved, it will follow that it does not move. But of itself, every body that is moved can fail to be moved, because it is moved between opposite termini of motion. Therefore, of itself it does not belong to it to be moved for a perpetual time. And thus neither does it belong to it of itself to move for a perpetual time. As for the objection about the heavens: the answer is that a body which of itself can both move and not move, can both be a mover and not be a mover, and can acquire the perpetuity of its motion from another—but that other must be incorporeal; which is why the first mover must be incorporeal. In this manner the sun can perpetually move lower things, not indeed of itself, but by virtue of an incorporeal substance.

Secondly, he removes a difficulty that could be raised. For someone might say that what of itself can both be moved and not be moved cannot acquire from another the perpetuity of motion—as the Commentator says that what can both be and not be cannot acquire from another the perpetuity of existing. But the answer is that there is not the same reasoning for motion and for being. For motion is a certain flowing from a mover into what is moved—that is, something unstable, having succession, and consisting in a kind of becoming. Being, on the other hand, is something fixed and at rest in a thing—that is, existing all at once, and not consisting in a becoming. Therefore, some mobile thing can acquire from another the perpetuity of motion which it does not have of itself, by reason of

the influence of the moving cause. But what of itself is in potentiality with respect to non-existence cannot, according to the way of nature, acquire from another the perpetuity of existing.

A fifth objection is that through the foregoing argument there does not seem to be greater reason why there should not be infinite power in a magnitude than outside a magnitude; for in either case it would follow that it moves in no time at all.

The answer to this—following the Commentator—is that finite and infinite are found in magnitude, time, and motion according to one and the same principle; and therefore the infinite in one of these removes the finite proportion in the others. But in things that lack magnitude, there is finite and infinite only equivocally. Hence the foregoing mode of demonstration does not apply to such powers.

There is also another and better answer—according to the mind of the Commentator in the twelfth book of the Metaphysics—that the heavens have two movers: a proximate one, which is of finite power, from which the motion has its finite velocity; and a remote one, which is of infinite power, from which it has its infinite duration. For this reason, if the power which is infinite exists outside a magnitude, it does not follow that it moves in an instant, because it can move a body mediately. But if infinite power were in a magnitude, it would of necessity move in an instant, because a body must move immediately—since a body does not move unless it is itself moved.

The sense of this response is that, since the power outside a magnitude moves through the mediation of the power within a magnitude, its action is limited by the power existing in the magnitude; for the power of the first cause operates according to the condition and nature of the second cause. We see, for example, that the sun generates a man through a man and a horse through a horse. Therefore, if the power within a magnitude is finite and consequently naturally suited to move with finite velocity, the infinite power outside the magnitude, moving through it, will not move with infinite velocity but with a finite and determinate one. But the power that is in a magnitude, since it moves the celestial body immediately—otherwise the body would not move the lower bodies, since a body does not move unless it is itself moved—if it were infinite, would of necessity move in no time at all;

for it cannot receive limitation from a second cause, since it moves not through another cause but immediately by itself. There is yet a further and better answer: that the power which is not in a magnitude is intellect, and moves by will; whereas the power that is in a magnitude is not intellect, since the intellect is not a corporeal power—and hence it moves not through intellect and will, but by the necessity of nature. For this reason, the power outside a magnitude moves not according to the proper character of its own power, but according to the requirements of the mobile. Hence it does not follow that it moves in an instant. But the power that is in a magnitude—namely, as a material power extended to the extension of its subject—moves according to the proper character of its own nature and power, just as a body moves according to the proper character and condition of its quantity. Hence it follows that it moves in an instant.

Furthermore, no motion from a corporeal mover can be continuous and regular, because a corporeal mover in local motion moves by attracting or repelling; and what is attracted or repelled is not in the same disposition toward the mover from the beginning of the motion to the end, since at one time it is closer, at another more remote. And thus no body can produce a continuous and regular motion. But the first motion is continuous and regular, as is proved in the eighth book of the Physics. Therefore, the mover of the first motion is not a body.

Again, no motion that tends toward an end which passes from potentiality into act can be everlasting; for when the act is attained, the motion ceases. If therefore the first motion is everlasting, the end toward which it tends must be always and in every way in act. But no body or power in a body is of this kind, since all such things are moved either essentially or accidentally. Therefore, the end of the first motion is not a body or a power in a body. But the end of the first motion is the first mover, which moves as the object of desire. And this is God. Therefore, God is neither a body nor a power in a body. Although it is false according to our faith that the motion of the heavens is everlasting—as will be made clear below—it is nevertheless true that this motion will not cease on account of any impotence of the mover or corruption of the movable substance, since in that case the heavenly motion would have been observed to slow down over time, as is apparent in lower things. Rather, we hold by faith that it will cease by the will of God. Therefore, the demonstrations of Aristotle have

their efficacy grounded in what is naturally possible; and given this, they are most efficacious—even though we hold by faith that the opposite is in fact the case.

This demonstrated truth is supported by the authority of Sacred Scripture. For it is said in John 4: 'God is spirit, and they who worship him must worship in spirit and truth.' And it is said in 1 Timothy: 'To the King of the ages, immortal, invisible, the only God.' And in Romans 1: 'The invisible things of God are clearly seen through the things that have been made'—for those things that are discerned not by sight but by intellect are incorporeal. By this truth, moreover, the error of the first natural philosophers is destroyed, who posited only material causes—such as fire, water, or something of the sort—and thus called the first principles of things bodies, naming these same bodies gods. Among them there were also some who posited love and strife as moving causes; and these too are refuted by the foregoing arguments, since, as love and strife are in bodies according to them, it would follow that the first moving principles are powers within a body. These same thinkers also posited God as composed of the four elements and of love—which gives one to understand that they posited God as the celestial body. Among the ancients, Anaxagoras alone came close to the truth, positing intellect as that which moves all things.

This same truth also refutes the pagans who posited the very elements of the world and the powers existing in them as gods—as the sun, moon, earth, water, and the like—having occasion to do so from the errors of the aforesaid philosophers. By the foregoing arguments there are also excluded the ravings of simple-minded Jews, of Tertullian, of the Vadians—also called Anthropomorphites—who described God with bodily features, as well as the Manicheans, who imagined God to be a certain infinite substance of light extended through infinite space. The occasion of all these errors was that, in thinking about divine things, they fell back on the imagination, through which nothing but a likeness of a body can be grasped. And therefore it must be set aside when meditating on incorporeal things.

[Ferrara's Commentary]

After Saint Thomas has universally excluded all composition from God, he now wishes, for the sake of a clearer and more certain knowledge, to exclude various forms of composition in particular.

Concerning this he does two things: first, he excludes the compositions by which a thing is said to be composed of some parts; secondly, the composition by which a thing is said to be composed with another, in chapter 26. Concerning the first, he does five things: first, he excludes quantitative composition; second, composition of supposit and nature, in chapter twenty-one; third, composition of being and essence, in chapter twenty-two; fourth, composition of subject and accident, in chapter twenty-three; fifth, composition of genus and difference, in chapter twenty-four. Regarding the first, wishing to exclude quantitative composition from God, he posits this conclusion: God is not a body. Concerning this he does three things: first, he adduces common arguments; second, the arguments of Aristotle; third, he excludes the errors of the ancients. Regarding the first point, he argues first as follows. Every body is composite, because it is continuous. God is not composite. Therefore, etc.

Second. God is not in potentiality. Therefore, he is not a body. The antecedent was proved above. The consequence is proved because every body is continuous, and a continuum is potentially divisible to infinity. But this argument seems not to conclude. For the potentiality that is in a continuum with respect to division is not a natural potentiality, as is evident in celestial bodies, but rather a potentiality of non-repugnance. And it does not seem to be repugnant to God that there be in him a potentiality of non-repugnance. The answer is that potentiality of non-repugnance is twofold: one that has its foundation in the character of active potentiality; and another that has its foundation in the character of passive potentiality. The first kind of potentiality of non-repugnance does not unfittingly belong to God—for example, that God is in potentiality with respect to the production of another world—because active potentiality implies perfection. But it is indeed unfitting to attribute to God the second kind of potentiality, because passive potentiality, as such, implies imperfection. Now the potentiality of non-repugnance with respect to division in a continuum is founded upon the character of passive potentiality. Therefore, it is unfitting to attribute this to God. For since he is, of himself, necessarily existent, not only does he not have in himself a natural potentiality toward undergoing division, but indeed nothing can be in him through which, insofar as he has it, he would be in potentiality in any way whatsoever to be divided.

Third. He is either a mathematical body or a natural body. Not the first, because a mathematical body does not exist of itself, since it is an accident. Nor is he a natural body, since every such body is movable—for nature is the principle of motion—whereas God is immovable. Therefore, he is not a body.

Fourth. Then our intellect and thought could conceive something greater than God. And thus God

would not be greater than our intellect. The consequence is proved because something greater than any finite thing can be conceived. But every body, whether rectilinear or circular, is finite. It must be noted that there is no contradiction between what is said here and what was said above in chapter eleven; for here it is regarded as absurd that something greater than God can be conceived, whereas there it was not regarded as absurd. For as we said in that place: if it is not granted that there exists in reality something than which nothing greater can be conceived, it is not absurd that something greater than God can be conceived—in which sense Saint Thomas spoke above. But given that something of that kind does exist in reality, as can now be established from the foregoing, it is absurd that something greater than God can be conceived. And from this supposition the present argument proceeds.

Second. It follows that God would not be the first being. This is false. Therefore, etc. The consequence is proved as follows. Above all bodies there is something more noble and prior. Therefore, if God is a body, something will be prior to and more noble than him. The antecedent is proved. According to the order of objects is the order of powers. But the intellect is above sense, since intellectual cognition is more certain than sense cognition. Therefore, above the sensible there is something intelligible. But every body that exists in reality is sensible. Therefore, etc.

Concerning the proposition 'Intellectual cognition is more certain than sense cognition,' one must consider that certainty, if taken properly—as Saint Thomas says in the third book of the Sentences, distinction twenty-six, question two, article four—is the firmness of the adhesion of the cognitive power to its knowable object. Now we can compare intellectual and sensitive cognition in two ways: in one way, by considering each with respect to its own proper object; in another way, by considering each in relation to sensible substances, which fall under both sense and intellect. If we speak in the first way, I say first that, all impediments being removed, certainty is no greater on the part of the power in the intellect than in the senses. For just as the intellect is always right concerning the essence of a thing, so too the senses are always right concerning their proper sensible object. And therefore sense adheres just as firmly to its proper sensible object as the intellect adheres to its intelligible. I say second that intellectual cognition is more certain than sensitive cognition on the part of its objects, because the object of the intellect—namely, the essence of a thing—is more perfect and invariable than the object of sense. Therefore, of its very nature it is apt to produce greater certainty in the intellect than is the sensible object, which is variable in many ways, in the senses. I say third that, if they are considered absolutely, intellectual cognition is also more certain. For sensitive cognition can be impeded accidentally from certainty by many causes—for example, by indisposition of the organ and the medium, and also by undue distance or proximity. The intellect, however, although it can be deceived through the intervention of composition, as is said in

the third book of On the Soul, yet cannot be so impeded by as many causes as the senses. If they are compared in the second way, intellectual cognition is also more certain—because sense does not penetrate the very substance of a thing, but perceives only its external accidents. The intellect, however, proceeds to the innermost core of a thing. From this a greater certainty about a thing is born than from sense-perception alone. Since, therefore, intellectual cognition is more certain than sensitive in several ways, the proposition of Saint Thomas is absolutely true, though it admits of a certain exception, as is evident from what was said first. But a doubt arises. Even though the object of intellect may be prior to and more noble than the object of sense, it does not seem to follow that something is prior to a body. For it will be said that in a sensible body the character of the object of sense is preserved—namely, sensible accidents—and also the character of the object of intellect—namely, the essence of the substance; and that in the body itself, what is the object of intellect is more noble than what is the object of sense, as substance is more noble than accident. The answer is that the foundation of Saint Thomas's argument appears to be this: just as the intellect is more certain than sense and altogether elevated above sense, so too there must be in the nature of things something intelligible that is altogether elevated above sensible things—something that is neither essentially nor accidentally sensible on account of its conjunction with the essentially sensible. Now the essence of a sensible thing, although it is perceptible by intellect alone of itself, falls under sense accidentally, as is said in the second book of On the Soul. Therefore, there must be something intelligible that is above it.

Third. Nothing is more noble than God. Therefore, he is not a body. The consequence is proved as follows. Since a living thing is more noble than a non-living body, and life is more noble than any living body—because it is through life that a living thing has its nobility above other bodies—every body will have something more noble than itself. It should be noted that by the name of 'life' Saint Thomas here understands the soul, by which the body lives; and he takes 'body' absolutely, as it is a body—that is, as having corporeal being, and as it is distinguished from the soul insofar as the soul is soul. Therefore, this argument proves that God is not a body as distinguished from the soul; but not that he is not a body as also having life. In this sense it follows that above any body, whether living or non-living, there is something prior—namely, the soul itself—which is related to the body, as it abstracts from the soul either really or conceptually (for this makes no difference to the point at issue), as act to potentiality. But if one were to take a living body not merely as the part vivified by the soul, but as the composite of soul and body, then the soul would not be more noble than the living body, since a part is not more noble than its whole—rather, it is less perfect. Also, the statement of Saint Thomas that a living thing is more noble than a non-living body is to be understood simply and absolutely. In a certain respect, however, some non-living body can be more noble than a living one. For since the nobility of a thing derives from its form, and since the soul is

of its own nature more noble than a form that merely gives corporeal being, it follows that an animated thing is simply more noble than an inanimate one. But because a more noble form in substance may be less perfect in some particular respect—for example, in the respect of informing a body—since it informs in a less noble manner: just as Saint Thomas says, in the first part, question seventy, article three, and in the question on Power, question six, article six, reply thirteen, that the intellective soul is more noble in itself than the form of the heavens (if the heavens are inanimate), yet not more noble in the respect of informing a body, since the form of the heavens gives incorruptible being whereas the soul gives corruptible being in relation to the body—it is therefore not incongruous that a non-living thing should in some particular respect be more noble than a living one. Thus we say that a fly is simply more noble than the heavens, but that in a certain respect the heavens are more noble than a fly. Nor does it matter that the heavens are the cause of the fly, since they are not its principal cause but an instrument of the intelligence that moves them.

Regarding the second point, Saint Thomas sets forth four arguments of the philosophers, by which they prove from the eternity of motion that God is neither a body nor a power in a body. The first argument is this. God is the first mover of the heavens, altogether immovable—both essentially and accidentally—since he moves with everlasting motion. Therefore, he is not a body or a power in a body. The consequence is proved: because no body moves locally unless it is itself moved, since the mover and the moved must be simultaneous. Likewise, no power in a body moves unless it is moved accidentally. This argument is drawn partly from the seventh and partly from the eighth book of the Physics. For the understanding of this argument, one must consider first that the proposition 'No body moves locally unless it is itself moved' is to be understood in this place of purely local motion, in which one body is moved by another not through the impression of some form that is the formal principle of motion, but solely through the impulse of the mover. For since the mover (that is, the immediate mover) and the moved must be simultaneous—about which we have spoken sufficiently in the seventh book of the Physics—the mobile cannot change place unless the mover also changes place either in whole or in part. For if, as the mobile passes from one place to another, the mover did not change place, the mover would no longer be simultaneous with what is moved. By this gloss the instance of what generates heavy and light things, and of the magnet drawing iron, and similar cases, is resolved: since these move by impressing a form through which the mobiles are moved, and not by mere impulse from without. For what generates heavy things moves them by giving them gravity, through which they descend; and the magnet moves iron by impressing on it a quality through which it is moved toward the magnet. One must note second that by 'power in a body' the Philosopher and Saint Thomas understand a material power extended to the extension of the body. Such a power, when the body is moved—whether with rectilinear or circular motion—is

moved accidentally. But a power that were indivisibly in a body would not be moved accidentally if the circular body were moved, as was shown above in the commentary on that place, following the mind of Saint Thomas.

The second argument is: God is of infinite power. Therefore, he is not a power in a body, nor is he a body. The consequence is proved because no infinite power is in a magnitude; for it can be neither in an infinite magnitude—since there is none, as is proved in the third book of the Physics and in the first book of On the Heavens—nor in a finite one. Therefore, etc. That it cannot be in a finite magnitude is proved: because it would move in an instant—which is repugnant to motion, as is proved in the sixth book of the Physics. The consequence is proved as follows. The effect that a lesser power produces in a greater duration, a greater power produces in a lesser duration; but infinite power is greater than every finite power; therefore it will move in less duration than any finite power whatsoever. Not in less time—for then infinite power would move in equal time with finite power, as is established by Aristotle's deduction, made by dividing the power. Therefore, in an instant. That God is of infinite power—which was the antecedent—is proved as follows. He moves for infinite time. But no finite power can move for infinite time: for if this were posited, a part of that body, having a part of the power, would move in less time—since the greater a thing's power, the longer it will be able to continue its motion—and thus it would follow that a finite time would measure an infinite time, as is deduced by dividing the body and its power into parts. This argument is manifestly that of Aristotle in the eighth book of the Physics. Saint Thomas raises many objections against this procedure of Aristotle and resolves them.

The first objection—that of Avicenna, as reported by the Commentator in comment seventy-eight on the eighth book of the Physics—is that Aristotle in his demonstration supposes that the body which causes the first motion is divisible. But this could be denied, and it could be said that that body is not divisible—as is clear even in the case of the celestial body.

Saint Thomas responds—and this is Averroes's response—that a conditional proposition can be true whose antecedent is impossible. And if anything destroys the truth of such a conditional, that thing is impossible. Just as it would be impossible if someone were to destroy the truth of the conditional 'If a man flies, he has wings.' Aristotle therefore does not use this antecedent as though it were true—namely, that such a body is divisible—but uses this true conditional: 'If that body were divided, a part of it would have less power than the whole.' The truth of this conditional is destroyed if one posits the first mover to be a body, on account of the impossibilities that follow. Hence it is clear that this is impossible. But a doubt is raised about this response concerning the

truth of the conditional, if we understand it as the Philosopher takes it—namely, by comparing a part of the power to a part of the mobile. For as is the ratio of the whole to the whole, so is the ratio of part to part, and consequently of time to time, as is evident from the seventh book of the Physics. Therefore, for as long a time as the whole moves the whole, a part will move a part. Therefore, the power of the whole is not greater in comparison to the whole motion than the power of a part in comparison to a part of the mobile.

To this objection, which seems to be against both Aristotle and Saint Thomas, some respond that the proposition assumed by Aristotle—'No finite power can move for infinite time'—is to be understood as follows: no power of finite duration can move a finite mobile for a duration that is temporally infinite. Understood in this way, the proposition to be proved makes it clear that a part of the durational power—which lasts for less time—moves a part of the mobile for less time with respect to its duration. From which it is evident that the time of motion cannot be perpetual while both mover and moved are corruptible. The passage cited from the seventh book of the Physics is therefore not to the point, since it is concerned with intensity, whereas in the present argument we are speaking of extension of duration. But that this response is not in the mind of Aristotle is argued as follows. The manner in which 'finite power' is taken in the proposition under discussion is the same as the manner in which 'infinite power' is taken in the conclusion to be proved by it—namely, 'The power of the first mover is infinite'—for the terms in the premises and conclusion must be taken in the same meaning. But in that conclusion, 'infinite power' is taken not only with respect to duration but also intensively and with respect to vigor. Therefore, in the premises also, 'infinite power' must be taken with respect to vigor, not merely with respect to duration. The minor is proved from the procedure of Aristotle: for he proves that the first mover is not in a magnitude, arguing that infinite power cannot be in a magnitude, and that God is of infinite power. He proves the major with respect to finite magnitude by arguing that if infinite power were in a finite magnitude, it would move in no time at all—which does not follow from the infinity of the power's duration, but from the infinity of its vigor. Therefore, in that proposition, 'infinite power' is taken with respect to vigor and not merely with respect to duration—unless we wish to accuse Aristotle of equivocating, taking 'infinite power' in the major with respect to vigor and in the minor with respect to duration only. Against this interpretation, however, before we answer the central doubt, a difficulty arises from Aristotle's procedure in the twelfth book of the Metaphysics. For, having shown the perfection of the first substance at text forty-two, he inquires at text forty-three whether there is only one such substance or many, and concludes that there must be as many such substances as there are revolutions of the stars—for the same reason: namely, that they move with everlasting motion and consequently with infinite power, as Saint Thomas explains. From this, two arguments arise against our interpretation. The first is that there are many

substances of the same condition as the first. But there cannot be many having infinite power with respect to vigor. Therefore, even the first does not have infinite power with respect to vigor, but only with respect to duration. Therefore, the conclusion 'The first mover is of infinite power with respect to vigor' is wrongly interpreted.

The second argument is that there are as many as there are revolutions of the stars, for the reason assigned concerning the first mover according to the Philosopher—namely, that they move with everlasting motion and consequently with infinite power. But there are not many of infinite power with respect to vigor, but only with respect to duration. Therefore, the reason assigned concerning the first mover—that it is not in a magnitude because it is of infinite power—is to be understood of the infinity of duration, not of the infinity of vigor. For the understanding of this, one must consider that, since the Philosopher showed in the twelfth book of the Metaphysics that there must be one substance altogether separated and primary, the conditions attributed to that primary substance precisely insofar as it is primary cannot belong to others, since there are not many primary ones—just as what belongs to a human being precisely as human does not belong to non-humans. Since, therefore, having infinite power intensively belongs to the primary substance insofar as it is primary—just as being the best and most noble does, as will be shown below—this same condition cannot belong to the other movers of the heavens, since they do not have the character of the primary substance. But other conditions, not belonging to it as primary, can also belong to others that are in conformity with it. When, therefore, the Philosopher says, 'Whether there is one such substance or many,' the sense is not: 'Whether there is one which has all the conditions demonstrated above for the first'—for it is certain that there is only one first. Rather, since he had just concluded that the primary substance is everlasting, immovable, separated from sensibles, not existing in a magnitude, and impassible and unalterable, he inquires whether there is only one such, namely, one that is everlasting, immovable, and impassible. As Saint Thomas's words at the beginning of the relevant lecture make clear: 'After the Philosopher has shown the perfection of the immaterial substance, here he inquires about the unity or multiplicity of it'—understand: of the immaterial substance. By this the answer to the first argument is clear. For it is said that according to the Philosopher there are many substances of the same condition as the first with respect to immateriality, everlastingness, and impassibility—but not with respect to all conditions. To the second argument it is said that when the Philosopher says there are many for the aforesaid reason, he is not citing the reason for which the primary substance is not in a magnitude, but the reason immediately stated at text forty-three—namely, that an everlasting motion must come from an everlasting substance that is immovable of itself, and that one motion must come from one mover. Hence when Saint Thomas says that they move with infinite power, this is to be understood not of infinite vigor—which belongs only to the first cause—but of infinite duration: because they

move for infinite time, their motive power must necessarily be of infinite duration—that is, must be everlasting, which is the same thing. Therefore, they themselves must also be substances of infinite duration, or everlasting. Returning now to the central doubt, following the teaching of Saint Thomas on the eighth book of the Physics, one can respond first that Aristotle is speaking by comparison to some mark in a magnitude. For in this way, more time is required for the whole mobile to traverse some mark of magnitude than for a part of it to traverse that same mark. But the objection proceeds from the whole and part taken absolutely, not by comparison to a mark of magnitude. But against this response it is urged: first, because Aristotle makes no mention of space, but says there are only three things—namely, the mover, what is moved, and the time. Second, because when a part is cut from the whole, velocity is reckoned by reference to the midpoint of both part and whole, not by reference to a point in space, but of the whole space. Third, because Aristotle speaks of circular motion as well as rectilinear. In circular motion, however, motion is not considered with reference to a determinate mark in space. For the understanding of these objections, one must consider that, since the time of motion can be divided in two ways—namely, according to the parts of the magnitude over which the motion occurs (according to which the whole mobile first traverses one part of the magnitude before the whole), and according to the parts of the mobile (according to which one part of the mobile first traverses some mark of magnitude before the whole does, and one part before another)—in the seventh book of the Physics, as Saint Thomas says in the eighth book of the same work, the whole power is compared to a part of the power according as the time of motion is divided by the division of magnitude. For it is true that in as long a time as the whole mobile, moved by the whole power, traverses some magnitude, a part of the mobile, moved by a part of the power, will traverse that same magnitude; for as is the ratio of the whole power to the whole mobile, such is the ratio of the moving part to the part of the mobile, if the parts of mover and mobile are taken proportionally. In the eighth book of the Physics, however, the Philosopher takes time according as it is divided by the division of the mobile. For if the power consists of ten parts—as Albert states—so that it has the capacity to move the whole mobile in ten hours (moving one part of the mobile for each hour to traverse some mark), it is certain that one part of the power, existing in one part of the mover, will make one part of the mobile traverse the said mark in one hour. And it is universally true, when time is divided in this manner, that a greater power moves for a greater time and a lesser power for a lesser time.

To the first objection it is therefore answered that the Philosopher enumerated only those things whose division his argument required—namely, the mover, what is moved, and the time. He did not need the division of magnitude, since motion was being taken by reference to a determinate mark of that magnitude. Therefore, he did not enumerate magnitude.

To the second it is said that although, when part is cut from the power, velocity is reckoned by reference to the midpoint of part and whole with respect to space—if time is divided according to the division of space—yet if time is divided according to the division of the mobile, velocity is reckoned with respect to a determinate mark in a magnitude.

To the third it is said that even in circular motion a part traverses some mark—whether real or imaginary—of a magnitude in less time than the whole. For in the lower spheres some part of an orb—for example, the body of a planet—traverses some mark of the superior orb in less time than the whole orb; and the supreme sphere first traverses, according to a part and in less time, some mark of a superior orb that is imagined, before the whole does so. One can respond secondly to the central doubt that Saint Thomas in this place does not take the part of the mover in relation to a part of the mobile, as Aristotle did—but by comparing it only to the duration of the motion. For the greater a power, the more it can continue its motion and its operation—and this is to be understood of a power belonging to a thing essentially, not accidentally. For the greater the fire in power, the longer it can continue its heating, and so forth for other things. Therefore, a part of that power, being as it were a lesser power, will be able to continue the motion for less time. From which it is apparent that the objection does not militate against Saint Thomas's argument at all, since he does not assume the proposition that is being attacked.

The second objection that Saint Thomas raises against Aristotle's argument is this: even if a body is divided, some power could exist in a body that is not divided when the body is divided—as the rational soul is not divided when the body is divided. And thus the argument does not conclude what it set out to prove—namely, that no finite power can move for infinite time—for it proceeds on the supposition that in a part of the body there is also a part of the power. The answer is that the whole of the principal argument's procedure does not prove that God is not united to a body as the rational soul is united to the human body—for that would be a matter of a different argument—but that he is not a power in a body in the way that a material power is, one which is divided by the division of the body. For it is clear that every such power is less in a part of the body than in the whole.

For a greater understanding of this it must be considered that among the forms by which something operates, some is of itself indivisible and is received indivisibly in a subject. And this is

the case when the whole is in the whole as in an adequate receptive subject, and the whole is also in each part of its adequate receptive subject—as the intellective soul is in the human body. Such a form is not divided by the division of its receptive subject, for if it is whole in each part, one part of it cannot be in one part of the subject and another part in another part. But another form, although it is of itself indivisible, in a subject nevertheless undergoes division and extension accidentally—such as whiteness, color, coldness. For if these were separated from every subject, they would lack all quantitative division; but in a subject they are not such that the whole is in the whole and the whole in each part, but rather the whole is in the whole and a part in a part. Hence they are divided with the division of their subject. These are called material powers. And it is proved by this argument that God does not belong to the class of such material powers. The third objection is that if the power of every body is finite, and if something cannot endure for infinite time by a finite power, it follows that the celestial body is corruptible. Saint Thomas first adduces and refutes the responses of others to this objection, and then sets forth the true solution.

Some respond—namely Alexander, as the Commentator reports in comment seventy-nine on the eighth book of the Physics—that the celestial body can indeed fail of itself, but acquires from another of infinite power the perpetuity of its duration. The words of Plato in the Timaeus, also adduced by Simplicius in his commentary on the first book of On the Heavens, seem to favor this response. But it is argued against by the reasoning of the Commentator in comment forty-one of the twelfth book of the Metaphysics. According to Averroes, it is impossible for what of itself can fail to be to acquire from another the perpetuity of existing, since it would follow that the corruptible would be changed into the incorruptible. And therefore the Commentator himself responds: that in the celestial body all power that exists is finite; yet it is not necessary that it have every power—for in the celestial body, according to Aristotle in the eighth book of the Metaphysics, there is a power with respect to where but not with respect to being. And thus it is not necessary that there be in it a power for non-existence.

Yet it must be known that this response of the Commentator is not adequate. For even granting that in the celestial body there is no quasi-passive power with respect to being—which is the power of matter—there is nevertheless in it a quasi-active power, which is the power of existing, as Aristotle explicitly says in the first book of On the Heavens: that the heavens have the power to be always.

Regarding the Commentator's proposition—'That which of itself can fail to be cannot acquire from another the perpetuity of existing'—it must be noted that the corruptible and the incorruptible are opposites and belong to different genera, as is said in the tenth book of the Metaphysics, when they derive from an intrinsic and essential principle. And since one genus cannot be transmuted into another, that which is by nature corruptible—that is, capable of non-existence—cannot become essentially incorruptible. But that something naturally corruptible should become perpetual through something added to it is not inappropriate, as Saint Thomas says in the second book of the Sentences, distinction nineteen, article two, reply four, and in On Evil, question five, article five, reply ten—for it always remains corruptible according to its nature. Therefore, the Commentator's proposition—if understood to mean that it is impossible for what of itself can fail to be to acquire from another a perpetuity founded on essential principles—is true. But if it means that it cannot acquire perpetuity even through something added to its essence, it is false. It must also be noted, regarding the argument against the Commentator, that Saint Thomas does not admit as true that in the heavens there is no power with respect to being—since he himself holds that the heavens are composed of matter and form, as is clear in his commentary on the eighth book of the Physics and as will perhaps be declared further below—but treats it as assumed as true in the Commentator's response. And even if its truth were granted, the response does not resolve the difficulty.

Concerning the statement of Saint Thomas—that in the celestial body there is a quasi-active power, which is the power of existing—it must be noted that this power of existing belongs to the potentiality of form, not to that of matter, as Saint Thomas says in his commentary on the first book of On the Heavens. For form according to its condition gives being to matter, and different forms give different kinds of being. Hence some give corruptible being, others incorruptible; some more lasting being, others less—speaking of variable being. For this there is no need to seek another reason than the very nature of the form itself, though the condition of matter also concurs—since the matter must be of such a kind on account of the nature and condition of the form, and not the reverse; for matter exists for the sake of form, not form for the sake of matter. And because form is not properly an efficient principle, yet approaches the causality of an active principle—since we see that every agent acts through some form—Saint Thomas therefore says that the power of existing is a quasi-active potentiality, and not simply an active one.

Second, Saint Thomas sets forth his own response, and says two things. First, that because motion has quantity and extension by its very nature, the infinite duration of motion requires that the

moving power be infinite. Second, that although a finite body endures infinitely, it is nevertheless not necessary that the power of existing be infinite in a finite body—because being does not have an extension of quantity, especially in a thing whose being is invariable, such as the heavens, and therefore it is not touched by time except accidentally. For it makes no difference, through the power of existing, whether something endures for an instant or for infinite time. For the understanding of this response it must be considered that the greater and more perfect the power of a cause, the greater and more perfect the effect that properly corresponds to it; and conversely, the more perfect the proper effect, the more perfect and efficacious the cause it requires—for causes must be proportioned to their effects. Since, therefore, motion is the proper effect of motive power—to which extension and successive duration properly belongs—and since accordingly, the greater the duration of a motion, the more perfect it is in respect of this duration: a greater power is therefore required in the motive cause for a motion of greater duration; and if it is of infinite duration, it will require infinite power—otherwise the perfection of the cause would not correspond to the perfection of the proper effect. Saint Thomas is therefore right to say that the infinite duration of motion requires an infinitely powerful mover. He is speaking, moreover, of the moving power that is primary—not of the moving power that is proximate and as it were the instrument of the primary cause, as his commentary on the eighth book of the Physics makes clear.

One must also know that since time is primarily and essentially the measure of motion, everything falls under time insofar as it is subject to change and variation. Although, therefore, no substantial being as such falls under time of itself, if it is conjoined to motion or variation it must necessarily be measured by time; but if it is invariable, it falls in no way under time. Hence it follows that a greater power is required for something to endure for a greater time in variable being; and if something were to endure in variable being for infinite time, there would have to be an infinite power from which it would have its infinite duration—just as infinite motion requires infinite power in the first mover. But for something to endure infinitely in invariable being, no infinite power is required—since that being does not fall under time, and therefore the infinity of time makes no contribution to the magnitude of the power. For that invariable being depends on the form of the thing absolutely, because it is joined invariably to its potentiality; and it makes no difference whether it endures for only an instant or for infinite time, since it is in no way measured by time but by a permanent and indivisible measure. Hence when the Philosopher says that the heavens have the power to be always, this is not to be understood as if the power of existing were directly and essentially the cause of perpetuity, but indirectly and consequently—insofar, namely, as it gives invariable being and, as a consequence, being that does not fall under time and corruption, from which it follows that the heavens always exist once they have had this power of existing. Hence the

heavens have the power to be always in a negative sense—namely, that they determine for themselves no time of existence.

It must also be noted, since Saint Thomas says that invariable being is touched by time only accidentally, that it is one thing for variable substantial being to be touched accidentally by time—for we also said above that it falls under time only accidentally—and another thing for invariable being. For the 'accidentally' attributed to variable being is taken as opposed to what is primary, and is the same as 'through another': it does not belong to it to be measured by time except because it is subject to variation, yet variability belongs to it essentially, though not primarily. But the 'accidentally' that belongs to invariable being is taken as opposed to what is essential: it is said to be touched by time because it is conjoined to motion, which is essentially and primarily measured by time—even though motion makes no variation in the being itself; just as we say that a musician is heated accidentally because he is conjoined to what is heated, although the alteration does not affect the musician as musician. Saint Thomas's response to the doubt is therefore: through a finite power, something cannot endure for infinite time if it is measured by time either primarily or not primarily but yet essentially—as in the case of motion and variable being. But what has invariable being, such as the heavens, can endure consecutively for infinite time through a finite power, precisely because it is touched by time only altogether accidentally.

The fourth objection is that it does not seem incongruous that a mover that is not altered by its moving—even if of finite power—should move for infinite time. For since the motion uses up nothing of its power, it will be able to move thereafter just as before; just as the power of the sun, which is finite, can according to its nature act on lower things for infinite time, because in its acting its active power is not diminished.

Saint Thomas responds to this objection first in his own person; second, he removes a certain doubt. His response is that the proposition 'Finite power cannot move for infinite time' is to be understood of the finite power of a finite body, and that such power cannot of itself move for infinite time. The reason for this is that, since a body does not move unless it is itself moved, if it should happen that it is not moved, it will also not move. But of itself, every body that is moved can fail to be moved, because it is moved between opposite termini of motion. Therefore, of itself it does not belong to it to be moved for a perpetual time—and thus neither does it belong to it of itself to move for a perpetual time. As for the objection about the heavens: a body that of itself can both be moved and not be moved, both move and not move, can acquire the perpetuity of motion

from another—but that other must be incorporeal; which is why the first mover must be incorporeal. In this manner the sun can perpetually move lower things—not of itself, but by virtue of an incorporeal substance.

He then removes a doubt that could be raised. Someone might say that what of itself can both be moved and not be moved cannot acquire from another the perpetuity of motion—just as the Commentator says that what can both be and not be cannot acquire from another the perpetuity of existing. But the answer is that there is not the same reasoning for motion and for being. For motion is a certain flowing from a mover into what is moved—that is, something unstable, having succession, and consisting in a becoming. Being, on the other hand, is something fixed and at rest in a thing—existing all at once, and not consisting in a becoming. Therefore, some mobile thing can acquire from another the perpetuity of motion that it does not have of itself, according to the influence of the moving cause. But what of itself is in potentiality with respect to non-existence cannot, according to the way of nature, acquire from another the perpetuity of existing.

The fifth objection is that by the foregoing procedure there does not seem to be greater reason why there should not be infinite power in a magnitude than outside a magnitude, since in either case it would follow that it moves in no time at all.

Saint Thomas responds in three ways. First, following the Commentator in comment seventy-nine on the eighth book of the Physics, that the power outside a magnitude is finite or infinite only equivocally. Therefore, from its infinity it does not follow that the finite proportion is removed in other things—in times and motions. But what is in a magnitude is finite or infinite according to the same principle as time and motion, because the finite and the infinite are found in magnitude, motion, and time according to one and the same principle, as is said in the third and sixth books of the Physics. Therefore, the infinite in one of these removes the finite proportion in the others.

Note that the Commentator says that finitude and infinity belong equivocally to a separated power and to quantities, because in these they do not belong according to one and the same principle. For in quantities the finite and infinite are said according to a certain extension and according to the privation of a limit of quantity; but in a separated form they are said according to perfection. Therefore, according to him, a power outside a magnitude and a power in a magnitude are not comparable. This response of the Commentator Saint Thomas, though he does not refute it here,

does refute in his commentary on the eighth book of the Physics, as we will adduce in the second response.

The second response—also according to the mind of the Commentator in comment forty-one of the twelfth book of the Metaphysics—is that since the heavens have two movers—a proximate one of finite power, and a remote one of infinite power—from the proximate mover the motion has its finite velocity, and from the remote one its infinite duration. For this reason, if the power which is infinite is outside a magnitude, it does not follow that it moves in an instant, since it can move a body mediately. But if infinite power were in a magnitude, it would of necessity move in an instant, since a body must move immediately—for a body does not move unless it is itself moved. The sense of this response is that, since the power outside a magnitude moves through the mediation of the power within a magnitude, its action is limited by the virtue existing in the magnitude; for the power of the first cause operates according to the condition and nature of the second cause—as we see that the sun generates a man through a man and a horse through a horse. Therefore, if the power in a magnitude is finite and consequently naturally suited to move with finite velocity, the infinite power outside a magnitude, moving through it, will not move with infinite velocity but with a finite and determinate one. But the power in a magnitude, since it moves the celestial body immediately—otherwise it would not move the lower bodies, since a body does not move unless it is itself moved—if it were infinite, would of necessity move in no time at all; since it cannot receive limitation from a second cause, as it does not move through another cause but immediately by itself.

Note also that, although Saint Thomas regards this response as better than the first, he nevertheless says in his commentary on the eighth book of the Physics that even it is insufficient—because the first response is contrary to Aristotle, who posits that the power which moves for infinite time is infinite and outside a magnitude; from which it is apparent that the infinity of power is comparable to the infinity of time according to the proportion of cause and effect, even though the infinite is not found in them according to the same principle. Also false is the claim that the infinity of separated power does not remove the finite proportion of the duration of its motion to the duration of a motion arising from a finite power. For the velocity of motion follows the magnitude of the power of the motive force as it belongs to it essentially—which is the magnitude of perfection—not as it belongs to it accidentally, namely by extension to a subject. For the more perfect a power is, the more active it is—not the more extended it is; for intense heat in a small quantity heats more than remiss heat in a large one.

The second response, however, does not remove from the separated power a finitude or infinity comparable to motion and time according to some proportion of cause and effect. Nor does it remove from the infinite separated power the capacity to move, of itself, in an instant. For according to this response, if it were to move immediately, it would of necessity move in an instant; but because it moves mediately, it can move in time. Now the motion of the heavens, according to the Commentator, has its finite velocity from the proximate mover—since that is of finite power. For this reason the second is better than the first.

Note also that Saint Thomas seems to want the Commentator to have understood the infinity of the first mover differently in the twelfth book of the Metaphysics than he did in the eighth book of the Physics. For in the twelfth book of the Metaphysics he grants that the first mover is infinite; but in the eighth book of the Physics he denies it, as he also seems to deny it in the second book of On the Heavens, comments thirty-eight, thirty-nine, sixty-three, and seventy-one, and in the chapter on the Substance of the Orb—when speaking of infinite vigor. But if someone wished to hold that the Commentator did not differ in opinion, and everywhere held that God is not of infinite vigor, he could say, regarding the passage from the twelfth book of the Metaphysics and conformably with what is said in the eighth book of the Physics, that the Commentator does not grant that God has infinite power in vigor, but that he has a certain infinity said equivocally by comparison with the infinity of power existing in matter—by which he acts unto the eternity of motion. Therefore, if such a power outside a magnitude is posited as infinite in its own manner—that is, not limited or finite as those things are which belong to the genus of quantity—it need not follow that it moves in no time, since that infinity is not comparable to the infinity of velocity of motion, as it is of a different character from quantitative things. But if there were infinite power in a magnitude, it would move in an instant—because it would have an infinity comparable to infinite velocity, in that it would be quantitative according to the same principle as time and motion. For the velocity and slowness of motion are to be considered according to this power—namely, the power in matter. An indication of this is that because of the finitude of the power in the orb, its velocity of motion is finite. If, however, someone wished to hold that the Commentator's view is that God is of infinite vigor, he could say regarding the passage in the eighth book of the Physics that the first mover is neither finite nor infinite with the infinity after which motion in an instant would follow—since that infinity of vigor which is outside a magnitude is not quantitative, so as to be comparable to intensive quantity.

Chapter XXI

That God is His Own Essence

From the foregoing it can now be gathered that God is his own essence, quiddity, or nature. For in everything that is not its own essence or quiddity, there must be some composition. For since in each thing there is its own essence—and if there were nothing in some thing beyond its essence, the whole of what the thing is would be its essence, and thus the thing would be its own essence—if something were not its own essence, there must be something in it beyond its essence. And thus there must be composition in it. Whence also in composite things the essence is signified by way of a part, as 'humanity' is signified as a part of the human being. But it has been shown that in God there is no composition. Therefore, God is his own essence.

Moreover, that alone seems to be beyond the essence or quiddity of a thing which does not enter into its definition—for a definition signifies what a thing is. But only the accidents of a thing are those that do not fall within its definition. Therefore, only accidents are in a thing beyond its essence. But in God there are no accidents, as will be shown. Therefore, nothing is in him beyond his essence. Therefore, he is his own essence. Furthermore, forms that are not predicated of subsistent things—whether taken universally or in the singular—are forms that do not subsist singularly in themselves as individuated by themselves. For we do not say that Socrates, or a human being, or an animal, is whiteness, because whiteness does not subsist singularly by itself, but is individuated by a subsistent subject. Similarly, natural forms do not subsist singularly by themselves but are individuated in their proper matters; hence we do not say that this fire, or fire, is its form. The essences or quidditities of genera or species are also individuated by the signate matter of this or that individual—though the quiddity of the genus or species includes both form and matter in a general way—and hence we do not say that Socrates, or a human being, is humanity. But the divine essence exists singularly by itself and is individuated in itself, since it is not in any matter, as has been shown. Therefore, the divine essence is predicated of God, so that it is said: God is his own essence.

Besides, the essence of a thing is either the thing itself, or is related to it in some way as a cause; for a thing receives its species through its essence. But nothing can in any way be a cause of God, since he is the first being, as has been shown. Therefore, God is his own essence. Again, that which is not its own essence is related, in some aspect of itself, to it as potentiality to act. Whence also the essence is signified by way of a form—as, for example, 'humanity.' But in God there is no potentiality, as was shown above. Therefore, he must be his own essence.

[Ferrara's Commentary]

After Saint Thomas has excluded quantitative composition from God, he now wishes to exclude the composition of supposit and nature. And he posits this conclusion: God is his own essence, quiddity, or nature. For the declaration of this it must be known that the name 'God' is taken differently by philosophers and by theologians. For since the philosophers did not know the Trinity of divine Persons, but posited only one supposit in the divine nature, by the name of God they mean 'that which has the divine nature' and 'that one supposit which according to them subsists in the divine nature'—just as by the name of the sun they mean 'that which has the nature of the sun' and 'that which subsists in the nature of the sun.' But among theologians, who posit the Trinity of divine Persons, by the name of God is meant 'having the divine nature indistinctly'—not 'a determinate supposit of that nature'—just as by the name 'human being' is meant 'having humanity indistinctly.' And since Saint Thomas has not yet treated of the Trinity of Persons, he admits the position of the philosophers and shows that the supposit of the divinity does not differ from the divinity itself.

First: If God were not his own essence, there would be some composition in him. But the opposite of this has been shown above. Therefore, etc. The consequence is proved in two ways. First, because from the opposite of the consequent the opposite of the antecedent is inferred: for if there is no composition in him, there is nothing in him distinct from his essence; therefore he is his own essence. Second, it is confirmed: because in composite things the essence is signified by way of a part. Therefore, the sign is that where there is something beyond the essence, there is composition; otherwise the essence would not be signified by way of a part.

But a doubt arises concerning this sign. For if, because the essence is signified by way of a part, composition is inferred to be present, there will also be composition in God—since his essence is signified by way of a part: for the divinity is that by which God is God, just as humanity is that by which a human being is a human being. For the understanding of this it must be considered, from the teaching of Saint Thomas in the second Quodlibet, question two, article two, reply one, that since there is a threefold supposit in beings—namely, the uncreated, which is God; the created immaterial, which are the intelligences; and the created material, which are substances composed of matter and form—in these three the supposit is related to the nature in three ways. For the created material supposit includes three things in reality: namely, the essence; the individuating principles, which limit the essence to being this particular one, distinct from others—such as this quantity, this figure, etc.; and accidents, which contribute nothing to the individuation of the nature—such as whiteness, knowledge, and the like. The created immaterial supposit, on the other hand, includes only two things: namely, the essence; and certain things beyond the essence, which contribute nothing to the individuation of the nature—such as being and certain other accidents belonging to the supposit. For in those natures it is not necessary to posit any individuating principle, since the nature itself is of itself this and individual. The divine supposit, however, says nothing else in reality than the essence: since neither are there individuating principles in it—because the divinity is of itself this and indivisible—nor are there other accidents extrinsic to the individuated nature, since nothing is accidental in God.

From this it follows that, on the part of reality, the divine essence in the divine supposit can in no way have the character of a part—since by the formal character of the divine supposit on the part of reality, nothing really distinct from its essence is implied, nor is it in reality conjoined to any accident. In the created immaterial supposit it has in some way the character of a part—insofar as the supposit in reality includes both the essence and the accidents existing in it. Yet it is not simply a part of the supposit, since those accidents—by the fact that they do not individuate the nature—are not of the intrinsic formal character of the supposit. In the material supposit, on the other hand, it simply has the character of a part, in that it is the formal part of the character thereof. For the material supposit in its formal character intrinsically includes both the essence itself and the individuating principles—not indeed as constituting the substance of Socrates, since substance is not constituted from accidents, but as limiting the essence to being this and individual, as is implied by the supposit.

From this it further follows that the mode of signification by way of a part in created essence—whether material or immaterial—has some foundation in reality and does not rest solely on the part of the name signifying it, but also on the part of the thing signified. In the divine essence, however, it has no foundation in reality, nor does it rest on the part of the thing signified, but only on the part of the name signifying it. For since in material creatures forms do not subsist but only composites do, the names imposed to signify simple forms retain the mode of signification by way of a part—even though the thing signified in no way has the character of a part—as is the case with the name 'divinity.' But another doubt arises concerning this. For when one thing includes several, one of which has the character of the receiver and the other of the received, what has the character of receiver has the character of matter, and what has the character of the received has the character of form—since it belongs to matter to receive and to form to be received. But if the material supposit intrinsically includes essence, accidents, and individuating principles, the essence itself is the receiver, while the accidents are what is received. Therefore, the essence will have the character of a material part, not of a formal part—the opposite of which was stated. The minor is proved: because accidents are received in substance, not substance in accidents.

For the understanding of this it must be considered that we do not say the supposit includes the essence and individuating accidents as if accidents were to arrive at an essence already constituted in specific being—individuating it and drawing it to suppositional being, as the argument seems to suppose—but we imagine that the matter is first disposed and limited by quantity and by the other accidents individuating it, and then the form is united to matter thus disposed in its ultimate perfection; and from these united there results the individuated essence. Hence the individuating accidents, since they are dispositions pertaining to the side of matter, are reduced to the genus of material cause; and consequently the essence is formally compared to them.

To the argument, then, the minor is denied. To its proof, the consequence is denied. For although those accidents are received in substance, they are not received—as dispositions of matter—in this substance which is the essence of the species; but, since the material form gives corporeal being and the being of this particular thing—for example, a horse—they are understood as received in matter insofar as it is actuated by the form according to corporeal being only, but still in potentiality with respect to equine being, for which being they are disposed by these accidents. For these accidents are pre-understood in matter, in the order of generation, as prior to the final grade given by the substantial form. To the principal argument it is therefore said that from the fact that in composite things the essence is signified by way of a part in a manner that holds on the part of the thing signified and has a foundation in it, Saint Thomas infers that there is composition in reality. Not

from the mode of signification that has no foundation in reality but holds only on the part of the signifying name, as happens in the mode of signifying the divine essence. Therefore, it does not follow that there is some composition in God.

Second: In God there are no accidents, as was shown above, where it was shown that nothing is in God beyond his nature and that there is no composition and no potentiality in him. Therefore, he is his own essence. The consequence is proved: because if he were not his own essence, there would be something in him beyond the quiddity, which is signified by the definition. But only accidents are those things that do not fall within the definition. Note that Saint Thomas here speaks of the definition of the specific essence and nature insofar as it explicates only the essential principles—for of such a definition it is true that everything that does not fall within it is an accident, and that nothing extrinsic to the essence falls within such a definition. But individuating accidents we said in the preceding argument to fall within the definition of a real individual and subsistent thing—not as essential principles, but as certain determinations and limitations of the essence. Therefore, it follows that where a thing is not its own quiddity, there is in it something beyond the essence that is not a part of the essence. And consequently in it there is some accident—because what does not fall within the definition as a part of the essence must necessarily be an accident.

Third: Forms that are not predicated of subsistent things either universally or singularly do not subsist individuated in themselves. But the divine essence exists singularly by itself as individuate in itself. Therefore, it is predicated of the thing. Therefore, this is true: 'God is the divinity.' For this is the predication at issue here, in which it is said 'This is this.'

The antecedent is shown by induction. Whiteness, since it does not subsist but is individuated through a subject, is not predicated of Socrates or of a human being—we do not say 'Socrates or a human being is whiteness.' Similarly, particular forms, since they are individuated in their proper matters, are not predicated of a thing—for we do not say that this fire is its form. The quidditites of things likewise are individuated according to the signate matter of this or that individual, though they include form and matter in a general way—hence we do not say that Socrates or a human being is humanity. Therefore, a form that is not predicated of a thing does not subsist by itself—that is, as individuate from itself—which I say because of the intellective soul, which does indeed subsist by itself but is not individuate by itself. Note here that in every predication a unity of predicate with subject is implied, but differently when a concrete is predicated and when an abstract is predicated. For when a concrete is predicated, a simple unity with the possessor of the

form is signified, by the mode of the concrete, and a unity in a certain respect with the form. But when an abstract is predicated, a simple unity between the subject and the form of the predicate is signified. For when I say 'Socrates is white,' a simple unity of Socrates with the possessor of whiteness is signified, and a unity by accident—which is between a subject and an accident—with whiteness. But when it is said 'Socrates is whiteness,' a simple unity between Socrates and whiteness is signified. For this reason, where the supposit and the nature signified abstractly are not simply identical, the essence is not predicated of the supposit. But where they are simply identical, the predication of one about the other is true. Concerning the proposition 'The essences of genera and species are individuated according to the signate matter of this or that individual': it must be known that some Thomists by 'signate matter' understand matter so capable of this particular quantity as to be incapable of that one—and they say that this capacity is not something really distinct from matter itself. Hence signate matter adds nothing above matter that is really distinct from it, but only the capacity for this quantity, which capacity is distinguished from it by reason alone. For these thinkers imagine that a particular agent appropriates matter to this particular form—so that in the first instant of the generation of Socrates, the particular composite is first formed in natural order, then all accidents follow in natural order; but in that prior of nature in which the particular composite primarily and essentially terminates generation, the matter that is an intrinsic part of Socrates is so appropriated to Socrates himself that it is not capable of any quantity other than that which Socrates determines for himself. And matter so appropriated is called signate matter. But although this is the opinion of a most learned man, it does not seem to me to approach the mind of Saint Thomas. For if signate matter is nothing other than matter appropriated to Socrates and capable of the quantity of Socrates to the exclusion of another, I ask: in that prior according to nature in which it is said to be appropriated, is there or is there not some form in the matter through which it is appropriated to this soul of Socrates? If there is some form—whether substantial or accidental—then signate matter does not denote merely prime matter, but matter with the form through which it is said to be appropriated and signate. If there is none: on the contrary—no potentiality receives limitation and appropriation except through some act that it receives, as is held from Saint Thomas in the first part, question seven, article one. But prime matter is simply potentiality. Therefore, it does not receive determination and appropriation except through some form—because it belongs to act and form to determine and limit. If, therefore, signate matter must be such that through it a form is individuated by such signation, it is necessary that in it there be some act really distinct from matter itself. Therefore, signate matter does not denote prime matter alone to the exclusion of everything really distinct from it, but matter with some limiting form.

For this reason another opinion seems to me to approach more closely the mind of Saint Thomas—one that holds that by signate matter is to be understood matter under quantity, so that both matter and quantity concur in individuation. Matter indeed, insofar as the individual is incommunicable through the exclusion of the communication by which the universal is communicated to the particular—for since matter is the primary subject, received into nothing inferior, the nature received into matter as such cannot be communicated to anything inferior. Quantity concurs insofar as the individual is distinct from every other individual of the same species by quantitative and material distinction. Hence, just as two things belong to an individual—namely, incommunicability and distinction—so signate matter, which is the principle of individuation, includes two things: matter itself as incommunicable, and quantity—to which material distinction primarily belongs—so that neither matter alone individuates, nor quantity alone, but matter signate and limited by quantity; the matter giving incommunicability by reason of matter, and distinguishing numerically by reason of its determination by quantity.

That this is the mind of Saint Thomas appears from the second part, question seventy-seven, article two; and from the fourth book of the Sentences, distinction twelve, question one, article one, where he posits that since two things belong to the character of an individual—namely, incommunicability and material distinction from others—the principle of one of these is matter and of the other quantity; and so the total principle of individuation is signate matter—that is, matter under quantity (which is called a sign of it, because through it it becomes sensible and determined to the here and now), as is said in the treatise On the Principle of Individuation.

Against this exposition the arguments of the first opinion do not stand. For it argues as follows. First: The same thing is the principle of the distinction of the individual from the species and from another individual of the same species—as it is universally true that when some common thing is divided into several subjective parts, the inferiors differ from one another and from the superior by the same thing, as is clear in the case of the species of a genus. But matter not under quantity, but appropriated in the manner described, is the intrinsically distinctive principle of the individual from the species, as Saint Thomas wishes in the treatise On the Principle of Individuation. Therefore, not matter under quantity, but matter so appropriated, is the principle of distinction of one from another.

Second: Each thing has unity in the same way as it has being, as is said in the first part, question seventy-six, article two, reply two. But Socrates is Socrates formally by his substance, not by

quantity. Therefore, he is neither numerically one nor numerically distinct by quantity formally. Therefore, quantity is not the principle of individuation with respect to distinction.

The answer to the first is twofold. First, that the major is false of material and individual distinction—whatever may be the case with formal and specific distinction. For by this matter the individual is distinguished from the species—because from it the individual has that it is incommunicable, whereas the nature is communicable. But by quantity the individual is materially distinguished from another individual.

The answer is second that the minor is also false. For the individual is distinguished from the species not by matter alone, but by signate matter under quantity—for by this the individual has that it is determined to the here and now, in which it is distinguished from the species, which abstracts from the here and now. Nor does Saint Thomas say the opposite in that treatise; rather, what is said here of his mind will be clear to those who consider it carefully.

To the second it is said first that if this argument concluded, it would prove by it that transcendent unity is the same as numerical unity, as Avicenna wished—which is refuted by Averroes and Saint Thomas in the fourth book of the Metaphysics, comment three. For it would be argued: each thing has numerical unity in the same way as it has being. But Socrates is a being by his own entity. Therefore, he is numerically one by his own entity. Therefore, numerical unity is the same as his essence. And thus numerical and transcendent unity would be the same—for transcendent unity, according to Saint Thomas, denotes the essence of a thing with individuation.

It is said second that a twofold unity belongs to Socrates: one transcendent, and another belonging to the genus of quantity, according to which he is counted along with other quantitative things and by which he is this particular signate and demonstrable thing. If therefore we are speaking of the being of a thing absolutely, the proposition of Saint Thomas holds true of the corresponding unity absolutely—which is transcendent unity: for as anything contributes to the being of something, so also does it contribute to that thing's transcendent unity. And Saint Thomas spoke in this sense in the passage cited, where he is speaking of the intellective soul, which is clearly one not quantitatively, if taken precisely, but only transcendentally—since quantitative unity belongs only to material things, as Saint Thomas holds in the question on Power, question nine, article seven. Hence he wishes that, since the soul does not depend on the body according to being—though it has being in the body, as will be declared in the second book—it does not depend on the body

according to its unity either. If, on the other hand, we are speaking of quantitative being, the said proposition holds true of the proportionate unity—which is the unity belonging to the genus of quantity—though Saint Thomas did not use it in this sense there. For as anything has quantitative being, in the same way it has unity of the genus of quantity. And since nothing has quantitative being except formally through quantity, everything is therefore formally numerically one through quantity. And of this unity we are speaking when we say that the nature is formally individuated through quantity and has material distinction from another.

To the argument it is therefore said that if the major is understood as Saint Thomas takes it—of being absolutely and of transcendent unity—the whole argument is granted: for we do not say that quantity is the formal principle by which Socrates is transcendentally one—though it is the cause without which he is not transcendently distinct from Plato in the same species; for the humanity of Socrates is this humanity only through this matter, and matter is not this matter distinct from that one unless it is under this quantity. But if the major is taken as we stated, and the argument proceeds to numerical unity, the argument is denied—because, as is clear, the fallacy of equivocation is committed: for in the premises transcendent unity is taken, and in the conclusion unity of the genus of quantity. But if the major is taken in the second sense, the argument is also denied—because the minor is not correctly subsumed. For it should be: 'But Socrates is not formally quantitative by quantity'—which is clearly false. Although Scotus, in the second book of the Sentences, distinction three, question six, dissents from Saint Thomas on the principle of individuation, nevertheless, since this question has been most fully discussed by others, let these remarks suffice.

One doubt alone remains. For according to the teaching of Saint Thomas, the substantial form arrives in the first instant of its being at bare matter; and according to natural order the form actualizes matter before accidents are present in it. In that prior, therefore, in which the form is united to matter, an individual is constituted—and yet there is no quantity there, but only matter. Therefore, matter alone is the principle of individuation, and quantity does not concur in it.

The answer to this is, first, that there is no instant in reality in which a material form is united to matter without quantity; for this form is not united unless to this matter, distinct by some other part of matter—and matter is not this and distinct from other matter except through quantity, as Saint Thomas says in his commentary on Boethius's On the Trinity, question four, article two, and as is the mind of Aristotle in the first book of the Physics. Therefore, there is never an individual in

nature that is not incommunicable and distinct and determined to the here and now, and thus has both matter and quantity.

The answer is said second that although this is the case in reality, since however the intellect is naturally apt to understand separately things that are simultaneous; and since all accidents presuppose in natural order the form to exist in matter in the genus of formal cause—though in the genus of material and dispositive cause some of them are in the reverse order with respect to some grade of form, as will be declared in the second book—it might seem to someone that we first understand the form to be in matter and the composite to be constituted, and then in that prior of our consideration we understand the individual to exist with respect to the principal condition of an individual—namely, incommunicability—but not with respect to distinction and signation to the here and now. But perhaps even this is not true. For the form cannot be understood to be in matter, constituting this supposit, unless quantity is pre-understood in matter—through which it is made this and distinct from another part of matter. For a form does not become this form except because it is received in this matter; and matter is not this matter except through some act that limits and distinguishes it.

Chapter XXII

That in God, Being and Essence are the Same

From the foregoing it can further be proved that in God essence or quiddity is not something other than his being. For it was shown above that there is something that is, of itself, necessarily existent, and that this is God. If, therefore, this being which is necessary were proper to some quiddity that is not what that being itself is, either it is discordant with and repugnant to that quiddity—as existing of itself is repugnant to the quiddity of whiteness—or it is consonant with and akin to it—as being in another is consonant to whiteness. If in the first way, that quiddity will not possess being that is, of itself, necessary—just as neither can whiteness exist of itself. If in the second way, either this kind of being depends on the essence, or both depend on some other cause, or the essence depends on the being. The first two are contrary to the character of what is, of itself, necessarily existent—for if it depends on another, it is no longer necessarily existent. From the third it follows that the quiddity would arrive accidentally at the thing that is, of itself, necessarily existent, since everything that follows upon the being of a thing is accidental to it. And thus the quiddity would not be the quiddity of that thing. Therefore, God does not have an essence that is not his being. But against this it can be said that this being does not absolutely depend on that essence—as though it could not exist at all unless the essence existed—but depends only as to the conjunction by which it is conjoined to it. And thus that being is, of itself, necessarily existent, but the conjunction itself is not necessarily existent of itself.

But this response does not avoid the aforesaid inconveniences. For if that being can be understood without that essence, it will follow that that essence is accidentally related to that being. But what is, of itself, necessarily existent is that being. Therefore, that essence is accidentally related to what is, of itself, necessarily existent. Therefore, it is not the quiddity of the latter but something posterior to God. But if that being cannot be understood without that essence, then that being depends absolutely on that from which its conjunction to that essence depends. And thus the same conclusion returns as before."),

para("Again, each thing exists through its own being. Therefore, that which is not its own being is not, of itself, necessarily existent. But God is, of itself, necessarily existent. Therefore, God is his own being.

Furthermore, if the being of God is not his essence—and it cannot be a part of his essence, since the divine essence is simple, as has been shown—it is necessary that this kind of being be something beyond his essence. But everything that belongs to something and is not of its essence belongs to it through some cause; for those things that are not of themselves one, when conjoined, must be united through some cause. Being therefore belongs to that quiddity through some cause. Either, therefore, through something belonging to the essence of that thing, or through the essence itself; or through something else. If in the first way: since the essence is through that being, it would follow that something is the cause of its own existence—which is impossible, because to be a cause is prior according to understanding than to be an effect; if therefore something were the cause of its own existence, it would be understood to exist before it had existence, which is impossible—unless one understands that something is the cause of its own accidental being, which is being in a qualified sense. For this is not impossible: for some accidental being is caused by the principles of its subject, prior to which accidental being the substantial being of the subject is understood. But we are not now speaking of accidental being, but of substantial being. But if being belongs to it through some other cause, then everything that acquires being from another cause is caused and is not the first cause; but God is the first cause having no cause, as was proved above; therefore, the quiddity that acquires being from elsewhere is not the quiddity of God. It is therefore necessary that the being of God be his very quiddity.

Moreover, 'being' names a certain act; for a thing is not said to be from the fact that it is in potentiality, but from the fact that it is in act. But everything to which a certain act belongs that is distinct from it is related to that act as potentiality to act—for act and potentiality are relative to each other. If therefore the divine essence is something other than its being, it follows that essence and being are related as potentiality and act. But it has been shown that in God there is nothing of potentiality, but that he is pure act. Therefore, the essence of

God is not something other than his being. Again, everything that cannot exist unless several things concur is composite. But no thing in which essence is one thing and being another can exist unless several things concur—namely, essence and being. Therefore, every thing in which essence and being are different is composite. But God is not composite, as has been shown. Therefore, the very being of God is his essence. Furthermore, every thing exists through the fact that it has being. Therefore, no thing whose essence is not its own being exists through its own essence, but through participation in something—namely, being itself. But what exists through participation in something cannot be the first being; for that in which something participates in order to exist is prior to it. But God is the first being, prior to which nothing is. Therefore, the essence of God is his own being. This sublime truth was taught to Moses by the Lord, who, when Moses asked him saying: 'If they shall say to me, What is his name? What shall I say to them?'—the Lord replied: 'I am who am. Thus shalt thou say to the children of Israel: He who is hath sent me to you'—showing that his proper name is 'He who is.' Now every name is imposed to signify the nature or essence of some thing. Whence it remains that the very divine being is his essence or nature. This truth has also been professed by Catholic doctors. For Hilary says, in the seventh book of On the Trinity: 'Being is not an accident in God, but subsisting truth, and an abiding cause, and the property of the natural kind.' Boethius also says, in the book On the Trinity, that the divine substance is being itself, and from it is being.

[Ferrara's Commentary]

After having excluded the composition of supposit and nature from God, Saint Thomas now consequently excludes from him the composition of being and essence, and shows that in God the actuality of existing and the essence are the same. For the declaration of this conclusion it must be known that being and the actuality of existing is nothing other than that which is signified by the verb 'is' when we say 'This exists.' And in creatures, according to the teaching of Saint Thomas, it is really distinguished from the quiddity—which is why of Adam it is true to say that he is a human being, but not true to say that he simply is. But in God the actuality of existing and the divinity are the same, and the same thing is signified in reality when it is said 'God is God' and when it is said 'God is.' That this is so, Saint Thomas proves by many arguments. First, God is supposed to be, of himself, necessarily

existent. Then: if the being which is necessary is joined to a quiddity distinct from it, either it is repugnant to that quiddity—as existing of itself is repugnant to whiteness—or it is consonant with and akin to it, as being in a subject is consonant to whiteness. The first cannot be granted, because being does not belong to that quiddity—just as existing of itself does not belong to whiteness. If the second is granted: either being depends on the essence; or both depend on the same cause; or the essence depends on the being. Not the first two, because it is contrary to the character of necessarily existent being that it depend on another. Nor the third, because then that quiddity would accidentally belong to the thing—since what follows upon the being of a thing is accidental to it—and thus it would not be its quiddity. Therefore, in God the quiddity is his being.

If it be said that the first is in some way true and not repugnant to what is necessarily existent—because that being depends on the essence not absolutely, as though it could in no way exist unless the essence existed, but only as to the conjunction with it; for that being itself is necessarily existent of itself, but the conjunction with the quiddity is not necessarily existent of itself—the counter-argument is: either that being can be understood without that quiddity, or it cannot. If the first, then that essence is accidentally related to that being. But what is necessarily existent is that being. Therefore, it follows that that essence is also accidentally related to what is necessarily existent. Therefore, it will not be its quiddity, but something posterior to it. If the second, that being depends absolutely on that from which the conjunction of that being with the essence depends. And thus the same conclusion returns as before. Note concerning the proposition 'It is repugnant to the quiddity of whiteness to exist of itself' that that repugnance is not logical—namely, arising from the very terms—but is a repugnance in the order of a natural agent. For it is repugnant to the quiddity of whiteness that it should from a created agent have existence of itself and thus naturally subsist. It is not repugnant to it, however, to be created as separately existing by God—as Saint Thomas holds in many places, especially in the Quodlibet VII, Question 4, Article 3.

Concerning the disjunction 'either that being can be understood without that essence, or it cannot,' note that 'being understood without the essence' is not here taken in the sense of the first operation of the intellect, but of the second. And the sense is: 'Either it can be truly

understood that such being is not conjoined to that essence, or it cannot be understood that it is not conjoined to it.' Whichever of these is granted, the force of the argument is not undermined, as has been deduced. A doubt is raised concerning this counter-argument: because it seems to assume what must be proved. For it assumes that 'what is necessarily existent is that being.' But one who says that the essence of God, or the necessarily existent itself, is distinct from his being would deny that proposition, just as he denies that God's essence is being itself.

The answer is that if something is posited that is, of itself, necessarily existent, it must be its own being—from the very analysis of the name. For what is, of itself, necessarily existent is what necessarily exists from itself and from nothing else. But if its being were distinguished from it, it would have to have its being from another, since nothing is the cause of its own existence. And thus it would not be, of itself, necessarily existent. Hence, however much anyone says that the quiddity of God is distinguished from his being, if he grants that God is, of himself, necessarily existent—unless he is ignorant of the analysis of the terms—he must grant that God is his own being. And therefore what must be proved is not assumed, but is shown to be true from the very analysis of the name.

Second: God is, of himself, necessarily existent. Therefore, he is his own being. The consequence is clear: because what is not its own being is not, of itself, necessarily existent, since each thing exists through its own being. If God is his own being, then his quiddity is being itself—since, as was shown, God is his own quiddity. Therefore, etc.

Note that a thing is said to exist both through its own being and through its own form, but differently. For through its form a thing is said to exist as through the principle and formal cause of the actuality of existing itself—where being is distinguished from the thing. Through being itself, on the other hand, a thing is said to exist as through the ultimate actuality of existing, which awaits no further act. And it is in this sense that the proposition of Saint Thomas—'Each thing exists through its own being'—is to be understood.

Third: It is supposed that, if being is distinguished from quiddity in God, its being cannot be a part of his essence, since God is simple. Then the argument proceeds: God is the first

cause having no cause. Therefore, in him essence and being are the same. The consequence is proved: because everything that is not of the essence of a thing belongs to it through some cause. Therefore, if being were distinguished from the essence, it would belong to it through some cause. Not through the essence itself, or through something that is of the essence—because since the essence exists through that being, something would be the cause of its own existence, which is impossible with respect to substantial being, because to be a cause is prior according to understanding than to be an effect. Therefore, being would belong to it through some other cause. Therefore, God would be caused. And thus he would not be the first cause.

Concerning the proposition 'To be a cause is prior according to understanding than to be an effect'—it must be noted that a cause does not always precede its effect in duration, but certainly does so in the order of nature. For a cause and an effect can be simultaneous in duration if the effect is not produced through motion, as will be shown below. Yet the effect presupposes the cause to exist by nature itself—when speaking of an efficient cause. And consequently, if something is conceived by the intellect to exist from another, the cause is first conceived to exist before the effect, as though the being of the effect presupposes the being of the cause. When, therefore, it is said here 'To be a cause is prior according to understanding than to be an effect,' it is not to be understood as though that priority were only from the conceiving intellect and had no foundation in reality—but because the completion of that priority is by the intellect, yet the foundation is on the part of reality, if there is truly a cause and a caused.

Fourth: In God there is no potentiality—he is pure act. Therefore, his quiddity is not distinguished from his being. The consequence is proved: because wherever they are distinguished, being is related to essence as act to potentiality. For everything to which an act distinct from it is conjoined is related to that act as potentiality to act, and being is an act.

Note that a simple essence lacking all matter is the proper receptive subject of being. And though in itself and absolutely it is a certain act, yet compared to being distinct from itself it

is related as potentiality to act—because being is the actuality of every form and nature, as is said in the first part, question three, article four; for no nature is completely and ultimately a being in act unless it is under the being of actual existence. And what receives an act has the character of potentiality compared to that act.

Fifth: God is not composite. Therefore, his essence is his being. The consequence is proved: because if essence were distinguished from being, God could not exist unless several things concurred—namely, being and essence. But what cannot exist unless several things concur is composite.

Note here that something is said to be composite in two ways, as is gathered from the teaching of Saint Thomas in the second Quodlibet, article three: in one way, because its essence results from the union of several; in another way, because it is conjoined to another as potentiality to act—in which sense that thing is said to be compounded, not from other things, but from itself and another. What therefore cannot exist unless several things concur is composite, not necessarily in the first way—unless those things constituted its essence—but either in the first or in the second way.

Sixth: If quiddity is distinguished from being in God, God does not exist through his own essence but through participation in being itself. Therefore, he is not the first being. This is false. Therefore, etc. The second consequence is proved: because that in which something participates in order to exist is prior to it. The first consequence Saint Thomas does not prove but leaves it as known from the terms. For each thing exists through being itself. Where, therefore, the essence is not being, it follows that the thing does not exist through its own essence. And since existing through one's essence and existing through participation are opposed, from the fact that something does not exist through its essence it follows that it exists through participation. But it must be noted, from what is gathered from Saint Thomas in the tenth book of the Metaphysics, in the second Quodlibet, and in his commentary on Boethius's On the Hebdomads, that 'existing through one's essence in such a way' can be taken in two ways. In one way, because what is predicated of it is of its essence—as a human being is an animal through its essence because animal is of the essence of a human being. And conversely, something is said to exist in such a way through

participation because what is attributed to it is not of its essence—as heated iron is called fire through participation. In this case, to participate in something is nothing other than to have it as added to one's own essence and nature. In a second way, 'existing through one's essence in such a way' is taken to mean being totally the essence of what is predicated of it, having nothing else through which it is determined. Conversely, existing through participation in such a way means not being totally the essence of what is predicated, but having something else conjoined to it. In this sense we say that a human being is a rational animal through its essence, and yet is an animal through participation—because even though it has the entire essence of animal, it has it nevertheless limited by 'rational,' as Saint Thomas says in the book On the Hebdomads. These two modes are related in such a way that they conversely entail each other. For existing through one's essence in the second mode entails existing through one's essence in the first mode—for what belongs to something according to its entire essence and totally must either be its essence or of its essence; for if it were received in it as added to the essence, it would be limited by its essence to some particular mode of existing—for every act received in another receives some limitation in the recipient. Participating in the second mode, however, does not entail the first mode of participation—rather, what participates in the second mode may even exist through its essence in the first mode, as a human being is an animal through participation in the second mode, yet is an animal through its essence in the first mode. But the first mode of participation entails the second—for what has something as added to its essence is not totally that essence, but has it according to some determinate mode thereof.

In this argument, therefore, it is inferred that God exists through participation in both modes from the positing that his essence is distinguished from his being. For given this, it follows that he does not exist through his essence in the first mode—that is, through something that is of his essence or is his essence itself. And consequently it follows that he exists through participation—that is, through something added to his essence. From which it further follows that he exists through participation in the second mode—that is, he is not being totally, and has being not according to every mode of existing but in a determinate mode. And thus he is not the first being.

Seventh, he confirms the conclusion by the authority of Sacred Scripture—namely, from Exodus three, where the proper name of God is said to be 'He who is'—and by the authority of Hilary in the book On the Trinity and of Boethius in the book On the Trinity.

Chapter XXIII

That in God, There is No Accident

From this truth it necessarily follows that nothing can supervene upon God above his essence, nor can anything be in him accidentally. For being itself cannot participate in anything that is not of its essence—though what is can participate in something else—for nothing is more formal or more simple than being. And thus being itself can participate in nothing. But the divine substance is being itself. Therefore, it has nothing that is not of its substance. Therefore, no accident can be in it. Furthermore, everything that is in a thing accidentally has a cause of why it is in it, since it is beyond the essence of that to which it belongs. If, therefore, something is accidentally in God, it must be there through some cause. Either, therefore, the cause of the accident is the divine substance itself, or it is something else. If something else, that something must act upon the divine substance—for nothing introduces any form, whether substantial or accidental, into any receiving subject, unless in some way it acts upon that subject; for to act is nothing other than to make something actual, which is done through form. Therefore, God would suffer and be moved by another agent—which is contrary to what was established above. But if the divine substance itself is the cause of the accident that is in it, it is impossible for it to be the cause of that accident in the respect in which it receives it—for then the same thing according to the same thing would make itself actual. Therefore, if God has some accident, it would have to be that according to one thing he receives and according to another he causes the accident—just as corporeal things receive their proper accidents through the nature of matter and cause them through the form. Thus God would be composite—the contrary of which was proved above. Again, every subject of accident is related to it as potentiality to act, since an accident is a form that makes something actual according to accidental being. But in God there is no potentiality, as was shown above. Therefore, no accident can be in him. Moreover, everything in which something accidentally inheres is in some way, according to its nature, mutable—for an accident is by its nature apt to both inhere and not inhere. If, therefore, God has something that accidentally belongs to him, it will follow that he himself is mutable—the contrary of which was proved above.

Furthermore, whatever has some accident is not whatever it has in itself—for an accident is not of the essence of its subject. But God is whatever he has in himself. Therefore, there is no accident in God. The middle premise is proved as follows. Whatever is in God is in him in the most noble manner, since God is the cause of all things, and each thing is found more nobly in the cause than in the effect. But a thing belongs to another in the most perfect manner when it is that very thing itself—for this unity is more perfect than when something is substantially united to another as form to matter, and even that union is more perfect than when something is accidentally in another. Therefore, God is whatever he has. Again, substance does not depend on accident, though accident depends on substance. But what does not depend on something can sometimes be found without that something. Therefore, some substance can be found without accident. But this seems to belong especially to the simplest substance—which is the divine substance. Therefore, accident is altogether absent from the divine substance. The Catholic teachers agree with this conclusion. Hence Augustine, in the fifth book of On the Trinity, says that in God there is no accident. From this established truth the error of certain persons speaking in the law of the Saracens is refuted—those who posit certain intentions superadded to the divine essence.

[Ferrara's Commentary]

After having excluded the composition of essence and being, Saint Thomas here further excludes from God the composition of subject and accident, and posits this conclusion: In God there is no accident.

First, it is proved: Being itself cannot participate in anything that is not of its essence (though what is can)—since nothing is more formal or more simple than being itself. God is being itself. Therefore, he has nothing that is not of his substance. Therefore, there is no accident in him. For a greater understanding of this argument one must consider first that since an act informs potentiality, it is always understood as less composite than the potentiality itself—that is, having less of potentiality and being more actual than the potentiality. Therefore, where there are several acts, one of which is compared to the other

as act to potentiality, the one compared as act is simpler and has less composition in this respect—for nothing is actualized through something less actual than itself, if only the character of act and potentiality is considered. If, therefore, subsistent being were to have some act added to it, it would be necessary that some act be simpler and more actual than it. But this cannot be—since being is the actuality of all forms. Therefore, it cannot have anything added to it. And this is the foundation of this argument.

One must consider second that this argument is taken by Saint Thomas from Boethius in the book On the Hebdomads, where Saint Thomas himself notes that this is common to all things considered abstractly: that they have nothing in themselves beyond their essence. For each thing is signified as that by which something is formally such—as whiteness is that by which something is white, and humanity that by which a human being is formally a human being. Now something is not formally white except through what belongs to the essence of white, nor is a human being formally a human being except through what pertains to the character and essence of a human being. Therefore, what is abstractly signified, if it is as it is signified, can have nothing distinct from itself. Concrete things, on the other hand, are signified as having that form. But from the fact that something has some nature, nothing prevents it from having something else that does not pertain to its character. For from the fact that a human being has humanity, nothing prevents it from also having something else beyond humanity. Therefore, it is rightly said that being itself cannot participate in anything that is not of its essence, but what is can—namely, being itself as a concrete: for 'being' is abstract, whereas a being is concrete.

Second: Nothing in God has a cause. Therefore, there is no accident in God. The consequence is clear: because every accident has a cause of its being present. The antecedent is proved: because either the cause of that accident is the divine essence or something else. If something else, then God would suffer and be moved by some agent—for nothing introduces any form into a receiving subject without in some way acting on it, since acting is making something actual. If the divine essence itself, then in God there would be something through which it causes and something through which it receives—just as corporeal things receive through the nature of matter and cause through the form. And thus God would be composite. The consequence is proved: because it is impossible for

something to be the cause of anything through that by which it receives it; otherwise the same thing according to the same thing would make itself actual. For the understanding of the proposition 'To act is nothing other than to make something actual'—it must be noted that 'making actual' is attributed, in the customary manner of speaking, both to the agent and to the form. For we say both that what heats makes something actually hot, and that heat does so. Yet this is done differently. For the agent is said to make something actual because it brings it to the act of form while co-producing the form. For which reason Saint Thomas adds that this is done through the form—as if to say: to act is to make something actual through the form produced in the patient. The form, on the other hand, is said to make something actual not because it produces anything, but because it is that through which the agent makes something to be actually such—for whiteness does not make something white by producing it, but is that through which what whitens makes something to be actually white.

Concerning the proposition 'The same thing according to the same thing does not make itself actual, but according to one thing acts and according to another receives'—a doubt arises from two quarters. First, because although it seems true in composites of matter and form—in which Saint Thomas gives his example—it does not seem universally true. For in a separated substance, proper accidents are caused by its essence and received in it; and likewise intellect and will are caused by the essence of the intellective soul and received in it; and yet not according to different things, since these are simple substances having no diversity of parts. Second, because the intellect essentially causes the act of understanding and receives it, and likewise the will causes the act of willing—since these are immanent operations.

To the first of these it is said first that in all things that cause something in themselves, there must be a diversity of act and potentiality—for if there were only act, it could not have the character of a receptive subject, since every receptive subject receives some being in act from the form it receives. But if it were only potentiality, it could not have the character of an agent. It is said second that this diversity is not to be taken in the same way in all things, but varies according to the variety of natures. For in composites of matter and form, matter itself is the principle of receiving and form is the principle of acting. In simple substances,

however, the essence itself is the principle of receiving—because it is compared to being as potentiality to act—and being itself is the principle of acting, since each thing acts insofar as it is in act; not indeed because being is the productive formal principle of proper accidents, but because it is the condition of the essence insofar as the essence produces those accidents—for nothing acts unless it is in act. It is therefore said that even in separated substances and in the soul there is one thing by which it receives and another by which it acts, because the one is the essence and the other is being. And thus in other things there must be the composition of essence and being, which cannot be found in God. But a doubt still remains. For even when a thing does not exist in act, a proper attribute follows upon its essence—since the proposition in which an attribute is predicated of a subject is of sempiternal truth. Therefore, actual being is not the condition of the essence insofar as it acts.

The answer is that when a thing does not exist, the attribute does not follow upon the essence in real being but only in intelligible being—from which it is held that the proposition in which the attribute is predicated of the subject is always true. A second answer can be given: that the proposition of Saint Thomas is to be understood of a diversity of character, not of a real diversity. For what acts in itself acts according to one character and receives according to another: for it acts according as it is in act, but is acted upon according as it is in potentiality. But since in composites one thing is really what is in act and another is what is in potentiality, acting and receiving in those cases are reduced to two really distinct principles. In simple substances, however, since through the same thing the substance is in essential act and in potentiality toward being—insofar as the essence itself is both a certain act in itself and potentiality with respect to being—the principle of producing proper accidents and the principle of receiving them are distinguished only by reason. Yet because the essence itself must really be potentiality with respect to being—just as it is really an act in itself—it is therefore necessary that everything of this sort that is the cause of proper accidents in itself be composed at least by the composition of being and essence. But it is not incongruous that the same thing in reality be the principle of producing and receiving the same accident, when it is not the productive principle through an intermediate action but only through the natural resultance of one thing from

another—as was shown above following the mind of Saint Thomas—provided that in some way it has the character of act and in some way the character of potentiality.

To the second doubt it is said that neither the intellect nor the will acts and is acted upon through the same thing entirely, but through different things. For just as in corporeal things matter is the principle of receiving and form is the principle of acting, so proportionally in the intellect and will. In the intellect, what produces the act of understanding in act is the intellect informed by an intelligible species—and the intelligible species itself is the ratio of causing—while the potentiality itself is the ratio of receiving. In the will, the will willing the end is what causes the volition of the means, and the volition of the end is the ratio of acting; while the potentiality of the will itself is the ratio of receiving.

Note, however, that the matter in corporeal things is differently related to receiving the proper accidents of the composite, and the potentiality of intellect and will to receiving the act. For in the former, matter is the ratio of receiving—yet such accidents are not received in matter alone, but in the composite. In the action of intellect and will, however, the potentiality itself is the ratio of receiving in such a way that it alone receives—for understanding is received in the intellect alone, and willing in the will alone. The reason for the diversity is that matter, since it is simply pure potentiality, is not the immediate receptive subject of accidental form—for all accidents belong to the composite; whereas intellect and will, though they are passive potentialities, are nevertheless not pure potentialities but a certain act, and therefore can be immediate and per se subjects of other accidents. But this response, with respect to the will, does not seem fully satisfactory. For even if in willing the means something is assigned as the ratio of acting and something as receptive, in the very volition of the end it is not apparent what might be the ratio of acting distinct from the ratio of receiving—but the bare will itself seems both to cause that act and to receive it. This doubt can easily be answered by those who hold the will to be a partial agent of volition, and the apprehended object to concur with it simultaneously through the intellect as another partial cause. For it would be said that the bare will alone is not the cause of the volition of the end, but the aggregate of the will and the end apprehended through the intellect; and the receptive subject of this volition is the potentiality of the will alone.

But for those who say the object does not concur actively in volition but only by way of end and form, it is more difficult to respond. Some say that the will is moved by God unto the volition of the end, so that the will is purely passive with respect to such volition. But this does not seem true to me—because to will names an immanent action in the agent; therefore, the same thing must in some way be the cause and the recipient of the volition. And also because the will is not said to will unless through an act elicited by itself—just as the intellect is not said to understand unless through an act produced by itself. For which reason it seems more to me—following the aforesaid opinion—that one should say: either that there is in the will some natural form that is for it the ratio of naturally willing the end, as in the intellect there is the natural habit of principles; and thus the total productive principle of the volition would be the will with that form, and the receptive subject would be the will; and thus the will is said to be moved by God unto the volition of the end insofar as God instilled in it the form through which it is naturally moved to the end, just as God instilled in the possible intellect the habit of first principles; or that God, in moving the will unto the volition of the end, is the principal agent and the agent-which, whereas the will itself is that by which God causes that very volition—as the generator is what moves the heavy object, while the form of the heavy thing is that by which it moves. Now it is not incongruous that the same thing be active with respect to a certain act and receptive of it when it is not the principal active agent but rather that by which the agent acts, pertaining to the side of what is moved—for then the same thing can be the form through which the principal agent acts insofar as in it there is the power of the principal agent, and can also be that by which the patient is acted upon insofar as it is the potentiality of the mobile.

Third: In God there is no potentiality. Therefore, there is no accident. The consequence is proved: because every subject is related to accident as potentiality to act that gives accidental being.

Fourth: God is not mutable. Therefore, it does not belong to him to be such that something can be in him and not be in him. Therefore, there is no accident in him. The first consequence is clear. The second is proved: because every accident is by its nature apt to inhere and not to inhere. But a doubt arises: because a proper accident is not apt to both

inhere and not inhere. It can be said that this argument does not conclude that there is no accident in God in the sense in which accident is divided against substance, but in the sense in which it is distinguished from a proper accident—for that is apt to inhere and not to inhere. This is clear from the manner of speaking, when he says 'if God has something accidentally belonging to him.' For only those accidents that can be absent are said to belong accidentally; proper accidents are said to belong per se. Nor is it inappropriate that among many arguments some prove universally that no accident simply belongs to God, while others prove only concerning accidents that are accidentally present.

Fifth: God is whatever is in him. Therefore, no accident is in him. The consequence is clear: because a thing is not its own accident, since an accident is not of the essence of a thing. The antecedent is proved: whatever is in God is in him in the most noble manner, since God is the cause of all things, and each thing is found more nobly in the cause than in the effect. But a thing belongs to another most perfectly when it is that very thing itself—for then the unity with it is more perfect than when a form is substantially united to matter, and even that union is more perfect than when something accidentally inheres in another. Therefore, etc. Concerning the proposition 'Each thing is found more nobly in the cause than in the effect'—a doubt is raised. For the nature of fire is not found more nobly in the generating fire than in the generated fire, nor is human nature more noble in the generating human being than in the generated human being—since the most special species is found equally in all its individuals, or at least is not necessarily more noble in one than in another. Therefore, etc.

The first answer—taking the proposition as universally true—is given in two ways, according to the teaching of Saint Thomas in many places. First: the proposition holds universally of the principally acting cause, not of the instrumental cause. The answer is second that the nobility of what is in a cause and in an effect can be referred both to the very perfection of the essence and nature in itself, and to the mode of existing. If referred to the nature in itself, it is not necessary that each thing be more noble in the principal cause than in the effect. For as was argued, in things of the same most special species the nature is not essentially more perfect in the cause than in the effect. If referred to the mode of existing, it can be understood in two ways: namely, according as it is in the cause absolutely,

and according as it is in the cause insofar as the cause is a cause. And the same distinction is to be made on the side of the effect. If taken absolutely, it is also not necessary that it be more noble in the cause than in the effect—for it can be with equal nobility of existing in the cause and in the effect, if the being of the cause and the being of the effect are considered absolutely. But if something is considered that is in an active cause virtually, according as it is in the cause, then it has more noble being than in the effect as it is an effect. For in the acting cause it has the character of that which produces; in the effect it has the character of what is produced. Now it is more noble to produce than to be produced. Therefore, it is more noble to be in the cause as cause than in the effect as effect. And thus the proposition of Saint Thomas is to be understood, as is clear from On Evil, question four, article one, reply fifteen.

Hence the objection has no force. For even though the nature of fire is not absolutely more noble in the generating fire than in the generated fire, yet it has a more noble mode according as it is in the generating fire insofar as it is generating, than in the generated fire insofar as it is generated. And the same must be said of humanity and of other things that are said univocally of cause and effect.

This exposition serves excellently for the purpose at hand. For since a thing has a more noble mode in the cause as cause, it is necessary that in God the most noble mode that can belong to a cause as cause be found. Now the most noble mode is that the effect be in the cause as the very essence of the cause—so that the cause acts through its own essence. Therefore, all things in God are the very essence of God, and nothing in him is an accident.

A second answer is possible: that the proposition holds true both with respect to essence and with respect to the mode of existing absolutely, but only in an equivocal cause. For the effect in an equivocal cause is nothing other than the very form of the equivocal cause; and the mode of existing of the effect in the cause is nothing other than the mode of existing of the cause. Now it is clear that the form and being of an equivocal cause is more noble than the form and being of the effect—since it contains the perfection of the effect and something more perfect than it. This sense also serves the purpose of Saint Thomas. For it is manifest that God is the equivocal cause of creatures, not their univocal cause.

Sixth: Substance does not depend on accident, but the converse. Therefore, some substance can be found without accident—which seems especially to belong to the primary substance, which is God. The consequence is proved: because what does not depend on something can sometimes be found without it. But a doubt arises about this proposition. For substance does not depend on its proper attribute, and yet cannot be found without it. Therefore, not everything that does not depend on another can always be found without it.

The answer is that this proposition is to be understood where one thing does not follow upon another by a natural sequence. For in those cases, although one does not depend on the other, yet since once it is posited the other naturally results, in reality it cannot be found without it—as was argued concerning a subject and its proper attribute, for a proper attribute naturally follows upon the nature of the subject. But substance and accident, in the common character of substance and the common character of accident, are not so related: for neither does substance depend on accident, nor does accident follow naturally upon the character of substance. Therefore, some substance can be without accident.

Lastly, the conclusion is confirmed by the authority of Augustine in the book On the Trinity.

And the error of the Saracens is refuted by this—of which Averroes, in comment thirty-nine of the twelfth book of the Metaphysics, makes mention—those who posit certain intentions superadded to the divine essence. By 'intentions' Saint Thomas understands forms—which we call intentions because they are separated from God's substance only by our intention and thought. But those thinkers said that they are also really distinct, and are accidents superadded to the divine essence.

Chapter XXIV

That The Divine Being Cannot be Designated by the Addition of Any Substantial Difference

From the foregoing it can also be shown that nothing can be superadded to the divine being that would designate it by an essential designation—in the way that a genus is designated by differences. For it is impossible for something to be in act unless everything exists by which its substantial being is designated: for an animal cannot be in act unless it is either rational or irrational. Whence also the Platonists, in positing ideas, did not posit separately existing ideas of genera—which are designated to the being of a species through essential differences—but posited separately existing ideas of species alone, which do not require essential differences for their own designation. If therefore the divine being were designated by some other superadded thing with an essential designation, the divine being itself would not be in act unless that superadded thing existed. But the divine being is its own substance, as has been shown. Therefore, the divine substance cannot be in act unless something supervenes upon it—from which it can be concluded that it is not, of itself, necessarily existent—the contrary of which was shown above. Again, everything that requires something superadded in order to be able to exist is in potentiality with respect to that thing. But the divine substance is in no way in potentiality, as was shown above. But its substance is its own being. Therefore, its being cannot be designated by any substantial designation through something superadded to it.

Furthermore, everything through which a thing comes to be in act, and which is intrinsic to the thing, is either the whole essence of the thing or a part of the essence. But what designates something with an essential designation makes the thing to be in act and is intrinsic to the thing designated—otherwise through it the thing could not be designated substantially. Therefore, it must be either the essence of the thing itself or a part of the essence. But if something were superadded to the divine being, this could not be the whole essence of God—since it has already been shown that the being of God is not other than his essence. Therefore, it would be a part of the divine essence. And thus God would be composed of essential parts—the contrary of which was shown above.

Again, what is added to something for the essential designation of that thing does not constitute its character, but only its being in act—for 'rational' added to 'animal' makes the animal to be in act, but does not constitute the character of animal as animal; for difference does not enter the definition of genus. But if something were added to God through which he were designated with an essential designation, that thing would have to constitute for that to which it is added the proper character of its quiddity or nature—for what is added in this way makes the thing to be in act; and this—namely, being in act—is the very divine essence, as has been shown above. Therefore, it remains that nothing can be added above the divine being that would designate it with an essential designation, as a difference designates a genus.

[Ferrara's Commentary]

In the last place, Saint Thomas excludes from God the composition of genus and difference. Concerning this he does two things: first, he excludes the potential composition, according as a genus contains many differences potentially by which it can be determined; second, the actual composition, according as a species is said to be composed of genus and difference.

Regarding the first, this conclusion is posited: Nothing can be superadded above the divine being that would designate it with an essential designation, as a genus is designated by differences. For the understanding of this, before the conclusion is proved, one must consider that a genus is said to be designated or determined essentially by differences—not as though those differences were of the essence and quiddity of the genus, but because they divide the nature of the genus into diverse essences and natures contained per se under the genus. For a genus denotes a certain unlimited and undetermined nature with respect to species; but through the addition of one difference it is contracted to one species, of which it is predicated essentially, and through the addition of another difference it is contracted to another species. And thus it is said to be designated by an essential designation—that is, determined to the essence of a species contained under it. It is in this manner, therefore, that the designation of the divine being is denied—as though it were a certain common

thing, expressing an undetermined nature, limitable and contractable through some difference to a more particular nature contained per se under it, as some have wrongly posited.

First proof: God is, of himself, necessarily existent. Therefore, his essence is not in act through something supervening. Therefore, neither is his being. Therefore, his being is not designated by an essential designation. The first consequence is clear. The second is proved, because his being is his essence. The third, because it is impossible for something to be in act unless everything exists by which its substantial being is designated—for an animal is not in act unless it is rational or irrational. Nor did the Platonists posit ideas except of the most special species. Therefore, if being were to be designated by an essential designation, it could not be in act except through that which would designate it. And thus it would be in act through something supervening.

Concerning the position of Plato, it must be noted that the phrase 'of the most special species' does not differentiate from all universals simply—for, as is clear in the first book of the Ethics, and is posited by Saint Thomas in the first part, question six, article four, and in On Truth, question twenty-one, article four, Plato posited ideas not only of the most special species but also of being, the one, and the good—but it differentiates from subaltern species, namely genera. For as is said in On Truth, question three, article eight, Plato did not posit ideas of genera but only of the most special species—because, since an idea only belongs to those things that are per se intended, and the intention of nature does not terminate in the production of the form of a genus but only of the form of a species, it was not necessary to posit ideas of genera but only of species. Hence when Saint Thomas sometimes says that Plato posited as separately existing those things that can be separated by the intellect, this is to be understood of those that are per se intended by nature. These are the most special species and those things common to all—such as being, the one, and the good—but not genera.

Note that the proposition 'It is impossible for something to be in act unless everything exists by which its substantial being is designated' can be explained in two ways. In one way, so that by 'substantial being' we understand the essence and quiddity itself. And so without

doubt it is true, as is declared by the example and by the position of Plato: for an animal cannot be in act unless the differences exist by which the nature of animal is determined to one species not further essentially determinable. But this sense does not seem to be to the point, because Saint Thomas is here speaking of the actual existence of God, not of his essence. In a second way it can be understood so that by 'substantial being' we understand the very actuality of existing. And then the proof can be explained in two ways: namely, through the way of analogy, and through the way of example. Through the way of analogy: because just as an animal cannot exist in act unless the difference limiting it essentially exists, so too, if being receives an essential limitation through something else, it cannot be posited in act unless that difference through which it is essentially limited exists. Through the way of example also: because an animal is not in act unless some difference of it exists through which its substantial being is determined. Therefore likewise in all other things, nothing is in act unless everything exists by which its substantial being is essentially determined.

But a doubt arises. For it does not seem incongruous that the divine essence be in act through something superadded—if that thing is not really distinct from the essence—just as it is not incongruous that through wisdom superadded to the essence, not really distinct from it but only conceptually, it should be wise. For thereby it is not prevented from being, of itself, necessarily existent—just as by being wise through wisdom it is not prevented from being wise of itself and through its own essence. Now if something essentially determining it were added to the divine being, that thing would be really neither distinct from the being nor from the essence—just as a difference contracting a genus is not really distinct from the genus. Therefore, it is not incongruous for it to be in act through something superadded to the essence.

For the understanding of this doubt, one must consider that we must speak differently of the nature of a genus as it exists in a species in reality, and as it is considered in common through abstraction from species and differences. In the first way, it is the same as the difference in reality, and the difference is not something added to the entity of the genus. In the second way, the genus is considered as formally distinct from the difference—not having with it any identity but a potential one, namely of containment, insofar as it contains those

differences potentially. Therefore, the difference is then considered as altogether outside the essence of the genus. And hence when the difference is added to the nature of the genus so considered, it is added as something extraneous to the essence of the genus. Hence if the genus were posited to exist as it is understood, it would be without the differences by which it is divided and contracted to inferiors. For it is clear that animal, considered in abstraction from differences, is essentially nothing other than animated sensible substance; and if 'rational' is added, it is called 'animated sensible rational substance,' where it is clear that 'rational' is added to the whole essence of animal. And thus in order for animal to exist, it is required that something be added to it that is outside its formal character—even though in what is constituted by them, genus and difference are the same in reality. Hence it cannot be said that a genus exists by itself, but through another—namely, through the difference.

So therefore, if the divine being, considered formally and according to its proper character, were some common thing essentially contractable in the manner of a genus, the divine essence likewise could not be in act except through something altogether alien to its quiddity and essence considered formally—even though that which is added would be the same in reality as the essence in that to which it would be united.

The answer to the doubt is therefore that it is not only incongruous that the divine essence should need something really distinct from itself in order to be in act, but it is also incongruous that it should need something that is outside its formal character and quiddity—for then it would not be, of itself and from its own quiddity and essence, necessarily existent, but would need something altogether extrinsic to its formal and quidditative character in order to exist. But what is said about wisdom is not the same. For wisdom is not outside the formal and quidditative character of the essence, if the divine essence were considered as it is in itself—but only according as it is diversely conceived by us. But if the divine essence were an undetermined nature in the manner of a genus, and were to be determined by an essential difference, that difference would be outside the quidditative character of the essence even as it is considered in itself—not only according to our mode of conceiving.

Second: The divine substance is in no way in potentiality—because it is being itself, which is the most actual. Therefore, the divine being cannot be designated essentially by something added to it. The consequence is proved: because everything that needs something in order to exist is in potentiality with respect to that thing—if it needs it as a limiting form.

Third: If something is designated essentially through an addition, that added thing makes the designated thing to be in act and is intrinsic to it. Therefore, it is either its essence or a part of its essence. It cannot be the whole essence of God—because his essence is the same as being; and what is added to being itself is not the whole of being, as it is added, even though it may materially be the same being. Therefore, it is a part of the essence. Therefore, God is composite—the contrary of which was shown above. The first consequence is proved: because what designates something with an essential designation makes the thing to be in act and is intrinsic to the thing designated. The second is also proved: because what makes a thing to be in act and is intrinsic to the thing is either the whole essence or a part of the essence. Note that this argument proceeds from the supposition that something is added to the divine being as constitutive of the divine essence—as something is added to a genus that is constitutive of the species.

But concerning the proposition 'What designates something with an essential designation makes the thing to be in act'—it must be known that 'being in act' can be taken in two ways: in one way, in quiddititative and essential act; in another way, in the act of actual existence. This proposition is understood not only of being in quiddititative act, but also of being in the act of existence. For this difference 'rational,' added to 'animal,' constitutes the human being—which is here called the designated thing—in the act of essence and quiddity: because in 'animal' the human being was contained potentially, but through the addition of the difference it is constituted in act as 'rational animal,' which is the essence and quiddity of a human being—just as through the union of form with matter the whole is constituted in quiddititative act. It also constitutes the human being in actual existence—insofar as it constitutes the quiddity, which is the proper receptive subject of being, formally and essentially speaking. For from the addition of the specific difference to the genus, the proper essential receptive subject of being is constituted—because the most

special species does not need any formal intrinsic thing in order to exist, though in material things certain material principles are required to individuate the nature. For this reason Porphyry says that difference conduces to being—because it constitutes the proper essential receptive subject.

Fourth: If something were added to the being of God, it would be added to his essence—because essence and being in him are the same. Therefore, it would be necessary that the essentially designating thing constitute the proper character of the nature and quiddity of God. But this is contrary to the character of what essentially determines something: for no such thing constitutes the character of that to which it is added—as 'rational' does not constitute the character of animal. The consequence is proved: because what is thus added makes the thing to be in act; but this in God is the divine essence, as has been shown above. Therefore, if something were essentially added to him, it would constitute his essence.

Concerning the proposition 'What is added to something for an essential designation does not constitute its character, but only its being in act'—it must be noted that this proposition is not the same as the proposition of the preceding argument which we explained. For in that proposition 'being in act' was referred to the thing constituted by the genus and the difference—or to the thing constituted by what is added and that to which the addition is made, which was called the designated or determined thing, namely the thing including the determination itself—not as that to which the designation is applied from outside. But here it is referred to that to which the addition is made, or to the genus itself. For the genus, because it has the character of potentiality and of what is determinable—as considered under the character of the universal whole—does not have in itself any act of those things by which it is determined to a species. Therefore, it is in potentiality with respect to differences and species. But through the addition of a difference it comes to be in act of the difference and species, and becomes the proper essential receptive subject of actual existence—just as matter, because it does not have in its substance any act, if it is considered in abstraction from all form, is in potentiality to be determined to this or that form and to this or that species; but when it has received a form, it is in act of that form

and of the species constituted by it, and in the being of actual existence that accompanies that form.

Chapter XXV

That God is Not in Any Genus

From this it is necessarily concluded that God is not in any genus. For everything that is in a genus has something in it through which the nature of the genus is designated to a species—for nothing is in a genus that is not in some species of it. But this is impossible in God, as has been shown. Therefore, it is impossible for God to be in any genus. Furthermore, if God is in a genus, either he is in the genus of accident or in the genus of substance. He is not in the genus of accident—for an accident cannot be the first being and the first cause. He cannot be in the genus of substance either—because substance as a genus is not being itself; otherwise every substance would be its own being, and thus would not be caused by another—which is impossible, as is clear from what has been said. But God is being itself. Therefore, he is not in any genus. Again, whatever is in a genus differs from others that are in the same genus in its being—otherwise the genus would not be predicated of many. But all that are in the same genus must agree in the quiddity of the genus—for the genus is predicated of all in the 'what it is.' The being therefore of whatever exists in a genus is beyond the quiddity of the genus. But this is impossible in God. Therefore, God is not in a genus.

Furthermore, each thing is placed in a genus by reason of its quiddity—for a genus is predicated in the 'what it is.' But the quiddity of God is being itself. According to this, nothing is placed in a genus—for then being would be a genus, which signifies being itself. It remains, therefore, that God is not in a genus. That being cannot be a genus is proved by the Philosopher as follows. If being were a genus, it would be necessary to find some difference through which it is drawn to a species. But no difference participates in the genus—in such a way, namely, that the genus is in the character of the difference, for then the genus would be posited twice in the definition of the species—but the difference must be beyond what is understood in the character of the genus. But nothing can be beyond what is understood through being, if being is of the understanding of those things of which it is predicated. And thus by no difference can it be contracted. It remains therefore that being is not a genus. Hence from this it is necessarily concluded that God is not in a genus.

From this it is also clear that God cannot be defined—for every definition is from genus and differences. It is also clear that demonstration cannot be made of him except through an effect—for the principle or middle term of a demonstration is the definition of that about which the demonstration is made. But it might seem to someone that, although the name 'substance' cannot properly belong to God—since God does not underlie accidents—yet the thing signified by the name belongs to him, and thus he is in the genus of substance. For substance is a being of itself—which clearly belongs to God, from the fact that it was proved that he himself is not an accident.

But to this it must be said, from what has been stated, that 'being of itself' is not in the definition of substance as a genus. For from the fact that it is called 'being,' it could not be a genus—since it has already been proved that being does not have the character of a genus. Nor from the fact that it is called 'of itself'—because this seems to import nothing other than a negation: for a thing is called a being of itself from the fact that it is not in another—which is a pure negation. And a negation cannot constitute the character of a genus, because then a genus would not say what a thing is, but what it is not. Therefore, the character of substance must be understood in this way: that a substance is a thing to which it belongs to be not in a subject; but a name is imposed from the quiddity, just as the name 'being' is imposed from being; and thus in the character of substance it is understood that it has a quiddity to which it belongs to be not in another—as something distinct from the quiddity. But this does not belong to God—for he does not have a quiddity other than his being. Hence it remains that he is in no way in the genus of substance. And thus neither in any genus—since it was shown that he is not in the genus of accident.

[Ferrara's Commentary]

Secondly, it is shown that in God there is no actual composition of genus and difference, and this conclusion is posited: God is in no genus. Concerning this conclusion Saint Thomas does three things: first, he proves it; second, he deduces certain corollaries from it; third, he solves a certain objection. Regarding the first, he argues first as follows: In God there is nothing through which the nature is designated to a species. Therefore, he is not in a genus. The antecedent is clear from the

preceding chapter. The consequence is proved: because nothing is in a genus that is not in some species of it—which is to be understood of those things that are complete in nature and directly contained under a genus, not of those things that are contained under a genus only by reduction. But the antecedent of this argument seems not to follow from the preceding chapter. For there it was shown that the divine being cannot be designated essentially by something superadded. But from this it does not follow that in God there is nothing determinable and nothing determining—just as from the fact that humanity cannot be limited and contracted by another formal difference it does not follow that in humanity there is no nature that is of itself contractable and a nature that contracts it, if they are considered formally.

The answer is that from the same arguments by which it was proved that nothing can be added to the divine being that would designate it essentially, it is clear that in God there is nothing that has the character of a difference designating essentially. For that which would be designated by it would not be, of itself, necessarily existent—because in order to be in act it would need that difference, as was the procedure in the first argument. And it would be in potentiality with respect to that difference—as was assumed in the second argument. That difference itself would also be a part of the essence formally taken—as the third argument concluded. Likewise, whatever is in act in God is formally identical with every nature that is in God, if those things that are in God are considered as they are in themselves—since all are being itself, pure and simple. Therefore, nothing existing in God can have something added to it that is outside its character. As the fourth argument proceeded. Therefore, implicitly, once it has been shown that the divine being does not admit essential limitation, it has also been shown that there is nothing in God that has the character of an essentially limiting difference.

Second: God is not in the genus of accident—because an accident cannot be the first being and the first cause. Nor in the genus of substance—because substance as a genus is not its own being; otherwise every substance would be its own being, since the character of a genus is preserved in all things contained under the genus, and thus no substance would be caused by another; but God is his own being. Therefore, God is not in any genus.

For the understanding of this argument, one must consider that a thing has the character of being caused by another from the fact that it receives being from that other—for causing, as was said above, is making something to be in act. Where, therefore, it is posited that the being of a thing does not belong to it from another, it follows that the thing is not caused. But from the fact that it

is posited that the substance of a thing is not distinguished from its being, it is necessary to posit that being does not belong to the thing through another efficient cause—for the essence of a thing belongs to it of itself, and not through a productive cause. For there is no cause that makes a human being to be a human being, or an animal, or a substance—since similar propositions of the first mode are of sempiternal truth, whether the thing is produced in being or not. And if Saint Thomas is found to say sometimes, as in On Truth, question twenty-one, article five, reply five, that a creature is from God according to its essence, this is to be understood that God produces the essence of the creature in being—not that he makes the essence of the creature belong to itself, as if he made a human being to be a human being. It follows, therefore, that if the substance is its own being, that substance will not be caused—because it will not receive being from another, just as it does not receive its essence.

Third: What is in a genus differs from all others in the same genus in its being. But it agrees with them in the quiddity of the genus. Therefore, in everything existing in a genus, being is beyond the quiddity of the genus. Therefore, God is not in a genus. The antecedent regarding the first part is proved by the fact that a genus is predicated of many; and certain things agreeing in one common quiddity are many for this reason—that they have distinct being. Regarding the second part it is proved because a genus is predicated in 'what it is' of all species. The first consequence is clear: because the same thing is not the principle of agreement and of distinction with respect to the same. The second is also clear: because in God being is not beyond his quiddity.

Concerning this argument it must be noted that from the fact that the species agree in the quiddity of the genus but differ in being—both quidditítative and of actual existence—it does not formally follow that those existing in a genus have being really distinct from their quiddity, but only formally distinct. As from the fact that the species of animal agree in the quiddity of animal but differ in the differences of animal, it does not follow that the quiddity of the genus is really distinct from the difference, but only formally. And this suffices for Saint Thomas's argument—for in God being is not only not really distinct from the essence, but not even formally. For if the divine essence were conceived, and all things that are in it, as they are in themselves, there would be one and indivisible character of all—because of the supreme simplicity of the divine nature and its purity. In order to insinuate this formal distinction of essence and being in a thing existing in a genus, Saint Thomas said 'The being of whatever exists in a genus is beyond the quiddity of the genus'—not that it is really distinct from the quiddity—though it is also true that it is really distinct, as will be proved by other arguments in the second book.

But a doubt arises concerning what has been said. For someone might say that, just as a genus denotes one common nature conceptually—as abstracted from differences by the intellect—so too the being of that generic quiddity is conceptually one and common, considered in abstraction from all limiting principles, and is the same as that quiddity. And just as the quiddity of the genus is really multiplied in several species through differences—since the nature of a genus in one species is diverse in reality from the nature of the genus in another, as is said in the tenth book of the Metaphysics—so too the being of that quiddity is diversified in diverse species. And thus there remains no greater unity of quiddity than of being—but just as the quiddity of the genus remains one conceptually and is multiplied in reality, so too the being of several species remains one conceptually and multiple in reality. For the understanding of this, one must consider that being belongs to a genus only insofar as it is limited in its inferiors. Therefore, the comparison between the quiddity of the genus and its being is to be observed according as the quiddity of the genus is considered in the species. For there is no being by which animal exists separately from all species in nature; but there is a being by which this animal which is a human being exists, and a being by which this animal which is a horse exists, and so forth.

One must note second that being, although it has a certain community of concept—insofar as every being is called the actuality of existing—is nevertheless not common in the manner of a genus. For the being of an animal does not denote one common nature found in all instances of animal-being, abstractable from them by the intellect and contractable by some difference—as 'animal' does. For since it denotes the actuality of all actualities, it cannot be limited by anything more formal and actual. But its community is the community of a form, which is limited through its receptive subject: for the being of a human being is distinguished from the being of a horse because the one is the actuality of this and the other of that. For this reason, just as the different receptive subjects of being are constituted—one by one difference of the genus and another by another—so too the formal character of actual existence is different in one species of a genus and different in another. And therefore, just as with the formal unity of the genus in all its species there stands a plurality of differences and specific being, so too with that unity of the generic quiddity there stands a plurality of the formal character of actual existence. To the doubt it is therefore said first that the genus is multiplied in the species both in reality and with respect to the specific quidditative being, but is not multiplied formally and with respect to its own proper quidditative being. For even though the nature of the genus in one is in reality diverse from the nature of the genus in another, it is not formally diverse—for the nature of animal in all animals is animated sensible substance.

It is said second that the actual existence of the genus does not remain formally the same in all—since it does not denote one nature abstractable from all by the intellect, but varies according as the diverse receptive subjects of that being are constituted by diverse differences. Thus the character of actual existence is diversified simultaneously with its real diversity. It is said third that, although these instances of being are one in some common concept that the intellect forms—in that they are one by a certain proportionality, insofar as the being of a lion is related to a lion as the being of a horse is related to a horse—yet the force of the argument is not thereby undermined. For this proposition is always true: 'That which is formally one in many is formally distinguished from what is multiplied in those same things'—otherwise the same thing would be one and many. Therefore, if the quiddity of the genus in the species is one, but being in those same species is many (even if perhaps they are one according to some concept of the intellect), the quiddity of the genus itself is formally distinguished from being. Nor does it avail to say that being itself remains one in many conceptually—because, as has been shown, on the part of reality there is nothing one and common to all those instances of being, as to all animals there is one common nature abstractable from them by the intellect.

From this it further follows that they are also really distinct—as the Most Reverend Cardinal of San Sisto ingeniously deduces in his commentary on the book On Being and Essence. For the real distinction of being from essence is the cause of the formal distinction between them—just as their real identity is the cause of their formal identity. For the following holds: 'The essence is really the same as being; therefore, it is not determined to any genus'—because the essence does not seek being in act from another formally, whereas the nature of a genus is limited by a difference. 'Therefore, it is pure being'—because being not determined to a genus is pure being. 'Therefore, being is of its character'—because being is of the formal character of pure being. 'Therefore, from the first to the last, the essence is really the same as being. Therefore, essence and being are formally the same.'

Fourth: God is his own being. Therefore, he is not placed in a genus. The consequence is proved: because nothing could be his genus except being—since each thing is placed in a genus by reason of its quiddity, and being itself is not implied except through 'being.' But being cannot be a genus, as is said in the third book of the Metaphysics. Therefore, etc. That being cannot be a genus the Philosopher proves there by this argument: every genus is contracted to a species by some difference—of whose character the genus itself is not, but which is beyond what is understood in the character of the genus, since if the genus were of the character of the difference, it would be

posited twice in the definition of the species. But nothing can be beyond what is understood through being, if being is of the understanding of those things of which it is predicated. Therefore, being cannot be a genus. For the understanding of the proposition 'Each thing is placed in a genus by reason of its quiddity'—it must be known that, since in a real thing there is quiddity and being, a thing is not placed in a genus by reason of its being, but by reason of quiddity alone—because its quiddity is potentially contained in a genus and the genus is predicated of it essentially. Hence, since everything directly contained in a genus is a species of it, to be contained in a genus by reason of quiddity means nothing other than to be a species of that genus through one's quiddity—and not through one's being, where being is distinguished from quiddity.

Note also concerning the proposition 'The difference must be beyond what is understood in the character of the genus'—that what is understood in the character of the genus is the very quiddity and nature of the genus, signified by its definition. Therefore, to be beyond what is understood in the character of the genus is to be beyond the essence and quiddity of the genus. But this can be the case in two ways. In one way, because something does not enter into the essence and quiddity of the genus—and in this way it belongs not only to difference but also to species. In another way, because neither does it enter into the quiddity of the genus, nor does the quiddity of the genus enter into its quiddity. And it is in this sense that the difference is understood to be beyond the quiddity of the genus—otherwise it would be posited twice in the definition of the species: once by itself and once as included in the difference.

But a doubt arises. For 'being' seems to be taken here as signifying actual existence—as is clear from Saint Thomas's intention of wanting, if God is in a genus, that being must be his genus, because the quiddity of God is being—namely, actual existence—and being signifies being itself. Now it is false that being taken in this way is predicated essentially of all things, as Saint Thomas seems to suppose, and that nothing is beyond the character of being—for according to him, it is so predicated essentially of God alone. For being predicated essentially is being that signifies the essence of a thing—which is also divided into the ten categories.

For the solution of this doubt, since the whole difficulty concerns the meaning of the term 'being,' it must be considered that, although being taken nominally and participially both import being—for in both ways being signifies what has being—yet they are imported differently through each mode. For if taken participially—as equivalent absolutely to 'existing'—being is imported as the principal and formal signified, in that it is the abstract of this concrete 'being'; while what has

being is imported secondarily, as the receptive subject of being—just as 'white' imports whiteness primarily and formally, which is its abstract, and the subject secondarily, in that it signifies whiteness by way of something inhering in another. But if taken nominally, then being is not its abstract but rather essence. Therefore, its principal signified is not being but essence; being, however, is imported through it as that from which the name is imposed—just as if a stone is said to be what offends the foot, the offending of the foot is imported secondarily as that from which the name is imposed, while its essence is the principal signified. This is clear from Saint Thomas in the tenth book of the Metaphysics, in the exposition of text eight, where he says that being divided by the ten categories signifies the natures of the ten genera according as they are in act or in potentiality.

It is said therefore first that being divided into the ten categories is being taken nominally—which signifies the essence primarily as the thing signified, and secondarily being as that from which the name itself is imposed. It is said second that this is what is predicated essentially of all things, and of which the Philosopher proves that it is not a genus—not being taken participially, whose principal signified is being as its abstract.

That the first of these is so is clear from Saint Thomas in On Truth, question twenty-one, article four, reply four, where he is speaking, as is clear from the first article of that question, of being divided into the ten categories. For there, positing the rule that in general forms the predication of the concrete of the abstract is received, he shows this inductively, saying: 'For we say that essence is a being, and goodness is good, and unity is one, and so forth'—where it is clear that he posits essence as the abstract and primary and formal signified of being. Also in the first article, reply one, he says that since being is said absolutely while good superadds a relation to a final cause, the very essence of a thing considered absolutely suffices for something to be called a being through it. And in the second Quodlibet, question two, article one, he posits that being, insofar as it signifies a thing to which being belongs, signifies the essence of a thing and is divided into ten genera—though, insofar as it signifies being, it is a predicate in the accidental sense, as he gives to understand.

The second, moreover, is proved because Saint Thomas holds that being is really distinguished from essence in every creature, and that it is not perfectly included in the character of anything created, as is clear in On Truth, question ten, article twelve, and elsewhere. Thus it is clear that what imports being as its primary signified cannot be predicated essentially of a creature; and consequently it is not that being of which the Philosopher proves it is not a genus on the ground

that it is predicated of all. But a difficulty seems to stand against this determination, because Saint Thomas in the first part, questions five and six, and in On Truth, question thirty, seems to want that the good—which is also divided into the ten categories, as is said in the first book of the Ethics—be convertible with being taken participially, not nominally. Which is clear from two things.

First, from the fact that he says that since good and being are convertible, as a thing is a being, so it is good; but it is not a being through its essence; therefore, neither is it good. In this procedure it is necessary to take being participially—because this is what is denied to belong to a thing through its essence, since being is really distinguished from every created essence. Therefore, being that is convertible with good and is divided into the ten categories is being taken participially.

Second, from the fact that he says that what formally makes something to be a being is not to be good—which is false of being taken nominally, because the actuality of existing, through which a thing is a being and is good, is being nominally.

To these difficulties it is said first, in general, that they proceed from a false foundation—namely, that being, when taken nominally, does not denote being, but only when taken participially. For this is most false: since in both ways, as we said above, it signifies what has being. But what is true is that when taken nominally it imports being secondarily and as that from which the name is imposed; when taken participially, it denotes being not only as that from which the name is imposed but also as the thing principally signified—for it is clear in the teaching of Saint Thomas that what the name is imposed from and what it is imposed upon can in some cases be the same. From which it follows that, taking being nominally, something can be said to be a being through participation by reason of the secondary signified and of that from which the name is imposed—even though by reason of the primary signified it is not a being through participation but through essence.

Note also that it is not the same to say 'being in act' in the sense in which being is divided into being in act and being in potentiality, and 'being taken participially.' For being in act that divides being primarily and formally signifies the essence—as also does being that is divided—but signifies it as it is under the being of actual existence; through which it differs from being in potentiality, which signifies the essence without actual being. And therefore being in act secondarily signifies being. But being taken participially—which is the same as existing, as was said—primarily and

formally signifies being itself; and secondarily the essence to which being belongs in its own manner. Hence although Saint Thomas may want good to be convertible with being in act, he does not want it to be convertible with being taken participially with respect to the first and formal signified. And therefore the assumption in the objections is false.

To the first proof it is said that Saint Thomas does not posit that argument in the form in which it is adduced. But indeed in On Truth, question twenty-one, article five, reply six, he says: 'In this way the essence is denominated good just as it is a being. Hence just as it has being through participation, so too it is good through participation.' But in this argument the created essence is not said to be a being through participation by reason of the first and formal signified, but by reason of the connoted—or by reason of that from which the name 'being' is imposed. For since the created essence has being distinct from itself and participated, being taken nominally is said of it through participation by reason of that being. And thus it is false that in that argument being is taken participially rather than nominally. The solution to the second difficulty is clear from the very words of Saint Thomas there, where he says that being is not called a being through some other being—for by that very being a thing is said to be. Therefore, being is not a being as what has being—even taking being nominally—but as that through which something has being. For being taken nominally is said primarily of what has being; but secondarily also of that through which something has being, as is clear in On Truth, the same question, article 4, reply 4, and in the first part, question 6, article 3, reply 3. To the central doubt it is therefore said first that being is taken as it signifies being—not indeed as the primary signified, but as that from which the name is imposed. And such is being taken nominally.

It is said second that for the intention of Saint Thomas it is not required that being signify being in any other way than we have stated. For since being signifies what has being, and predicates the essence of any thing, and in God the essence itself is really the same as being—nothing could be his genus unless it imports being itself absolutely and without limit, either primarily or secondarily. But such is being even taken nominally: for it imports being absolutely secondarily, and quiddity primarily. And thus in God it signifies a quiddity that is being itself. It is said third that it is not false—rather, it is true—that being which signifies being as that from which the name is imposed is predicated essentially of things, with respect to its first and formal signified. But it is indeed false that being taken participially—whose principal signified is being—is predicated essentially, and that nothing is beyond its character.

But two further doubts remain. The first is that if good is convertible with being taken nominally, and good is divided into the ten categories insofar as it is the same as being, as is said in the first part, question five, the last article, reply one—it follows that good must be convertible with being divided through being in act and being in potentiality, since that is what is divided into the ten categories—not with being in act only. The opposite of which was stated.

The answer to this is that just as being common to act and potentiality is divided into the ten categories, so too is being in act. Hence not only being but also being in act is divided into act and potentiality—for in every genus some thing is as potentiality and some thing as act. Hence being in potentiality is divided into the ten categories, and similarly being in act. For some potentiality is of the genus of substance, and some of the genus of quality, and so forth for others; and similarly some act is of the genus of substance, and some of the genus of quality, and so forth. These things are clear from what the Commentator has in the third book of the Physics, comment nine. Therefore, the following consequence is denied: 'Good insofar as it is the same as being is divided into the ten categories; therefore, it is convertible with being divided through act and potentiality, and not with being in act.' The reason is that not only common being is divided into the ten categories, but also being in act and being in potentiality.

The second doubt is: if good is convertible with being taken nominally by an essential conversion—for it is of this kind that Saint Thomas understands these to be convertible, since he posits them to be really the same and good to add above being only a conceptual relation—it follows that goodness and the essence of a thing are really the same. But Saint Thomas says in the first part, question six, article three, reply three, that the goodness of a created thing is not its very essence. Therefore, etc. The consequence is proved: because from the opposite of the consequent the opposite of the antecedent is inferred. For if goodness—which is the formal signified of 'good'—is not the same as essence—which is the formal signified of 'being'—it follows that good adds something real above being. And thus they are not convertible essentially. For the understanding of this it must be considered first that it is one thing to say 'being absolutely' and another to say 'being in act.' For being taken absolutely signifies only the essence as that upon which the name is imposed, while being signifies as that from which the name is imposed. But being in act does not signify only the essence, but also being itself. Hence actuality in act—which is the formal signified of being in act—denotes the essence primarily and connotes being secondarily—not only as that from which the name is imposed, but also as the actuality of the essence. One must consider second that, since good and being in act are essentially convertible, it is

necessary that just as being in act signifies formally both essence and being, so too good signifies these. And similarly it is necessary that goodness—which is the formal signified of 'good'—include both these things, just as they are included in actuality in act. And thus goodness does not denote only the essence of a thing, nor only its being, but essence under being. One must consider third that just as being in act signifies essence as the fundamental goodness and being as the completive and determinative goodness, so too good signifies essence as fundamental goodness and being as completive and determinative goodness.

To the doubt it is therefore said first that it supposes two false things. One is that it is the same thing to say 'being absolutely' and 'being in act.' The other is that the formal signified of being in act—with which good is convertible—is only essence: whereas, as was said, it includes both essence and being. It is said second that the consequence is false, speaking of an all-encompassing identity. To the proof, the assumption is denied. To its proof, it is said that essence is not the total signified of being in act, but essence together with being. And therefore it does not follow that good adds something real above being in act with respect to its total signified, but only with respect to its partial signified. This moreover is not incongruous—for being in act itself also adds above essence, since it denotes not only the essence but also being. Nor does it follow that it is not convertible essentially with being in act—but only that it is not convertible with the partial signified thereof.

It is said third that the statement of Saint Thomas holds true in two ways. First, of total and complete goodness—which, since it includes essence and being, is not wholly identical with the essence, though it is in some way identical with it: just as what includes more is identical with each of those things it includes, yet adds something above each. Second, of completive and terminative goodness—for such goodness is being; and in creatures being and essence are distinguished. But what Saint Thomas often says—that the goodness of a thing is the act of existing—is to be understood not of complete and total goodness, but of completive and terminative goodness. Concerning the conditional statement 'If being is of the understanding of those things of which it is predicated'—it must be noted that Saint Thomas does not speak conditionally because it is doubtful to him that being is of the understanding of those things of which it is predicated. For he holds in other places, as we cited, that being signifies the essences of things. But he uses this manner of speaking to remove a calumny by which someone might deny that being is essentially predicated. As if to say: Since being is the most universal predicate of all, nothing can be that does not receive being into its character—unless someone were to deny that being is predicated essentially of things, which would be manifestly false.

But then a doubt arises: if being is of the understanding of those things of which it is predicated, then being will be placed in the definitions of things—since everything of the understanding of a thing is placed in its definition. The opposite of this, however, the Philosopher says in the eighth book of the Metaphysics. The answer is that since a definition is given to distinguish one thing from another, only that through which the defined thing has some distinction from others is placed in the definition of a thing. But this is only genus and difference—which say something determinate—not being, in which all things agree. Hence Saint Thomas glosses the proposition of Aristotle by saying that being is not placed in the definition as a genus. But we have written more fully on this in the annotations to the second book of the Posterior Analytics. But what is assumed—namely, that everything of the understanding of something is placed in its definition—it is said to be true only of what posits some determinate grade of it by which it is distinguished from others. But such is not being. Therefore, it need not be placed in the definitions of things. Scotus, moreover, holds in the first book of the Sentences, distinction three, question three, that being is not predicated formally of the ultimate differences but only identically. But this is a matter for debate in metaphysics.

Regarding the second, two corollaries are deduced. First, that God cannot be defined—since every definition consists of genus and differences, and God is not in a genus. Second, that demonstration cannot be made of him except through an effect—because the principle or middle term of a demonstration is the definition of that about which the demonstration is made. Since, therefore, there is no definition of God, it follows that there is no demonstration of him Concerning the second corollary and its argument, a doubt is raised. For if demonstration cannot be made of God for this reason—that there is no definition of him—it follows that no demonstration can be made of being, nor of substance, nor of any other highest genus. And consequently metaphysics, which treats of being and substance, and mathematics, which treats of quantity, would not be sciences. The inference is clear: because none of these has a definition composed of genus and difference, since none of them has a genus above them.

For the understanding of this, one must consider that we can speak of demonstration a priori in two ways. In one way, of that whose middle term is truly and really the cause of the inherence of the attribute in the subject of which demonstration is made. In another way, of that whose middle term is not truly and really the cause of the attribute, but is only a middle term conceptually—insofar as it expresses a certain character prior in character to the character of what

is taken as the attribute, and is the reason why such an attribute inheres in the subject. The first demonstration requires as its middle term a true definition consisting of genus and difference—because the true cause of a determinate attribute is the quiddity and essence of the thing under a genus, which is signified by a true definition; for attributes of a genus that does not stand under another genus are not really caused from the nature of that genus, since a genus does not have existence except insofar as it is limited to a species by differences. The second demonstration, however, does not require a true definition as its middle term, but it suffices that there be some concept of the intellect prior in some essential order to the attribute, and completely explicating the nature of the subject.

It is therefore said first that of God there can in no way be a demonstration of the first kind—since in God nothing is truly caused. And this is fittingly proved by the fact that God has no definition. It is said second that neither of being nor of the highest genera is there a demonstration of this kind—for the same reason.

It is said third that it does not follow that metaphysics and mathematics are not sciences. For though by the first genus of demonstration nothing can be demonstrated of being and the highest genera, something about them can nevertheless be demonstrated by the second genus of demonstration. For though these do not have a definition, they have, as Saint Thomas says in his commentary on the fifth book of the Metaphysics, a certain simple conception of the intellect that can be called a character.

It is said fourth that neither can there be a demonstration of God in a perfect sense in the second mode—neither as concerns us nor in itself. For we cannot have any concept of the intellect that perfectly explicates the quiddity of God. And in itself there is only one character for God—since all things that are in him, said absolutely, are of his character; and thus it is not necessary to distinguish on the part of reality the character pertaining to God's quiddity and the character pertaining to an attribute—so that one character is demonstrated and the other is the middle term of the demonstration. And therefore Saint Thomas says that demonstration of him cannot be made except through an effect.

Regarding the third point, Saint Thomas removes a certain objection. For someone might say that, although the name 'substance' cannot properly belong to God—since God does not underlie accidents—yet the thing signified by the name belongs to him, and thus he is in the genus of

substance. For substance is a being of itself—which clearly belongs to God, from the fact that it was proved that he is not an accident. But the answer is that 'being of itself' is not in the definition of substance as a genus. For from the fact that 'being' is said, it cannot be a genus—since it has already been proved that being cannot have the character of a genus. Nor from the fact that 'of itself' is said—because this seems to import nothing but a negation: for a thing is called 'a being of itself' from the fact that it is not in another, which is a pure negation. And a pure negation cannot constitute the character of a genus—for then the genus would not say what a thing is, but what it is not. The character of substance must therefore be understood as follows: that a substance is a thing to which it belongs to be not in a subject—the name being imposed from the quiddity, just as the name 'being' is imposed from being—and thus in the character of substance it is understood that it has a quiddity to which it belongs to be not in another, as something distinct from the quiddity. But this does not belong to God—for he does not have a quiddity other than his being. Hence it remains that he is in no way in the genus of substance. And thus it is denied that 'being of itself' is the character of substance, as was assumed. Concerning Saint Thomas's statement that 'being of itself' is not in the definition of substance—it must be known that certain Thomists so understand these words as though he wished to say that being does not fall within the concept of substance as a genus. But this interpretation does not accord with the mind of Saint Thomas. For he does not say absolutely that being is not placed in the definition of substance, but that this whole phrase—'being of itself'—is not in the definition of substance—that is, is not the definition of substance, because from no part of that character could substance have the character of a genus. But its definition or character, according to Avicenna, is this: 'A thing to which it belongs to have being not in another'—according to which character the genus can belong to it, since it expresses a certain positive special mode of being.

Chapter XXVI

That God is not The Formal Being of All Things

By the foregoing, moreover, the error of those who say that God is nothing other than the formal being of each and every thing is refuted. For this being is divided into the being of substance and the being of accident. But the divine being is neither the being of substance nor the being of accident, as has been proved. Therefore, it is impossible that God be that being by which each thing formally exists.

Furthermore, things are not distinguished from one another according to the fact that they have being—for in this all agree. If, therefore, things differ from one another, either being itself must be specified through some added differences—so that for diverse things there is diverse being according to species—or things differ because being itself belongs in a diverse way to diverse natures according to species. But the first of these is impossible: because nothing can be added to being in the manner in which a difference is added to a genus, as has been said. It remains, therefore, that things differ because they have diverse natures, by which being is acquired in different ways. But the divine being does not come to some other nature, but is the nature itself, as has been shown. If, therefore, the divine being were the formal being of all things, all things would simply be one.

Moreover, a principle is naturally prior to that of which it is a principle. But in some things, being has something as its quasi-principle: for form is said to be the principle of existing, and similarly the agent, which makes certain things to be in act. If therefore the divine being were the being of each thing, it would follow that God—who is his own being—has some cause, and thus is not, of himself, necessarily existent—the contrary of which was shown above. Furthermore, what is common to many is not something beyond the many except by reason alone—as 'animal' is not something other than Socrates and Plato and the other animals except in the intellect, which apprehends the form of 'animal' stripped of all individuating and specifying factors; for what truly is is the human being, the horse, and the individual animal. But the divine being, as has been shown, is not common conceptually, as though it were a certain common form—that is, the formal being of all

things. For the divine substance is not such that something other than it, outside it, shares in it. If therefore the divine being were the formal being of all things, and the divine substance is not a common form, it follows that the divine substance is not the formal being of all things, which contradicts the hypothesis. Furthermore, if the divine being were the formal being of all things, since the divine being is uncreated—as was shown earlier—it would follow that the being of no creature is created. But this is false. Moreover, the divine being is completely perfect in goodness and in every perfection. Therefore, if it were the formal being of all things, all things would be equally good and equally perfect. But this is manifestly false. Furthermore, to be related to something as cause is to be naturally distinct from it. But the divine being is the cause of the being of other things, as will be proved later. Therefore, it is really distinct from the being of other things. Therefore, it is not the formal being of all things.

[Ferrara's Commentary]

After showing that there is no composition in God arising from any constituents, Saint Thomas now shows that there is no composition in him with anything else. With regard to this he does two things: first, he shows that God himself is not the formal existence of all things; second, that he is not the form of anything, in the following chapter. As to the first point, he shows that those erred who held that God is the formal existence of all things. Concerning this he does two things: first, he attacks this error; second, he sets forth its foundations and responds to them.

I. As to the first point, he argues first thus. Formal existence is divided through the existence of substance and the existence of accident. But the divine existence is not the existence of substance (namely, that which is a genus) nor of accident, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore, etc.

One should note here that, just as *being* is divided through substance and accident, so too is *to-be* divided through substantial existence by which a thing is said to exist absolutely in nature and accidental existence, by which a thing is said to be such-and-such, for instance white or black. But just as the division of being into substance and accident can be taken in two ways namely, as a division into genera only, and as a division into substance taken both as it is said of the genus of substance and of that substance which is not in a genus, and into the categories of accidents so too can existence be divided in two ways through the substantial and the accidental. But since

substantial existence contains both the existence of substance that is outside a genus and the existence of substance that is in a genus, if a division is made into substantial existence in general and accidental existence, this implicitly also makes a division into the existence of substance that is in a genus and accidental existence. What Saint Thomas says, therefore that formal existence is divided through the existence of substance (namely, that which is a genus, for so it must be understood, since it has only thus far been proved above that God is not the existence of substance, when it was proved that God is not in a genus) and the existence of accident must be understood not of the primary and immediate division of existence, but of the secondary and implicit division, inasmuch as substantial existence comprises both the existence that is in a genus and the existence that is outside a genus. For if God were the formal existence of all things, it would be necessary that he be both the existence of substance that is in a genus and the existence of accident, and not only the existence of substance that is not in a genus.

II. Secondly. It would follow that all things would be simply one. This is impossible. Therefore, etc. The inference is proved as follows. All things would have one existence. For since things are not distinguished insofar as they have existence (because in this all things agree), it is necessary, if they are to differ according to existence, either that existence itself be specified through differences, or that it be received in diverse natures. Not the first, because no difference can be added to being, as has been shown above. Nor the second, if the divine existence is the formal existence of all things, because it is not existence received in a nature, but is the divine nature itself. Therefore all things will have simply one existence.

Concerning that proposition, Things are not distinguished from one another according to the fact that they have existence, it should be considered that it can have a twofold sense. The first is that the formal notion of being is specified, and the sense is: things are not distinguished in this, that they have existence, because all things agree in this, that they have existence. The other is that the proper mode of distinction of that which has existence is excluded, and the sense is: things are not distinguished according to some mode of existing that is, they do not have one and another existence. Just as, if we should say that animals are not distinguished according to the fact that they are animals, the sense could be either that they are not distinguished in the common notion of animal, or that they are not distinguished by the differences of animal, and thus are not diverse animals. The first sense is true in both cases, and this is what Saint Thomas intends. The second sense is false.

III. Thirdly. God has no cause. Therefore he is not the formal existence of all things. The antecedent is clear, because the existence of God is God himself, who has no cause, since nothing is prior to him. The consequence is proved as follows. Existence in certain things has a cause, or something as, so to speak, a principle namely, the form itself, which is the principle of existing, and the agent itself. It should be noted that when existence in things produced by another is said to have something as, so to speak, a principle, the term quasi is not taken comparatively, but as expressing a truth. How agent and form are diverse causes of existing has been stated above.

IV. Fourthly. Then God would not be any existing thing except in the intellect. But the opposite of this has been shown above. Therefore, etc. The inference is proved as follows. That which is common to many is not besides the many except according to reason, as is clear in the case of animal. For if the common animal were something, there would be several animals in Plato: for man is essentially animal and Plato, and thus in Plato there would be the common animal, and the animal that is man, and the animal that is Plato. If, therefore, God is the common formal existence of all things, God will exist only in the intellect.

One should consider here that it is one thing to say, That which is common to many, or universal, is not a being except in the intellect, and another to say, The universal is not anything besides the many except in the intellect. The first is false, and the second is true. For the universal itself is not a being of reason, if it is taken materially and with regard to the thing denominated, but is a real being existing in things: for animal is a real being existing in particular animals. But it is true that abstraction and universality itself belong to it only in the intellect: for the common animal is not found separated from particular animals in the nature of things, but it can indeed be considered by the intellect through abstraction from all particulars. In this way, then, is understood the consequence drawn by Saint Thomas: God would not be any existing thing except that which is in the intellect only that is, God would not be anything existing through itself outside the intellect, distinct and separate from all other things, but would be separate from things only in thought and intellect.

V. Fifthly. God would be the term of generation. But this is false, since he is eternal. Therefore, etc. The inference is proved as follows. Generation, properly speaking, is a path into existence, and corruption a path into non-existence: for form is not the term of generation, nor privation the term of corruption, except because privation makes for non-existence and form for existence. Hence, if

form did not make for existence, it would not be said that the thing which received such a form is generated.

For the understanding of what is said here, one must consider that the composite, and the form, and existence are all terms of generation, but in different ways: the composite is the term as that which is generated first and through itself; the form as the completion of the essence of the thing generated; existence as its ultimate actuality. Because, then, existence is the formal term of generation, not as a completion of essence actuated by another act, but as the ultimate actuality of the thing, which is incapable of further actuation, generation is therefore said to be a path toward existence: for a path properly regards its ultimate term, and takes its determination from it.

2. But concerning this argument two doubts arise. The first is that it does not seem incongruous that the divine existence should be the term of generation. For Christ was truly begotten and is truly a son, and his generation terminates at no other existence than the divine existence, since in him there is but one substantial existence, according to the teaching of Saint Thomas. Therefore the divine existence is the term of generation. The second is that this inference does not seem to hold: God is eternal; therefore he is not the term of generation. For the Son is begotten in the divine persons, and consequently the divine existence is the term of that generation. And yet the Son is eternal.

3. To clarify this, one must consider that Saint Thomas here speaks of that generation which is a change from non-existence to existence, and not of that which is simple production. For it follows, if the divine existence is the formal existence of all things, that it is the term of such generation, since many created things are produced by that generation. He likewise speaks of the term of generation as newly produced by it, in the manner in which the philosophers spoke of the generation of subsisting things, saying that those things are generated which are produced from non-existence into existence, and whose existence previously was not. And it is established that many things of this sort are generated in nature, among them."

VI. Sixthly. Then the existence of any given thing would be from eternity, since the divine existence is eternal. Therefore there would be no generation or corruption. The final inference is proved as follows. For if there is generation, it is necessary that that eternal pre-existing existence be newly acquired either by something already existing, or by something in no way previously existing. If the

first, then the thing that is generated does not receive a new existence, but a new mode of existing, since it already existed, and there is, according to that position, one existence of all things. Therefore it is not generated, but altered. If the second, then it comes to be from nothing, which is repugnant to generation.

2. Concerning what Saint Thomas says that to receive a new mode of existing, but not a new existence, does not constitute generation a doubt arises. For it follows that Christ was not temporally begotten, and consequently is not the son of the Blessed Virgin, the opposite of which Catholics hold. For through the incarnation the divine suppositum does not receive a new existence, but a new mode of existing, or a new relation to human nature, since in Christ there is but one substantial existence. If, then, to receive a new mode of existing does not constitute generation, it follows that Christ is not begotten. If it be said that, although he does not receive a new existence but a new mode of existing, he nevertheless receives a new nature, because he begins to be the suppositum of human nature, and for this reason is said to be begotten this does not hold. For, as Saint Thomas says in the preceding argument, granted that something receives a form, if that form does not make for existence, that thing is not said to be generated.

3. It is said that, since no mention has yet been made of the Trinity of divine Persons, Saint Thomas here speaks of generation as it is taken by the philosophers. Among them, something is said to be generated simply when it begins to subsist in some nature. This, among natural things, occurs when a thing begins to exist simply and receives a new existence. Therefore they say that only that is simply generated which receives a new existence, not that which takes on a new mode of existing. According to them, then, that proposition is true, because they considered only the generation of natural things. And if it be supposed that the divine existence of all things is the formal existence, it will follow that there is no natural generation. Among theologians, however, something begins to be the suppositum of some nature and yet does not begin to exist simply just as the divine suppositum begins to be the *suppositum* of human nature and to subsist in it, and yet does not begin to exist simply, since it has eternal existence. Because, then, Christ begins to subsist in human nature, he is said by theologians to be truly begotten, although he has not received a new existence, but only a certain new relation to human nature, which begins to exist in its own manner through the divine existence. Hence that proposition of Saint Thomas, taken from the mind of the philosophers, is not true except where something receives a new mode of existing, or a new relation, through the fact that it begins to be the *suppositum* of some nature of which it was not previously the *suppositum*. This indeed would be impossible among the philosophers, who consider these

lower things; but among theologians it is true in the case of Christ. For then that too is truly said to be begotten, although it receives no new existence, but only a new mode of existing. As for what Saint Thomas said that if form does not make for existence, the thing receiving the form is not said to be generated this likewise must be understood, according to the theologians, unless the thing receiving such a form begins to be the *suppositum* subsisting in that form; for if it begins to be the *suppositum* of that nature, it will be said to be generated, although it does not have simple existence through such a nature. Among the philosophers, however, it is simply true, because nothing among natural things begins to subsist in some nature unless it has a new existence through that nature.

VII. The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of Scripture, since it places God as exalted above all things, as in Isaiah 6, and as above all things, as in Romans 9. For if he were the existence of all things, he would then not be above all things, but something of all things. It is confirmed, secondly, because the error of the idolaters who imposed the name of God on wood and stone, which is rejected in Wisdom 14, would return. For it could then be truly said, just as it is truly said stone is a being, so too stone is God. One should consider that, just as a being is truly said to be that which has existence as its formal actuality, so God is truly said, as to the mode of signifying, to be that which has divinity as its form. Since, then, the divine existence is the same as divinity, if that were the formal actuality of a stone, it would be truly said that the stone has divinity as its form, and thus is God.

VIII. As to the second point, he adduces four foundations of such a position. The first is that Dionysius, in chapter 4 of *On the Celestial Hierarchy*, says that the existence of all things is the super-substantial divinity. But Saint Thomas says two things. First, that from this it cannot be had that divinity is the formal existence of all things; rather, the opposite is held, since it says that divinity is above all things which is also shown from what is found in Chapter 2 of *On the Divine Names*. He says, secondly, that it is understood in the sense that divinity is the existence of all things because a certain likeness of the divine existence is found in all things from God.

For the understanding of this solution, one must consider that, since the existence of each thing, as Saint Thomas says in the Summa Theologica First Part, Question 105, Article 5, is most intimate to the thing, inasmuch as it is the actuality of all that is in the thing, it must belong to the thing's nature as the actuality of the whole nature and of all its parts. And thus it cannot be something altogether exceeding the nature of that of which it is the existence: for human existence is limited to the nature of man, and the existence of a horse to the nature of a horse. Hence, if the divine

existence altogether exceeds the nature of any given thing, and its nature is set above the natures of all things, as Dionysius held, it follows that it is not the formal existence of things.

IX. The second is that the aforesaid men supposed that the divine existence, to which no addition is made, is not something proper, but the common existence of all things, because that which is common is specified or individuated by addition. But Saint Thomas says that the divine existence is without addition not only in thought, but also in the nature of things. And it lacks not only addition, but also the receptivity of addition. That which is common, or universal, however, cannot exist without addition, but is considered without addition; it is not, however, considered without the receptivity of addition, as is also clear of *animal*: for if no difference could be added to it, it would not be a genus. Hence the reasoning seems rather to lead to the opposite conclusion, as also appears from the Commentator on the *Book of Causes*.

Note that the divine existence cannot have the notion of common existence by the commonness of a universal predicable, but indeed it is common existence by the commonness of an exemplary form, since every existence is a certain likeness of it.

Note also that a twofold difference is posited here between common existence and divine existence. Although they agree in this, that nothing is added to them for nothing is added to the divine existence, since all things in God are the very existence itself; and likewise common existence has nothing, as such, by which it is limited they nevertheless differ, first, because the divine existence exists in the nature of things, separated from every other thing, without any addition; whereas universal existence, like other universals, cannot exist without an addition that limits and contracts it. Secondly, because the divine existence not only lacks addition, but cannot even receive addition, since it cannot be received in another; whereas common existence can receive addition not, indeed, essential difference, as has been shown above, but material addition: for it is limited by the natures in which it is received. It should be noted also that not only does the divine existence not receive the addition of something contracting and particularizing it, but neither does it receive the addition of something distinct from itself that supervenes upon it. The substantial existence of all other things, however, receives the addition of a supervening accident, since there is no created substance that is entirely stripped of accidents and accidental existence. For this reason it is rightly said here that the divine existence is distinguished from all other things because nothing can be added to it.

X. The third is that God is of infinite simplicity. From this they supposed that what is found at the ultimate point of resolution must be God, as though it were the simplest thing. But Saint Thomas says that they did not attend to the fact that the simplest thing in us is not so much a complete thing as something belonging to a thing. To God, however, simplicity is attributed as to some subsisting thing.

Note that the response rests on this: that the simplest thing in us, to which the resolution is made, need not be God, because that simplest thing which is in us is not so much a complete thing as something belonging to a thing. God, however, is the simplest thing, and is not something belonging to a thing. We can interpret these words in two ways: The simplest thing in us is not so much a complete thing as something belonging to a thing. First, so that one is excluded and the other affirmed, such that the sense is: it is not a complete thing, but rather something belonging to a thing just as if we should say, Socrates is not so much white as pale, that is, he is not white, but rather pale. Second, so that both are affirmed: namely, that it is both a complete thing and something belonging to a thing. But then complete must be taken not simply, but within a genus. For the actual existence of a thing is complete within the genus of acts, since it is the ultimate actuality, incapable of being actuated by another act; yet it is not a thing perfectly subsisting, but something belonging to a thing, by which the thing itself subsists. Both interpretations, then, can be true. But the first seems more intended, since existence is not a thing simply perfect, according to the first interpretation; yet it is perfect within a genus, according to the second.

XI. The fourth is the manner of speaking by which we say that God is in all things. But Saint Thomas says that God is not in things as something of the thing, but as the cause of the thing, which in no way is lacking to its effect, and that we do not say in the same way that the form is in the body and that the sailor is in the ship. It should be noted that Saint Thomas does not say that the form is not similarly in the body and the sailor in the ship as though he meant that God is in things merely as the sailor is in the ship for this is contrary to what he said, namely that God is in things as a cause that in no way is lacking to its effect, because, that is, he always preserves it as long as the thing exists; whereas the sailor is not the cause of the ship, and indeed is sometimes absent from it. Rather, he meant to show that there are many modes of being in something, and therefore it does not follow, God is in all things; therefore he is the formal existence of all things, just as it does not follow, The sailor is in the ship; therefore he is the form of the ship.

Chapter 27

That God Is Not the Form of Any Body

It having been shown that God is not the existence of all things, it can likewise be shown that God is not the form of any thing. For the divine existence cannot be the existence of any quiddity that is not itself to-be, as has been shown. But that which is the divine existence itself is nothing other than God. It is therefore impossible that God should be the form of anything else. Moreover. The form of a body is not itself to-be, but the principle of existing. But God is to-be itself. God, therefore, is not the form of a body. Again. From the union of form and matter there results something composite, which is a whole with respect to matter and form. But parts are in potency with respect to the whole. In God, however, there is no potentiality. It is therefore impossible that God should be a form united to anything. Besides. That which exists through itself is more noble than that which has existence in another. But every form of a body has existence in another. Since, then, God is the most noble being, as the first cause of existing, he cannot be the form of anything.

Furthermore. The same can be shown from the eternity of motion, thus. If God is the form of something movable, since he himself is the first mover, the composite will be a self-moving thing. But a self-moving thing can be moved and not moved. Both, therefore, are in it. But that which is of this sort does not have the indeficiency of motion from itself. It is necessary, therefore, to posit above the self-mover another first mover, which bestows on it the perpetuity of motion. And thus God, who is the first mover, is not the form of a self-moving body. This argument is useful to those who posit the eternity of motion. If this is not posited, the same conclusion can be reached from the regularity of the motion of the heavens. For just as a self-mover can be at rest and in motion, so too it can move more quickly and more slowly. The necessity, therefore, of the uniformity of the motion of the heavens depends on some superior principle that is altogether immobile, which is not part of the body that moves itself, as some form of it. The authority of Scripture agrees with this truth. For it is said in the Psalm: Thy magnificence is exalted above the heavens, O God. And in Job 11: He is higher than heaven, and what wilt thou do? He is deeper than hell, and how wilt thou know it? The measure of him is longer than the earth, and broader than

the sea. Thus, then, is dissolved the error of the gentiles who said that God is the soul of the heavens, or even the soul of the whole world. And from this error they defended idolatry, saying that the whole world is God not by reason of body, but by reason of soul, just as a man is said to be wise not by reason of body but of soul. Granting this, they supposed it followed that worship was not owed to the world and its parts; the Commentator likewise says, in *Metaphysics* XI, that this passage was the lapse of the wise men of the nation of the Sabians, that is, the idolaters because they held God to be the form of the heavens.

[Ferrara's Commentary on Chapter Twenty-Seven]

Just as it has been shown that God is not the formal existence of all things, so it is shown in this chapter that he is the form of nothing. I. It is proved, first. The divine existence cannot be the act of any other quiddity distinct from itself. But God is the divine existence itself. Therefore, etc. Concerning this proposition, The divine existence cannot be the act of any other quiddity, a doubt arises. For in Christ human nature exists through the divine existence. Therefore the divine existence is its act, since to be the act of something's existing is nothing other than for that thing to exist through such actuality. Therefore the divine existence is the act of some nature and quiddity distinct from itself. The response, admitting the assumption, is that the divine existence is not the act of human nature: for it is not united to it formally as the act of a potency. Nor is it said to exist through the divine existence as though existing belonged to it first; for existing does not belong primarily to a nature, but to a suppositum; rather, it is said to exist through the divine existence because it is really united to the existing suppositum formally through the divine existence. Hence the consequence is denied. To the proof, it is said that the assumption is true if through such actuality that thing exists primarily and through itself but not if it exists as drawn into the unity of a *suppositum*. It is further said, for the understanding of Saint Thomas's proposition, that he does not take quiddity for nature as distinguished from a *suppositum*, but indifferently for every entity. The sense, then, is that the divine existence cannot be the formal act of any entity really distinct from itself.

It is said, thirdly, that according to Hervaeus and others who hold it to be the mind of Saint Thomas that there is not in Christ only one existence except when speaking of personal and *suppositum* existence, the assumption is false: for human nature in Christ does not exist through the divine existence, but through its own proper existence.

II. Secondly. The form of a body is not existence, but the principle of existing. God, however, is existence. Therefore, etc.

Thirdly. Any given part is compared to the composite whole as potency to act. In God, however, there is no potentiality. Therefore, etc. Note that, although form in relation to matter is act, nevertheless, because the whole has the character of form in comparison to the parts as is said in *Physics* II and *Metaphysics* V, since the parts are the matter of the whole form itself too, in comparison to the whole, has the mode of potency. For this reason it is rightly said here that a part is compared to the whole as potency to act.

Fourthly. God is the most noble being, as the first cause of existing. Therefore, etc. The inference is proved as follows. That which exists through itself is more noble than that which has existence in another. But every form of a body has existence in another. Therefore, etc.

Fifthly. Then the composite of God and body would be a self-mover, since God is the first mover. But a self-mover can be moved and not moved. Such a thing does not have the indeficiency of motion from itself. It is necessary, therefore, that above it there be another first mover, which bestows perpetuity of motion. And thus there would be some mover prior to God. Saint Thomas adds that the process of this argument is useful to those who posit the eternity of motion; but even without positing this, the same conclusion can also be reached from the regularity of the motion of the heavens. For the uniformity of motion requires that there be some mover altogether immobile, which is not part of a self-mover, since a self-mover, just as it has in itself to be moved and not moved, so too has to be moved more quickly and more slowly.

III. It is confirmed also by the authority of the Psalm, Thy magnificence is exalted etc., and Job 11, He is higher than heaven, etc. Likewise, the error of the idolatrous gentiles is excluded, who held that God is the soul of the heavens, or even of the whole world, and that for this reason divine worship was owed to the parts of the world, as themselves having God as their form. Of this error Averroes makes mention in *Metaphysics* XI, comment 41, saying that this passage was the lapse of the wise men of the nation of the Sabians; and Augustine, in Book IV of *The City of God*, chapter 31, and in Book VII, chapter 6.

Chapter 28

On Divine Perfection

Although those things that are and live are more perfect than those that only are, God, nevertheless, who is nothing other than his own existence, is universally a perfect being. And I say *universally perfect* in the sense that no nobility of any genus whatsoever is lacking to him.

For every nobility of any given thing belongs to it according to its existence: for no nobility would belong to man from his wisdom unless through it he were wise, and so for the rest. Thus, then, according to the mode in which a thing has existence, is its mode in nobility: for a thing, according as its existence is contracted to some special mode of nobility, greater or lesser, is said in this respect to be more or less noble. If, therefore, there is something to which the whole power of existing belongs, no nobility that belongs to any thing whatsoever can be lacking to it. But to that which is its own existence belongs existence according to the whole power of existing itself: just as, if there were some separate whiteness, nothing of the power of whiteness could be lacking to it for a white thing lacks something of the power of whiteness from a defect of the recipient, which receives whiteness according to its own mode, and perhaps not according to the whole capacity of whiteness. God, therefore, who is his own existence, as has been proved above, has existence according to the whole power of existence itself. He cannot, therefore, lack any nobility that belongs to any given thing.

But just as every nobility and perfection is in a thing according as it is, so every defect is in it according as it in some way is not. But God, just as he has existence totally, so too is non-existence totally absent from him; for in the manner by which a thing has some existence, it falls short of non-existence. From God, therefore, every defect is absent. He is, therefore, universally perfect. But those things that only are, are not imperfect on account of an imperfection of absolute existence itself; for they do not have existence according to its whole capacity, but participate in existence through a certain particular and most imperfect

mode. Again. Every imperfect thing must be preceded by something perfect: for seed comes from an animal or from a plant. Therefore the first being must be most perfect. But it has been shown that God is the first being. He is, therefore, most perfect. Moreover. Each thing is perfect insofar as it is in act; imperfect, however, insofar as it is in potency with the privation of act. That which is in no way in potency, then, but is pure act, must be most perfect. But such is God. He is, therefore, most perfect.

Moreover. Nothing acts except insofar as it is in act. Action, therefore, follows the mode of act in the agent. It is impossible, therefore, that the effect which is brought forth through an action should be in a more noble act than is the act of the agent; it is possible, however, that the act of the effect should be more imperfect than the act of the causing agent, because the action can be weakened on the part of that in which it terminates. But in the genus of efficient cause there is a reduction to one cause which, as is clear from what has been said, is that from which are all things, as will be shown in what follows. It is fitting, then, that whatever is in act in any other thing whatsoever be found in God much more eminently than it is in that thing, and not the reverse. God is, therefore, most perfect.

Again. In each genus there is something most perfect in that genus, to which all the things that are of that genus are measured, since from it each thing is shown to be more or less perfect, according as it approaches more or less to the measure of its own genus just as white is said to be the measure among all colors, and the virtuous man among all men. But that which is the measure of all beings can be nothing other than God, who is his own existence. To him, therefore, no perfection that may belong to any things can be lacking, otherwise he would not be the common measure of all things.

Hence it is that, when Moses sought to see the divine face or glory, the answer was given him by the Lord, I will show thee all good, as is found in Exodus 33, thereby giving him to understand that the fullness of all goodness is in himself. Dionysius likewise, in Chapter 5 of *On the Divine Names*, says: God does not exist in some particular way, but has taken to and accepted in himself, simply and without limitation, the whole of existence.

It should be known, however, that perfection cannot be fittingly attributed to God if the signification of the name be considered as to its origin: for that which has not been made does not seem able to be called perfect. But because everything that comes to be is brought from potency into act and from non-existence into existence when it is made, it is then rightly said to be perfect, as it were totally made, when potency has been totally reduced to act, such that it retains nothing of non-existence, but has complete existence. Through a certain extension of the name, therefore, that is called perfect not only which, in coming to be, attains to complete act, but also that which is in complete act without any making. And thus we say that God is perfect, according to that saying of Matthew 5: Be ye perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect.

[Ferrara's Commentary]

After Saint Thomas determined concerning the divine simplicity, from which it can be had what God is, so far as he can be known by us, he now begins to determine concerning the divine perfection, through which it is shown what manner of being he is. With regard to this he does two things: first, he determines concerning perfection absolutely; second, concerning particular perfections, in chapter 37. As to the first point, he does three things: first, he determines concerning the divine perfection; second, concerning the likeness of the creature to God, which results from such perfection, in the following chapter; third, concerning the terms by which the diverse divine perfections are signified, in chapter 30. As to the first point, he does two things: first, he proves that God is universally perfect; second, he excludes a certain doubt.

I. He proposes, then, first the conclusion, saying that, although those things that are and live are more perfect than those that only are, God nevertheless, who is existence itself, is universally a perfect being that is, no nobility of any genus whatsoever is lacking to him. For the understanding of what is said here, before the conclusion is proved, one must consider, first, that existence, according to its common notion, contains under itself diverse degrees and perfections of being just as whiteness contains diverse degrees of whiteness, which follow one another in a certain order, such that the second cannot exist without the first,

nor the third without the second and the first, and so for the rest. This containment, however, is the containment of form and act, not of potency, since the existence of all acts is actuality. Such things, when considered as certain common forms and acts, would, if they existed through themselves, have their whole degree and the whole of their perfection; but if they are received in something else, they take on limitation according to the condition of the recipient, and do not have all the degrees of their perfection in one thing just as whiteness, if it were separated from every subject, would have the whole perfection of whiteness, as Saint Thomas teaches in the first argument, as will be declared there immediately; but when received in a subject, it is more perfect or more imperfect according to the disposition of the subject. Nevertheless, whatever has a later degree of whiteness also has the earlier.

2. One must consider, secondly, from the teaching of Saint Thomas in the *First Part*, question 4, article 2, reply to the third, and *De Veritate*, question 20, article 2, reply to the third, that *to be* and *to live* can be considered in two ways: in one way, such that to live includes *to be* and adds something to it; in another way, such that they are distinguished according to reason by abstraction of one from the other, taking, that is, *to be* by itself and precisely, and *to live* by itself precisely namely, with regard to that which it adds to *to be*. Just as the sensitive and the intellective can be considered insofar as the intellective includes the sensitive and adds to it intellectuality, so too the sensitive can be considered by itself, and the intellective precisely with regard to the intellectuality which it adds to the sensitive.

If they are taken in the first way, to live is more perfect than to be. But this does not belong to it as both are signified in the abstract, but only as they are signified in the concrete. For, as to be is signified in the abstract, it cannot be taken as something contained and limited and exceeded by the degree of life, since it is signified as a form and actuality containing every perfection of being just as whiteness signified in the abstract is taken as unlimited and containing the whole perfection of whiteness, and thus as more perfect than itself as it is limited in some subject. In the concrete, however, as existence is signified by this name being, and life by this name living thing, existence is contained in the living thing itself, because then existence is not taken as something unlimited and containing the whole perfection of being, but as denoting the lowest degree of being, which is contained in life as

the imperfect is contained in the perfect. If, however, they are taken in the second way, then existence is more perfect than life, because existence includes every perfection of being, and consequently the degree of life, whereas life denotes precisely the very degree of being which is to live. And it is in this way that they are signified in the abstract.

Thus, then, the living thing is more perfect than the being that only is, because the living thing contains in itself the degree of being which is to live, and the degree of being simply; whereas being contains only that lowest degree of being, which is to exist. But existence itself, separated from every recipient and subsisting, is not limited to some degree of being, but has in itself every perfection of being. For this reason Saint Thomas rightly says, from the mind of Dionysius, in chapter 5 of *On the Divine Names*, that those things which are and live are more perfect than those that only are that is, than those which have only this degree of being, which is to exist; existence itself, however, which is God, is a being universally perfect, that is, it has every perfection of being.

Saint Thomas proves this conclusion first thus. God is subsisting existence itself. Therefore he has in himself the nobility and perfection of each and every thing. The antecedent has been proved above. The consequence is proved by supposing that the nobility of each thing belongs to it according to existence: for no nobility would belong to man through his wisdom unless through it he were wise, and so for the rest. From this it follows that according to the mode in which a thing has existence is the mode of its nobility taken: for from the fact that the existence of a thing is contracted to a greater or lesser degree of nobility, the thing is said to be more or less noble. Then the argument runs thus. According to the mode in which a thing has existence, it has its nobility. Therefore that which has the whole power of existing has every nobility. But subsisting existence has the whole power and capacity of existing. Therefore it has every nobility. The minor is proved by the example of whiteness: for although some degree of whiteness can be lacking to that which has whiteness, owing to a defect of the recipient, which perhaps does not receive the whole capacity of whiteness, yet if whiteness were separated from every subject, nothing of the power of whiteness could be lacking to it. So, therefore, will it be with existence separated from every recipient nothing of the perfection and power of existing can be lacking to it. From this argument he draws a certain confirmation of the conclusion. According to the

mode in which a thing has existence, it falls short of non-existence. Therefore that which has all existence has all non-existence removed from it. Therefore from it every defect is removed. Therefore it is universally perfect. Therefore God, who has all existence, is universally perfect.

Finally, he removes a doubt. For those things that only are, are imperfect. Therefore existence is imperfect. If, then, God is existence itself, it follows that he is something imperfect. The response is that such things are imperfect not on account of an imperfection of existence absolutely that is, because they have absolute and unlimited existence itself, as the doubt supposes but because they participate in existence according to the most imperfect degree, which is merely to exist.

III. Concerning that proposition, The nobility of each thing belongs to it according to its own existence, one must consider that it is not the mind of Saint Thomas that the imperfect degree of being which is merely to exist, or even the existence of any given form considered as it were cut off from the form, is itself the nobility of the thing; rather, his mind is that, since the perfection and nobility of each thing comes from form because it belongs to form to perfect nobility and perfection do not come from form as it is understood separately from the thing according to existence, but as it is united to the thing according to its existence. For nothing is properly the form and perfection of something except insofar as it gives existence to it: for wisdom would not be the form of man unless it gave him to be wise, in the manner in which it belongs to a form to give existence. The nobility of each thing, therefore, belongs to it according to its own existence that is, according to the form as united to it according to existence, and as making the thing to be such.

2. Concerning the example of whiteness, it should be noted that we can consider a twofold perfection in whiteness: one, namely, essential and specific, which is signified through the definition; the other, gradual, according to the diverse degrees of existence which whiteness can naturally have according as it is diversely participated by a subject, or even as it is separated from a subject. If we speak of the first perfection, separated whiteness is not more perfect than whiteness existing in a subject, nor is it more perfect in one subject than in another, since the essence of a thing consists in something indivisible. But if we speak of the

second, then separated whiteness can be more perfect than whiteness in a subject, and more perfect in one subject than in another: for, separated, nothing of the power of whiteness that is, of the perfection and being of whiteness can be lacking to it, because it is determined to no degree; and in one subject it can have a more perfect degree than in another. What Saint Thomas says that it happens from a defect of the recipient that some degree of the power of whiteness is lacking to it, because it perhaps does not receive it according to the whole capacity of whiteness he therefore states tentatively, because it makes no difference to the point at hand whether some subject can receive whiteness according to the whole capacity of whiteness or not. However it may be, nothing of the power of whiteness can be lacking to separated whiteness, because it is not limited; whereas something can be lacking to some white thing on account of its own indisposition. But what is the truth of the matter? Saint Thomas holds, in *Sentences Book III*, distinction 13, question 1, article 2, that a form existing in a subject is of necessity limited as to the existence owed to that form, because it does not have the whole existence that is possible to its nature; yet it is possible that it have that form according to every aspect of that form, such that nothing is lacking to it pertaining to the perfection of that form. The first I understand thus: since existence separated from every subject is a more perfect mode of existing absolutely than any existence in a subject, no existence in a subject can virtually contain that abstract existence and be equal to it, since the more imperfect cannot equal nor virtually contain the more perfect. But abstract and wholly unreceived existence, as the most perfect, virtually contains every existence in a subject, and equals all such existences. Therefore the form existing in a subject is limited as to existence, and does not have the whole existence of the form by way of equation and virtual containment, as having the most perfect and unlimited existence. The second I understand thus: there are certain accidental forms having various perfections and completions, according as they can be extended to various effects, as is the case with grace. And such forms can be had by some subject according to every degree of perfection that is, according as they can extend to all their effects, although not according to the whole of their existence: just as Christ had in himself every completion of the perfection of grace.

IV. Concerning that proposition, From God non-existence is totally removed, it should be noted that this is not said as though all existence belongs formally and distinctly to God,

and every non-existence is removed from him formally. For this is false. For God does not formally have the existence of man or of a horse or of other material things; otherwise he would be man and horse and all material things formally. But he has every existence eminently, with respect to every perfection of theirs, and virtually. And in this way no non-existence belongs to him. For it is not true to say that God is not man or horse or whatever else is material, virtually and by a certain eminence, as uniting in himself, and containing in an indivisible way, whatever in them is divided although it is true that he is not formally man or horse.

V. Secondly. Every imperfect thing proceeds from some perfect thing: just as seed comes from an animal or from a plant. Therefore the first being must be most perfect.

Thirdly. God is in no way potency. Therefore he is not imperfect. The inference is proved as follows. Each thing is perfect according as it is in act; imperfect, however, according as it is in potency with the privation of act. Note here that imperfection does not belong to potency except by reason of an attached privation: for privation is itself a certain imperfection, just as form is a perfection. For this reason Saint Thomas says that a thing is imperfect according as it is in potency with the privation of act.

Fourthly. God is the first efficient cause. Therefore whatever is in act in any given thing is in God, and much more eminently than in that thing. Therefore he is most perfect. The first inference is proved as follows. Action follows the mode of act in the agent, since nothing acts except according as it is in act. Therefore what is in the effect must be found in the cause. Saint Thomas notes, moreover, that it is impossible that, through the action of an agent, existence be brought forth in a more noble act than is the act of the agent, since action follows the mode of act in the agent. But it is indeed possible that the act of the effect be more imperfect than the act of the agent, owing to the indisposition of the matter, by which the action itself is weakened. Here it should be noted that, since both agent and patient concur in transient action, it can happen, through a defect of either, that the effect be weak and imperfect either, namely, through weakness of the power of the agent, or through indisposition of the patient. But if the agent be weak, however disposed the patient may be to receive, an effect having a more noble act than the agent will nevertheless never be

produced, because action and effect follow the mode of the form of the principal agent. But if the power of the agent be strong, while the recipient is indisposed, the perfection of the effect will be impeded notwithstanding the strength of the power, because the agent cannot introduce the act into the patient except in the manner in which the patient is fit to receive it. How the effect, however, is in the active cause in a more noble manner than in itself has been shown above.

Fifthly. If he were not universally perfect, he would not be the common measure of all things. But this is false, since nothing can be the measure of all beings except that which is existence itself. The inference is proved as follows: in each genus all things are measured by the most perfect thing of that genus, since each thing is shown to be more or less perfect according as it approaches more or less to that thing: thus white is the measure among colors, and the virtuous man among all men, namely according as they are placed in the moral genus. It should be noted here, as Saint Thomas says in *De Veritate*, question 2, article 4, reply to the fourth, that whiteness is not the measure of colors except by reason of light, which is, as it were, the formal element in color: for with respect to this it exceeds all other colors. But with respect to what is, as it were, the material element in color namely, the termination of the diaphanous it is not the measure of the other colors.

The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of Exodus 33, I will show thee etc., and of Dionysius, in chapter 5 of *On the Divine Names*, where he says, God does not exist in some particular way, etc.

VI. As to the second point, because someone might suppose that God is not perfect, since *perfect* seems to be said of that which through making attains to completion, and God cannot be made. Saint Thomas removes this cavil, saying that, although as to the first imposition of the name, every perfect thing is made, since this name was first imposed to signify that which has been brought from non-existence to existence and from potency to act so as to be perfect, lacking nothing to it, and such a thing must indeed have been made; nevertheless the name has also been extended to signify that which is in complete act, even if it does not, by coming to be, arrive at that act. According to the first imposition of this

name, then, God cannot be said to be perfect; but indeed according to the second, according to that saying of Matthew 5, Be ye perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect.

Chapter Twenty-Nine

On the Likeness of Creatures

From this it can be considered how a likeness to God can or cannot be found in things. For effects falling short of their causes do not agree with them in name and notion, yet some likeness between them must necessarily be found: for it belongs to the nature of action that an agent produce something like itself, since each thing acts according as it is in act. Hence the form of the effect is indeed found in some manner in the exceeding cause, but according to another mode and another notion, by reason of which the cause is called equivocal. The sun, for instance, causes heat in lower bodies by acting according as it is in act; hence the heat generated by the sun must obtain a certain likeness to the active power of the sun, through which heat is caused in these lower things by reason of which the sun is called hot, although not according to one and the same notion. And thus the sun is said to be somewhat like all those things in which it efficaciously induces its effects, from all of which, in turn, it is also dissimilar, inasmuch as such effects do not possess heat and the like in the same way as it is found in the sun. So too God bestows all perfections upon things, and on this account has both likeness and unlikeness with all things at once.

And hence it is that Sacred Scripture sometimes recalls a likeness between him and the creature, as when it is said in Genesis 1, Let us make man to our image and likeness and sometimes likeness is denied, according to that saying of Isaiah 40, To whom then have you likened God, or what image will you make of him? and in the Psalm, God, who is like to thee?

Dionysius agrees with this reasoning, who in chapter 9 of *On the Divine Names* says: The same things are both like and unlike to God: like, indeed, according to an imitation of him who is not perfectly imitable, in the manner in which it happens to belong to them; unlike, however, according as caused things have less than their causes. According to this likeness, however, the creature is more fittingly said to be like God than the converse. For a thing is said to be like another when it possesses that other's quality or form. Since, then, that which

in God exists perfectly is found in other things through a certain deficient participation, that with respect to which the likeness is observed belongs simply to God, and not to the creature. And thus the creature has what belongs to God; hence it is rightly said to be like God. It cannot, however, be likewise said that God has what belongs to the creature. Hence it is not fittingly said that God is like the creature just as we do not say that a man is like his image, although his image is rightly said to be like him.

Much less properly is it said that God is likened to the creature. For *assimilation* implies a movement toward likeness, and thus belongs to that which receives from another the property of being like it. The creature, however, receives from God that by which it is like him; not, however, the converse. God, therefore, is not likened to the creature, but rather the reverse.

[Ferrara's Commentary]

Because it has been shown that the nobilities and perfections of all things are in God, Saint Thomas consequently shows how, from this, there can be likeness or unlikeness between God and the creature. With regard to this he does two things: first, he shows the proposition as to the thing itself; second, as to the denomination.

I. As to the first point, this conclusion is set forth: God has both likeness and unlikeness with all things. The first part is proved, because he is the agent of all things and bestows all perfections. But every agent acts something like itself, since each thing acts according as it is in act that is, according as it actually has that which it causes in the effect.

The second part is proved, because the perfections which are in God are not in creatures according to the same mode and according to the same notion by which they are in God: for effects falling short of their causes do not agree with them in name and notion. This, however, imports a certain unlikeness. It is confirmed by the authority of Sacred Scripture. For sometimes it states that there is a likeness between God and the creature, as in Genesis 1, Let us make man, etc.; sometimes, however, it posits an unlikeness, as in Isaiah 40, To whom then have you likened, etc., and in the

Psalm, *O God, who is like to thee?* Dionysius too, in chapter 9 of *On the Divine Names*, posits both parts.

II. For the clarification of the second part of the conclusion, he notes that, although the form of the effect is found in some manner in the exceeding cause, this is nevertheless according to another mode and another notion for which reason it is called an equivocal cause. For the heat generated by the sun in these lower things obtains a certain likeness to the active power of the sun, through which it is caused, by reason of which the sun is called hot, although not according to one notion: hence the sun is in some manner like the things produced by it, and in some manner unlike them. Likewise God too has both likeness and unlikeness with the things produced by him. It should be noted here too that, just as in predications equivocal things are said to be those whose name is the same but the notion of the substance diverse, so a cause is said to be equivocal when the name of the produced form belongs both to the cause and to the effect, but according to one notion and another. Thus we say that the sun is the equivocal cause of the hot: because the name of heat belongs both to the sun and to its effect, for the sun is called hot and the air is called hot, but this is so according to diverse notions; for the sun is called hot, not because it has in itself the same form according to the same specific notion by which the air is hot, but because it has in itself an active power in which heat is virtually contained, which is of a far more worthy nature than the form by which the air is called hot. And it is similar in other cases, and especially in God, in whom the form agrees neither in species nor in genus with the effects produced by him, but only according to a certain analogy, as is said in the First Part, question 4, article 3. Hence he is not an altogether equivocal cause, but rather an analogous one, as is said in Book I of the Sentences, distinction 2, article 2.

III. As to the second point, this conclusion is set forth: according to this likeness, it is more fittingly said that the creature is like God than the converse. It is proved as follows. A thing is said to be like another which possesses that other's quality or form. But the creature possesses the form of God, not God the form of the creature, since the form is found perfectly in God, but in the creature according to a certain deficient participation. Therefore the creature is said to be like God, but God is not said to be like the creature.

It should be noted, as is said in Book I of the Sentences, distinction 19, question 1, article 2, that a form is properly said to belong to that which has it perfectly and completely: it is not said to belong to that which has it imperfectly and according to a certain imitation. For this reason, when each of

the things between which there is likeness has the form according to the same specific notion, the one is said to be like the other and conversely: because that form is properly the form of both, since both have it perfectly, and thus each is said to have the form of the other, in which the notion of mutual likeness consists. But when the form is in one perfectly and completely, and in the other imperfectly and according to a certain imitation, that which has it imperfectly is said to have the form of the other, and to be like it, but not the converse. And because every perfection communicated by God to creatures is in God in a perfect mode, on account of which its form is properly said to be his, but in the creature it is imperfectly and according to a certain deficient participation; therefore the creature has the form of God and is like to him, but not God to the creature.

But it should be noted that it is one thing to say that a created thing has perfectly and completely some form which is a participated likeness of the divine perfection, and another to say that a created thing has perfectly and completely the form by which God acts in creatures. The first is indeed true in many cases: for fire perfectly has the essence of fire, and man the essence of humanity, which are certain participated likenesses of the divine goodness, and these are properly the forms of fire and of man. The second, however, is false and impossible. For the form by which God acts, and which he in some manner communicates to creatures, is the divine essence and the divine goodness, which is found to be perfectly and completely only in God, although some participation of it may be found in creatures. For this reason Saint Thomas rightly says that the creature possesses the form of God, but God does not possess the form of the creature: because, namely, every perfection of a creature is a certain participation of the divine goodness, which is properly the form of God; whereas the perfection and form of God is not in the creature as its form, since it is not had by the creature perfectly, but through a certain participation of it.

From the aforesaid conclusion Saint Thomas infers as a corollary that it is much less properly said that God is likened to the creature. It is proved, because assimilation implies a movement toward likeness, and thus belongs to that which receives from another the property of being like it. The creature, however, receives from God, but not God from the creature. Therefore the creature is likened to God, but not the converse.

IV. But concerning the things that have been said, a doubt arises. For equality and likeness are relations of equiparance: for the equal is said to be equal to its equal, and the like to be like its like.

If, then, the creature is said to be like God, God too will be said to be like the creature. And if the creature is likened to God, God too will be likened to the creature.

For the clarification of this doubt, one must consider that it would not suffice for the intention of Saint Thomas to say that the creature is therefore said to be like God, and not God like the creature, because in the creature there is a real relation, which is called likeness, whereas in God there is not such a real relation, but only one of reason: for in the same way no name importing a relation of God to creature would be fittingly said of God, since no relation of God to creature is real, but every one is a relation of reason. For this reason he himself, in the First Part, question 4, article 3, reply to the fourth, and in Book I of the Sentence, in the place cited above, assigns, from the reasoning of Dionysius in chapter 9 of *On the Divine Names*, that mutual likeness is received in those things, namely, which are of one order, but not in cause and caused. Saint Thomas interprets to be of one order, in Book I of the Sentences and in the Quaestiones de Veritate, question 23, article 7, reply to the eleventh, as meaning that, just as the one has the form of the one, so the other has the form of the other; this occurs, however, when the form according to which likeness is observed exists according to the same notion in each of the extremes, as whiteness in two men for in these the extremes are said to be mutually like. In cause and caused, however, he interprets, in the places cited above, that mutual likeness is not received when the caused does not receive the form of the cause according to the same notion, but comes to be in imitation of the form of the cause: just as a statue of Hercules comes to be in imitation of Hercules for which reason we say that the statue of Hercules is like Hercules, because it was made in imitation of him and has his form; but we do not say that Hercules is like his statue. For this reason, therefore, the creature is like God but not the converse, because they stand as cause and caused, the caused not receiving the form of the cause according to the same notion, but according to a certain imitation; from which it follows that the creature has the form which belongs to God, but God does not have the form which belongs to the creature. Hence it appears that Dionysius, in that place, is not speaking universally of cause and caused, but of this cause which is God, and of the things caused which are his creatures, which cannot have equality with God. This is established from the words of Dionysius himself. For after he said, In cause and caused we shall by no means admit a reciprocal conversion, he immediately adds: For it is not given to these alone or to those to be alike, but to all that admit of likeness, God is the author of their being alike.

To the doubt, then, it is granted that likeness is a relation of equiparance; but the consequence is denied namely, that if the creature is said to be like God, God too is therefore said to be like the

creature. For likeness is not said to be a relation of equiparance because both extremes are relatively denominated by the same name; rather, it is because, as such, the like is not said in relation to something that either is superior or is subjected, but in relation to an equal. And if that to which something is said to be like is referred by a mutual relation to it, it will be referred by the same name: for the like is said to be like its like, namely when each extreme is denominated in respect to the other. Nevertheless it can happen that sometimes each extreme is not denominated in respect to the other, which is when the form is not found in each extreme according to the same notion. This response Saint Thomas seems to intend in De Veritate, in the place cited above, where he says that likeness and conformity, although they are relations of equiparance, do not always have each of the extremes denominated in respect to the other, but only when the form according to which the likeness or conformity is observed exists in each extreme according to the same notion.

2. It should be noted, nevertheless, that, although according to the proper and customary usage of the term we do not say that God is like the creature, or Hercules like his image, because such things are not accustomed to be denominated in respect to those things which come to be in imitation of them, yet if one wished to extend the signification of the term, such that the denomination should be made with respect to the relation understood in God as terminating the relation of the other extreme such that God should be said to be like the creature because he terminates the creature's relation and likeness to himself I would not consider this incongruous. For which reason Saint Thomas does not say here that God can in no way be said to be like the creature, but that it is more fittingly said that the creature is like God than the converse, because, namely, this is more in accord with usage. What he says, however, in the First Part that it is in no way to be conceded that God is like the creature is to be understood while preserving the proper usage of the term. For we are accustomed to say that only that is like another which has a form that is the other's that is, which it has fully and perfectly; not, however, when the one indeed has the form completely and perfectly, while the other has a certain participation of it, in which respect likeness is observed according to imitation, but not according to agreement in a form of the same notion.

Similarly, if to be likened, or assimilation, is taken as denoting a movement toward the unity of the form according to which likeness is observed, it cannot be said that God is likened to the creature, nor Hercules to his image. But if it is taken for that which is to be the term of the likeness of the creature to God, or of the image to Hercules that is, to be conceived with respect to that which terminates the relation of likeness it is not incongruous to say that God is likened to the creature, and Hercules to his image.

Chapter XXX

Which Names Can Be Predicated of God

From these considerations it can also be considered what can or cannot be said of God, and what is said of him alone, and what also of him together with other things.

For since every perfection of the creature is found in God, but according to another, more eminent, mode, whatever names absolutely designate a perfection without defect are predicated of God and of other things such as goodness, wisdom, existence, and other things of this kind. But whatever name expresses such perfections together with a mode proper to creatures cannot be said of God except by way of likeness and metaphor, by which the properties of one thing are commonly adapted to another just as a man is called a stone on account of the hardness of his intellect. Names of this kind are all those imposed to designate the species of a created thing, such as man and stone: for to each species there is owed a proper mode of perfection and of existence. Likewise, whatever names designate properties of things that are caused by the proper principles of the species cannot be said of God except metaphorically. But those names which express such perfections together with the mode of supereminence by which they belong to God are said of God alone such as the highest good, the first being, and other things of this kind.

I say, however, that some of the aforesaid names import perfection without defect with respect to that which the name was instituted to signify; for as to the mode of signifying, every name is accompanied by defect. For by a name we express a thing in the manner in which we conceive it by the intellect. Our intellect, however, taking its beginning of knowledge from the senses, does not transcend that mode which is found in sensible things, in which form and that which has form are distinct, on account of the composition of form and matter. Form indeed is found in these things as simple, but imperfect, inasmuch as it does not subsist; whereas that which has form is found indeed as subsisting, but not as simple rather, as having a certain concretion. Hence our intellect, whatever it signifies as subsisting, signifies in concretion; whatever it signifies as simple, it signifies not as that

which is, but as that by which a thing is. And thus, in every name we use, as to the mode of signifying, an imperfection is found, which does not befit God, although the thing signified may belong to God in some eminent mode as is clear in the name of goodness and of the good; for goodness signifies as not subsisting, whereas the good signifies as concrete. And as to this, no name is fittingly applied to God, but only as to that which the name is instituted to signify. Such names, then, as Dionysius teaches, can both be affirmed of God and denied: affirmed, indeed, on account of the notion of the name; denied, however, on account of the mode of signifying.

The mode of supereminence, however, by which the aforesaid perfections are found in God, cannot be signified by names imposed by us except either by negation, as when we say that God is eternal or infinite, or also by relation of him to other things, as when he is called the first cause, or the highest good. For we cannot grasp of God what he is, but only what he is not, and how other things stand in relation to him, as is clear from what has been said above.

[Ferrara's Commentary]

Since it has been proved that every perfection is in God, it now remains to consider concerning the terms by which the perfections of things are signified, how they may belong to God. With regard to this Saint Thomas does two things: first, he treats of uncomplex terms; second, of complex terms, in chapter 36. As to the first point he does two things: first, he determines concerning these terms and names absolutely; second, comparatively, in chapter 32. As to the first point he does two things: first, he treats of these terms as to their predication of God; second, as to their plurality, in the chapter following.

As to the first point he does three things: first, he shows which names belong to God; second, he clarifies certain statements; third, he teaches the manner of naming God with respect to certain things.

I. As to the first point, he proposes that it must be considered what can or cannot be said of God, and what is said of him alone, and what also of him together with other things. And in responding he says three things, according to the three things proposed. Beginning from the last, as the most common, he says that names importing perfection absolutely without defect are predicated of God and of other things, such as goodness, wisdom, existence, and the like.

As to the first, he says that names importing perfection together with a mode proper to creatures are not said of God except by way of likeness and metaphor, in the manner in which, according as something is found in one similar to the properties of another, the one is called by the name of the other, as a man is called a stone on account of the hardness of his intellect. Such are the names of the species of a creature and of its properties, like man, stone, risible, and the like, and those which designate properties of things that are caused by the proper principles of the species.

As to the second, he responds that names which import perfection together with a more supereminent mode by which they belong to God are attributed to God alone, such as the highest good, the first being, and the like.

2. It should be noted that, since a name is not attributed to a thing except by reason of its own signification, in order that some name be predicated of a thing truly and properly, and not merely metaphorically, it is required that the whole of its proper signification be attributed to it, and every condition which belongs to the signified, as the signified of that thing. For if only part of the signification belonged to it, it would not be attributed to it truly and properly: just as, although a stone is a substance, it is not therefore called an animal, because animal imports not merely substance, but also the sensible, which does not belong to a stone. Likewise, if this name white were imposed to signify primarily a substance as informed by whiteness, it could not be said of Socrates, in whom there is no whiteness, because, although he is a substance, he would not be a substance under whiteness, which would be the condition of substance as signified by the name white. If, then, some name in its signification imports both a certain perfection and the proper mode by which that perfection exists in a creature, since that mode which is proper to the creature does not belong to God, although the perfection imported by the name be in him, that name is not said truly and properly of God. Just as man imports the perfection of humanity together with the material mode by which it is in that which has humanity, therefore this name man, since God is, is not predicated of him, although the perfection of humanity is in God. Likewise it is with names that in

their signification import the proper mode by which perfections exist in God. For such names are not truly predicated of a creature.

As to the second point, because it has been said that some names import perfection without defect, lest someone take occasion of error from this, Saint Thomas distinguishes that for a name to import defect can be understood in two ways: either, that is, with respect to the thing signified, because, I mean, the defect itself is part of the signification of the name; or with respect to the mode of signifying. In the first way, some names signify with defect, others not. But in the second way, all signify with defect. The reason for this is that, since a thing is expressed by a name according to the mode by which we conceive it by the intellect, and the intellect conceives a simple form as that by which something is, but not as that which is, whereas it conceives a subsisting thing in a certain concretion and composition, because it takes its knowledge from sensible things, in which form and that which has form are distinct, on account of the composition of form and matter, and simple forms do not subsist but other things exist by them, whereas subsisting things are composite, it therefore signifies simple things by abstract names, after the manner of a form, to which it belongs to be that by which something is; but subsisting things by concrete names, after the manner of concretion and composition and of that which has form in each of which a certain imperfection is imported.

From these things it is clear that no name is fittingly applied to God as to the mode of signifying, although some may belong to him as to the thing signified, since such imperfection is not in God, even though the thing signified may belong to him in some eminent mode.

From which it is deduced as a corollary, from the mind of Dionysius, in chapters 1 and 5 of On the Divine Names, that the names imposed by us which are attributed to God can both be affirmed and denied of God. This is clear from what has been said. For as to the notion or signification of the name, they belong to him; but as to the mode of signifying, not at all.

III. As to the third point, he notes that the mode of supereminence by which perfections are found in God cannot be signified by names imposed by us except either through negation, as when we say that God is eternal or infinite, or through relation of him to other things, as when we say first cause or highest good, since we cannot grasp what God is, but only what he is not, and how other things stand in relation to him.

It should be noted that eternal, although according to the word it seems to be said affirmatively, is nevertheless said negatively as to the thing: for that is called eternal which is altogether immutable, and which lacks beginning and end of duration; just as, although this name blind is an affirmative word, it nevertheless imports a negation of sight. For this reason Saint Thomas counted eternal among the negative names said of God.

IV. Concerning the foregoing, two doubts arise. The first concerns that proposition: By a name we express a thing in the manner in which we conceive it by the intellect. Scotus, indeed, in Book I of the Sentences, distinction 22, says that this is false if understood precisely. Rather, he says, something can be signified more distinctly than it is understood. He proves this because, if it were true, no name imposed by one in this life would signify any thing of the genus of substance, but, just as some property is conceived precisely, from which the name is imposed, so precisely that property would be signified by the name. Stone, for instance, would not signify anything of the genus of substance, but something of the genus of action, namely the bruising of the foot. But this is false, because the one who imposes the name intends to impose the name not on that accident, but on the underlying substance.

The second doubt concerns that proposition: Our intellect, with respect to what is simple, signifies not as that which is, but as that by which something is. For from this it would follow that no abstract name would be a substantive noun. For a substantive noun signifies something after the manner of that which stands through itself; an abstract noun, however, according to that statement, does not signify a form after the manner of that which stands through itself, but after the manner of that which inheres in another, since it signifies as that by which something is, and not as that which is.

V. To the first of these it is said that for a thing to be signified more distinctly than it is understood can be taken in two ways: in one way, such that the mode of distinction holds on the side of the thing signified and understood; in another way, such that it holds on the side of the one signifying and understanding. In the first way the sense is that the thing is signified as more distinct than it is understood to be distinct. And in this sense Scotus's proposition can be true, nor is it contrary to the position of Saint Thomas. For it is not incongruous that a name be imposed to signify a thing that is most distinct from others, and yet not every notion of the distinction be understood. In the

second way the sense is that the mode of signifying of the name is more distinct than the mode by which the intellect knows the thing signified itself. And in this sense Scotus's proposition is false, and that of Saint Thomas is true. For since a name does not signify a thing except by means of a concept of the intellect, a name is said to signify the thing confusedly and indistinctly, so far as concerns the name, when it signifies it under a confused and indistinct concept; distinctly, however, when under a distinct concept. Hence the mode of the distinct signification of the name follows the mode of the distinct concept, since it represents more distinctly when under a more distinct concept. From which it is clear that it is impossible for a name to signify a thing more distinctly than it is understood. For since to signify distinctly is to signify under a distinct concept, and the intellect, in conceiving the thing, understands it, it follows that a name cannot signify more distinctly than the intellect understands, but they correspond proportionally to one another. For if the intellect apprehends the thing only confusedly, and imposes a name on it, that name too will signify confusedly, that is, under a confused concept; but if the intellect understands distinctly, and the name of the thing is imposed according to that concept, then the name too will signify distinctly.

To Scotus's reasoning, then, the response is by denying the consequence. For it is said that, if the substance of the thing were in no way known, but only the property, the name would not signify the substance of the thing, but only the property. But because from the knowledge of properties one arrives at some knowledge of the substance, whether confused or distinct, as Scotus himself concedes, narrating in that same place a certain process of Augustine, in Book VI of On the Trinity, chapter 6, for proving that every creature is composite therefore the name too sometimes signifies the very substance. For stone does not signify only the bruising of the foot, but a certain substance to which this property belongs. Which, if the imposer of the name, by inquiring from such a property, knew distinctly, he signified by this name distinctly; but if he knew it confusedly, the name too signified confusedly, that is, under a confused concept. Universally, then, it is true that things are named by us according as they are understood: for, as Saint Thomas says in the First Part, question 13, article 9, reply to the second, names do not follow the mode of existing which is in things, but that which is in our knowledge.

VI. For the clarification of the second doubt, one must consider, first, that an accident, whether defined in the abstract or in the concrete, always includes the subject in its definition, which is imported through the name. For when it is defined in the abstract, it includes the subject obliquely, as when it is said, Snubness is a curvature of the nose; but when defined in the concrete, it includes

it directly, as when it is said, The snub is a nose that is curved. These two modes of including the subject differ, however. For when the abstract name includes the subject in its signification, the subject is not part of the signification of the name, but is rather expressed as something extraneous to which it has a relation: for since whiteness signifies only that by which something is white, and the subject is in no way that by which something is white, the subject is in no way something signified by such a name. But when the concrete name of an accident includes the subject, it includes it as part of the signification a secondary part, however, and as co-signified along with the principal signification: for white signifies principally whiteness, and secondarily co-signifies the subject having whiteness. This is had from Averroes, Metaphysics V, comment 14, and from Saint Thomas in the same place, where they say, against Avicenna, that white signifies in the first place the accident, and in the second place the subject; and the same is had in Physics I, comment 25. And Saint Thomas adds that whiteness in no way co-signifies the subject. A sign of this diversity is that through the abstract the subject is imported obliquely, but through the concrete it is imported directly, as denominated by the form.

One must consider, secondly, that to be signified after the manner of substance, and to be signified after the manner of accident, refer principally to the very form signified. For a name is said to signify after the manner of substance when it is signified by the name in the manner in which substance, outside the intellect, has existence. And because substance existing outside the intellect is a being not existing inherently in another subject, therefore an accidental form is said to be signified after the manner of substance when it is not signified together with another signified to which it inheres. And it is signified in this way by an abstract name: for such a name signifies it solitarily, co-signifying nothing else along with it. It is said, however, to be signified after the manner of accident when it is signified by the name in that manner in which an accident has existence in the nature of things. Hence, since the existence of an accident is to-inhere, it is signified after the manner of accident when it is signified together with something else after the manner of that which inheres in it. And it is signified in this way by a concrete name. For such a name signifies the form after the manner of that which inheres in a subject, and signifies the subject itself together with it in the manner stated.

One must consider, thirdly, that it is not the same for a name to signify after the manner of substance and for a name to signify after the manner of a complete subsisting thing. Likewise it is not the same to signify something as that by which something is, on the part of the name, and to signify after the manner of accident. For a name's signifying after the manner of substance is taken

by comparison to the form principally signified, which is signified solitarily, without another co-signified to which it inheres, as is clear from what has been said. But a name's signifying after the manner of a complete subsisting thing is to signify after the manner of substance complete in species, and not after the manner of a part. To signify something, moreover, as that by which something is, of such a kind aptitudinally, as is here understood, is to signify something as a form and as a simple nature solitarily, without the co-signification of anything else, because the form alone is that by which something is formally such. To signify after the manner of accident, however, is not to signify the form alone, but together with it the subject also, as that to which the form inheres, as has been said above.

2. From these things it is clear, first, that the concrete name and the abstract name of an accident are distinguished on the side of the thing signified, because the abstract name signifies the form alone, whereas the concrete name signifies not the form alone, but also the subject of the form. And therefore the former is said to signify after the manner of substance, the latter after the manner of accident. They are distinguished also because the abstract name, since it signifies the form alone, does not signify it as something complete that has existence, but as that by which something has existence aptitudinally, because forms, among us, do not subsist as complete in species; the concrete name, however, since it secondarily signifies the subject which has existence through the form, signifies something as that which has existence, and consequently after the manner of a complete subsisting thing; for only that which subsists substantially is that which properly has accidental existence through an accidental form.

It is clear, secondly, that the objection has no force. For it proceeds as though it were the same to signify a thing as that by which something is formally, and to signify a thing after the manner of accident. But this, as is clear, is false. For the same name signifies both after the manner of substance, that is, of that which stands through itself, and as that by which something is. For to stand through itself can be taken in two ways: in one way, as it is opposed to that which is to inhere accidentally; in another way, as it is the same as in no way to exist in another, which is the same as to subsist as complete in species. In the first way the abstract name signifies after the manner of that which stands through itself, but not in the second way.

VII. But concerning the foregoing a threefold doubt arises. The first is that Saint Thomas, in Book I of the Sentences, distinction 22, question 1, article 1, reply to the third, says that what is signified by a name is signified as subsisting, and he gives the example of whiteness. Therefore it is false what

we have said, that an abstract name signifies indeed after the manner of substance, but not after the manner of that which subsists.

The second is that in the Categories it is said that white signifies a pure quality. And Saint Thomas, Book III of the Sentences, distinction 7, question 1, article 1, reply to the fifth, holds that white does not signify its subject, but couples it as something extrinsic. Therefore it is wrongly said that the concrete signifies not only the form, but also the subject.

The third is that the Commentator, On the Soul II, comment 8, says that in the case of artificial things, the name is said first of the matter, and second of the thing composed together. Therefore it is false that the concrete name first signifies the form and secondarily the subject, as has been said above.

VIII. To the first it is said that Saint Thomas, in the place cited, takes to signify after the manner of a subsisting thing differently than he takes it in this place and in the First Part. For there, to signify after the manner of a subsisting thing is taken as the same as to signify not after the manner of that which proceeds from another, in which way a noun is distinguished from a verb. Here, however, we take to signify after the manner of a subsisting thing as the same as to signify after the manner of substance complete in species, which is properly that which has existence. Hence there is no contradiction.

To the second it is said that Saint Thomas and Aristotle speak of the primary and formal signification of the name: for this must be one. This, however, does not preclude that it secondarily co-signify something else after the manner of a subject.

To the third it is said, following the Commentator in the same place, that since the name in the case of artificial things is said both of the individual substance through itself, and of the artifact insofar as such, the name can be considered in two ways. In one way, as it is the name of the artifact insofar as such; and thus it signifies first the artificial form, and secondarily the matter, as do other concrete names of accidents. In another way, as it is the name both of the individual substance through itself and also of the artifact; and thus it is said first of the matter, and second of the thing composed of matter and artificial form that is, this name is prior according as it signifies the individual

substance, than according as it signifies the artifact, as the Commentator gives the example of the axe: for even when the sharpness, which is the form of the artifact, is removed, the axe remains, which is the individual substance. And thus is the statement of the Commentator understood.

Chapter XXXI

That Divine Perfection and the Plurality of Divine Names Are Not Repugnant to the Divine Simplicity

From the foregoing it can also be seen that divine perfection and the many names said of God are not repugnant to his simplicity.

For we have said that all the perfections found in other things are attributed to God just as effects are found in their equivocal causes. These effects, indeed, are in their causes virtually, as heat is in the sun. But such a power, unless it were in some way of the genus of heat, the sun, acting through it, would not generate something like itself. From this power, then, the sun is called hot, not only because it produces heat, but because the power by which it does this is something conformed to heat. Through the same power, however, by which the sun produces heat, it also produces many other effects in lower bodies, such as dryness. And thus heat and dryness, which are diverse qualities in fire, are attributed to the sun through one single power. So too must all the perfections, which belong to other things according to diverse forms, be attributed to God necessarily according to his one power. This power, moreover, is not other than his own essence, since nothing can be accidental to him, as has been proved. Thus, then, is God called wise not only according to this, that he produces wisdom, but because, according as we are wise, we in some measure imitate the power by which he makes us wise. He is not, however, called a stone, although he has made stones, because in the name of stone is understood a determinate mode of existing, according to which a stone is distinguished from God. A stone, however, imitates God as its cause according to existence, according to goodness, and other things of this kind, just as do other creatures.

Something similar to this can be found in cognitive powers and in human operative virtues. For the intellect, by one single power, knows all the things which the sensitive part apprehends by diverse powers, and also many other things besides. The intellect, too, the higher it is, the more things it can know by some one thing, things which a lower intellect

cannot attain to know except through many. The power of a king, likewise, extends to all those things to which the diverse powers under him have their order. So, then, God too possesses, through his one simple existence, an omnimodal perfection, which other things attain, indeed much less perfectly, through certain diverse means.

From this it is clear that there is a necessity of giving many names to God. For since we cannot know him naturally except by arriving at him from his effects, it follows that the names by which we signify his perfection must be diverse, just as the perfections found in things are found diverse. If, however, we could understand the very essence itself as it is, and adapt to it a proper name, we would express it by one name alone. This is what is promised to those who shall see him through his essence, according to Zechariah, the last chapter: In that day there shall be one Lord, and his name shall be one.

[Ferrara's Commentary]

Having shown that some names can be attributed to God, Saint Thomas shows that such names are also several. With regard to this he does two things: first, he shows that the plurality of names and the plurality of divine perfections are not repugnant to the divine simplicity; second, he draws out the consequence of the proposition.

I. He demonstrates the first by this argument. All the perfections of creatures are in God according to his one power. Therefore neither the perfections themselves, nor the many names importing those perfections, are repugnant to the divine simplicity. The consequence is clear, because the power of God is his very essence, since nothing can be accidental to God.

The antecedent is shown by a likeness in three ways. First, in natural things. For it is supposed that all the perfections of things are in him just as effects are in an equivocal cause. Then thus: as the sun stands to heat and dryness and the other effects found in lower bodies, so too does God stand to all perfections for in both cases there is a comparison of an equivocal cause, in some manner, to its effects. But in the sun, heat and dryness are present virtually; and through the same power they are attributed to the sun, although in fire they are diverse qualities. Therefore all the perfections of

things, too, which belong to other things according to diverse forms, are attributed to God according to one power.

But because, from the fact that the effects of the sun are contained virtually in the sun, and all things are contained virtually in God, someone might believe that the sun is called such, for instance hot, and God such, for instance wise, for this reason only, that things of this kind are caused by them, and not on account of any likeness existing between them, Saint Thomas removes this false sense, saying that the sun is not called hot solely because it causes heat, and God wise because he causes wisdom, as some have held; but because the power by which the sun causes heat is something conformed to heat for unless it were in some way of the genus of heat, the sun, acting through it, would not generate something like itself. Likewise, God too is called wise because, according as we are wise, we in some measure imitate the power by which he makes us wise that is, according as between our wisdom and the power of God there is some likeness and conformity. This is clear because, if he were called wise solely because he produces wisdom, by the same reasoning he would be called a stone because he causes a stone. Yet we do not say this, because in the name of stone is understood a determinate mode of existing, according to which the stone does not imitate God but is distinguished from him although in the stone too there are other things, which do not import such a mode, by which it does imitate God, such as goodness, existence, and the like.

Concerning that proposition, Unless the power of the sun were in some way of the genus of heat, the sun, acting through it, would not generate something like itself, which Saint Thomas also seems to wish to hold true of God, one must note that he did not say simply unless it were of the genus of heat, but added in some way. For it is not necessary that there be, between the power of an equivocal cause and its effect, an agreement in genus properly speaking, but it is necessary that there be an agreement in some single analogous and proportional notion such that genus is here taken for everything common according to notion, however it be common so that between cause and effect there be some likeness.

II. Concerning what Saint Thomas says, and what has also been touched upon above namely, that God is not called a stone, because in the name of stone is understood a determinate mode of existing, according to which the stone is distinguished from God a twofold doubt arises. The first is that every name of perfection, except perhaps transcendental names, includes something of imperfection, by which it is distinguished from God. Therefore no name will be said of God. The antecedent is clear: wise, just, knowing, and the like, signify quality, which does not belong to God.

The second is that there is nothing in a thing that has not been produced by God, and consequently that does not imitate the divine power. Therefore, however much the name of stone may import a mode by which it is distinguished from God, God could be called a stone, just as he is called wise, on account of such likeness and imitation of that mode of the stone to God.

It is confirmed. For the sun is called hot, as Saint Thomas wishes here, notwithstanding that hot signifies a proper mode of existing in fire or air, by which it is distinguished from the sun for heat is a corruptible quality, in which it is distinguished from the power of the sun.

III. For the clarification of these points, one should know that, when we speak of names, as to how they belong or do not belong formally to God, and how they import imperfection, we understand this of their formal and proper signification, by which one name in signifying is distinguished from another. For example: the name wisdom in creatures, as to what it properly and particularly and distinctly imports, denotes the knowledge of the highest causes although it also imports quality, as something common to it and to other things. When, however, we ask whether the name of wisdom belongs to God formally, we are not asking about the signification common to it and to others, but about the proper notion which it adds to the common significations. Similarly we speak of the name stone and other names. Hence it is said in On the Power of God, question 7, article 4, reply to the second, that such names belong to God according to the notion of difference, and not according to the notion of genus.

To the first, then, the antecedent is denied, speaking of the proper and formal and differential signification: for it is of this that the discussion is. For there are many names which, in such signification of theirs, import no imperfection. To the proof it is said that quality is a common signification, not a differential one, of any of these.

It can also be said that such names can be taken in two ways. In one way, absolutely and transcendently that is, as they are said analogically both of a perfection that is in a genus, and of a perfection that is outside a genus. And then it is denied that they formally signify quality as something common to every perfection signified: for the name of wisdom, taken absolutely, is said both of wisdom which is a quality, and of wisdom which is a substance. In another way, with a determination, as when we say human wisdom. And then it is indeed true that they signify quality;

but they are not said in that sense formally of God, on account of the mode of the creature which is included in such a signification. For although God is absolutely wise, he is nevertheless not wise with a human wisdom.

To the second it is said that the effect, as to the imperfection which it states, has no likeness in God, but only as to the perfection. Therefore it does not imitate God as imperfect, but is something distinct from God. For this reason a name importing the proper mode of existing of a material thing, such as this name stone, since it imports a certain imperfection material existence including an admixture of imperfection is not said formally of God, since its whole proper signification does not belong to him, but only virtually, because whatever of perfection is found in the stone is wholly contained in the power of God. It is denied, then, that nothing is in a thing which has not been produced by God: for the imperfection that is in a thing, in the manner namely in which it belongs to negation to be in a thing, is not produced by God, but happens on the part of creatures inasmuch as they are from nothing, as is said in Book I of the Sentences, distinction 2, article 2, and On the Power of God, question 7, article 5, reply to the eighth. Hence every mode of creatures, as to every perfection which it states, is from God; but not as to the imperfection which it includes.

To the confirmation it is said that the sun is not called hot formally, but only virtually, as is said in On Truth, question 4, article 6. Hence the likeness which Saint Thomas posits between the sun with respect to heat and dryness, and God with respect to the perfections that are in creatures, is observed only with respect to this: that an effect is in its cause virtually, and that several effects are contained in one power, but not with respect to the formal predication of names. For although the sun virtually contains heat and dryness, the name of heat and dryness nevertheless does not belong to the sun formally; but many names of perfections found in creatures belong formally to God, although some indeed do not belong formally.

IV. Secondly, the stated antecedent is proved from the likeness of cognitive powers. For the intellect, by one single cognitive power, knows all that the sensitive part apprehends through diverse powers, and yet other things besides. And the higher the intellect, the more things it can know by some one thing. Therefore the cause which is the highest contains all things by one power.

Thirdly, it is proved from the likeness of human operative virtues. For just as one royal power extends to all those things to which the diverse powers under it have order, so too God, through his

one simple existence, has every perfection which other things attain through many diverse things indeed, a much greater perfection.

One should consider here that, since the perfections which are diverse in creatures are united in God, inasmuch as his one power, which is the divine essence, contains them all by actual containment, and not by potential containment, in the way that matter is said to contain material forms, all the perfections are in God in a more noble manner than they are in creatures. For in creatures they have limited and finite existence, since every existence of a creature is limited to some degree; but in God they have infinite, unlimited, and subsisting existence, which is the divine existence. For this reason Saint Thomas often says that they are in God according to a more eminent mode, because, namely, they are the divine existence itself and the divine essence itself, which is most perfect, infinite, and unlimited; and that they are united in God, because, namely, all of them in God are one indivisible substance, which is the divine essence, equivalent to all the perfections of creatures, and indeed containing a still ampler perfection.

V. As to the second point, this conclusion is drawn: it is necessary that there be many names said of God. It is proved as follows. The perfections of things are diverse. Therefore the names of them too must necessarily be diverse. Therefore the divine names too must necessarily be many. The consequence is proved because we cannot know God naturally except from his effects.

Saint Thomas adds, moreover, that if we could understand the divine essence as it is and adapt to it a proper name, we would express it by one name alone. This is promised to the blessed, who see the divine essence, according to that saying of Zechariah, the last chapter: In that day there shall be one Lord, and his name shall be one.

VI. But a twofold doubt arises concerning this. The first is concerning this last statement, namely that the blessed will have one unique and proper name for God because they will understand the divine essence as it is in itself. For a unique and proper name of God is not had except by one who comprehends God himself. But just as we do not comprehend God, neither do the blessed. Therefore, just as we do not name God by one name, neither do the blessed.

The response, from the teaching of Saint Thomas, Book I of the Sentences, distinction 2, question 1, article 3, is that we can understand in two ways that one who sees the divine essence as it is imposes one name. In one way, such that he forms in his intellect a single concept perfectly and adequately representing the divine essence, and by means of that concept signifies God with one name. And it is not understood in this sense here. For just as God cannot be perfectly represented through any created likeness, as will be shown in Book Three of this work, neither can he be represented through a single concept of a created intellect. Hence, however much someone may see the divine essence as it is in itself, he cannot, in this manner, name God by one name, because this could not happen without comprehension. In another way, such that, seeing the divine Word, which, being one, perfectly represents God, he signifies God by one name by means of that Word. And it is in this sense that what is said here is understood: for this can happen without comprehension.

2. Another doubt concerns the multiplicity of names. For if, because the perfections are diverse, names must be many, it follows that no name will be equivocal. For an equivocal name, being one, signifies many things.

The response is by denying the consequence. For when we say that, from the plurality of perfections in creatures, it follows that there are many names, we are speaking of proper names, by which only one thing is signified. For it follows, if there are several things which ought to be named by proper names, that there must be several such names. This, however, does not preclude that, besides proper names, there be also other common and equivocal names. If it be further objected that many men are found having the same proper name, and thus it does not follow that distinct things must have distinct proper names the response is that distinct things must have distinct names if the thing is to be distinctly expressed and distinctly made known to another. But where different men have the same name by mere identity of sound, the one is not, through that name as such, made known as distinct from the other. Therefore, if one is to be made known to another as distinct from another, it is necessary, besides that common word, to find another particular word for instance, the man of such a figure, or the son of such a one, and the like. The plurality of perfections, therefore, requires a plurality of names if they are to be distinctly signified and made known to another, for which purpose words were invented although there can also be other common words, whether univocal or equivocal.

Chapter XXXII

That Nothing Is Predicated Univocally of God and Other Things

From these considerations it is clear that nothing can be predicated univocally of God and other things. For an effect which does not receive a form according to a species similar to that by which the agent acts cannot receive, according to univocal predication, the name taken from that form: for it is not univocally said that the heat of fire generated by the sun, and the sun itself, are hot. But the forms of things of which God is the cause do not attain to the species of the divine power, since they receive divisively and particularly what is found in God simply and universally. It is clear, therefore, that nothing can be said univocally of God and other things.

Moreover. If some effect should attain to the species of its cause, it would not follow the univocal predication of the name unless it received a form the same in species according to the same mode of existing: for it is not said univocally of a house that is in the art and of a house that is in matter, on account of the fact that the form of the house has dissimilar existence in each. But other things, even if they were to obtain an altogether similar form, would not nevertheless obtain it according to the same mode of existing: for there is nothing in God that is not the divine existence itself, as is clear from what has been said, which does not happen in other things. It is impossible, therefore, that anything be predicated univocally of God and other things.

Besides. Everything that is predicated univocally of several things is either a genus, or a species, or a difference, or an accident, or a property. But nothing is predicated of God as a genus, nor as a difference, as has been shown above; and thus neither as a definition, nor even as a species, which is constituted from genus and difference. Nor can anything be accidental to him, as has been demonstrated above; and thus nothing is predicated of God either as an accident or as a property, for property belongs to the genus of accidents. It remains, therefore, that nothing is predicated univocally of God and other things.

Again. That which is predicated univocally of several things is, in each of them, at least according to the intellect, simpler than they. But of God neither according to the thing nor according to the intellect can anything be simpler. Nothing, therefore, is predicated univocally of God and other things.

Moreover. Everything that is predicated of several things univocally belongs to each of them by participation: for the species is said to participate in the genus, and the individual in the species. But nothing is said of God by participation, for everything that is participated is determined to the mode of the thing participated, and thus is had partially and not according to every mode of perfection. It is necessary, therefore, that nothing be predicated univocally of God and other things.

Besides. What is predicated of certain things according to prior and posterior is certainly not predicated univocally: for the prior is included in the definition of the posterior as substance is included in the definition of accident, according as it is being. If, then, being were said univocally of substance and accident, it would be necessary that substance also be placed in the definition of being, predicated according as it is predicated of substance. This is evidently impossible. But nothing is predicated of God and other things in the same order, but according to prior and posterior: since all things are predicated of God essentially for he is called being as it were essence itself, and good as it were goodness itself; whereas of other things predications are made through participation, as Socrates is said to be a man not because he is humanity itself, but because he has humanity. It is impossible, therefore, that anything be said univocally of God and other things.

[Ferrara's Commentary]

After Saint Thomas determined concerning the divine names absolutely, he now determines concerning them comparatively. With regard to this he does two things: first, he compares the names themselves to the things signified; second, he compares the names themselves to one another, in chapter 35. As to the first point, he sets forth three conclusions. The first is set forth in this chapter; the second, in the following chapter; the third, in chapter 34.

I. The first conclusion, then, is: nothing can be predicated univocally of God and other things. And to be predicated univocally is taken in conformity with the definition of univocals given by Aristotle in the Categories namely, that it is the same to be predicated univocally as to belong to several things according to one and the same notion entirely.

It is proved, first, that the forms of those things of which God is the cause do not attain to the species of the divine power. Therefore nothing can be said univocally of God and other things. The antecedent is proved because creatures receive them divisively and particularly, whereas in God they are found simply and universally. The consequence is clear, because an effect which does not receive a form similar in species to that by which the agent acts cannot receive a name according to that form by univocal predication: for it is not said univocally that the heat of fire generated by the sun is hot, and that the sun is hot.

II. For the clarification of the antecedent, one must consider that Saint Thomas, distinguishing according to species the forms of creatures from the divine power, says that these are in the creature divisively and particularly, but in God simply and universally opposing simply to what he called divisively, and universally to what he called particularly. Two things, therefore, must be clarified: namely, how this diversity is to be understood, and how this diversity argues a specific distinction.

As to the first, it should be noted that the perfections signified by us through diverse names justice, wisdom, goodness, and the like are distinguished in creatures both really and formally: for the notion of wisdom is one thing, and the notion of justice another, and likewise their entity is one and another, although they may sometimes be one in subject. And this is what it is for them to be divisively in the creature. In God, however, such things are simply that is, unitedly and without real division, since all are one simple and indivisible essence, which is the Godhead. And because the Godhead has one notion, if considered according to what it is in itself for it is one quiddity in itself, and conceivable by a proportioned intellect under one concept therefore wisdom and justice and goodness and the other perfections in God are also one formally, since their notion is numerically one, so far as concerns the thing as understood in itself; for of one thing and essence there is, according to itself, but one adequate and total quidditative notion. It is true, nevertheless, that this notion contains eminently the notion of wisdom, and of justice, and of the other perfections, being adequate to none of them.

It should be noted, however, when I say that wisdom is contained eminently in the Godhead, and the notion of wisdom in the notion of the Godhead, that I do not so understand it as though the divine wisdom were eminently contained in the Godhead, such that the Godhead has a more eminent mode than the divine wisdom itself, or the notion of the Godhead were more perfect than the notion of wisdom, were they to be considered as they are in themselves for this is impossible, since the Godhead and the divine wisdom are one indivisible entity, and the same subsisting existence, and one quiddity and essence, and have one numerically identical adequate notion but rather that the wisdom found in creatures, to which the name of wisdom was first assigned, is contained in the Godhead according to a certain likeness, having a more excellent mode of existing than the mode by which it is in creatures; and likewise the notion proportioned to created wisdom is contained eminently in the adequate notion of the Godhead, inasmuch as the notion of the Godhead is the notion of wisdom and of goodness and of the other divine perfections, containing perfectly and unitedly the perfections of all the other notions which have been formed of these by our intellect. Just as we say that the vegetative and the sensitive soul are contained eminently in the intellective soul, and their notions in its notion not because the intellective soul has a more excellent mode than the sensitive and vegetative soul in it, and the adequate notion of the intellective soul is more perfect than the notion of the vegetative and sensitive soul, which are the same as itself (for this is impossible, since in the intellective soul there are one indivisible entity, and one indivisible existence of theirs, and of that entity and quiddity one numerically perfect and adequate notion, if conceived according to what it is) but because that vegetative perfection which is in plants, and the sensitive soul which is in brute animals, have in the intellective soul a likeness possessing a more perfect mode than they themselves have in other things; and their notions are contained by the notion of the intellective soul eminently, since in it the notion of the vegetative and the sensitive is the same as the notion of the intellective, as we have said, if the entity of the intellective soul be completely conceived; for of one quiddity there is but one numerically perfect and adequate notion.

2. Similarly, perfections are in creatures particularly, but in God universally. But this can be understood in two ways. In one way, such that particularity and universality refer to the proper existence of the form. For in a creature, perfection has received existence, and consequently does not have the whole existence of the form, but with a certain limitation, according to what has been said above. In God, however, it is subsisting; and consequently it has the whole existence of the form, and unlimited. It is, then, in the creature particularly that is, limitedly according to the

existence of the form; but in God universally that is, unlimitedly and according to the whole perfection of being owed to that form.

In another way it can be understood such that perfection is said to be in the creature particularly that is, according to its own and particular entity, really and formally distinct from another perfection, such that it is itself and not another perfection, even existing in the same subject; but in God universally that is, according to an unlimited entity, such that all are one essence of the Godhead universally, not, indeed, by universality of matter, but by universality of form and of perfection containing them; and each is such that it is also every other perfection existing in God.

In either way, what is said here is true; but nevertheless the second interpretation seems more to be the mind of Saint Thomas, if compared with what he says in the First Part, question 4, and in other places. And thus the same thing is imported by divisively and simply as by particularly and universally; which has been added for greater explanation.

3. From these things, then, is clear the second point namely, that this mode of existing argues a specific distinction. For it is manifest that a perfection which in the cause is one essence and one nature with every other perfection is not of the same species as a perfection which is limited and distinct from other perfections. For the one has a greater essential perfection than the other, which makes for a specific distinction. For the sensitive soul in man is distinguished according to species from the sensitive soul in a brute animal, by the fact that in man it is essentially more perfect, being the essence even of the intellective soul, which does not belong to that which is in brute animals.

III. Concerning that proposition, An effect which does not receive a form according to a species similar to that by which the agent acts cannot receive, according to univocal predication, the name taken from that form, a twofold doubt arises. The first is that univocation, at least logical univocation, is not only in species, but also in genus. Therefore, although an effect may not receive the same form according to species as the form of the agent, if it receives the same form according to genus, the name of that generic form will be predicated univocally of them. For body is said univocally of celestial and corruptible bodies, according to the logician, even though the form of corporeity caused by the heaven in these lower things is not the same according to species, but only according to genus, as the form of corporeity of the heaven.

The second is that, in that case, no effect will be univocal with its cause. For Saint Thomas says, Secunda Secundae, question 110, article 1, reply to the third, that no effect has the species of its cause.

2. To the first of these it is replied that Saint Thomas is not speaking of any name whatever of effect and cause, but of a name taken from the form of the effect, as is clear from his words. A name, however, is taken from the form of the effect when it signifies that specific form itself under its proper notion, and not when it signifies it under a generic notion just as the name hot, taken from the heat produced by fire, does not signify the generic nature of heat absolutely, but the specific nature: for the action of the agent does not terminate at the abstract form of the genus, but at a form determined to a species. And therefore, if the form itself is not of the same species in the cause and the effect, that name is not said univocally of the cause and effect, because the notion imported by the name as said of the effect, and the notion imported by it as said of the cause, are not one and the same notion, which is required for univocation. From this it follows excellently that no name said of God and creature is said univocally: for every such name is taken from a form that is received in the effect; which, because it is not of the same species in God and in the creature, the name is not therefore said according to one notion of the name of God and creature. Saint Thomas does not, therefore, intend by that proposition to exclude every univocal predication of cause and effect whatsoever, but the univocation of a name signifying the form of the agent under its proper notion and likewise the form of the effect. As for what is brought forward concerning body, this is not to the point: for the name body is not a name taken from the form of the effect as such, according to its proper and specific notion.

3. To the second it is said that Saint Thomas, in the Secunda Secundae, is not speaking of an effect separated from its cause, but of an effect accompanying the essence of the cause within that very cause, as falling-downward is the effect of a heavy body, and risibility the effect of man. Such an effect, indeed, evidently does not have the species of its cause. Here, however, the discussion concerns an effect separated from the cause itself, and produced through a true and real action, and not resulting from a natural concomitance.

IV. Secondly, it is argued thus. Things, even granting (which nevertheless is false) that they should receive from God a form similar according to species, would still have, in God, another mode of existing than in creatures. Therefore the name of them is not said univocally of God and creatures. The antecedent is proved, because in God these are the existence itself, but not in creatures. The

consequence is proved, because, if an effect attains to the species of its cause, unless it receives the same form according to the same mode of existing, it does not obtain univocal predication of the name: for it is not said univocally of a house that is in the mind and a house that is in matter, on account of the dissimilar mode of existing for in the mind it has immaterial existence, but in matter material existence.

It should be noted that, from what Saint Thomas says here, when it is said by Aristotle that univocals are those whose notion of substance is the same, it is understood that the notion is the same both according to form and according to mode of existing. For this reason Saint Thomas posits two things, in On Truth, question 27, article 7, as belonging to a univocal effect: namely, that the likeness of the effect be in the cause both according to natural existence and according to the same notion.

But then a doubt arises. For body is said univocally, at least according to the logician, of the corruptible and the incorruptible. And yet these have a diverse mode of existing.

It is said that this argument concludes only concerning physical and natural univocation, in which not only the notion but also the existence of the thing is considered, and not concerning logical univocation, in which only the notion of the thing is considered, as seems to be said in On the Power of God, question 7, article 7, in the contrary argument.

V. Thirdly. Nothing is predicated of God as a genus or as a difference, as has been shown above; nor as a species, since this consists of genus and difference; nor as a property or accident, since nothing of the genus of accidents is in God. Therefore nothing whatever is predicated univocally of him simply. The consequence is proved, because everything that is predicated univocally is one of these.

2. To this argument, Scotus would deny the consequence. To the proof, he would deny the assumption. According to him, in Book I of the Sentences, distinction 3, question 3, and distinction 8, question 2, being is predicated univocally of God and creature; and yet it is neither genus, nor species, nor difference, nor property, nor accident. For it is not a genus which would seem most to be the case because, owing to its very great commonness, it is predicated

quidditatively of some differences, though not of the ultimate ones; but a genus is not predicated quidditatively of differences. And thus it is univocal, and yet none of those five predicables.

3. But this response of Scotus does not evacuate the argument of Saint Thomas. For it to be clearly evident, one should know that, although from Aristotle, Metaphysics III, comment 10, it is had that being cannot be a genus because it cannot have differences, since nothing is of which being is not part of the concept, while a genus is not part of the concept of differences if, nevertheless, it were posited to be univocal, it would be necessary that it be a genus, and have differences of which it would not be part of the concept. For this not to be part of the concept of differences is not of the notion of a genus, but accompanies the notion of a genus, and follows upon it as a property: for a genus is said affirmatively, just as is a species, and in its quidditative concept includes no negation, as is clear from the definitions of genus and species; just as also not to be predicated quidditatively of quality accompanies the notion of substance, without, however, entering into the very notion of substance. Therefore, to see whether being is a genus, one must first look to those things that constitute the notion of genus, not to those that follow upon it: because, if the former belong to it, it is necessary also that what follows belong to it; for it is contradictory that the notion of something belong to a thing, and that what necessarily follows from that notion not belong. Just as, because risibility follows the notion of man, in order to see whether Socrates is a man, one need not look first at whether he is risible, but at whether he is a rational animal: once this is established, it is apparent that he is risible, since from the one the other follows. It would indeed be foolish to say, once it is established that Socrates is a rational animal, that he is not a man because he is not risible. Indeed, he cannot fail to be risible if he is a rational animal; and if it be granted as true that he is not risible, one argues by the sign that he is not a rational animal, and that he is not a man. In the same way, if the notion of genus belongs to being, one need not deny that it is a genus because it is predicated quidditatively of certain differences, which would conflict with what accompanies the notion of a genus. Rather, from this very fact that the notion of genus is shown to belong to it, it is concluded that it is not predicated of differences; and if it is predicated, it is argued a posteriori that it is not a genus, and that it is not that to which it follows that it be a genus.

4. That the notion of genus belongs to being, if it is univocal, is also shown both from the foundation of the intention, and from the very definition of second intention. It is shown from the foundation. For a genus, such as animal, denotes a certain nature abstractable by the intellect from its inferiors, and from every limiting principle, which through the same difference is really contracted to a species, such that that difference is of the intrinsic constitution of the essence of the

species. This is clear from what is said in the case of animal. For from the very notion of animal it is established that it is conceived without anything limiting it to a species: for when I say, a sensible animate substance, no species of animal is denoted. It is also clear that, through this difference which is rational, which is really the same as animal, it is limited to man, and is the intrinsic difference of man's essence. If, then, being is univocal, these two things must necessarily belong to it. For every univocal thing, even univocation taken metaphysically, which Scotus posits, denotes one form abstractable from all the univocates. Likewise it must be limited through a difference and divided into diverse univocates. For it will be limited either through diverse modes of existing, or through some essential difference, since it is something most common. Not through diverse modes of existing: because diverse species of substance, for instance man and horse, of which being is predicated quidditatively, agree in the same mode of existing. Likewise, because modes of existing do not belong to the essence of a created thing, since in creatures existence is distinguished from essence, as will be shown below: if, then, being denotes one quiddity common to them, and they are not distinguished except through diverse modes of existing, it follows that they will not be distinguished intrinsically and essentially but this is false, since they are distinguished essentially through differences. It is necessary, therefore, that, if being denotes one nature and quiddity common to them, that quiddity be divided and contracted through those differences really identified with it. Otherwise, in man there would be two quiddities, and likewise in the horse namely, the quiddity of being and the quiddity of the difference; and thus it would not be simply one. Indeed, neither being nor the difference itself would be predicated of the species in the nominative case: because neither would state the whole quiddity, but a part; and a part is not predicated of the whole in the nominative case.

From the notion of genus too the same is clear. For a genus is that which is predicated univocally of several things differing in species, in answer to the question what is it. It is established, however, that, if being is univocal, this notion belongs to it: because it will be predicated univocally and quidditatively of diverse species. Therefore, etc.

5. From these things it is clear that there is a contradiction in Scotus's statements, when he posits that being is univocal, and that it is predicated quidditatively of certain differences. For it follows, as we have shown, by reason of the matter, although perhaps not by reason of the form: it is univocal, therefore it is a genus, therefore it is not predicated quidditatively of differences, since a genus is outside the concept of difference. And thus it is a contradiction to say that it is univocal, and that it is predicated of differences.

From these things it is clear that, when Aristotle proves that being is not a genus because it does not have differences, his reasoning is a posteriori. For from the fact that it does not have differences, it follows that it is not a genus, nor univocal: because, if it were univocal, it would have differences, since nothing other than a genus can be univocal.

The reasoning of Saint Thomas, therefore, is efficacious. And that assumption is true Everything that is predicated univocally is either a genus or a species, etc. because nothing other than being stood in the way of this division, which was posited to be univocal and yet not to be any of these. It has been shown, however, that if being is univocal, it must necessarily be a genus.

VI. Fourthly. Nothing is simpler than God, neither according to the thing nor according to the intellect. Therefore, etc. The consequence is proved, because that which is predicated univocally of several things is simpler than each of them, at least according to the intellect.

For the clarification of this assumption, one must consider that one must speak otherwise of the univocal as to simplicity, and otherwise of the analogous and the equivocal. For the univocal is contracted to its inferiors through something added: just as animal is contracted by rational to man, and man to Socrates through individuating principles. It is therefore necessary that the univocal itself state something simpler than the univocates, since the univocal itself is included in the univocates, and they add something to its notion. The equivocal, however, and the analogous which states several notions as they are one by proportion, which properly is called analogous by the Greeks is not simpler than any analogate or equivocate. Indeed, it is rather more composite: for it does not denote one nature common to its inferiors, to which the inferiors add something; rather, it denotes immediately several natures, and is compared to each as the many to the one. Dog, for instance, denotes several things: namely, a terrestrial animal, a sea fish, and a celestial constellation; whereas a sea fish denotes only one. For this reason, dog is not something simpler than sea fish; rather, it is, as it were, more composite.

From this it follows that, although we posit being to be common to God and creature, it need not therefore be simpler than God: for we do not posit it to be univocal, signifying one notion common to God and creature, but to be analogous, and to signify immediately several things.

2. Concerning that proposition, Nothing can be simpler than God, neither according to the thing nor according to the intellect, a doubt arises. For being is something simpler according to the intellect, since all the conceptions of the intellect are taken by addition to being, as is said in On Truth, question 1, article 1.

It is said that something can be simpler than another according to the intellect in two ways: in one way, from the condition of the thing itself; in another way, from the condition of the intellect understanding it. From the condition of the thing, when one thing has in itself that whereby it is conceived by a simple concept, while another has that whereby it must be conceived by a composite concept. From the side of the intellect, when the intellect, unable to comprehend by one concept a thing conceivable simply and by a single simple concept, on account of its own weakness, forms diverse concepts of it, of which one stands to the other by way of addition. Being, then, as to the one imperfect concept which it denotes, of which there will be discussion below, is not simpler than God according to the intellect from the condition of the thing itself; but it is so from the imperfection of our intellect, which forms a concept of God by addition to the concept of being, because it does not see God as he is in himself. For if the concept of the divine essence were formed according as it is in itself, adequately, that concept would be most simple, containing no plurality just as the thing itself is most simple, alien from all composition and multiplicity. Hence the proposition of Saint Thomas is to be understood as meaning that nothing is simpler than God according to the intellect, so far as concerns the side of the thing itself. With this, however, it is consistent that being be simpler than God according to the intellect, from the defect and weakness of our intellect.

VII. Fifthly. Nothing is said of God by participation. Therefore nothing is said of him univocally. The antecedent is clear, because everything that is participated is had partially and not according to every mode of perfection the opposite of which, as we have said above, belongs to God. The consequence is proved, because that which is predicated univocally of several things belongs to each of them by participation: for the species is said to participate in the genus, and the individual in the species.

It should be noted that a univocal thing is not therefore said to be participated by its inferiors as though they took a part of its essence, but because they do not receive it according to every mode of

perfection. For in diverse things it has more perfect and more imperfect existence, and in one thing there are not all such modes of perfection although each of them has the whole essence of the univocal thing.

VIII. Lastly. Everything that is said of God and of a creature is predicated according to prior and posterior. Therefore nothing is said of God and creature univocally. The antecedent is clear, because all things are said of God by essence, while of the creature all things are said by participation: for God is said to be a being as it were essence itself, and good as it were goodness itself; whereas Socrates is said to be a man not because he is humanity itself, but because he is a thing having humanity. The consequence is proved, because that which is said according to prior and posterior is not predicated univocally. For in such cases the prior is included in the definition of the posterior, just as substance is included in the definition of accident according as it is being: from which it would follow, if being were said univocally, or according to one notion, of substance and accident, that, in the definition of substance according as it is being, substance would itself be placed which is impossible.

It should be noted that in this argument Saint Thomas posits essence as the abstract of being. This we said above to be his mind.

For the clarification of the antecedent, it should be considered that each thing is said first of that which is such by essence, before it is said of that which is such by participation: just as fire is said first of that which is essentially fire, before it is said of that which is ignited. But to be such by essence can be understood in two ways: in one way, because it is the very essence itself, as imported by the abstract name; in another way, because, although it is not the essence itself as signified by the abstract name, but adds something to it, it nevertheless receives the predication of that essence in the concrete essentially. In the first way, then, to be such by essence is taken here, not in the second way as is clear from Saint Thomas's example. It should be noted, moreover, that he did not give the example of the same name said of God and Socrates, but of different names, in order to explain the matter more fully. For if the essential predicate, like man, is not said by essence in the first way of Socrates, but by participation, much more so the name of goodness, which is not said essentially. Concerning this matter, how it is taken diversely as said by essence and by participation, enough has been said above.

2. Concerning that proposition, That which is said according to prior and posterior is not predicated univocally, it should be noted, from the teaching of Saint Thomas in On Truth, question 2, article 11, that it is one thing for the inferiors themselves to have between them an order of prior and posterior, and another to participate in the common term itself according to prior and posterior. For the inferiors to have such an order between them is for one to be prior to another in existence and according to the notion of its own name: and this order is not repugnant to univocation just as in the notion of number, all numbers are univocated and made equal, and yet between the species of numbers there is such an order. To participate in the common term according to prior and posterior, however, is for it not to be participated according to one notion, but according to diverse notions, of which one is prior to the other and is included in the notion of the other. For this reason Saint Thomas says that the prior is placed in the definition of the posterior as belonging to it according to the common name: just as substance is placed in the definition of accident according as it is being. For if it be asked, what is it for an accident to be a being? the answer will be that it is for it to be something inhering in substance. And such an order is repugnant to univocation, since the univocal denotes one notion, whereas here there are several notions. How, however, the prior is placed among analogates in the definition of the posterior will be shown in the chapter on analogy.

IX. Scotus, in the places cited above from Book I of the Sentences, holds the opposite of this conclusion, positing that being is univocal to God and creature explaining, however, that he calls univocal that concept which is so one that its unity suffices for contradiction, by affirming and denying it of the same thing; it also suffices as a syllogistic middle term, such that the extremes, united in a middle term thus one, may without the fallacy of equivocation be concluded to be one with each other. He proves his proposition, however, in three ways.

First. An intellect certain of one concept and doubtful of diverse concepts has a concept of which it is certain, other than the concepts of which it is doubtful. But the intellect can be certain of something that it is a being, while doubting whether it be finite or infinite, created or uncreated. Therefore the concept of being concerning something is other than this or that concept. Therefore it is univocal.

Second. Every metaphysical inquiry concerning God proceeds by considering the formal notion of something, and, having removed from it every imperfection, attributing it to God. Therefore every metaphysical inquiry presupposes that the intellect has the same univocal concept which it takes

from creatures. If it be said that it is not the same notion that is investigated of God, but another, the contrary follows: it follows that from no proper notion of those things which belong to God as they are in creatures can anything be concluded of God, because the notion of the one and of the other is altogether different. Indeed, it would no more be concluded that God is wise from the notion of wisdom which we apprehend from creatures, than that God is formally a stone.

Third. It would follow that we could not know God naturally by any simple concept. For in the phantasm there is virtually included only a concept conforming to the creature. If, then, one concept is not univocal to God and creature, but the concept of God is one and another than that of the creature, it follows that we shall be able to have no such concept of God.

Fourth is the authority of Aristotle, Metaphysics II. There he argues that the principles of eternal things must necessarily be most true, because each thing is maximally such by that through which univocation belongs to other things. Therefore something univocal is common to God and other things.

X. For the response to these arguments, one must consider that, taking univocal in the manner in which Scotus explained it in that declaration of his, there would be no difference between him and Saint Thomas: for all those things belong also to the analogous. But because Scotus reckons that these things cannot belong except to that which denotes one concept altogether cut off from others, and for this reason reckons that being is univocal, to which such things belong therefore a response is made to his arguments.

To the first it is said, first, that that concept of which the intellect is certain is other than the concepts of which it is doubtful, not indeed by total abstraction, but as containing them all by way of analogy, as will be declared below. It is said, secondly, that from this nothing is concluded except that being denotes some one concept other than the concepts of other things. This is granted: for it denotes a certain imperfect concept, as will be shown below. It is not, however, thereby concluded that it denotes one univocal concept.

To the second, the consequence is denied. For from that process, the same concept altogether for instance, of wisdom is not attributed to God, but a proportional one, by which God is formally

called wise, but not a stone. It is said, secondly, that it is presupposed that the intellect has the same common concept, imperfectly signifying both perfections signified by such a name not, however, a perfect and univocal one.

To the third it is said, first, that, if we speak of a concept adequate to the thing, it is no incongruity that God cannot be conceived by us through any simple concept. Indeed, this is necessary, since we cannot conceive any divine perfection according as it is in itself. Hence Saint Thomas says, First Part, question 13, article 5, that when this name wise is said of God, it leaves the thing signified as incomprehended and exceeding the signification of the name.

It is said, secondly, that, if we speak of an imperfect and inadequate concept of the thing, as it is signified by some name, many such concepts can be had of God common to him and to creatures. Nor is it incongruous that some such concept be virtually contained in the phantasm: for the prior can be contained in the posterior with respect to some imperfect concept common to both, inasmuch as the thing represented through the phantasm is a certain participated likeness of the prior.

It is said, thirdly, that even this unity of the imperfect mental concept does not make for univocation, as will be more fully declared in chapter 34.

It is said, fourthly, that, if some concept proper to God can be had, by which the divine perfection itself is known according to the mode of eminence by which it differs from the perfection of the creature, that concept is virtually contained in the phantasm of the creature, inasmuch as it is the instrument of the intellect investigating the conditions of God from creatures, since the effect contains the cause participatively. Hence the divine perfection itself is contained in the perfection of the creature, not as an effect in a cause, but as a cause in an effect: because, that is, the likeness of the cause and its power is preserved in the effect, although sometimes deficiently and imperfectly.

To the fourth it is said that Aristotle takes univocation for analogy, when certain things agree in one notion proportionally. According to which notion there can also be comparison in the analogous, such that one thing is said to be more such than another, because its notion, imported by that name, is more perfect than the notion of the other.

Chapter XXXIII

That Not All Names Are Said of God and Creatures by Pure Equivocation

From the foregoing it is also clear that not whatever is predicated of God and other things is said according to pure equivocation, as are those things that are equivocal by chance. For in things that are equivocal by chance, no order or relation of the one to the other is observed; rather, it is altogether by accident that one name is attributed to diverse things: for the name imposed on one does not signify that it itself has an order to the other. But this is not the case with the names that are said of God and creatures. For in the commonness of such names an order of cause and caused is considered, as is clear from what has been said. Not, therefore, is anything predicated of God and other things according to pure equivocation.

Moreover. Where there is pure equivocation, no likeness is observed in the things, but only unity of the name. But of things to God there is some mode of likeness, as is clear from what has been said above. It remains, then, that they are not said of God according to pure equivocation.

Again. When one thing is predicated of several according to pure equivocation, we cannot, from one of them, be led into knowledge of the other: for the knowledge of things does not depend upon words, but upon the notion of the names. But from those things which are found in other things we arrive at the knowledge of divine things, as is clear from what has been said. Such things, therefore, are not said of God and other things according to pure equivocation.

Besides. Equivocation of a name impedes the process of argumentation. If, then, nothing were said of God and creatures except by pure equivocation, no argumentation could be made by proceeding from creatures to God. The contrary of this is evident from all who speak of divine matters.

Moreover. It is in vain that some name is predicated of something unless through that name we understand something of it. But if names are said of God and creatures altogether equivocally, we understand nothing of God through such names, since their significations are known to us only according as they are said of creatures. In vain, therefore, would it be said or proved of God that he is being, good, or anything else of this kind. But if it should be said that through such names we know of God only what he is not as, for instance, that he is called living because he is not of the genus of inanimate things, and so for the rest it will at least be necessary that living, said of God and creatures, agree in the negation of the inanimate. And thus it will not be purely equivocal.

[Ferrara's Commentary]

The second conclusion is this: not whatever is predicated of God and other things is said according to pure equivocation, namely as those things which are said equivocally by chance.

It should be noted that Saint Thomas here takes pure equivocals as distinguished from analogues. For even the analogues themselves are equivocal; but nevertheless, because among themselves they have a certain unity of proportion, they are not therefore said to be purely equivocal that is, having altogether diverse notions, which are also called equivocals by chance, because the name imposed by diverse people to signify diverse things was not imposed from some likeness of the one to the other, but because it so happened. Rather, they are called equivocals by design, because they import the one from some likeness to the other. For the one who imposed the name, because he considered a certain proportion between them, therefore named them by the same name yet the one in order to the other, and according as the one is included in the notion of the other.

I. The conclusion is proved, first, as follows. In things equivocal by chance, no order or relation to another is considered, but it is altogether accidental that the same name is attributed to diverse things, since the name imposed on the one does not signify that it has an order to the other. But in names said of God and creatures, an order of cause and caused is considered. Therefore, etc.

It should be noted that in the names said of God and creatures an order of cause and caused is considered, not because such order is formally imported by these names themselves otherwise all

would be relative names but because they import the foundations of the order of cause and caused; and from the consideration of an order of this kind, since it has been considered that this perfection depends upon God as upon a cause, and therefore that there is something in God by which there is a likeness between them, especially since it imports no imperfection from its differential concept, the same name has been imposed both on God and on the creature. Hence what Saint Thomas seems to mean by this argument that an analogous name signifies that the one has an order to the other is understood either formally or fundamentally: because in some it is imported formally, in others only fundamentally, as will be demonstrated in the following chapter. This is common to all, however, that from the consideration of such an order the same name has been imposed on both of the analogates; so that it can be said that the relation of cause to caused is that from which the name is taken, but not that to which it is imposed as to the thing signified by the name. I have said this according to one manner of expounding the statements of Saint Thomas, and adhering to the opinions of others. In the following chapter, however, another manner will be shown, perhaps more fitting.

II. Secondly. Of things there is some mode of likeness to God. Therefore the name is not said of God and creatures by pure equivocation. The consequence is proved, because where there is pure equivocation, no likeness in things is observed.

Note that among purely equivocal things there is no likeness which is imported by the equivocal name, as that from which the name is taken. But there can absolutely be some likeness between them.

III. Thirdly. From the things found in other things, we come to the knowledge of divine things. Therefore between them there is not pure equivocation. The consequence is proved as follows. When one thing is predicated of several according to pure equivocation, we cannot from one of them be led into the knowledge of the other, since the knowledge of things does not depend on words, but on the notion of the name.

It should be noted here too that, absolutely speaking, one of the equivocates can lead into the knowledge of the other, inasmuch as they can be alike in some other respect. But formally speaking, taking equivocates as equivocates that is, as having only the name in common the one cannot lead into the knowledge of the other. For if there be two men who by chance are both called Socrates,

from the knowledge of the one of them as Socrates, one cannot arrive at the knowledge of the other from the fact that he too is called Socrates, since they agree in nothing except the name as such; and from mere words there is no knowledge of the thing, nor does anything really belong to a thing from mere naming.

IV. Fourthly. It would follow that no argumentation could be made by proceeding from creatures to God. The consequence is proved, because the equivocation of a name impedes the process of argumentation.

It should be considered that in every argumentation it is necessary that the extremes agree and be united in one middle term. This, however, is removed by the equivocation of a name. For if I should say, Every dog barks; the celestial constellation is a dog; therefore it barks, it is evident that the extremes are not united in the middle term, since the name assumed as the middle term is taken in one signification in the major premise and in another in the minor. Likewise, if I should say, Every wise being considers the highest causes; God is wise; therefore he considers the highest causes, if wise is said purely equivocally, it will be taken in one signification in the major and in another in the minor, and thus there will be no union of the extremes in the middle term.

V. Lastly. It would follow that it would be in vain to say or prove anything of God. The consequence is proved, because we would understand nothing of God through those equivocal names, since the significations of those names are known to us only according as they are said of creatures namely, either simply, or proportionally, that is, insofar as they signify either the perfection of the creature, or something having a proportion to the perfection of the creature. But it is in vain that some name is predicated of something, unless through that name we understand something of it.

If it be said that through those names we know of God only that he is not for instance, that he is said to be living because he is not of the genus of inanimate things it will at least be necessary that living, said of God and creatures, agree in the negation of the inanimate. And thus it will not be purely equivocal.

It should be noted that some have said, as Saint Thomas recounts in the First Part, question 13, article 2, and On the Power of God, question 7, article 5, that names said of God are said of him by way of negation as living because he is not inanimate, and so for the rest. But this is rejected in those places: both because in this way every name would be said formally of God, since there is no name through which some mode that does not befit God is not removed; and because, since every negation is proved through an affirmative, the intellect could not deny anything of God unless it first knew something of him affirmatively. This position, then, is not accepted by Saint Thomas here; but, even granting it, he wishes to maintain that names are not said purely equivocally of God and creatures.

Chapter XXXIV

That the Things Said of God and Creatures Are Said Analogically

Thus, then, it is left from what has been said that the things which are said of God and other things are predicated neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically that is, according to an order or relation to some one thing. This indeed happens in two ways. In one way, according as many things have a relation to some one thing: just as, according to a relation to one health, an animal is said to be healthy as its subject, medicine as its effective cause, food as its preservative, urine as its sign. In another way, according as the order or relation of two things is observed, not to some other thing, but to one of themselves: just as being is said of substance and accident according as accident has a relation to substance, not according as substance and accident are referred to some third thing. Names of this kind, then, said of God and other things, are not said analogically according to the first mode for it would then be necessary to posit something prior to God but according to the second mode. In this analogical predication, however, the order is sometimes the same according to the name and according to the thing, and sometimes not the same. For the order of the name follows the order of knowledge, since it is a sign of an intelligible conception. When, then, that which is prior according to the thing is also found to be prior according to knowledge, the same thing is found to be prior both according to the notion of the name and according to the nature of the thing: just as substance is prior to accident both in nature, inasmuch as substance is the cause of accident, and in knowledge, inasmuch as substance is placed in the definition of accident. And therefore being is said prior of substance than of accident, both according to the nature of the thing and according to the notion of the name. But when that which is prior according to nature is posterior according to knowledge, then in analogous things the order is not the same according to the thing and according to the notion of the name: just as the curative power, which is in things that produce health, is prior by nature to the health which is in the animal, as cause to effect; but because we know this power through its effect, we therefore also name it from the effect. And hence it is that healthful is prior in the order of the thing, but the animal is said to be healthy by priority according to the notion of the name. Thus, then, because we arrive at knowledge of God from other things, the reality of the names said of God and other things

belongs to God by priority according to his own mode, but the notion of the name belongs to him posteriorly. Hence he is also said to be named from his effects.

[Ferrara's Commentary]

From the foregoing there is left a third affirmative conclusion, namely: the things said of God and other things are predicated analogically that is, according to an order or relation to some one thing. This conclusion, however, he proves only from a sufficient division. For either they are said univocally, or equivocally, or analogically. Not univocally nor equivocally, as has been shown above. Therefore analogically.

I. He explains, moreover, two things. The first is how such names are said analogically. The second is how the prior name belongs to God. He explains the first by a certain division. For things are said analogically, or according to a relation to some one thing, in two ways. In one way, according as several things have a relation to some one third thing: just as animal, medicine, food, and urine are said to be healthy in relation to one health, which is the animal's. In another way, according as the order of one to the other is observed: just as being is said of substance and accident according as accident has a relation to substance. Names, then, said analogically of God, are not said according to the first mode, since it would be necessary to posit something prior to God; but according to the second mode.

As to the second point, he notes that the order namely, of prior and posterior in a name is sometimes the same according to the thing and according to the name, because, namely, the thing is prior both according to nature and according to the notion of the name; but sometimes it is not the same. For when that which is prior according to the thing is also prior in our knowledge, then the same thing is prior both according to the thing and according to the notion of the name, since the order of the name follows the order of knowledge, as a sign of intellectual conception: just as substance is prior by nature to accident as its cause, and prior in knowledge inasmuch as it is placed in its definition; therefore being is said prior of substance, both according to the thing and according to the notion of the name. But when that which is prior according to nature is posterior in knowledge, then the order is not the same according to the thing and according to the notion of the name: just as, although the curative power is prior to the health of the animal according to the thing, as its cause, yet because it is known from its effect, healthy is said prior, according to the

notion of the name, of the animal than of the curative thing. Similarly, then, because we know God from other things, the reality signified by the name belongs by priority to God according to his own mode that is, that reality is prior in God than in the creature, because it is the cause of that which is in the creature; but the notion of the name is posterior. Hence he is also said to be named from his caused effects: because the concept imported by the name, which is the concept of the creature, is prior to the concept of God, or the concept of the divine perfection, imported through the same name.

II. Concerning what has been said that the reality of the names of God and other things is prior in God it should be noted that, since such names do not signify one nature common to God and creature (for then they would be univocal), but immediately signify the perfection of God and the perfection of the creature, the perfection which is in God is according to itself prior to the perfection which is in the creature, just as a cause is naturally prior to its effect. And therefore it is said that the reality of the names that is, that which is signified through the names is prior in God: because, namely, that perfection signified by the name which is in God is, of those found in creatures, prior and more perfect. Concerning that proposition, Substance is prior in knowledge to accident, it should be noted that this is understood of intellective quidditative knowledge. This is clear from the reasoning adduced, because substance is placed in its definition, as has been said above. It is also understood of its knowledge by which it is known insofar as it is being. For the reality imported by the name of being, according as it is said of substance, is prior in nature and perfection than the reality imported by the same name according as it is said of accident. Likewise that reality is known by the intellect prior to the reality of accident itself, since, as has been said in chapter 32, substance is placed in the definition of accident according as it is being. Concerning this diversity of analogy, it should be considered that there is implicitly touched, among those modes, this difference: that in the first mode of analogy there is something prior to both analogates, namely that to which they have attribution and relation; in the second mode, however, there is nothing prior to all the analogates, but one of them is prior to the other.

III. Concerning the foregoing, a threefold doubt arises. The first is against the argument by which it is proved that the first mode of analogy does not belong to God: namely, that something would be prior to God. Either it is understood of priority according to the thing, or of priority according to the notion of the name. If the first, the consequence does not hold: because, as appears in the example given, health, to which all things are said to be healthy, is not prior according to the thing,

but the curative power, which is medicine, is prior to it, as is said here. If the second, it is no incongruity that something be prior to God, as is also said here.

The second is against the mode of analogy here attributed to the divine names. For Saint Thomas seems to hold the opposite in On Truth, question 2, article 11. There he holds that the analogy belonging to God and creatures is not according to the agreement and proportion of one to another, but according to a certain proportionality.

The third is against the mode of priority and posteriority according to the notion of the name. For in the First Part, question 3, article 5, in the argument to the contrary, it is said that nothing is prior to God either according to the thing or according to the intellect. Therefore the name is not said of God posteriorly according to the notion of the name. The opposite of which is said here.

IV. To the first of these it is said that it is understood of priority according to the thing. For this, one should consider that in the first mode of analogy, sometimes, as to the formal and proper signification of the name, an intrinsic denomination occurs only in one namely, in that one by comparison to which the others are called such analogically, because the signification of the name is in that one alone formally, while in the others it is not formally, but they are said to be such extrinsically, namely by relation to that one. Sometimes, however, the formal signification belongs also to the others, and consequently all are said to be intrinsically such. Thus health, imported by the name healthy, is found only in the animal, and therefore the animal is intrinsically denominated healthy; but in medicine and food it is not found, but they are said to be healthy extrinsically from a relation to the health of the animal. Being, however, is found formally in substance, in quality, and in quantity. In both modes, then, it is true that something is prior according to the thing to both of those which are said analogically in relation to a third. For healthy is said prior according to the thing of the animal than of medicine and food: because in the animal there is the very reality of health, whereas in these there is only the relation to it; and the reality is naturally prior to the relation that bears upon it.

Likewise being is said prior according to the thing of substance than of quantity and quality, which are said to be beings in relation to it: for the nature of entity is naturally prior and more perfect in substance than in quality and quantity, because the very entity of substance, signified primarily and

formally by the name of being, is nothing other than substance itself, which is naturally prior to accident.

It is denied, then, that healthy does not belong prior according to the thing to the animal than to other things. To the proof it is said that, although the curative power is naturally prior to the health of the animal, it is nevertheless not formally and primarily imported by the name healthy, but only the health of the animal. We are speaking here, however, of the reality formally and primarily imported by the analogous name.

V. But against this it seems to stand that Saint Thomas, wishing to show that the order of the thing is not the same as the order of the name, wills that the name healthy, as to the notion of the name, belongs prior to the animal, but as to the thing signified, belongs prior to the curative thing.

It is said that Saint Thomas is not speaking of the formal and primary signification of healthy, of which we have spoken, but of the material signification, and of the foundation of the relation to health. For the curative power is not signified formally by the name healthy, but materially. Hence he meant to say that healthy, as said of the curative thing, is said of a reality prior by nature: for the curative power is prior to health. But because that reality is signified not formally, but only materially, as the foundation of the relation to the health of the animal, therefore healthy, said of the animal and of the curative thing, as to the foundation by which the curative thing comes to be signified by the name healthy through a relation to the health of the animal, is said according to the thing prior of the curative thing than of the animal: because, namely, the curative power is naturally prior to health, just as a cause is to its effect. And this sufficed for the purpose of Saint Thomas, who wished to show that the order according to the thing, with respect to every reality imported, is not always the same as the order of the name. With this, however, it is consistent that, with respect to the formal significates alone, that which is said of the animal is also said prior according to the thing. For that which is said of the animal signifies the very form of health; that which is said of the others signifies the relation to it. It is established, however, that the reality itself is naturally prior to the relation to it.

2. One could respond, secondly, that the name healthy can be analogous in two ways, considered diversely. For if it is taken according to its proper, formal, and primary signification, which on the side of the thing is one, then it pertains to the first mode of analogy. And thus, not only according

to the notion of the name and its imposition, but also according to the thing signified, it belongs prior to the animal than to the others; and the others, insofar as they are healthy, have something prior to themselves according to the thing, namely the health of the animal: for the animal has that health itself, whereas the others have only a relation to it. If, however, it is taken as primarily signifying, on the side of the thing, several things namely, both the due proportion of the humors itself, which is its proper signification, from which medicine is extrinsically called healthy, and the curative power, according to which medicine is called healthy intrinsically and formally, though improperly then it pertains to the second mode of analogy, and is said prior according to the thing of medicine than of the animal, although according to the notion of the name it is the reverse, inasmuch as we first formed the concept under which it signifies the proportion of the humors, before the concept under which it signifies the curative power. Nor is it incongruous that Saint Thomas use the same name diversely for an example: for he does this to show that the same name, taken in diverse ways, can belong to diverse modes of analogy. Hence also in the Quaestiones de Potentia Dei, question 7, article 7, to show both modes of analogy, he gives an example from the name of being, according as it is considered diversely.

VI. It should be noted, since we have said that the formal and proper signification of an analogous name is sometimes found in one alone, sometimes in all, that this is not contrary to what is said in the First Part, question 16, article 6, where Saint Thomas seems to wish that in all analogues the name according to its proper notion is found in one alone, from which the others are denominated. For by proper notion we can understand two things: namely, the notion or nature imported primarily and principally, by comparison to which the others are said to be such for this is called the proper notion of the name, because it is imported primarily and principally; and the analogous name, said absolutely, is taken for that signified, as is said in On Interpretation I, just as the name of being, said absolutely, is taken for substance or every notion formally imported by the name. In the first way Saint Thomas speaks in the First Part: for it is certain that the primary signification of an analogous name is found in one analogate only, namely the first. In the second way, however, we have spoken here. And it is the mind of Saint Thomas, Book I, distinction 19, question 5, article 2, reply to the first: for it is established that the name being states, in its formal signification, something existing in substance and in accident, which is one analogically, as will be shown below. And similarly it is with the names that are said analogically of God and creatures.

It can also be said that Saint Thomas does not there take the analogous in its whole commonness and universally, but only for that analogous which, according to what is said immediately, is said

from one or to one. For this served his purpose, since the truth of which he was speaking there is said analogically of the intellect and of things in this manner. We, however, have spoken universally of the analogous. For if it is taken universally, it is established that some is found in one alone according to its formal signification, while some is found in all.

VII. For the clarification of the second doubt, one must know that analogy is a Greek term, and is taken differently by the Greeks and by certain Latins. The Greeks, as is clear from Ammonius and Simplicius in their exposition of the definition of equivocals given by Aristotle in the Antepredicaments, divide equivocals by design into those that are said from one, as from the art of medicine is called a certain medical book and a certain medical instrument; and those that are said to one, as healthy is said of medicine and food in relation to the health of the animal; and those that are analogous, and they say those things are analogous which are one by proportion, among which, namely, there is a certain proportionality. Hence Ammonius says that analogy is considered in at least four terms: just as the foot of a man and the foot of a couch are called foot analogically; for the proportion that the foot of a man has to a man, the same proportion the foot of a couch has to a couch.

According to their proper signification, then, analogous things are said to be proportional that is, having between them a likeness of proportion. And an analogous name is said to be that which signifies several things as they are proportional: just as foot is said of the foot of a man and of a couch, and sight of bodily sight and of the intellect, and principle of the heart and of the foundation of a house. In this signification Aristotle uses the name analogous, as is clear in Metaphysics V, the chapter on the One, and in Ethics I, chapter 7. By certain Latins, however, analogous is taken for every name importing several things according to some relation, either to one or among themselves both those that are from one and to one, and all the proportionals calling all these absolutely analogous, which are properly called equivocals by design. Hence much confusion arises in the knowledge of analogues. Saint Thomas, therefore, in the Quaestiones de Veritate, considering the true notion of analogy, and that the names said of God and creatures are truly said analogically, said that between God and creature there is an analogy of proportionality, not of proportion, which is rather called equivocation by design, from one or to one, than analogical signification.

2. One should know further that the analogy which is of one to another, in the common and usual signification among the Latins, taking analogy thus, can be taken in two ways: in one way, as it is

distinguished against the analogy of two to some third; in another way, as it is distinguished against the analogy of proportionality. For the analogy of one to another, divided against the analogy of two to a third, is taken as a certain common thing, and is divided into the analogy of proportion and the analogy of proportionality. The analogy of proportion states a certain determinate distance and relation of one to another, according as they are signified by some name; the analogy of proportionality, however, does not state a certain and determinate relation or habitude to another absolutely, but a likeness or proportion of proportion of two to two others, such that between the things analogated there is not absolute likeness, but between their proportions to certain things. Such analogy can be found both in things much and in things little distant, as is said in On Truth, in the place cited, reply to the fourth: for there is no greater likeness of proportions between two and one and six and three, than between two and one and a hundred and fifty. Sometimes, however, the analogy of proportion, because it is only between the analogated things themselves between each other, is absolutely signified by a name common to the analogy of proportion and of proportionality as by its own name, such that it is called the analogy of one to another. And thus the analogy of one to another is distinguished against the analogy of proportionality, just as is the analogy of proportion although the same thing is signified by this name analogy of one to another, and by this name analogy of proportion.

If, then, the analogy of one to another is taken in the first way, then there is between God and creature an analogy of one to another: because it is according to a comparison of God and creature to each other, and not according to a comparison of God and creature to some third thing of which the analogous name is said by priority than of them. And it is taken thus here, and in the First Part, and in the Quaestiones de Potentia, when it is said that this is an analogy of one to another. If, however, it is taken in the second way, then it is not an analogy of one to another: because there is no determinate distance and relation between God and creature, such that, namely, from the one the other could be comprehended and terminated by the intellect. And it is in this sense that he means it in the Quaestiones de Veritate, when he says that this is not an analogy of one to another. Hence there is no contradiction. For he does not deny that this is an analogy of one to another absolutely, but one which states a determinate distance or a determinate relation to the other.

VIII. But this solution does not seem to be the mind of Saint Thomas. For when he speaks of the analogy of God to creature, he speaks of that in which the prior is placed in the definition of the posterior, just as substance is placed in the definition of accident, as is clear in chapter 32, in the sixth argument. Such, however, is the analogy according to proportion, which is distinguished

against the analogy of proportionality, as is clear from On Truth, the same question and article, reply to the sixth. If, then, he denies in the Quaestiones de Veritate that this is an analogy of one to another, there is a contradiction in his statements.

It is responded, first, in conformity with what has been said above, that in the analogy of proportion, in which a determinate distance and relation of one to another is observed, the prior is placed in the definition of the posterior: because the posteriors import a certain relation to the first, just as medicine is said to be healthy in relation to the health of the animal, and accident is said to be being in relation to substance. For the name in those cases was imposed on the posteriors to signify either formally a relation to the other, as healthy of medicine, or a thing with an order to another, as being said of accident signifies accident in relation to substance, not indeed as to a correlative, but as to a subject. In the analogy of proportionality, however, the prior is not necessarily placed in the definition of the posterior, speaking of those names which formally and properly belong to the prior and the posterior because of those things which are properly said of one and metaphorically of the other, there is another account, as is clear in the First Part, question 13, article 6. For in such things as are formally said of both according to proportionality, it is not necessary that the one signify formally a relation to the other, although it may fundamentally signify something whereby a likeness of proportions is observed between them, and from this agreement the same name is imposed on both: just as, when foot is said of the foot of a couch, it does not signify a relation to the foot of a man, although it signifies something in which there is agreement with the foot of a man, and from the one the name is imposed on the other.

Therefore what Saint Thomas says in chapter 32 that the prior is placed in the definition of the posterior and in the First Part, question 13, article 6 that in all names said analogically, it is necessary that all be said in relation to one, and therefore that one must be placed in the definition of all must be understood of all analogues that are said either in relation to some third thing, or that have between themselves the analogy that is called of proportion; not, however, of analogues by the analogy of proportionality, as is said in the question of On Truth cited above.

As for that argument adduced from chapter 32, it can be said that from it one does not have that the names said of God and creature analogically are of the number of those analogues in which the prior is placed in the definition of the posterior; but, since Saint Thomas wished to show that they are not said univocally, he assumed that they are said according to prior and posterior, and that such cannot indeed be univocal which he showed in those things manifest to us, which are

analogous according to proportion, in which the one is placed in the definition of the other, from which it appears that that name does not state altogether the same notion; leaving from this all the more that, in other things which are said only according to proportionality, diverse notions must be imported according to prior and posterior, since those significates have a greater distance than the significates analogous according to proportion, and are therefore more alien from the notion of the univocal.

IX. One could respond, secondly, and better, in my judgment, to the mind of Saint Thomas, that in every mode of analogy it is true that the prior is placed in the definition of the posterior, insofar as it is considered and signified analogically. For the clarification of this, one must consider that one must speak otherwise of analogues where the order of the imposition of the name is proportioned to the order of the things formally signified, and otherwise where the order of the imposition of the name does not follow the order of the thing signified. For where the same order is preserved, the name is not said of the posterior except in relation to the prior: because the posterior is not understood except in relation to it itself. But because, where one thing is conceived in relation to another and is signified with such an order, it is necessary that that to which it states a relation be placed in its definition according as it is signified by such a name, whenever such a name is said of it, it is said with respect to the first analogate, which is placed in its definition. Thus it is clear in those things formally signified by the name healthy: for the intellect does not conceive medicine as healthy except inasmuch as it apprehends it to be causative of the health of the animal, nor does it signify it by the name healthy except by formally importing a relation of cause to the health of the animal; therefore in the definition of healthy said of medicine is placed healthy said of the animal, and this name healthy is never said of it except with relation to the health of the animal.

Where, however, the order of the imposition of the name is contrary to the order of the thing, the name first imposed on what is posterior according to the thing is said of it in two ways: namely, absolutely, and analogically or proportionally. For the intellect first considered that posterior thing absolutely, and imposed a name on it by means of an absolute concept. Then, through inquiry, it arrived at the knowledge of that which is the first analogate according to the thing, and attributed to it the name that had been imposed on the posterior. And, knowing that the posterior has a relation to the prior, it signifies such a relation by the same name through a certain third imposition; and the name which it had first imposed to signify the thing absolutely, it then imposes to signify that same thing in order and relation to the other. And thus, since it has imposed that name also on the prior, it takes the name as said analogically of both. From which it results that

sometimes such a name is taken as signifying one thing simply, on account of the first imposition; sometimes, however, as stating several things analogically and according to a relation of one to another, on account of the last imposition. And in the definition of that name as it is said absolutely, according to the first imposition, the first analogate is not placed; but it is indeed placed in its notion as it is predicated analogically of those several things for thus the name which was first imposed on the thing absolutely is imposed posteriorly on it as said analogically. Just as, if the name of being had first been imposed to signify the nature of accident without order to substance, namely insofar as it has existence absolutely; then, it being known that to have existence belongs in a more noble way. accident, it would be an imposition of the substance itself; thirdly, because the known [thing] that is not convenient to be predicated thus in substance, is placed to signify according to an order of substance, and analogically to another it signifies that essence: this name is not one, according to what is said of substance, it is not placed in the definition of the other as is said of an accident, but according to a second imposition; but whether analogically, according to a second imposition, it is said. Thus it is of all divine names which properly and analogically are said of God and creatures. For this name wisdom, according to its first imposition, is placed to signify human wisdom absolutely, and as it is primarily known; from this, the name is extended to the divine wisdom as exemplified [by it], which is placed to signify divine wisdom; so the second imposition is to signify divine wisdom in a human manner, according to which we understand divine wisdom through the cause and exemplar, and it is accepted as a common name of the analogical and the proportioned. And it is similar with other divine names. According to the first imposition, the name of the analogate is not placed in the definition of the other: because it is not accepted then as an analogical name, but as univocal. According to the second, however, as it is taken analogically, it happens that in the second imposition, the perfection of the divine is placed in the definition of the perfection of the creature signified by the same name.

But that this is the mind of Saint Thomas, *1 Sent., in Prolog., a. 2, ad 2*, where he says that the analogy of the creature to the Creator is from this: that one thing is from another and is received from another: because the creature does not have essence except as it descends from the first essence, nor is it named essence except as it imitates the first essence. And he joins this similarly to the case of wisdom and all other things said of God and creatures.

Secondly, this is the sense of Saint Thomas, here and in the *Prima, q. xiii, a. 6 and 10*, where in all analogies, namely those that are from many to one, or from one to another, the primary analogate is placed in the definition of the others. This second sense is also verified in Saint Thomas, *Prima, q. xiii, a. 5*, where he says that whatever is said of God and creatures is said according to some order of the creature to God as its principle and cause: it is understood according to the second sense of the

analogical. Nor does what Saint Thomas says in the *Questions on Truth, XI, art. xi* stand in the way: that this proposition [of ours] has truth in the analogy of attribution. For his sense is that in the analogy of attribution, the primary analogate to which it is absolutely imposed is not placed in the definition of the others, because a certain determined distance and relationship is required, through which he can lead the knowledge of the others insofar as they are signified by that name. However, this is not true universally in the analogy of proportionality: because the primary [analogate] to whom the name is first given, as such, does not have a determined relationship to the others for the sake of proportionality, nor is it necessary that it lead into a perfect and quidditative knowledge of the others. But this still stands: that in all analogies, however accepted, the primary analogate is always placed in the definition of the others: namely, that for which the name was first imposed; and it is from this that the secondary name is imposed. In divine names, first the name is imposed on the creature, according to a second imposition of the name, it is placed in the definition of the others insofar as they are analogical: just as the man who is analogically called wise, who has a certain participation according to divine wisdom; and so of others.

X. To the third doubt, it is said that this is the order of conceiving according to which our intellect follows time rather than the priority of the things themselves. For it understands from the priority of the thing itself through its simplicity. Whence it is not a contradiction. How then can it be that it is not possible to be simpler than according to the second imposition, as noted above.

XI. Other difficulties which arise around the names of the analogical, if you wish to understand more fully, see the most ingenious work On the Nominum Analogia by the Reverend Thomas Cajetan, Cardinal of Pope Sixtus. However, I think it is worthwhile to investigate one point in this place: How do these names of God and creatures, if they are analogical, not say one concept? For they create a great difficulty for the doctrine of Saint Thomas.

For sometimes he seems to say that names of this sort do not have one ratio [concept], but many: as in *Prima, q. xiii, a. 5*; and in *Qq. de Potentia, vii, a. 7*, *Verit., q. ii, a. 11*, and in many other places mentioned above. At other times, he seems to say that there is one concept: as in *Verit., q. ii, a. 1*, where he says it is necessary to place some unity in the concept of names of this sort. Item, *1 Sent., d. xix, q. v, a. 2, ad 1*, where he says that some things are said analogically of God and creatures according to intention and nature: from which it seems that there is not only one important intention, but also one nature. It is confirmed: because when we say *God is wise* and *this man is wise*, this name "wise" is not taken as a vacuum, according to Saint Thomas, but as something which is in creatures, even though the same ratio is attributed to the creator; even though it represents the divine perfection imperfectly. Whence and superior *dist. ii* he says names which are

absolute perfections say some defect of God's part: which is understood with respect to the concept of the ratio of the things that say defect.

XII. To clarify this difficulty, there is the Thomistic sentence. They think therefore, because of what has been brought forth, and similarly all analogical things said of God and creatures, they say one formal concept of the thing itself, which conceptually is one from the concepts of others, even if it does not say one objective and precise concept, but only an analogical one. But others say that it is not to say one concept adequate to the concepts of inferiors, just as there is no objective unity: but, just as these things are united in a certain proportion, so all mental concepts are united according to proportionality.

XIII. This second opinion seems more true to me, and more conforming to the doctrine of the philosophers and Saint Thomas. For the sake of whose intelligence we must consider, that what is quidditatively and essentially predicated of things, is predicated of the concept of the thing itself: for the concept of the thing is the concept of that which the thing is. Therefore, a concept of a thing can be considered in two ways: one, according to the concept of the name, and this is imperfect and inadequate. This concept is perfect and adequate, but not according to the proportion of the predication, but according to the presentation, namely not only of all things which are predicated, but also perfectly and naturally represents the thing itself through which it is signified.

Therefore, if from the first concept of the wise, those who say they do not have one mental concept, as in the first concept, it is moved against them by the first, because they do not have one concept that is univocal. To the reason of unity, it is said according to the definition of Aristotle in the *Praedicamentis*, that it is placed where a name is given to many things according to the same ratio. For when the ratio is taken from the definition, it is of the concept of the mind, and not from the nature or objective concept, according to Simplicius and Ammonius in the *Praedicamentis* saying that the ratio is taken from the definition: for the definition is the description of the oration, and consequently the first is in the mind. It is clear in the second, where Saint Thomas says that names are not synonymous, but inferior, as in *Prima, q. xiii, a. 4*, and *I Sent., dist. ii, quest. ii, art. 2*, he shows that names which signify one and the same thing, but through different ratios, are not synonyms. And explaining the word "ratio," he says: *that which the name signifies, is the concept which the intellect forms of the thing signified by the name.* And so, following the treatise *De Divinis Nominibus* He never expresses any other meaning than the ratio of the name, even where it is used equivocally. From this it appears that, to speak of univocation, the following are required: a concept of the mind which is one, and a thing represented by that concept which is one.

It is clear, therefore, that the name substance does not have a single general ratio (concept) that is equally applicable to all genera of substance; rather, in various genera, it implies a certain nature which underlies the intention of universality, but it does not represent it uniformly according to what it is in itself. For substance is not a single underlying reality (subject), but there are many different substances. Yet, the intellect, from various things, gathers a single intention and applies it to the concept of each nature from the intellect. And so, secondly, the agreement between material and immaterial things exists only in the concept of the intellect. Therefore, the name substance is not univocally predicated of material and immaterial things; otherwise, it would follow that they share a single genus. For only the unity of a mental concept does not suffice for the unity of a univocal name, as the Philosopher [Aristotle] says in the *Categories*. Arguments are brought against this conclusion from several sides, but they do not convince. For they argue first that, because God is understood through a concept, it follows that the name of that concept is univocal.

Secondly, because the ratio of the name is what is predicated of the things. But the concept of the mind is the predicate of the thing.

To the first, it is said that for the ratio of univocation it is not enough that there be any kind of unity; what is required is a unity that is formally and primarily signified by the name, so that there is no other ratio of the thing and it represents the thing as one according to that in which they agree. It is not so between God and creatures: for the concept of the mind representing God is different from the concept of the mind representing a creature; similarly, it is not only the concept of "animal" that represents man and horse, but only according to "animality" in which they agree, and not according to the differences by which they are distinguished. But the divine concept, through which He understands Himself and all other things, is the omni-encompassing concept and even the very being (esse) of God; it is not a concept of proportion, or exceeding; and thus it represents things not only according to that in which they are similar, but also according to all the conditions by which each thing is distinguished from others. Therefore, that concept is not one, which can be the basis for one ratio of a univocal name. Rather, it is said to be one because of the unity of the divine ratio according to which God understands, by which He understands all things uniquely.

To the second, it is said that the ratio of a name is one, or things are said to be univocal, when they coincide in the thing through identity, or fundamentally: for in all univocals there is a basis for the ratio of the name. Whence, when a univocal name is predicated of univocals, it is not predicated according to the concept itself, but according to that in which the concept is founded, which is signified through the concept.

By this, I do not intend to exclude another unity besides the unity of the mental concept for the name of God and creature. For I intend that the unity of the concept of the mental name follows some unity of the thing: but this is not the unity of a genus or a species, but a unity of proportion; just as the unity of the mental concept follows some other unity of things in univocal predication.

XIV. Fourthly, it moves what was said above: Saint Thomas said in the definition of accidents that they belong to being (ens). For it is also a saying of Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, text 2 and 3: "Every concept of being is not a practice but a concept of substance and accident." It follows from the sequence. Because, if it were to be understood without precision, nothing in the definition of accidents would be placed in the definition of substance; just as it is not the case that being is in the definition of man, or of lower things, nor vice versa. Therefore, it is much more necessary that we say there is a precise concept of the name "God" and "creature": for between God and creature there is a greater distance than between substance and accident.

XV. It follows from what was said above: in saying, as Thomas does, that it is not possible to say "God" and "creature" according to the same ratio, he means that being (ens) in *Metaphysics* V, q. 5, a. 5, is said to be in "analogy," not that there is one ratio in univocals, but it is entirely diverse in equivocals; it signifies diverse proportions to something one.

XVI. If we speak of an imperfect and inadequate concept of the name, it is not inconvenient to say that one mental concept of all is common, just as those which are similar are one. But it is inconvenient that a concept abstracting from something imperfect, which does not represent the nature of the similarity perfectly, should be that which the name signifies.

Where it must be considered that there are some names which are distinguished from univocals, when the concept of the mind is one and precise, even if it represents the thing imperfectly and conveniently; and the concept of the name perfectly represents the similarity of those things; just as the concept of "animal" represents the nature of animals in man, for he is assimilated to it; because nothing else is in the animal, such as animal itself, as it is in the horse; but in man it is man, and in the horse it is horse. Thus, the concept of animal does not represent the fundamental similarity in the name of analogy signified primarily and per se, but it agrees with it through a precise concept. From this it is clear: considering some thing to be "being per se" (esse per se), and another thing "being in another" (esse in alio), and similar things in their being, although each thing has its own foundation, the common concept formed in the mind is of the sort that it is being (esse), because both are being; but this concept is not perfect and adequate to each being, but only imperfect and inadequate. Because what is placed in the definition of an accident insofar as it is being, is placed

substantively, as Saint Thomas and Aristotle say; and this is significant: because that which is an accident according to its own nature follows from the ratio. And it is similar in other analogies.

Therefore, it is said that there is not one precise and adequate mental concept representing the thing signified by the name of substance, quality, and others; but there is a similarity and proportion: just as it is per se between all natures immediately signified by the proportions of those and the similar respects of themselves. And in this it differs from the univocal concept: because the univocal concept is not many concepts but one unique concept according to the proportion of things, or simply one; and it is primarily signified, so that it is univocal. But we say that this concept of "being" is imperfect and inadequate for all things, and it represents that they are similar. And on this point Saint Thomas says: "all these concepts are resolved into one and simplified; and it is most simple."

What he says later in the same place about the intention and nature of the common, he means about the community of analogy. Because the essence of substance is the entity and nature signified by the name of being, and similarly for quality and others. And they agree in the intention of commonality which is founded in them. And there is a nature of proportion and similarity. And because the ratio of being (ens) for substance is per se the ratio of accident, and the ratio of substance is included in the ratio of accident according to what it is, the idea of being is said to be "prior" and "posterior" (secundum prius et posterius).

XVI. What is said of being (ens) must be understood similarly of all names belonging to God and creature analogically, as they belong to this unity or multiplicity. The name "Wisdom" primarily signifies the wisdom of God and secondarily the wisdom of creatures, having a certain similarity and proportion, according to what another example shows: Just as in our wisdom a creature, in its own way, considers the same causes through its own wisdom. Similarly, the diverse mental concepts which are proper to any of the analogs would require an adequate [concept], if we were able to conceive of the divine wisdom itself according to what it is in itself. But because we cannot do this, we form one concept adequate to the creature, but we form another of God proportionally to the concept of the creature, which [concept] is inadequate to Him.

And further, because of the similarity of the concept of our wisdom to the concept of divine wisdom, we form one common concept of wisdom suitable to the divine and the human, but imperfect and inadequate to both, in which each wisdom is assimilated. And thus a name said in such a way signifies one concept, inadequate and imperfect, not perfectly expressing the divine wisdom insofar as it is wisdom, but representing both wisdoms as they are similar.

However, one precise, perfect, and adequate concept of the analogs is not expressed. Whence, when "wise" is predicated of God, its concept, as it is predicated of Him adequately, is not other than the concept proper to the divine wisdom: just as, when it is predicated of man, its concept is not other than the concept of human wisdom. Whence the *Prima [Pars]*, question 13, article 5, Saint Thomas says that, "since this name 'wise' is said of man, it signifies some perfection distinct from the essence of man and from his power and from his being; and from all things of this kind: but when we say this name of God, we do not intend to signify something distinct from the essence or power or being of Him. But the truth is that the name 'wise' does not say the divine wisdom itself except as one proportionally with created wisdom: the name, however, 'divine wisdom,' signifies it absolutely and according to one simple reason."

Because the same reality, as founding the similarity and proportional agreement, is signified by an analogical name; but as it founds the distance and dissimilarity, it is signified by a proper name. Therefore, an analogical name is said to signify one [thing] by proportion: for all the analogs are one, and they all have one concept, the same in similarity and proportion; and thus the concept of one is the concept of the other proportionally.